


















































“An original argument, based on vanguard state 
theory… A very original and superb piece of 
scholarship.” 
Andrew Tan, Macquarie University
Examining how the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 
responded to external threats over 
the past 50 years, this book provides 
a compelling account of regional 
state actions and foreign policy in the 
face of potential sovereignty violation.
The author draws on a large amount 
of previously unanalysed material, 
including declassified government 
documents and WikiLeaks cables, to 
examine four key cases since 1975. 
Taking into account state interests 
and the role of external powers, 
the author develops the ‘vanguard 
state theory’ to explain ASEAN state 
responses to sovereignty violation, 
which, it is argued, has universal 
applicability and explanatory power.
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Introduction: ASEAN and 
the Vanguard State
Small countries have little power to alter the region, 
let alone the world. A small country must seek a 
maximum number of friends, while maintaining the 
freedom to be itself as a sovereign and independent 
nation. Both parts of the equation – a maximum 
number of friends and freedom to be ourselves 
– are equally important and interrelated.
Lee Kuan Yew, former Prime Minister of Singapore1
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is a regional 
institution founded in 1967 by the states of Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Growing to include Brunei 
in 1984, Vietnam in July 1995, Laos and Myanmar in July 1997, 
and Cambodia in April 1999, the institution has repeatedly defied 
expectations. Born out of the remnants of the Association of Southeast 
Asia (ASA) (1961–1967), a precursor regional institution frustrated by 
member state inability to overcome national and bloc interests,2 there 
was initially little hope that ASEAN would succeed where the ASA 
had failed. Yet ASEAN has transformed itself into arguably the most 
successful regional institution outside of Europe. This is particularly 
noteworthy in light of Southeast Asia’s history of colonization and 
intervention, and the cultural, social, economic and political diversity 
that characterizes ASEAN’s constitution.
ASEAN’s Cold War origins
What are the reasons for ASEAN’s conception in 1967? And how has 
this dictated ASEAN’s policy and direction in the decades since its 
establishment? To understand the origins of ASEAN, an understanding 
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of the history of the Southeast Asian region is crucial. The states 
that comprise the region understood as Southeast Asia are incredibly 
politically, socially, and culturally diverse, home to a variety of different 
ethnic and religious communities. This diversity created barriers between 
the different states in the region, with communication and cooperation 
historically difficult to initiate and sustain.3 So much so, that it was not 
until the Pacific War that the term ‘Southeast Asia’ entered common 
usage, when Western allies established a Southeast Asia Command 
(SEAC) to fight Japanese imperialism in 1943.4 This conflict coincided 
with the struggle of a number of regional states for independence 
from colonial rule. European powers first colonized the region in the 
16th century, with only Thailand spared to act as a buffer state between 
British and French colonies.5 As a result of colonization, divisions between 
the countries were exacerbated, and each state’s internal sociocultural 
dynamics inexorably altered. Nationalism was expressed in the form of 
armed struggles in Indonesia against the Dutch, and in Vietnam against 
the French. Between 1946 and the establishment of ASEAN in 1967, the 
majority of the region’s states had gained their independence.
ASEAN is a product of this history and the colonial origins and 
legacies of its member states. As noted by Narine, ‘the experience of 
colonialism deeply affected how the states of Southeast Asia perceived 
the regional environment’.6 External states, particularly great powers, 
were viewed as interventionist and exploitative, and their motives 
regarded with suspicion. The advent of superpower rivalry between 
the United States (US), the Soviet Union and China solidified these 
views. By 1967, the international system was gripped by Cold War. 
Once again, the Southeast Asian region was divided, this time along 
ideological and political lines. Nowhere was this more apparent than 
in Vietnam, where a proxy conflict was waged between communist 
and anti-communist forces. Early attempts at establishing a regional 
organization in Southeast Asia proved unsuccessful. The Southeast 
Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), formed in 1954, acted as a 
vehicle for external interests and lacked regional inclusivity. More 
inclusive organizations, such as the ASA, fell victim to regional state 
disputes. From 1962 to 1966, disagreements and conflicts between 
the region’s states had hamstrung any efforts at cooperation. These 
disputes largely centred upon the proposed amalgamation of Malaya, 
Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah into the Federation of Malaysia. Both 
the Philippines and Indonesia refused to recognize the new Federation. 
The Philippines disputed the territorial claim of Sabah. Indonesia 
denounced the influence of Britain, which it viewed as ‘an imperial 
power imposing its will on Southeast Asia’.7
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As a result, Indonesia embarked on a violent four-year campaign 
of Konfrontasi, or confrontation, with the newly federated state of 
Malaysia, growing to include Singapore following its forced separation 
from the federation in 1965. The campaign was only ended in 1966, 
when a power struggle between Indonesia’s General Sukarno and 
General Suharto culminated in the latter successfully overthrowing 
the former’s regime. With the new Indonesian General keen to 
enhance regional stability and reassure neighbours of the country’s 
good intentions, the time seemed ripe for another attempt at regional 
cooperation. For the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, a major 
factor in their support for a new regional organization was suspicion 
concerning Indonesia’s potential regional ambitions. Through a new 
association, these states hoped to constrain Indonesia while offering 
protection for some of the smaller and more vulnerable regional states.
It is these events that paved the way for the establishment of ASEAN 
on 8 August 1967. Whilst the new Association was ostensibly ‘a by-
product of institutionalized regional reconciliation,’ there is little doubt 
that ‘security was uppermost in their minds … [if] not conspicuously 
addressed’.8 These security concerns were informed by the history 
of intervention in the region, weak domestic political structures 
vulnerable to insurgencies, separatism, and manipulation from external 
actors, and fear that US regional retrenchment might tip the balance of 
power in favour of the communist-controlled Soviet Union and North 
Vietnam. ASEAN’s founding fathers defined the Association’s aims in 
the 1967 Bangkok Declaration. These were to accelerate economic 
growth, social progress and cultural development in the region, to 
promote regional peace and stability through an abiding respect for 
the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter, to promote active 
collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of mutual interest, 
and to maintain close cooperation with similar existing regional 
organizations.9 The Declaration’s preamble refers to the Southeast 
Asian state’s determination ‘to ensure their stability from external 
interference in any form or manifestation’.10
Through ASEAN, the Southeast Asian states hoped to reduce 
intervention and military influence by external actors, foster regional 
state cooperation, and strengthen resilience against communist 
insurgencies.11 The Association’s unique organizational structure, 
referred to as the ‘ASEAN Way’, has been credited with helping 
to bring together the diverse states of Southeast Asia by providing 
a conducive and non-threatening environment in which to discuss 
regional challenges. This consists of a preference for informal, 
consensus-based decision-making within a loosely structured and non-
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legalistic institution. For Leifer, it is only through the establishment 
of ASEAN that a ‘conventional, if limited, coherence’ developed in 
Southeast Asia.12 Analysis of ASEAN’s Cold War regional role lends 
weight to this assessment. Between 1967 and 1991, the ASEAN states 
maintained a successful campaign to counter Vietnamese expansionism. 
These efforts took precedence over the pursuit of regional quarrels 
and bilateral state differences.
ASEAN’s post-Cold War relevance
If ASEAN was established to manage Indonesia’s regional ambitions 
and to strengthen the region against communist threat, why has it 
persisted beyond the Cold War environment in which it was established? 
Commitment to a post-Cold War regional order and deepening state 
cooperation has motivated the Southeast Asian states to expand ASEAN 
membership, and to promote its institutional model beyond the 
confines of the region. This has undoubtedly been driven by regional 
uncertainty over the future intentions of China. In view of China’s 
geographic proximity and history of intervention in Southeast Asia, 
the ASEAN states hoped a consolidated Southeast Asian regionalism 
would ‘strengthen the collective shield against China’.13 Inclusion of the 
former Soviet-proxy Vietnam into ASEAN in 1995, followed by Laos, 
Myanmar and Cambodia, represented an additional step towards this 
regional consolidation. For many observers of the region, ASEAN has 
since evolved into a credible regional and international actor. ASEAN’s 
supporters credit the Association with a major role in ending the Cold 
War in Southeast Asia; successfully integrating Indonesia into the 
Southeast Asian region; managing interstate regional conflicts; robust 
growth, driven in part by the liberalization and structural reforms 
of its smaller, developing states; and successfully exporting its model 
of regionalism beyond the region’s borders to enhance dialogue and 
cooperation with external states, as seen through initiatives such as 
the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). As summarized by Severino, 
‘ASEAN has achieved a certain degree of political solidarity, become a 
force for stability in the region, and managed to engage external powers 
constructively in Southeast Asian affairs’.14
ASEAN’s critics dispute these claims and question the Association’s 
coherence and relevance outside of the context of the Cold War. In 
this view, any successes have been overshadowed by the continued 
existence of territorial disputes between member-states; halting efforts 
at deeper economic integration; an ineffective and incoherent response 
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to the Asian financial crisis of 1997; an inability or unwillingness 
to respond to a number of humanitarian crises that have originated 
from within the region; and a failure to prevent external actors from 
intervening in the region and dividing the Association. The ASEAN 
Way’s emphasis on consensus ‘has meant that the politics of the lowest 
common denominator has tended to prevail and difficult problems have 
been avoided rather than confronted’.15 For Weatherbee, on ASEAN’s 
‘singularly important regional politics and security issues, rather than 
solidarity, there is disunion, and rather than common action, national 
self-interest determines policy choices’.16 This has been exacerbated 
by ASEAN expansion in the immediate post-Cold War period, and 
the inclusion of disparate states that each seek to pursue their own 
state interests.
ASEAN’s endurance since the end of the Cold War has precipitated 
an extensive and contentious debate. The degree to which the 
Association has achieved the aims codified in the Bangkok Declaration, 
and remained relevant in the contemporary international system, is 
contested. These debates hinge upon broader themes of state autonomy, 
regional order, and the role and purpose of regional organizations. 
As is argued here, these themes can be addressed alongside those of 
ASEAN’s origins and future, through deeper analysis of the Association 
and its responses to intervention.
Questioning ASEAN resistance to sovereignty 
violation
This book addresses this history of external interference in Southeast 
Asia, through analysis of the ability of regional states to resist 
sovereignty violation from external powers. It answers one central 
question: when has ASEAN state resistance to sovereignty violation 
succeeded, and when has it failed? In addressing this question, the 
book analyses past instances of (non)resistance to sovereignty violation, 
considers the degree to which the Association has realized its founding 
aim of stability from external intervention, and provides a predictive 
tool that can be used for future interactions between ASEAN member 
states and external states. Southeast Asia’s experience of intervention 
is still relevant today. The region remains of geopolitical importance 
for great powers, and future interventions cannot be ruled out. An 
understanding of the ways in which these regional states utilize state 
and institutional balancing and bargaining strategies to help defend 
state sovereignty and territorial integrity is therefore critical.
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ASEAN state preoccupation with resisting intervention and 
upholding state sovereignty cannot be overemphasized. ASEAN’s 1976 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia codifies 
a number of principles designed to structure relations within the 
institution, and with actors external to the region. These principles 
continue to dominate ASEAN’s practice. The TAC contains articles 
that refer to ASEAN’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-
interference in the internal affairs of member states, and the principle 
that ‘every state [has the right] to lead its national existence free 
from external interference, subversion or coercion’.17 It is important 
to note that this final principle is not unique to ASEAN. The UN 
Charter endorses this concept of sovereignty by confirming ‘the 
principle of the sovereign equality of all its members’.18 This article 
of the TAC is based on this conception of sovereignty, which stresses, 
‘territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic 
authority structures’.19 For many, the principle of non-intervention is 
the key element of sovereign statehood.20 Despite the centrality of the 
principle of sovereignty, it has often been contravened, with external 
actor intervention the most common form of sovereignty violation. 
Because powerful states often intervene in the internal affairs of less 
powerful states, the latter have always been the strongest supporters 
of the rule of non-intervention.21 The difficulty for small states lies in 
their ability to uphold this principle. This is something that this book 
addresses directly, through analysis of the different mechanisms for 
resistance available to ASEAN member states.
The book addresses a number of important questions pertaining 
to ASEAN, its characteristics, and its member state behaviour since 
inception. It considers the degree to which a group of small, vulnerable 
regional states are able to exercise autonomy, and continue to survive 
in an environment dominated by great powers. This includes an 
investigation into the potential role of ASEAN as an organization, 
both regionally and internationally, with a specific focus on ASEAN’s 
ability to uphold regional order, and engage in regional conflict and 
dispute resolution. The analysis brings to the fore the impact of state 
membership within the institution during times of conflict. Rather 
than view ASEAN as a monolithic entity, the book engages in a deeper 
assessment of the interaction and behavioural patterns of ASEAN 
member states during periods of regional and international crisis. This 
process unveils the complexities of regional state relationships, both 
internally and with external powers, in addition to inter-organizational 
power dynamics and the resulting impact that these have in dictating 
ASEAN policy.
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An introduction to existing ASEAN scholarship
ASEAN’s ability to resist sovereignty violation and defend regional 
autonomy from external intervention is contested within the existing 
ASEAN scholarship. Since the turn of the 21st century, the most 
prominent of these bodies of literature is that which is most closely 
aligned to the constructivist school of thought.22 Constructivist 
authors emphasize ASEAN state autonomy, the transformative power 
of ASEAN’s norms, the socializing impact that these norms have 
on member state identities and behaviours, and ASEAN’s ability to 
uphold regional order, even when directly challenged. Constructivist 
scholarly works employ a breadth of variables, ranging from norms 
to culture, identity and ideas, to understand and explain ASEAN’s 
ability to uphold sovereignty and resist intervention. The strengths of 
this argument lie in the desire to look beyond the impact of material 
forces to explain ASEAN’s deepening cooperation and resilience since 
the end of the Cold War.
Taking an alternative approach to that described above are works 
most closely aligned with realist theory.23 A realist approach to 
Southeast Asian regionalism is predicated on state centricity, the 
critical role of the US in maintaining a regional balance of power, 
and state concern with self-interest and zero-sum bargaining. Unlike 
the argument presented by the constructivists, these scholars take a less 
positive view of ASEAN autonomy. Instead, ASEAN’s ability to resist 
sovereignty violation is wholly contingent upon the actions of great 
powers. In their explicit challenge to constructivist theorizing, they 
have opened and widened the debate on Southeast Asian regionalism. 
The arguments these authors present are compelling. Rooted in 
material explanations and using structural variables, they provide a 
view of the Southeast Asian region that goes beyond the domestic 
level, to consider the influential role of great powers.
In a more recent addition to the literature, the critical theoretical 
approach emphasizes state contestation, the scope of political conflict, 
and the struggles between and within Southeast Asia’s social forces.24 
This critical approach to Southeast Asian regional order provides an 
alternative theoretical account that stands apart from the constructivist-
realist debate. Its strengths lie in its non-statist approach, which allows 
greater emphasis for the role of domestic groups, their interests and 
their interactions. In doing so, it provides an explanation for ASEAN’s 
mixed record of non-interference and intervention in a way that 
existing accounts of the region lack. This book engages with these 
different scholarly explanations for ASEAN’s ability to defend regional 
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autonomy and resist intervention. By analysing the strengths and 
weaknesses of these arguments, it highlights the gaps evident in the 
literature upon which vanguard state theory seeks to build. In doing so, 
it presents a theory that both complements and advances the existing 
account of ASEAN resistance to sovereignty violation.
Explaining ASEAN resistance to sovereignty 
violation
The argument presented here occupies a middle ground within 
existing ASEAN scholarship. ASEAN’s history is understood according 
to a realist theoretical logic, in terms of the relationship between an 
ASEAN ‘vanguard state’ and selected external powers. A ‘vanguard 
state’ is defined as an ASEAN state that comes to the fore of the 
Association when it has vital interests at stake that it wishes to pursue. 
While a state’s interests may vary, vital interests relate to state survival 
and the preservation of state sovereignty. An ASEAN state only begins 
to assume the role of vanguard when state security is threatened. This 
study contends that a convergence in interests between an ASEAN 
vanguard state and an external actor will cause the success of ASEAN 
vanguard state resistance to sovereignty violation (see Figure 1). 
When an ASEAN vanguard state has interests that converge with 
those of an external power, it has an active and substantial role in 
resisting sovereignty violation. In addition to seeking external power 
guarantees, a vanguard state will also seek to secure its own interests 
within the Association. It will do so by attempting to set ASEAN’s 
agenda, by garnering great power security commitments, and seeking 
to portray a united ASEAN front in support of vanguard state policy. 
Conversely, an absence of interest convergence between the ASEAN 
vanguard state and a designated external actor will cause the failure 
of ASEAN vanguard state (and by extension ASEAN) resistance to 
sovereignty violation. While the ASEAN vanguard state clearly has an 
important role to play in preventing external actor intervention, an 
equally important factor explaining ASEAN resistance to sovereignty 
violation resides in the critical role played by selected external powers. 
Indeed, this study shows how ASEAN is unable to resist challenges 
to its sovereignty when its interests do not converge with those of an 
external actor.
This argument contains a number of strengths that together offer 
a contribution to the field. First, by focusing on both the roles of, 
and interrelationship between, regional states and external actors, 
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it offers a more expansive argument for resistance to sovereignty 
violation than currently exists in the ASEAN literature. Additionally, 
through the creation of a ‘vanguard state’ concept, it provides a new 
theory that allows the reader to reconsider individual and group state 
behaviour within a regional organization, particularly as it pertains 
to foreign policy strategy, and to re-evaluate the impact of regional 
institutional membership for state security and survival. To support 
the theory presented here, an array of primary source information 
has been collected covering a time span from 1975 to present day. 
This information provides a comprehensive account of shifting state 
interests, both within ASEAN and of states external to the region, and 
the impact of varying interest convergence on ASEAN-state security 
and territorial integrity.
Outline of the book
The book comprises six chapters. Chapter 1 explores in more depth 
the contending arguments for sovereignty violation in Southeast 
Asia. It highlights the ways in which constructivist, realist and critical 
theorists have approached the topic of ASEAN regionalism and 
member state autonomy, followed by an introduction to vanguard 
state theory and the ways in which the argument presented can build 
upon existing literature. Chapters 2 to 5 provide in-depth case study 
analysis of ASEAN’s mixed resistance to sovereignty violation, both 
during the Cold War and in the post-Cold War period. This begins 
with an analysis of the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975, 
providing evidence to show how the Cold War regional environment 
created a convergence of interests between Indonesia, the ASEAN 
vanguard state, the US and Australia regarding the newly decolonized 
territory of East Timor. With external and regional power backing, 
Indonesia was able to invade East Timor without any repercussions 
from the international community, despite considerable attempts by 
the UN to intervene in Indonesia’s internal affairs to allow the East 
Timorese an act of self-determination.
Continuing the examination of the Cold War period, Chapter 3 
reviews the events of the Third Indochina War between 1978 and 
1991. Analysis of recently declassified US documents helps shed light 
on the informal alliance that developed between Thailand, China, 
the ASEAN states, the ousted Khmer Rouge, and to a lesser extent 
the US, in an effort to contain Vietnamese and Soviet influence in 
Southeast Asia following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978. As 
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a consequence of high interest convergence between Thailand and a 
designated external power, China, ASEAN was able to resist violations 
to the sovereignty of Thailand from a Soviet-backed Vietnam. This 
brings us to the beginning of the post-Cold War period, with Chapter 
4 analysing the East Timor humanitarian crisis of 1999. It shows how 
interest divergence between Indonesia, the US and Australia, following 
the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, led to external powers applying 
pressure on Indonesia to elicit regime change in East Timor. In a 
weakened state, Indonesia was coerced into accepting an international 
peacekeeping force in East Timor, despite asserting that such a force 
would constitute an unacceptable breach of its state sovereignty. 
Critically, ASEAN institutional cohesion alone was not sufficient to 
prevent Indonesian sovereignty violation at this time.
The final case study chapter analyses the South China Sea dispute 
from 1992 to present day. It shows how partial interest convergence 
between the Philippines, Vietnam and the US has been insufficient 
to prevent these dual vanguard states from having their maritime 
sovereignty violated by an assertive China. Through the analysis of 
three separate time periods, 1992–2012, 2012–2016, and 2016 to 
present, the chapter traces the varying levels of interest convergence 
and intra-ASEAN cohesion, both of which have failed to reach the 
robust levels required to satisfy vanguard state theory. The book 
concludes by analysing the research findings to provide a definitive 
response to the central research question advanced here. In doing so, 
it assesses the applicability of vanguard state theory to sovereignty 
violation in Southeast Asia, and concludes by considering the potential 
effects of humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) on the future of ASEAN sovereignty.
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Interests and Vanguard 
State Theory1
The existing literature regarding ASEAN’s record on sovereignty 
violation is polarized. Over the last two decades, a highly influential 
group of theorists associated closely with the constructivist perspective 
has emphasized ASEAN’s autonomy and ability to uphold regional 
order despite challenges. A second perspective has been advanced 
by theorists of a realist persuasion, who emphasize ASEAN’s lack 
of autonomy in the face of sovereignty challenges, and reliance on 
external actors’ sufferance. Finally, a third approach, associated with 
critical theory, explains ASEAN’s record on sovereignty as a function 
of social forces within individual ASEAN states. This study attempts 
to contribute to the literature by advancing a fourth perspective, also 
rooted in realist theory, where ASEAN’s record is highly dependent 
on the stance of external actors whose interests align with those of 
the organizations.
Constructivist theory: the power of norms and 
ideas 
For the past two decades, a number of influential constructivist works 
have sought to understand and explain the prolonged period of relative 
peace evident in Southeast Asia since the conception of ASEAN. For 
these scholars, ASEAN’s continued growth in the aftermath of the 
Cold War cannot be explained by balance of power politics or self-
help behaviour. Rather, ASEAN’s historical experience, identity and 
norms of behaviour have played a crucial role in enhancing regional 
peace and cooperation. The strength of this approach is that it seeks to 
understand ASEAN regionalism on an ideational, rather than material 
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footing, thus adding depth to the regional debate. However, a closer 
assessment of the literature highlights limitations, upon which this 
account seeks to build.
Institutional cooperation and coercion
Constructivists argue that norms have a transformative impact, 
regulating state behaviour, redefining state interests and constituting 
state identities.2 In this view, ASEAN norms are inherently cooperative 
and benign. In only considering cooperative norms, however, 
constructivists who have traditionally analyzed ASEAN are unable to 
adequately explain variance in Southeast Asia’s international relations. 
This is an important point, as evidence strongly suggests that ASEAN’s 
cooperative norms are routinely violated by all member states. For 
example, the norms of regional autonomy and non-interference 
have both been compromised. ASEAN allied itself with China in its 
containment policy of Vietnam following its invasion of Cambodia. 
Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor and the ensuing 27-year conflict 
and humanitarian crisis was largely met with ASEAN disunity and 
apathy. As Khoo states, ‘it would appear that focusing on “perverse 
norms” would go a long way to explain ASEAN’s international 
relations, particularly after the Cold War’.3
A related point is that the constructivist literature on Southeast Asia’s 
international relations is overly focused on institutions as venues for 
cooperation, whereby ASEAN’s norms have a socializing effect on 
external powers, heralding a wider East Asian regional order modelled 
on Southeast Asian regionalism.4 Unfortunately, this minimizes the 
role of coercive power dynamics in institutions. Acknowledging 
these problems in the literature, recent work by Glas addresses the 
absence of war between ASEAN members in light of the region’s 
on-going militarized disputes. Through a focus on practices and 
habits of regional relations, understood as ‘habits of peace’ shaped 
prior to reflection, Glas explains patterns of conflict and cooperation 
in the Southeast Asian region.5 These habitual practices relate to a 
number of different Southeast Asian attributes, including the practice 
of consensus, informal decision-making and dispute settlement, and 
substantiated by thinking on non-interference, member state equality, 
and face-saving.
Glas’ argument is persuasive, but not without challenges. It is unclear 
from where and when these habits originated, and whether they apply 
evenly across actors despite the different timeframes of ASEAN state 
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membership. Most important is the author’s acknowledgment of the 
challenge posed in recognizing habitual behaviour, which by definition 
lacks reflective thinking.6 Due to the difficulties associated with 
pinpointing habitual behaviour from other forms of cognitive practice, 
Glas leaves room for a rationalistic, interest-driven interpretation of 
actor behaviour. This is particularly the case when responding to 
security threats. While Glas argues that ‘habitual practices temper how 
states perceive risks and circumscribe responses to crises’,7 the case of 
the Thai-Cambodian border dispute would suggest otherwise. In this 
case, Cambodia broke with the ASEAN habit of non-interference when 
it approached the UN Security Council for assistance to resolve the 
dispute. This difficulty in identifying interest from habit suggests a more 
complicated process of regional relations than the author allows for.
From a realist perspective, power and interests are fundamental to the 
study of institutions. Here, small states can act in concert to secure their 
interests. As Schweller and Priess argue, ‘actors that gain power within an 
institution have the ability to set its agenda and influence the distribution 
of benefits and costs among members’.8 According to Mansfield, ‘states 
and interest groups have an incentive to capture international institutions 
because they can generate power for those that control them. Actors 
that gain power within an institution have the ability to set its agenda’.9 
Institutions are therefore arenas, where states respond to incentives and 
work to secure their interests. As will be illustrated in our study, great 
powers frequently have leverage over smaller states. Gruber argues that 
weaker states voluntarily cooperate within institutions because they have 
‘no better option’.10 Cooperation and power are therefore mutually 
reinforcing.11 An appreciation of this realist literature on institutions 
suggests that the constructivist overemphasis on positive cooperation 
and inability to discount rationalistic behaviour offers an incomplete 
picture of international relations.
Problematic variables: the role of norms and ideas
The strength of a causal argument rests in large part on the degree 
of rigour that has attended the conceptualization of its variables. In 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, Acharya focuses 
on institutions, norms and the process of identity building in the 
making of a security community. The author confirms his independent 
variable to be norms.12 The dependent variable is the construction of a 
security community. Identity acts as a ‘central explanatory tool in the 
making and unmaking of security communities’.13 However, the way 
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in which identity affects the dependent variable is not clear. Acharya 
is not specific as to whether identity acts as an intervening variable 
or an independent variable, and as such it is unclear where identity 
fits into his causal argument. This leaves his argument ambiguous. 
In Whose Ideas Matter? Acharya formulates two diagrams in which 
he confirms his intervening variable to be regional cognitive priors, 
created when certain external ideas or norms resonate with leaders.14 
Acharya confirms the dependent variable to be institutional design and 
change. However, the independent variable differs between diagrams. 
Firstly, it is stated as ‘ideas and norms’, secondly as ‘transnational 
norms’. This conflation of different concepts results in an independent 
variable that lacks conceptual clarity. A similar problem exists in 
Jürgen Haacke’s ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture. Rather 
than identifying a causal argument, Haacke employs a proliferation 
of key constructivist concepts as variables. In this respect, ASEAN 
norms have been reconceptualized as a diplomatic and security culture, 
making norms and culture interchangeable concepts.15 While Haacke 
uses the terminology of culture, his focus is on norms. This creates 
problems with respect to the clarity of his argument.
Ba confirms that founding ideas about Southeast Asia led to the 
‘collective pursuit of regional resilience vis-à-vis outside forces’.16 
Ba’s independent variable is ideas, and her dependent variable is a 
process of socialization. In this view, discourse and the exchange of 
ideas can change state behaviour. However, as Mearsheimer argues, 
‘changes in the material world drive changes in discourse’.17 Discourse 
therefore, ‘turns out not to be determinative, but mainly a reflection 
of developments in the objective world’.18 Thies also highlights the 
Kenneth Waltz argument, that structure shapes and constrains the 
units of the system through competition and socialization.19 As such, 
‘the process of interstate interaction is structured by socialization 
operating on behalf of anarchy and the distribution of capabilities’.20 By 
incorporating socialization into its explanation of structure, neorealism 
is able to account for the impact of both material and ideational factors 
on state behaviour. What Ba believes are core concepts driving events 
are actually determined by variables from realism, a rival theory to her 
theoretical framework.
The above analysis highlights the difficulty inherent in conceptualizing 
constructivist norms. This makes it increasingly difficult to observe the 
potential impact of norms and their role in shaping state behaviour 
or changing state practice. A recent edited collection by Betts and 
Orchard takes steps to address this problem in the literature. For the 
authors, existing theory has predominantly focused on the process 
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of institutionalization, understood as the international process by 
which norms emerge at the international level.21 How norms play 
out in practice, and the normative political contestation that occurs 
at the domestic level, is under-theorized, resulting in a ‘normative 
institutionalization-implementation gap’.22 The authors address this 
gap by developing the concept of ‘implementation’. They identify a 
number of causal mechanisms that can either constrain or constitute 
implementation efforts, including ideational, material and institutional 
domestic factors. Critically, such an approach allows for a variety 
of structural factors, in addition to allowing a role for domestic or 
international actors and the influence they also exert. The result is a 
theory that explains variation in norm compliance and state practices.
Betts and Orchard’s argument advances the constructivist analysis 
of norms. Aspects remain under-theorized, however, providing 
space for an alternative approach to state behaviour. For instance, 
it isn’t clear from the narrative exactly how implementation can be 
observed, how variance in implementation can be measured, and at 
what stage implementation can be said to have occurred. Indeed, 
the authors suggest that the ‘implementation process may have no 
clear end point’, and that ‘norms are never fixed’.23 The authors also 
contend that ‘implementation draws our attention to a crucial part of 
the causal process through which norms are “effective” or not in their 
outcomes’.24 Exactly what an effective outcome looks like isn’t clear. 
If we consider the ASEAN norm of non-interference for instance, its 
effectiveness is largely open to contention. The edited collection does 
not theorize on the ASEAN case, and it is not always apparent where 
some of ASEAN’s more unique norms or practices sit within Betts 
and Orchard’s theory. The authors delineate norms under one of three 
categories: treaty norms, principle norms and policy norms, although 
it is less apparent how norms are attributed to such categories. The 
authors also state that ‘bureaucratic contestation is likely to define 
which aspects of norms are successfully implemented and which fall 
by the wayside’.25 How this then applies to ASEAN, which lacks a 
bureaucratic structure, is unclear.
Of most interest is the author’s inclusion of material causal factors, 
an approach that recognizes the important role that both interests 
and external actors play in shaping norms. As the authors confirm, 
‘imprecise and ambiguous norms are likely to be interpreted (and 
hence applied) through the lenses of parochial sets of interests and 
reconciled through power’.26 This represents an advance on the work 
of Acharya, whose focus on local actor norm localization marginalizes 
such factors. A number of works in the edited collection provide a 
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material-based account. Betts utilizes the concept of regime to consider 
the way, in which norms can be reconciled through interests at the 
national level.27 Job and Shesterinina, on the other hand, consider the 
role of China in shaping the R2P norm in light of its adherence to state 
sovereignty.28 Similarly, Aneja provides an actor-driven account of the 
implementation of the needs-based assistance norm.29 These represent 
an important step, yet a gap remains. Whilst interests have a causal role, 
they remain under-theorized, and lack any real analysis of how interests 
can be defined or interest variance measured. It can also be argued 
that actors are given too much power in the implementation process, 
with the impact of structural constraints on state practices neglected. 
Ultimately, these are areas that this study will seek to contribute, to 
provide a better understanding of both domestic and external actor 
interests and the international environment in which they interact.
Realist theory: US influence and the balance of 
power
The standard realist perspective represents another strand in the 
literature. If the constructivist literature has overemphasized ASEAN’s 
ability to resist sovereignty violations, then this strand in the literature 
sees little agency for ASEAN in regional affairs. According to Leifer, 
the notion of ‘regional solutions to regional problems’ is inherently 
flawed, for two important reasons. First, the notion neglects the 
prospect of regional differences over strategic perspectives. Second, the 
notion ‘assumes that a regional association can solve problems, whereas 
any degree of institutional success in Pacific Asia since the Second 
World War has depended on conspicuously avoiding a problem-solving 
role’.30 Leifer specifically focuses on the ARF, which he argues ‘has 
reflected the condition of the more important regional relationships 
and, in particular, that between the US and China’.31 This has made 
achieving regional solutions for regional problems ‘more a myth than 
a valid aspiration’.32 Leifer’s approach places significant emphasis on the 
role of extra-regional powers, minimizing ASEAN’s role in its search 
for regional autonomy.
Responding to the constructivist literature on Southeast Asian 
regionalism, Jones and Smith believe that constructivist scholarship 
has misrepresented the underlying characteristics of ASEAN, which 
actually conform to power-political realities. Thus, in order to enhance 
state security, ASEAN states have engaged in classic balance of power 
politics, specifically the retaining of ‘US influence in the Asia-Pacific 
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to offset the rising power of China’.33 Significantly, Jones and Smith 
claim that ASEAN’s preference for consensus and conflict avoidance 
has lent itself to extra-regional actors manipulating ASEAN norms to 
serve their own best interests.34 As such, extreme caution should be 
exercised when attempting to expand ASEAN’s regional project onto 
a wider regional canvas.35
The realist analysis offers a strong counter-argument to constructivist 
thinking. However, empirical evidence suggests that there are aspects 
of this analysis that should give us pause. In the realist view described 
above, the ASEAN states are portrayed as ‘ultimately dependent upon 
the continued American security commitments’.36 While external 
powers such as the United States clearly play an important role in 
the region, this view arguably goes too far, and unhelpfully obscures 
the role of regional states. Indeed, evidence which has emerged 
relatively recently from the US State Department archives confirms 
that Indonesia adeptly exploited US fears of communism to secure 
its own interests with respect to East Timor,37 and that it did so with 
ASEAN backing.38 This implies a greater role for Indonesia than is 
acknowledged in the current realist argument.
The existing realist analysis of the Third Indochina War displays 
a similar problem. For these scholars, the conflict was an archetypal 
example of great powers using regional states to secure their own 
interests. In this respect, ASEAN was a ‘convenient front for external 
actors’,39 adopting a position that ‘favoured China’s interests, above all’.40 
While it is clear that external powers sought to secure their interests 
during this conflict, this approach minimizes the important role played 
by regional states. In seeking to secure its own interests, Thailand 
arguably played a greater role in the conflict than is evident in the 
current realist analysis. Certainly, China viewed Thailand, and ASEAN, 
as a vital component in its strategy to contain the Vietnamese.41 The 
empirical evidence suggests that the view advanced by Leifer, Jones and 
Smith contains limitations, which I seek to rectify. The authors offer 
a strong counter-argument, whereby ASEAN states have very little 
autonomy, and rely on external powers to maintain regional order. 
However, in taking a restrictive view of ASEAN autonomy, Leifer, Jones 
and Smith are unable to convincingly explain examples of ASEAN state 
cooperation, consensus and resistance to external intervention.
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Critical theory: the power of social forces
A new approach to sovereignty and intervention in Southeast Asia is 
provided in the work of Jones, who transcends the constructivist-realist 
debate by proffering an argument broadly categorized as a critical 
theoretical approach, one which is closely aligned to materialist state 
theory and social conflict theory. A relatively recent addition to the 
literature, Jones highlights inconsistencies within the existing debate on 
the ASEAN norm of non-interference, which many scholars believe 
has been upheld despite evidence to the contrary. Seeking to explain 
ASEAN’s mixed record of intervention and non-interference, Jones 
advances a perspective where ‘intervention and the non-interference 
principle can be explained as the outcome of struggles between and 
within ASEAN’s most powerful social forces’.42
For Jones, sovereignty and non-interference can be analyzed 
as a ‘technology of power’ mechanism, which is used by domestic 
groups to help determine the scope of political conflict in a way 
that best suits their needs.43 Because of this ‘intimate relationship 
between sovereignty and social order’, sovereignty is always subject to 
contestation by socio-political forces.44 According to Jones, the state 
and its institutions support the owners of capital in their domestic 
conflicts. By invoking the non-interference norm, state actors are able 
to contain socio-political conflict within a specific region, and exclude 
outside influences that may wish to aid social groups in their control 
for state power. However, state actors will also violate this norm when 
they perceive any external threat. Non-interference can therefore be 
invoked or discarded to suit particular interests or strategies.
There is much to Jones’ argument to engage with, beginning with 
his conceptualization of the role of the state. According to this view, 
‘power is not some thing or capacity vested in state apparatuses but 
rather is widely dispersed … among many different social forces, 
such as classes and class fractions’.45 States are therefore viewed as 
complex, rather than coherent, exhibiting a variety of internal 
divisions. This approach to the state is also evident in a more recent 
analysis of governance in Southeast Asia provided by Gerard, who 
‘conceptualizes states as complex social relations, meaning their form 
is structured through conflicts between social forces seeking to advance 
their interests at the expense of others’.46 Such approaches challenge 
the neo-Weberian view of the state as a ‘black box’, as favoured by 
traditional International Relations scholars. Indeed, for neorealists, 
constraints imposed by the international system create the same basic 
incentives for all states, making domestic variables such as regime or 
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leadership type of little importance.47 However, more recent works 
associated with the realist school have sought to open the black box 
of the state by connecting external and internal variables. These 
approaches show the way in which unit level variables, such as domestic 
constraints or elite interests, can function as intervening variables to 
explain the relationship between the relative distribution of power 
in the international system and the foreign policies of states.48 While 
‘ideal state behaviour is that which conforms with the unitary actor’, 
there are times when these conditions are not met due to domestic 
variables.49 Crucially, ‘when systemic constraints are ignored, foreign 
policy failure results … [and] the system punishes’.50 Jones’ analysis, 
with its preferential focus on internal social forces, de-emphasizes 
external variables such as systemic constraints and the distribution of 
power. Arguably, he therefore provides an incomplete picture of the 
state and its role in the international system.
Jones explores the relationship between sovereignty and intervention 
by reconceptualizing both as a ‘technology as power’. This allows 
for the identification of patterns of sovereignty and intervention, 
with sovereignty continuously contested by social forces. The end 
product is shaped by this struggle and then conditioned by local 
and global geopolitical factors. This raises the question of whether 
this is a two-way process, with external geopolitical factors also 
conditioning the domestic sphere. If so, a countering argument could 
be made, whereby the external forces actually shape and condition 
the domestic relations. It is clear that Jones’ argument has a role 
for external actors, with successful sovereignty claims depending 
upon ‘prevailing constellations of power [and] interests … at the 
international level’, and with rival social forces potentially ‘supported 
by different external agents’.51 However, the interests of these external 
actors are subservient to that of internal social forces, which are the 
‘fundamental drivers’ of sovereignty regimes. These external forces 
therefore play a conditioning, rather than causal role, in sovereignty 
and intervention.52 The argument presented here will redress this 
imbalance, to show how in reality these external actors play a much 
more crucial role in Southeast Asian sovereignty and intervention than 
is currently allowed for.
In doing so, it will provide a deeper conceptual analysis of how 
interests are measured and defined, something implicit in Jones’ 
analysis rather than explicit. It will also consider the important role 
for consensus and cooperation between internal and external actors for 
the maintenance of political authority, in addition to the instances of 
conflict that undoubtedly occur. In this respect, a more positive view 
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of sovereignty will be offered, beyond Jones’ analysis of a ‘conflict-
ridden process’, which requires ‘tremendous amounts of violence’.53 
While the author agrees with Jones that ‘violent clashes of interest’,54 
occur in territorializing sovereign states, it will be contended that 
this is only part of the picture, and minimizes the instances of interest 
convergence which can also occur. This project will therefore seek 
to build on the work done by Jones, and consider the actions that 
ASEAN member states can take to resist violations to their sovereignty. 
Emphasis on state ability to resist sovereignty violation, as opposed to 
explanations for when sovereignty is or is not transgressed, provides a 
predictive, rather than historic, analysis. According to this approach, 
there is little point seeking to explain why certain states have been 
singled out for intervention. This is because external intervention in 
the affairs of weaker states is driven by geopolitical events dictated 
by the structure of the international system and the actions of great 
powers. Instances of intervention sit outside of the control of smaller, 
weaker powers, which must always assume the worst and prepare 
themselves accordingly. This analysis rests upon their ability to do so. 
The result is a dynamic theory that seeks to explain how, why and 
when states cooperate in light of conflicting regional and international 
state interests and power dynamics.
Contribution to the realist debate
Vanguard state theory will build upon existing arguments, to offer a 
theory that can explain the mixed record of sovereignty violation in 
Southeast Asia through a focus on Southeast Asian and external power 
interest convergence. In doing so, it contributes to the current realist 
regional and institutional literature. Realist authors Joseph Grieco55 
and Gil Merom56 attempt to enhance realist explanatory power in 
relation to institutional and regional analysis. For Grieco, neorealist 
thought is notably lacking in its ability to explain weak member state 
behaviour within international institutions. However, neorealism can 
be ‘amended to ascribe significance to international institutions’ by 
including a ‘voice opportunities thesis’.57 According to this approach, 
weaker states are able to voice concerns regarding stronger powers 
and any unfair divisions of gains. This helps strengthen weak power 
influence over stronger powers. Taking a different approach, Merom 
attempts to address ‘the regional void in realism’ by explaining the 
significance of regional order from a realist stance.58 He does this 
by suggesting two amendments to the theory: ‘contingent realism’, 
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which widens the scope of realism beyond the distribution of power 
to include unit-level variables; and ‘constructive realism’,59 which 
introduces the logic of constructivism to help explain prolonged 
periods of peace and regional society building.
These are important steps towards enhancing realist explanatory 
power. Merom and Grieco’s work is a useful entry point by realists 
into the regional literature. However, neither Grieco nor Merom 
have succeeded in producing fully developed or testable theoretical 
amendments. Grieco has posited his ‘voice opportunities thesis’ in 
relation to Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) rule 
trajectory only. It is not clear whether this can be applied to a Third 
World institution, or could be moved out of the sphere of international 
political economy and into the field of security studies. Merom 
advances a theoretical framework only, using a brief discussion of 
the Middle East to highlight his amendments. While this study will 
attempt to integrate with this literature, a gap remains to explore a 
realist understanding of regionalism which is supported by strong case 
study analysis.
To that end, this book will seek to develop a theory of sovereignty 
and intervention in Southeast Asia that incorporates foreign policy 
strategy based on the assumptions of realist theory. This is in accordance 
with the work of Colin Elman, who argues that we can use neorealism 
as a theory of foreign policy, which ‘makes determinate predications 
for dependent variable(s) that measure the behaviour of individual 
states’.60 In doing so, it will seek to contribute to the literature on 
small states from a realist perspective, where states are conceptualized 
as unitary and rational actors.61 By adopting a realist-based theoretical 
approach, this book seeks to advance an argument that looks beyond 
ASEAN adherence to norms and the role of social forces, to explain 
the mixed record of ASEAN state resistance to sovereignty violation. 
In determining the dynamics of ASEAN resistance to sovereignty 
violation, two variables present themselves: interest convergence and 
success of resistance to sovereignty violation (see Figure 1 for diagram).
Delineating our variables
For the purpose of this study, the independent variable is interest 
convergence between an ASEAN vanguard state and an external actor. 
A vanguard state is a regional state with the most compelling interests 
at stake in a given issue. Vanguard state theory does not preclude there 
being more than one vanguard state. In the event of two or more 
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vanguard states, the same criteria apply. States must have the same 
compelling interests at stake in a given issue, and there must be some 
degree of coordination between them. A vanguard state is able to set 
the agenda of ASEAN and to portray a united ASEAN front in support 
of vanguard state interests. The dependent variable of this study is 
success of ASEAN vanguard state resistance to sovereignty violation. 
ASEAN success, or lack thereof, at resistance to such deviations will be 
assessed using case study analysis. Sovereignty is understood in terms 
of the Westphalian model, defined as an ‘institutional arrangement for 
organizing political life that is based on two principles: territoriality 
and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority 
structures’.62 Both the independent variable and dependent variable 
are to be viewed as continuous variables, characterized by a sliding 
scale of convergence or success. This dynamic can be restated in the 
following hypothesis: if there is an increase in interest convergence 
between an ASEAN vanguard state and an external actor, then this 
will cause an increase in success of resistance to sovereignty violation; 
conversely, if there is a decrease in interest convergence between an 
ASEAN vanguard state and an external actor, then this will cause a 
decrease in success of resistance to sovereignty violation.
Defining and measuring interest convergence
In advancing an alternative account in the literature, the critical 
independent variable in our analysis is the degree of convergence 
in state interests between an ASEAN vanguard state and a specific 
external actor or actors. Consistent with a realist theoretical approach, 
we draw on a realist understanding of how interests are defined. This 
can be contrasted with a constructivist conception, whereby ‘interests 
are constructed through social interaction … [and] are defined in 
the context of internationally held norms and understandings about 
what is good and appropriate’.63 Following the work of Stephen 
Krasner, analysis begins with, and ultimately attempts to defend, the 
basic premise underlying what has become known as the state-centric 
realist paradigm. In this view, states (defined as central decision-making 
institutions and roles) can be treated as unified, rational actors pursuing 
aims understood in terms of the national interest.64
Interests enjoy a strong tradition within the realist literature, where 
there exists a consistent view of the basic state interest, which is state 
survival. For example, classical realist Hans Morgenthau argues that ‘the 
state has no right to let its moral disapprobation of the infringement 
13
INTERESTS AND VANGUARD STATE THEORY
of liberty get in the way of successful political action, itself inspired by 
the moral principle of national survival’.65 Similarly, neorealist Kenneth 
Waltz believes that ‘by comparing nations and corporations, the elusive 
notion of national interest is made clear. By assumption, economic 
actors seek to maximize expected returns, and states strive to secure 
their survival’.66 John Mearsheimer reaffirms this view, stating that 
‘survival is the primary goal of great powers’.67 When a state must act 
to ensure its survival, this constrains a state’s consideration of broader 
interests. However, during periods of relative peace, ‘powers have the 
“luxury” of choosing their interests and goals’.68 During such times, a 
range of other values will be sought, including ‘rank, respect, material 
possessions and material privileges’.69
An understanding of the foregoing literature leads us to conceptualize 
our variables in a particular way. For the purposes of analysis, this 
study begins with the basic assumption that state interests are premised 
on the basic point of seeking survival. Building on the works of 
Timothy Crawford70 and Daryl Press,71 a continuous variable has been 
constructed representing the state interests at stake, with vital interests 
at one end and secondary interests at the other. Crawford defines vital 
interests as involving ‘self-preservation, political independence, and, by 
extension, defence of strategically vital areas’.72 Similarly, Press defines 
vital interests as preservation of ‘sovereignty’.73 Secondary interests 
can vary greatly, and may range ‘from very important interests, such 
as maintaining trade routes, the safety of your allies, and even national 
“prestige”, to much more ephemeral ones’.74 While ranking the 
hierarchy of state interests is inherently difficult, ultimately interests 
pertaining to national self-preservation logically must take precedence.75 
A theory of vanguard state interests therefore begins with the basic 
assumption that states seek to secure their survival, but acknowledges 
that states have many interests, which they will seek to pursue when 
survival is not at stake. This is especially applicable in the case of weak 
states. According to Handel, ‘the international system leaves [weak 
states] less room for choice in the decision-making process. Their 
smaller margin of error and hence greater preoccupation with survival 
makes the essential interests of weak states less ambiguous’.76
Cooperation may be based on a response to threats,77 or for the 
pursuit of gains.78 Convergence is measured by identifying symmetric 
or asymmetric interests,79 whether vital or secondary (as defined by 
Crawford), and arrangements for cooperation between states. This 
study acknowledges that complete interest convergence between 
states is difficult to obtain. Varying degrees of interest convergence 
are possible, and interests can change over time. Partial interest 
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convergence between an ASEAN state and an external actor is 
unlikely to elicit the high levels of sustained cooperation required to 
cause ASEAN state resistance to sovereignty violation. A high level of 
interest convergence is required to elicit the cooperation required to 
resist violations to state sovereignty. Interest convergence is a dynamic 
process, whereby small states actively seek ‘maximum great-power 
commitment to their security interests while trying to minimize the 
price of obtaining that support’.80 They do so because they ‘generally 
lack formidable independent power capabilities’ and as such ‘cannot 
affect the international security landscape on their own’.81 However, 
because some small states ‘occupy strategic positions’, they can ‘affect 
the overall global distribution of power by adding to the resources of 
some great powers and constraining others’.82
Engaging with this literature, our analysis begins with the underlying 
premise that the study of interest convergence can yield utility to 
the field of Southeast Asian international relations. As this study will 
show, without external actor interest convergence, ASEAN is unable 
to resist sovereignty violations from powers external to the region. 
During periods of decreased interest convergence, this analysis shares 
the same expectations as Leifer and Jones and Smith, and is consistent 
with existing realist literature. However, this study contributes to the 
literature by demonstrating that when a clear interest convergence 
occurs between an ASEAN state and an external power, a substantial 
compact is constructed. In short, an ASEAN vanguard state plays the 
important and necessary function of actively seeking and supporting 
a great power commitment to regional policies, or intervention 
in regional affairs, which are consistent with the interests of both 
the ASEAN state and the external actor. At this time, an ASEAN 
vanguard state has an active and substantial role in resisting sovereignty 
violations from other external powers. Great powers will use regional 
institutions to pursue their own interests.83 When vital interests are at 
stake, however, regional states will seek to do the same.
Vanguard state theory: on balancing, bargaining 
and power
The aim of this research is to provide a better understanding of 
ASEAN institutional dynamics and patterns of state behaviour. It does 
so by constructing a theory of foreign policy, defined as a theory that 
can ‘explain why different states or even the same state at different 
times pursues particular strategies in the international arena’.84 Its core 
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assumptions are realist in nature, based upon a state-centric view of the 
international system, where states exist in a decentralized and anarchic 
system characterized by the principle of self-help.85 Its primary focus is 
on state interests and the role of a ‘vanguard state’, conceptualized as an 
ASEAN state that comes to the fore of the Association when it has vital 
interests at stake that it wishes to pursue. As defined by Crawford86 and 
Press,87 these vital interests relate to state survival and the preservation 
of state sovereignty. Vanguard state behaviour is variably understood as 
either security maximizing,88 or power maximizing.89 An ASEAN state 
only begins to assume the role of vanguard state when vital interests 
are at stake, when state security is threatened and very possibly under 
conditions of actual conflict.
Once a vanguard state has come to prominence, it will perform 
two major functions, which reflect an external balancing logic.90 First, 
because of its relative weakness, the vanguard state will actively seek 
out an external power whose interests align with its own. Second, the 
vanguard state will seek to portray a united ASEAN front in support of 
its interests, by engaging and mobilizing states within the institution. 
This supports the view that states will engage in balancing behaviour, 
and that ‘balances of power [will] recurrently form’.91 There are a 
number of different strategies at a vanguard state’s disposal to engage 
an external power and a regional state. The most important of these are 
through intelligence gathering, opening channels of communication 
and engaging in high-level meetings, much of which is predicated on 
the basis of prior relationships, perceived credibility and reputation.92 It 
is through these methods that a vanguard state will identify convergent 
state interests. A vanguard state may use diplomacy, bargaining, 
incentives, coercion and bilateral agreements or alliances to further 
solidify this interest convergence.
Two dominant factors shaping ASEAN dynamics and behavioural 
patterns are individual state threat perceptions93 and relative power vis-
à-vis other members of the international system. It is this consideration 
of relative power that dictates ASEAN state relations externally, with 
respect to great powers, and internally, with respect to the regional 
organization itself. When assessing its ability to effect change, a regional 
state recognizes that its limited material capabilities require it to pursue 
enhanced relations with a great power. Of equal importance for our 
theory is the relative power dynamic within ASEAN. For a vanguard 
state to influence other ASEAN members, it must have the relative 
power to do so. This supports the view that ‘estimates of relative 
power are the currency of diplomatic bargaining’.94 It is therefore not 
surprising that, of the case studies presented here, Indonesia as the 
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region’s dominant power has had most success in its role of vanguard 
state, and Vietnam and the Philippines the least. Intra-ASEAN power 
dynamics do matter, as our analysis will seek to show.
For the purpose of this study, sovereignty, autonomy and intervention 
are conceptualized in terms of power. Autonomy is considered a core 
principle of state sovereignty. According to Krasner, the principle of 
autonomy is one of the core elements of Westphalian sovereignty, 
and means that ‘no external actor enjoys authority within the borders 
of the state’.95 Michael Mann intrinsically links the concepts of 
autonomy and sovereignty to power. Mann argues that a state’s ability 
to ‘provide a territorially-centralized form of organization’ provides 
for state autonomy.96 For Mann, it is this institutional and territorial 
centralized nature that is ‘the most important precondition of state 
power’.97 Hence, power is an essential element in the relationship 
between sovereignty and autonomy.
According to the Westphalian model, sovereignty can be violated 
through imposition, where a weak state is forced to do something it 
would not ordinarily do, and intervention, where more powerful states 
coerce ‘public authorities in weaker states to accept externally dictated 
authority structures’.98 For many, the principle of non-intervention, 
which is always violated through coercion or imposition, is the key 
element of sovereign statehood.99 Interventions occur when there is 
an asymmetry of power.100 Because powerful states intervene in the 
internal affairs of less powerful states,101 weaker states have always been 
the ‘strongest supporters’ of the rule of non-intervention.102 Weaker 
states will always seek to resist violations to their sovereignty. It is our 
contention that they are able to do so when their interests converge 
with that of an external actor.
Conceptualizing ASEAN
The way in which ASEAN is conceptualized, and the degree to which 
ASEAN can be considered an ‘actor’, is debated here. Defined by 
Rüland as the ability to ‘develop presence, to become identifiable, 
aggregate interests, formulate goals and policies, make and implement 
decisions’,103 a key ability for any actor is to ‘formulate a coherent 
position’, and to receive recognition and identification as an actor in a 
given context.104 As case study analysis of the South China Sea dispute 
will show, ASEAN lacks the ability to consistently aggregate interests 
and formulate coherent policy, in part due to its loose institutional 
organization and preference for consensus decision-making. This 
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places limits on the degree of ASEAN’s ‘actorness’. However, our 
analysis suggests that at times of vanguard state prominence, once a 
vanguard state has successfully mobilized the member states in support 
of its interests, ASEAN can be conceptualized as a unitary actor. This 
is in accordance with the work of Frey, who argues that any group 
actors ‘must display sufficient behavioural cohesion among members 
so as to produce unitary group actor behaviour’.105 While the degree 
of cohesion required to elicit unitary group actor behaviour must be 
high, Frey acknowledges that ‘absolutely unitary action is a naively 
impractical criterion for a group actor’.106 As such, evidence of minor 
or insignificant state deviations from cohesion should not result in 
denial of group actor designation.
As our analysis will show, these moments of cohesion are both rare, 
and can be victim to power dynamics within the grouping. In the 
periods when ASEAN cannot be considered a unitary actor, which, 
as evidence will show, is the overwhelming majority, ASEAN is 
understood as a grouping of member states. ASEAN resistance to 
sovereignty violation therefore refers to member state ability to resist 
sovereignty transgressions. Clearly, this ability has repercussions for the 
whole Southeast Asian region, where ‘Southeast Asia’ is defined as the 
geographical area encompassed by the ten member states of ASEAN.
Methodology
This book adopts a case-study analysis of the concept of ASEAN 
resistance to sovereignty violation. Cases have been selected in order 
to demonstrate variation on the dependent variable. Specifically, cases 
selected show a range of variation characterized by different levels of 
success. By showing variation on the dependent variable, the study 
seeks to avoid the very serious problem of selection bias, which occurs 
when we ‘subtly or not so subtly select observations on the basis of 
combinations of the independent and dependent variables that support 
the desired conclusion’.107 To avoid selection bias, ‘selection should 
allow for the possibility of at least some variation on the dependent 
variable’.108 Thus, to illustrate this I have chosen four case studies, 
which span five decades since ASEAN’s establishment. The four 
cases that this study will examine are: the Indonesian invasion of East 
Timor (1975); the Third Indochina War (1978–91); the East Timor 
humanitarian crisis (1999); and The South China Sea Dispute (1992 
to present).
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The Indonesian invasion of East Timor (1975) and the East Timor 
humanitarian crisis (1999) deal with the same key actors. A significant 
factor in favour of the selection is that the cases represent variation 
on the dependent variable. The 1975 case is an example of successful 
resistance to sovereignty violation, and the 1999 case an example of 
failure to resist sovereignty violation. As such, they offer an explanation 
for varying outcomes, in addition to providing evidence for changing 
state interests over time. Similarly, the South China Sea Dispute (1992 
to present) shows variation in interest convergence over a 25-year 
time frame, and represents a good case to test partial convergence. 
The Third Indochina War (1978–91) is prevalent in the constructivist, 
critical theory and realist literature. As such, it acts as a good case to 
test existing theoretical explanations, in addition to the vanguard state 
theory posited in this book. An additional and compelling rationale 
for the case selection relates to the availability of empirical evidence. 
Declassified US state documents for the period up to 1980 provide 
a strong empirical basis for the Indonesian invasion of East Timor 
(1975) and the Third Indochina War (1978–91). The availability of 
media reports and United Nations documentation also provide a strong 
empirical foundation for the East Timor humanitarian crisis (1999) 
and the South China Sea Dispute (1992 to present).
According to the work of Arthur Stinchcombe,109 we must observe 
covariation in order to derive observations in support of causal theory. 
Without variation in the causal variable, it is not possible to observe 
variations in the dependent variable. To establish covariation, my 
independent variable is a continuous variable characterized by variation 
in interest convergence. Change of this variable should change the 
value of the dependent variable, thus establishing causal direction. In 
an attempt to make causal inferences, this study will employ a process-
tracing technique. The benefits of case study analysis are discussed 
in depth by Van Evera. Of particular note is Van Evera’s discussion 
of the benefits of tests using a process-tracing methodology, which 
‘gain strong controls from the uniform character of the background 
conditions of the case’.110 This allows for a number of observations of 
values on the independent and dependent variable. Through process 
tracing it is possible to ‘examine the process whereby initial case 
conditions are translated into case outcomes’.111
This book seeks an answer to the following question: when has 
ASEAN state resistance to sovereignty challenges succeeded, and 
when has it failed? ASEAN resistance to sovereignty challenge is 
understood in terms of the Association’s ability to exclude external 
actors from the domestic authority structures of any ASEAN state.112 
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All four cases represent examples of ASEAN resistance to sovereignty 
challenges aimed at an ASEAN vanguard state. The Indonesian 
invasion of East Timor (1975) is an example of Indonesia successfully 
resisting challenges to its sovereignty from the United Nations and the 
international community. These external actors increasingly sought to 
intervene in Indonesia’s domestic affairs following the invasion. Interest 
convergence with key external powers ultimately prevented this from 
occurring. The Third Indochina War (1978–91) is an example of 
Thailand successfully resisting territorial sovereignty violation from 
an aggressive neighbouring state, Vietnam, which was backed by the 
Soviet Union, a pole in the international system. The East Timor 
humanitarian crisis (1999) is an example of Indonesia failing to resist 
challenges to its sovereignty, after an international peacekeeping 
force entered East Timor. The South China Sea dispute (1992 to 
present) is an example of the Philippines and Vietnam partial interest 
convergence with the United States, and the inability of these states 
to resist violation of their sovereignty from an assertive China in the 
South China Sea.
The question of ASEAN’s ability to resist sovereignty challenges is 
critical to the field of international relations for two important reasons. 
First, it illuminates the dynamic of the ASEAN states’ sovereignty 
practices.113 The principle of sovereignty provides a state with authority 
and control over its people and territory, in addition to securing against 
intervention by external actors.114 ASEAN’s ability to uphold this in 
practice has clear implications for state autonomy and security, and is 
of importance to the individual states, the organization and the region 
as a whole. Indeed, this has wider implications for any small states 
and regional organizations within the international system. Second, it 
clarifies the contested question of the ability of ASEAN to uphold its 
norms and principles, specifically the principle of non-intervention by 
external powers,115 and the norm of upholding regional autonomy.116 
ASEAN’s ability, or lack thereof, to uphold these principles is of vital 
importance to regional security, and to the security of the wider 
international community.
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The Indonesian Invasion 
of East Timor
On 12  December 1975, the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) introduced Resolution 3485, ‘strongly deplor[ing] the 
military intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in Portuguese 
Timor’.1 This was followed by two diluted UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolutions introduced on 22 December 1975 and 22 April 
1976, ‘call[ing] upon the Government of Indonesia to withdraw 
without delay all its forces from the Territory’.2 Resolution 3485 
passed with 72 votes to 10, and 43 abstentions.3 Abstentions came from 
Europe, New Zealand and the US. The United Nations (UN) votes 
were indicative of the way Indonesian officials ‘correctly judged the 
balance of forces’ when planning their invasion of the former colony.4 
They faced relatively little international condemnation, either at the 
time of invasion, during its aftermath, or indeed, for the majority of 
its 27-year occupation. In the view of both London and Washington 
during the 1970s and 1980s, East Timor was deemed ‘too small, 
backwards and isolated to survive on its own’.5
During Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, Indonesia was 
able to act with relative impunity. Despite UN Resolution 3485, 
Jakarta was supported in its actions by the member states of ASEAN, 
the US and Australia. Indeed, it can be argued that without external 
support, it is unlikely Indonesia would have invaded East Timor at 
that time. With regional and external power backing, Indonesia was 
able to resist international opposition in East Timor following the 
invasion, thus resisting any potential violation of its sovereignty at that 
time. In the case under investigation, Indonesia can be classified as the 
ASEAN vanguard state, having the most compelling interests at stake 
with regards to East Timor. From Jakarta’s perspective, decolonization 
of the territory represented a power vacuum, which could invite 
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unwanted attention from powers external to the region. It was also 
an opportunity for Indonesia to enhance its security, and maximize 
power regionally, by absorbing the territory within the archipelago. As 
the vanguard state, Indonesia was able to garner great power security 
commitments, and apply pressure on the ASEAN states to obtain 
unanimous support for Indonesia’s East Timor policy in 1975.
While Indonesia had an important role to play in this process, an 
equally important factor is the role played by external actors. In 1975, 
ASEAN’s ability to resist violations to the sovereignty of Indonesia from 
a UN-backed international coalition was a consequence of high interest 
convergence between Indonesia and the external powers, specifically 
the US and Australia. For the US, Indonesia was a key regional ally 
following defeat in Vietnam and retrenchment from the region. For 
Australia, Indonesia was a vital component in securing Australia’s 
Northern periphery, and allowing entry into regional organizations. 
In the context of a Cold War regional environment, there were clear 
interests for these external powers to support Indonesia. Ultimately, 
this would take precedence over self-determination for the people of 
East Timor.
The chapter will begin by describing the regional environment 
between 1970 and 1975, paying specific attention to Indonesia’s role 
in this environment. It will then consider the factors surrounding 
decolonization in East Timor and the subsequent civil war that 
occurred there. It will assess Indonesia’s interests regarding the 
territory, and how this led to the emergence of the ASEAN vanguard 
state. Subsequent analysis will consider the interests of both the United 
States and Australia in 1975, and how these interests converged with 
Indonesia’s with regard to East Timor, in addition to Indonesia’s role 
within ASEAN and the level of cohesion that developed in support of 
Indonesia’s East Timor policy. Following an assessment of the empirical 
record surrounding Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975, the 
chapter will detail the ways in which regional and external power 
interest convergence helped Indonesia to resist potential sovereignty 
violation from actors external to the region. The chapter will conclude 
with a theoretical assessment of the case study, and consider contending 
theoretical explanations for Indonesia’s ability to resist sovereignty 
violation following the invasion of East Timor in 1975.
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Indonesia and the Cold War regional environment 
(1970–1975)
Why did Indonesia invade and annex East Timor? As one commentator 
noted, ‘the international geopolitical context … [created] favourable 
conditions for the invasion’.6 Therefore, a consideration of the 
regional environment is critical, and reflects the strong role played 
by Indonesian interests during that period. The year 1975 saw a 
number of communist advances in Indochina. On 17 April 1975, the 
communist Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia. In Vietnam, 
the North Vietnamese communists had overrun Saigon. By April 
1975, the Pathet Lao took power in Laos, transforming the country 
into the Lao Popular Democratic Republic. Communist success in 
Vietnam was met with alarm in Southeast Asia, although the degree 
of alarm differed according to each state’s geographic location and 
external security guarantees.7
Indonesia’s size, location and anti-communist leanings meant that it 
had a unique role to play in Southeast Asia’s Cold War environment. 
Indonesia’s President Suharto gradually assumed power in Indonesia 
following a military backed coup in October 1965.8 In the period 
following the coup, Suharto’s forces ‘organized and encouraged the 
killing of as many as one million real or alleged members of the 
PKI [Communist Party of Indonesia]’.9 Following the deposition of 
Sukarno, Indonesia’s sitting President at the time of the coup, Suharto 
established a new regime in Indonesia known as the New Order, 
which immediately received US and other Western state backing. 
In doing so, Western powers were able to help eradicate communist 
elements in Indonesia. The New Order was characterized by the 
dominance of a number of elite combat units, known as the Kopassus. 
Seeking to exert domestic control, Suharto’s regime focused on the 
danger posed by the resurrection of communist elements, which it 
believed could threaten both national and regional stability.10 By 1975, 
Indonesia suddenly found itself in ‘the limelight as the largest power 
in the region’.11 In this context, Suharto ‘appeared to be the greatest 
barrier to Communist advances in the region, and was thus an essential 
factor in the defense of Western interests’.12
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Decolonization in East Timor: emergence of the ASEAN vanguard 
state
Within this Cold War regional setting, the small territory of East 
Timor gained its independence from Portuguese colonial rule in 
April 1975. East Timor is the largest island of the Sunda island chain, 
with Western Timor forming part of the Indonesian archipelago. 
Its capital Dili is located 600 kilometres from Darwin, the closest 
Australian airport, and approximately 2,000 kilometres from Jakarta.13 
In 1975, the population of East Timor was approximately 652,250 to 
707,500.14 Following Portuguese colonial rule, a number of different 
indigenous factions began to emerge. The first faction was the 
Timorese Popular Democratic Association (Apodeti). Encouraged by 
Jakarta, Apodeti advocated integration with Indonesia. The second 
faction was the Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), which advocated 
gradual decolonization and continued links with Portugal. The final 
faction was the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor 
(FRETILIN), which supported an independent East Timor with 
immediate effect. In addition to these three main parties, two smaller 
parties also emerged: the Klibur Oan Timur Aswain (KOTA), the 
Sons of the Mountain Warriors, and Trabalhista, a Labour Party. By 
mid-1975, FRETILIN had emerged as the dominant faction.
Indonesia’s General Suharto denied any aspirations to incorporate 
the former Portuguese colony into the Indonesian archipelago, instead 
arguing that the Timorese had the right to self-determination. At the 
same time, ‘political elites in Jakarta periodically suggested that East 
Timor’s future lay with Indonesia’.15 This suggestion was acknowledged 
by many Western elites, who ‘resigned themselves as a matter of policy 
to [East Timor’s] eventual absorption by Indonesia’.16 Indonesia’s 
subversive actions in Timor prior to Portuguese decolonization 
undoubtedly fuelled these speculations. In April 1972, Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik ‘stated that Indonesia would support 
an anti-Portuguese liberation movement if the Timorese people really 
wanted it’.17 By mid-1974, ‘unidentified Indonesian sources in Kupang 
began giving financial aid and radio broadcast assistance to Apodeti, 
apparently in the expectation that the organization would win popular 
support for a voluntary merger of East Timor with Indonesia’.18 By 
December 1974, ‘100 Indonesian commandos were sent to West 
Timor as part of the first phase of a campaign to destabilize East 
Timor’.19 According to Leifer, ‘Indonesia cloaked an evident interest 
in studied ambivalence … [which] persisted in declaratory policy even 
after overt military intervention had virtually decided the political 
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future of East Timor’.20 While reasons for Indonesia’s interest in 
East Timor have never been explicitly stated, evidence suggests two 
important factors at play. Both of these factors provided Indonesia 
with the most compelling interests at stake in the future of East Timor.
Security and the communist threat
First, there were basic security concerns. The territory of East 
Timor represented a power vacuum, geographically proximate to 
Indonesia’s border. Jakarta feared that this might invite increased 
communist diplomatic attention and influence in Southeast Asia. 
In a recorded meeting between Suharto and the Australian Prime 
Minister Gough Whitlam in September 1974, Suharto argued that ‘if 
Portuguese Timor were to become independent, it would give rise 
to problems. It [is] not economically viable. It would have to seek the 
help of another country … there [is] a big danger that communist 
countries – China or the Soviet Union – might gain the opportunity 
to intervene’.21 Suharto’s claims are significant in that they reflect 
Indonesian regional-based fears that directly stem from the Cold 
War environment. Indonesia’s decision to become involved in East 
Timor occurred, ‘not because the Portuguese half of the island was 
perceived as an asset but because it was thought necessary to secure it 
in order to deny its uncertain utility to others’.22 Indonesia’s support 
for Apodeti can therefore be viewed in light of Indonesia’s concern 
with national security. This was especially necessary considering 
Jakarta’s ‘fundamental sense of territorial vulnerability, arising from 
geographic fragmentation and ethno-religious diversity, made acute 
by the dominant influence of the military and their perspective in 
government’.23 In Jakarta’s view, East Timor represented a potential 
‘backdoor entrance’ for the spread of insurgency movements. The 
prospect of a FRETILIN controlled East Timor ‘was not taken lightly 
in Jakarta, particularly among the military, where great concern was 
expressed over the likelihood that a Marxist-led eastern Timor could 
become a support base for communist insurgencies and infiltration 
throughout Indonesia’.24 Even an East Timor controlled by the UDT 
was of little comfort. This was because the new Portuguese government 
‘was seen as unstable and vulnerable to communist takeover’.25 As 
Suharto informed Whitlam in 1974, ‘decolonization in Portuguese 
Timor should not upset either Indonesian or regional security’.26
It is undeniable that following Vietnamese communist victory in 
Indochina, there existed a generalized fear of communist expansion 
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in Southeast Asia, so security-based concerns were a reality. Arguably, 
however, Suharto’s comments on East Timor were also an attempt 
to justify a power-maximizing Indonesian policy. This assessment 
is supported by the fact that, while states have to consider future 
expectations in formulating policy,27 there is little evidence of actual 
communist intent to intervene in East Timor. Indeed, Indonesia 
appears to have exaggerated the communist threat by ‘fabricat[ing] 
press reports [claiming] Chinese agents were orchestrating anti-
Indonesian and pro-independence sentiment in East Timor and that 
Beijing was providing FRETILIN with arms and military preparation 
for a communist coup’.28 In an Australian government letter sent 
from Minister John McCredie to First Assistant Secretary of South 
East Asia Division Graham Feakes in May 1974, McCredie stated 
that ‘there is as yet no evidence that we are aware of regarding any 
significant communist activity in Portuguese Timor’.29 Similarly, in a 
telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia 
dated 20 September 1975, it was confirmed that ‘the Indonesians 
have assurances from the Russians of nonintervention’.30 Moerdani 
was ‘slightly less sure about the Chinese because of traffic between the 
substantial Chinese minority in Timor and Macau. In any event, there 
is little likelihood of effective Soviet or Chinese involvement’.31 This 
is a point emphasized by James Cotton, who confirms that ‘neither 
Australia nor even Indonesian policy makers spend much time on 
the grounds for this claim’.32 Indeed, Indonesia had expressed some 
desire to accommodate the Vietnamese communists. As Suharto 
informed Ford in 1975, there was the possibility that Vietnam, ‘will 
apply Communism just within their borders in order to improve the 
conditions of their peoples. If so, we are okay’.33
Indonesian expansionism and conquest
The foregoing highlights the distinct possibility that Jakarta had interests 
in relation to East Timor that extended beyond securing state security 
in an uncertain regional environment. As Kiernan argues, ‘the major 
Indonesian goal was conquest’.34 With conquest as a goal, ‘Suharto 
secured US acquiescence in the territory’s prospective incorporation 
by Indonesia. The expansionist impulse would simply be denied; the 
excuse, the communist threat’.35 This analysis is supported by the view 
of Prime Minister Lee of Singapore, who informed Dr Kissinger in 
a 1975 meeting that ‘Indonesia wants to be a great military power’.36 
In Southeast Asia, Indonesia was recognized as ‘the dominant and 
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hegemonic power’ with a ‘strong sense of proprietary entitlement to 
order inter-state relations’.37 Indonesia was aware that its position as 
regional hegemon, and its strategic location and pro-Western, anti-
communist leanings, were vital for the US during and following its 
defeat in North Vietnam in 1975.
This sense of proprietary entitlement can be seen in Indonesia’s 
relations with neighbouring territories. According to Ramos-Horta, 
‘West New Guinea was the first flagrant act of land-grabbing carried 
out by the Indonesian generals. Then as today, Indonesia, because of 
its vast natural resources and strategic location … managed to win the 
acquiescence of major powers to its empire-building’.38 While East 
Timor ostensibly appeared to be of little worth to Jakarta, seabed oil 
and gas reserves in the Timor Gap provided the possibility of rich 
future resources. Indeed, a seabed border agreement was negotiated 
between Indonesia and Australia in May 1971, which demarcated the 
area east of Timor. This area was roughly equidistant between the 
two countries, and contained a wealth of oil and gas deposits.39 This 
will certainly have factored into Indonesia’s decision-making when 
contemplating the future of East Timor.
What is apparent is that the annexation of East Timor satisfied two 
key Indonesian interests. First, it reflected a security-based goal of 
denying external communist forces a potential regional ally. Second, 
it satisfied Indonesia’s desire to maximize its regional power position 
through conquest and expansion. As a recently decolonized territory 
bordering the archipelago, Indonesia clearly had the most compelling 
interests at stake in the future of East Timor. These were arguably 
vital interests, affecting Indonesia’s regional security and sense of 
prestige and power. With clear interests at stake in the territory, Jakarta 
increasingly sought to influence the final outcome of East Timor’s bid 
for self-determination.
Civil war in East Timor
Due to weak support for Apodeti, the Indonesian government 
attempted to bribe or pressure the leaders of the various East Timorese 
parties to defend integration, although this failed to garner support.40 
In light of the uncertain regional and international environment, 
FRETILIN and the UDT entered into a coalition in January 1975, 
a move supported by the Portuguese government.41 The aim of this 
coalition was to establish an independent East Timor. From the outset, 
Indonesia sought to undermine this coalition. It did so through a 
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‘campaign of de-stabilization’ called Operasi Komodo, which began 
not long after the legalization of the East Timorese political parties in 
1974.42 Operasi Komodo specialized in the dissemination of propaganda 
and disinformation within the East Timorese territory, with the sole 
purpose of inciting tension between the factions.
An important change had occurred in East Timor by April 1975. 
The UDT, dominated by landowning families, felt increasingly 
threatened by a number of FRETILIN’s policies, such as land reform, 
which were increasingly popular with the Timorese citizens.43 These 
differences were seized upon by the Indonesian intelligence services, 
which ‘fomented suspicion and conflict’ between the parties.44 In early 
August 1975, the Vice President of the UDT travelled to Jakarta 
to meet with President Suharto’s aide, General Ali Murtopo, before 
travelling on to Australia.45 Evidence suggests that Murtopo, in 
conjunction with the Indonesian intelligence agency, was able to play 
on UDT fears, and convince the UDT ‘that FRETILIN was plotting 
an uprising to impose a ‘communist-styled’ regime on the island.’46 The 
UDT leaders ‘apparently concluded that Portuguese Timor’s hopes for 
independence now depended upon curbing FRETILIN influence’.47 
The UDT visit to Jakarta also angered FRETILIN leaders, who 
accused the UDT leadership of ‘securing clandestine Indonesian 
support for UDT against FRETILIN in return for future Indonesian 
support in Timorese affairs’.48 Based on the information provided by 
Murtopo, the UDT leaders ‘counter-charged that FRETILIN was 
acting in the interests of the Portuguese Communist Party’.49
By May 1975, the UDT had left the coalition. In July 1975, Suharto 
publicly stated that ‘East Timor could not be independent, due to 
the alleged inviability of the territory in economic terms … and 
that the future of East Timor lay in integration with Indonesia’.50 
By August 1975, it was clear to policy makers in Australia that 
‘Indonesia was determined to invade East Timor, all that was wanting 
was an appropriate pretext’.51 Within East Timor, tensions increased 
throughout 1975. From March to July, the Portuguese authorities 
staged local village elections, with FRETILIN consistently gaining 
between 50-55 percent of the East Timorese vote.52 The results of the 
Timorese election prompted the Indonesian military to act, ‘to check 
the Front’s growing popular support’.53 The military orchestrated a 
UDT coup, which was launched on 11 August 1975.
In a show of force, members and supporters of the UDT coup seized 
key points in Dili and Baucau. In addition to weapons seized from the 
police arsenal, UDT also received Indonesian ground, air and naval 
gunfire support, which allowed the capture of Timorese districts such 
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as Balibó and Maliana.54 There were also ‘unconfirmed reports that 
Indonesia was providing vehicles and advisors to UDT forces … and 
that areas falling under UDT control were being integrated into the 
administrative structure of West Timor’.55 Within days of the Dili coup, 
policy makers in Australia became aware that ‘the coup makers acted 
with the foreknowledge of BAKIN, the Indonesian State Intelligence 
Organization’.56 Adam Malik reportedly pledged ‘Indonesia’s “full 
support, quietly or openly” to the four anti-FRETILIN parties, 
sometimes collectively referred to as the “Timorese anticommunist 
movement” in the Indonesian press’.57
On 20 August, FRETILIN forces defeated a UDT force at Aileu, 
before moving onto Dili, which was captured seven days later, and 
Baucau, which was recaptured ten days later. FRETILIN were 
supported by troops from the Portuguese colonial army, which 
facilitated the establishment of Falantil (Armed Forces for the National 
Liberation of East Timor), a pro-independence military wing.58 Civil 
war raged between the UDT and Fretilin, with violent fighting 
leaving a predicted 2,000-3,000 people dead.59 On 23 August, the 
Portuguese Minister for Foreign Affairs contacted the UN, stating that 
‘the situation had deteriorated … conditions in the capital had become 
chaotic; hundreds of inhabitants, including women and children, 
had been murdered’.60 The Portuguese administration withdrew 
from Dili on 27 August, retreating to Atauro Island.61 In doing so, it 
surrendered all authority and responsibility for the territory.62 From 
the beginning of September 1975, Fretilin had secured military control 
of the majority of East Timor.63 These events left Jakarta with two 
options: to accept an independent, FRETILIN-controlled East Timor 
at the Indonesian border, or to forcefully intervene and integrate the 
territory into the archipelago.
ASEAN vanguard state – external power interest 
convergence
Despite having clear interests at stake following the decolonization 
of East Timor, Indonesia had been reluctant to launch a full-scale 
invasion of the territory. As will be shown, Indonesia was in receipt 
of economic, military and domestic support from Western powers, 
which it was not willing to place in jeopardy. It therefore became vital 
to obtain great power acquiescence prior to invasion. As the vanguard 
state, Indonesia set out to obtain support from these major powers. 
Evidence will show that Australia and the US supported Suharto’s East 
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Timor policy ‘so as not to offend the Soeharto [sic] government and 
because the West did not wish to see another piece of Southeast Asia 
fall to “communism” so soon after the fall of Saigon’.64
Indonesia and the United States: the Ford Government (1974–
1977)
By 1975, the ‘domino theory appeared more real than perhaps at 
any time during the Cold War’.65 For the US, an expansionist Soviet 
Union consolidating power in Southeast Asia was a significant threat. 
Successive US governments viewed Indonesia as ‘a bastion of anti-
Communism and stability, a crucial source of resources, and one of 
the fastest growing sites in the world for US private investment’.66 
Kissinger confirmed the US position towards Indonesia in July 1974, 
stating that it needed ‘Indonesia to play a more active stabilizing role 
in light of the reduction of our own presence in Southeast Asia’.67 
Between 1966 and 1974, Washington had averaged over $200 million 
per year in economic aid to Jakarta, and more than $20 million in 
military assistance.68 Seeking strong allies in the East, Kissinger and Ford 
embarked on a ‘renewed search for regional strongmen that Suharto 
skilfully exploited’.69 This is evident in US military aid to Indonesia, 
which increased from $20 million in the 1960s and early 1970s, to 
nearly $43 million in the year 1976.70 Between 1976 and 1979, the US 
furnished Indonesia with total military assistance of over $250 million.71
In 1973, the US suggested that ‘Indonesia should play a larger role 
in Southeast Asian regional defence and that the US should begin 
increasing military assistance commensurate with that role’.72 This 
suggestion was well received by Suharto, who in a meeting with 
Kissinger and Ford stated that his main goal was to combat communism, 
and he ‘consistently (if mistakenly) described the independence 
movement of East Timor (FRETILIN) as communist-dominated’.73 In 
light of recent events in Indochina, Ford and Kissinger were inclined to 
accept the veracity of Suharto’s claims. By mid-1975, Suharto was able 
to use the US defeat in Vietnam to negotiate increased economic and 
military aid. During a meeting between General Suharto and President 
Ford at Camp David on 5 July, Ford informed Suharto that the US 
was ‘able to make available some military equipment items to help you 
in your situation – four naval vessels … some tanks, aircraft such as 
C-47, and four C-123 transports’.74 Suharto elaborated on Indonesia’s 
regional problems, highlighting his concerns regarding communist 
military strength, ‘fanaticism and ideology’. Suharto requested that 
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the US agree ‘to strengthen the [Indonesian] national resilience … the 
most important need is not in the military field but in the economic 
area. This is where we must build the nation’. Ford agreed, stating that 
the US would do ‘what we can do to supply those needs’.
Having secured increased economic and military aid, Suharto turned 
the conversation to East Timor, stating a preference for ‘carrying out 
decolonization through the process of self-determination’. However, 
Suharto went on to state that ‘with such a small territory and no 
resources, an independent country would hardly be viable … if they 
want to integrate into Indonesia as an independent nation, that is not 
possible because Indonesia is one unitary state. So the only way is to 
integrate into Indonesia’. Suharto summarized his concern, stating 
that ‘those who want independence are those who are Communist-
influenced. Those wanting Indonesian integration are being subjected 
to heavy pressure by those who are almost Communists … I want 
to assert that Indonesia doesn’t want to insert itself into Timor 
self-determination, but the problem is how to manage the self-
determination process with a majority wanting unity with Indonesia’.
Having sown the seeds of communist threat in East Timor in the 
minds of Kissinger and Ford, ‘Suharto returned from Washington 
on July 8 and made his first public statement suggesting that an 
independent East Timor was not viable’.75 It was only a few days later 
when UDT leaders launched their coup to suppress FRETILIN.
The United States as a silent ally
The US largely followed Indonesia’s lead with regard to events in East 
Timor, opting for a silent partner approach. Concerned about the 
possible communist sympathies of Timorese political factions such as 
FRETILIN, the US deemed absorption into Indonesia to be the only 
viable policy available. As early as February 1975, US officials were aware 
that Indonesia had made the ‘basic decision that an independent Timor, 
susceptible to communist influence would be [an] unacceptable threat 
to Indonesia’s security, and that integration of Timor into Indonesia 
[was the] only acceptable long term solution’.76 US recommendation at 
that time was a posture of ‘maximum … silence, avoiding any basis for 
suggesting either US encouragement or discouragement of Indonesian 
actions’.77 In a memorandum from WR Smyser of the National Security 
Council Staff to Dr Kissinger on 4 March 1975, Smyser surmised ‘the 
Indonesian Government fears that a hasty Portuguese pullout will leave 
a weakened Timor subject to the Left Wing instincts of a few leaders of 
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the independence movement, leaders whom the Indonesians fear to be 
influenced by Peking’.78 According to Smyser, ‘President Suharto has 
developed programs to increase Indonesian influence in Timor through 
low-key political operations’. However, ‘these programs have not been 
very successful. Because of that, there has been mounting pressure in 
Indonesia for direct military action’. According to Indonesian reports 
obtained by the US, ‘preparations for such action are proceeding, 
and there is one report that Suharto has ordered incorporation of 
Portuguese Timor into Indonesia by no later than August, 1975, by 
force if necessary. Portuguese officials have told us they will not resist 
any Indonesian use of force’.
With events unfolding rapidly, US Ambassador Newsom 
‘recommended a general policy of silence … arguing that we have 
considerable interests in Indonesia and none in Timor. If we try to 
dissuade Indonesia from what Suharto may regard as a necessary use 
of force, major difficulties in our relations could result’.79 During a 
Secretary of State’s staff meeting in Washington on 12 August 1975, 
Habib confirmed this approach, stating that ‘I think it is a situation in 
which we should just do nothing. It is quite obvious that the Indonesians 
are not going to let any hostile element take over an island right in the 
midst of the Indonesian archipelago’.80 Similarly, in a Secretary of State 
meeting on 8 October 1975, Habib confirmed that ‘it looks like the 
Indonesians have begun the attack on Timor … I think what we are 
doing is like Jack – keeping our mouth shut about the thing’.81 When 
asked by Kissinger if that was conceivable action to take, Habib replied 
‘we’ve been doing it, so I think it’s quite conceivable’.82
However, Suharto still remained cautious about launching a full-scale 
invasion. Suharto’s main concern was that invasion might jeopardize 
‘the long-term US military assistance that the armed forces were 
counting on to undertake their plans for military modernization’.83 
This stance was confirmed in a telegram from the Embassy in Indonesia 
to the Department of State on 16  August 1975. The telegram 
confirmed Suharto’s ‘apprehension’ over the US reaction, with General 
Murdani of the Indonesian army intelligence stating that the President 
‘realized that if Indonesia invaded Timor, [the] results of [the] Camp 
David meeting would be lost’.84 Murdani was informed that the ‘US 
[was] not opposed to incorporation of Timor but hoped peaceful 
alternatives could be found’.85 In a meeting between Dr Kissinger and 
Adam Malik on 5 September 1975, Kissinger sympathized with the 
Indonesian position, informing him that he ‘had always assumed that 
in about ten years or so Indonesia would take over Portuguese Timor 
– for symmetry! I will not spend any sleepless nights over it’.86 Malik 
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stressed that ‘in Timor things are moving very quickly. We could use 
your help … with the Portuguese. Maybe you could talk to them … 
we hope the non-communists will come out on top … the delegation 
will be going over our military needs and our priorities’. Kissinger 
concluded that he had ‘always been in favor of a decent military aid 
level for Indonesia. You can count on it’.
Ford and Suharto meeting, December 1975
Relations between the US and Indonesia continued to develop 
positively, with the establishment of a joint US-Indonesian Consultative 
Commission signed in November 1975. This culminated in a 
meeting between General Suharto, President Ford and Dr Kissinger 
on 6 December 1975. Dr Kissinger prepared President Ford for this 
meeting in a memorandum sent 21  November 1975, informing 
Ford that ‘your Jakarta visit will be a dramatic reaffirmation of the 
significance we attach to our relations with Indonesia, the largest and 
most important non-Communist Southeast Asian state’.87 The US goal 
was therefore to ‘focus our dialogue increasingly on broader issues of 
continuing major interest of the two governments: the US role and US 
interests in East Asia, both for their own sake and to balance Soviet and 
PRC [People’s Republic of China] pressures’. Kissinger continued to 
state that ‘in the post-Vietnam environment, US interests in Indonesia 
are based both on its present position in the region and, especially, on 
its anticipated future role … its geographic location and resources are 
of major strategic importance in the region’.
With regard to East Timor, Kissinger stated that ‘Jakarta has become 
concerned that the backward and resource-poor colony would attain 
what the Indonesians expect would be a weak, unviable independence 
leaving it susceptible to outside – especially Chinese – domination … 
a merger with Indonesia is probably the best solution for the colony if 
the inhabitants agree’. Having been suitably briefed by Kissinger, Ford 
met Suharto on 6 December. The meeting specifically focused on US 
and Indonesian uncertainty following the end of the Vietnam War. 
Suharto turned the conversation to East Timor, asking Ford for US 
‘understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action 
[in East Timor]’.88 Ford replied that ‘we will understand and will not 
press you on the issue. We understand the problem you have and the 
intentions you have’. Kissinger highlighted the US concern regarding 
Indonesian use of US arms during the invasion, but ultimately stressed 
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that ‘whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence 
the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return’.
This conversation highlights US concerns regarding the regional 
environment, and the importance of Indonesia to the US in its 
regional strategic calculations. Evidence suggests that Indonesia sought 
to maximize its regional power, commensurate to that role. Clearly, the 
US made a conscious decision to aid Indonesia in its policy towards 
East Timor. The US ‘was grateful for political support and corporate 
access to what President Nixon called “by far the greatest prize in 
the South-East Asian area” and was glad to do a painless … favour 
for a loyal friend’.89 The meeting between Ford and Suharto was 
instrumental in removing any residual concerns Suharto had regarding 
a potentially negative response to invasion by the US government.
Indonesia and Australia: a most important neighbour
Australia’s positioning in relation to Indonesia meant that a friendly 
relationship was vital to Canberra’s security and defence. In the 
20th century, Indonesia has been instrumental in providing ‘a strategic 
shield to Australia’s vulnerable and sparsely populated northern 
approaches’.90 At the height of the Cold War, this strategic shield was of 
significant importance, preventing potential intervention from external 
powers. Because Indonesia had the ‘capacity to disturb or enhance the 
regional balance of power, because Indonesia can facilitate or check 
Australia’s entrée to regional political forums and because of great power 
interests in Indonesia, Australian diplomats have been loath to offend 
Indonesia’.91 Instead, Australia has been confronted with the challenge 
of how to ‘reconcile its Western origins with its Asian geography in 
creating a viable security identity’.92 Australia has sought to address 
this issue through stable relations with Indonesia. Within Canberra, it 
was believed that maintaining Indonesia’s territorial integrity was ‘the 
best way of maintaining geopolitical ‘stability’ in Australia’s corner 
of Southeast Asia’.93 In such a diverse nation, Suharto’s firm control 
of the archipelago, especially his anti-communism and intolerance 
of separatism, was accepted as the key to Australia’s own territorial 
security.94 Indonesia was ‘viewed as a staunch anti-communist regime 
that was a positive force for regional stability and moderation’.95 
Richard Woolcott, who became Australian Ambassador in March 1975, 
admitted taking a ‘pragmatic or realist approach to international affairs’ 
in his dealings with Indonesia.96 Woolcott argued that if Indonesia were 
‘intent on a policy of [East Timor] absorption … Australia [was] in no 
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position to deny that intention, any effort [would] only cause harm to 
a bilateral relationship so important to Australia’s security’.97
While a positive bilateral relationship with Indonesia was an 
important interest for Australia, this does not mean that Canberra did 
not have wider geopolitical concerns regarding the Cold War regional 
environment in 1975. In an Australian government memorandum 
regarding the strategic significance of Timor to Australia and its 
relation to a major power threat, it was stated that ‘access specifically 
to Portuguese Timor by a major power would: greatly facilitate the 
application of strategic pressure against Indonesia to make additional 
base areas in eastern Indonesia available to it. Indonesia might well be 
susceptible to such pressure; seriously prejudice the potential military 
capability of Australia or its allies to support Indonesia against such 
pressure; and enable the development of air bases which would 
enhance a major power’s operational capabilities’.98 Canberra was also 
of the opinion that endorsing Indonesian actions in East Timor would 
open the Australian government to oil and gas drilling rights in the 
region’s waters.99 As Minister in the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, 
John McCredie stated that ‘Indonesian absorption of Timor makes 
geopolitical sense. Any other long-term solution would be potentially 
disruptive of both Indonesia and the region. Its [absorption] would 
help confirm our seabed agreement with Indonesia’.100 As previously 
highlighted, the Timor Gap is rich in oil and natural gases. The seabed 
border agreement negotiated between Indonesia and Australia in May 
1971 to delimit the area east of Timor held the promise of vast future 
gains.101 It is apparent from Australian documents that Timorese oil 
was a major interest. In a submission to Australian Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Don Willesee in May 1974, it was confirmed that Australia had 
direct interests in Timor, with oil specifically referred to at that time.102
As will be shown, successive Australian governments assumed a 
position on Indonesia’s East Timor policy that conformed to these 
core state interests. Prime Minister Gough Whitlam made it clear 
to Suharto that he supported the integration of East Timor into the 
Indonesian archipelago. Despite a succeeding Fraser government 
initially criticizing this approach, once in office, there was little change 
to this policy. Australia’s geo-strategic interests were to take precedence 
over independence for East Timor.
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The Whitlam Government (December 1972–November 1975)
Australian Prime Minister Gough Whitlam played a vital role 
in supporting and enabling Suharto’s East Timor policy. Within 
Canberra, ‘Timor policy was … Whitlam policy’.103 Whitlam had a 
‘principled aversion to mini-states’, and believed that it ‘was better to 
have one neighbour [Indonesia] to deal with than a proliferation of 
small countries’.104 According to this view, an independent East Timor 
would only succeed in destabilizing the region and its neighbours. 
Whitlam also perceived ‘the separation of West and East Timor as a 
legacy of colonialism, and indicated he was prepared to dismiss East 
Timorese claims for independence in order to rectify this “colonial 
accident”’.105
As part of an East Timor enquiry conducted by the Australian 
Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, Whitlam testified that he 
had inherited his view of East Timor from preceding governments.106 
The Menzies government (1949–66) believed that Portuguese Timor 
would inevitably become the object of Indonesian attention, and 
that this was only a matter of time and could not be prevented. 
Mr Whitlam told the Committee that analysis of this period ‘came 
to the same conclusion, that East Timor was non-viable politically 
and economically’.107 This belief underscored Whitlam’s approach 
to East Timor, which was articulated in a meeting with President 
Suharto in September 1974. Prior to Whitlam’s meeting with Suharto, 
Senator Willesee, Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, ‘approved a 
policy that gave emphasis to self-determination for the East Timorese 
people’.108 At the meeting, however, Whitlam took a different line 
to the brief. This was to have significant consequences for Australia’s 
future East Timor policy.
At the September meeting, Whitlam informed Suharto that ‘first, 
he believed that Portuguese Timor should become part of Indonesia. 
Second, this should happen in accordance with the properly expressed 
wishes of the people of Portuguese Timor’.109 Whitlam emphasized 
‘that this was not yet Government policy but that it was likely to 
become that’. Whitlam stated his belief that ‘Portuguese Timor was too 
small to be independent. It was economically unviable. Independence 
would be unwelcome to Indonesia, Australia and to other countries 
in the region, because an independent Portuguese Timor would 
inevitably become the focus of attention of others outside the region’. 
The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs prepared a background 
paper, dated 11 September 1974, to take account of the approach 
adopted by Whitlam during his meeting with Suharto. In the paper, it 
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stated that Australia ‘shares [Indonesia’s] belief that the voluntary union 
of Portuguese Timor with Indonesia, on the basis of an internationally 
acceptable act of self determination, would seem to serve the objective 
of decolonization, and at the same time the interests of stability in the 
region’.110 Whitlam ‘dismissed advice that by acquiescing in Indonesian 
demands he was in fact encouraging a hardline faction led by Ali 
Murtopo and other generals’.111 This was despite evidence that ‘already 
for some months previously the Indonesians had settled on a policy 
of incorporation’.112
Whitlam met with Suharto again in April 1975, at Townsville, 
Queensland. At this meeting, Whitlam told Suharto that ‘he still 
hoped that Portuguese Timor would be associated with or integrated 
into Indonesia; but this result should be achieved in a way which 
would not upset the Australian people’.113 He informed Suharto that 
‘the majority of the people of Portuguese Timor had no sense of 
politics, and that in time they would come to recognize their ethnic 
kinship with their Indonesian neighbours’. President Suharto informed 
Whitlam that while Indonesia ‘had no territorial ambition to include 
the territory of Portuguese Timor into the Republic of Indonesia’, 
Jakarta had ‘concluded that integration with Indonesia was the best 
solution’.
In a bid to support Jakarta, Canberra refused to assist the FRETILIN 
administration that was established in Dili following the UDT coup.114 
José Ramos-Horta, Foreign Minister and founder of FRETILIN, 
travelled to Australia with the hope of getting the Australian Consulate 
in Dili reopened, only to be informed by Canberra that this would 
not be possible, as it would offend the Indonesians.115 As Ambassador 
Woolcott confirmed in a letter dated 24  September to Canberra 
Times journalist Bruce Juddery: ‘the alternatives now seem to be a de 
facto FRETILIN Government or the integration of East Timor into 
Indonesia. Neither will involve a genuine act of self-determination … 
basically, this situation is Portugal’s – not Indonesia’s – fault. Given 
this Hobbes choice, I believe Australia’s interests are better served by 
association with Indonesia than by independence’.116
Similarly, in a leaked August 1975 telegram, Woolcott stated that 
‘we leave events to take their course, and act in a way which would be 
designed to minimize the public impact in Australia and show private 
understanding to Indonesia of their problems. I am recommending 
a pragmatic rather than a principled stand but that is what national 
interest and foreign policy is all about’.117
Australian support for Indonesia was not merely tacit in nature. 
From the Whitlam government onwards, a pro-active role was taken 
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whereby Australia ‘“neutralized” negative public opinion about 
Indonesia … and aided Indonesia in the diplomatic sphere’.118 One 
example of this is Australia’s continued support for Indonesia following 
the killing of five Australian journalists at Balibó in 1975. In the process 
of monitoring Indonesian military radio, Australian intelligence had 
become immediately aware that Indonesia’s Kopassandha troops 
were responsible for the attack. These troops, among others, had 
received substantial military training by the Australian, British and 
US governments.119 Nevertheless, ‘far from criticizing Indonesia or 
demanding a proper investigation of the killings, Australia sought to 
deflect attention from the available evidence’.120 Canberra ‘publicly 
accept[ed] the false Indonesian claim that the “Balibó Five” had been 
caught in the crossfire during a battle between FRETILIN and UDT 
forces’.121 According to James Dunn, ‘the fact that … we did not 
even protest was to the Indonesian military a green light’.122 Dunn 
confirmed that Whitlam ‘astonished the Indonesians by making it 
very clear [in 1974] that his preferred solution was that East Timor 
go to Indonesia … the Indonesians didn’t expect Australia to be so 
generous. Whitlam’s words encouraged the military to believe that 
this was the way to go’.123
The Fraser Government (November 1975–March 1983)
By 11 November 1975, Malcolm Fraser had been appointed to replace 
Whitlam as Prime Minister. According to Whitlam, this change in 
leadership constituted ‘the last refraining influence on Indonesian 
action’.124 After this date, ‘Australia had a Government which, in 
Indonesian eyes, shared its suspicion of communist insurgency, and 
would plainly welcome any action to supress it’.125 Indeed, Fraser did 
appear more concerned about communist influence than Whitlam. 
Fraser depicted ‘the Soviet Union as bent on preponderance’, and 
argued that ‘the Soviet Union still seeks to expand its influence 
throughout the world in order to achieve Soviet primacy’.126
Despite an apparent joint concern with Indonesia regarding 
communist influence in the region, the Fraser government set out 
to publicly distance itself from Indonesia’s actions in East Timor. On 
26 November 1975, Mr Fraser indicated that his caretaker government 
‘would do nothing about reported Indonesian bombings in East 
Timor … the tragic events that were occurring were a direct result 
of the barrenness of the foreign policy of the Whitlam Government, 
which the caretaker Government had to continue’.127 Australian 
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Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, also ‘initially took 
a pro-independence stand and was highly critical of the Whitlam 
government’s handling of the entire East Timor issue and acquiescence 
in Indonesian policy’.128 However, evidence suggests that this was little 
more than public posturing. On 2 October 1975, Peacock stated in 
Parliament: ‘we understand Indonesia’s concern. The events of the civil 
war in Timor are taking place in an area at the end of the Indonesian 
island archipelago. Who can doubt the concern that Indonesia must 
feel’.129 The Indonesian government ‘took the statement as an assurance 
that an incoming Fraser government would maintain continuity with 
the Timor policy of the Whitlam government’.130
Peacock reinforced this statement in a meeting with Mr Harry 
Tjan of the Jakarta Centre for Strategic and International Studies, and 
Mr Lim Bian Kie of General Moerdani’s Special Operations Group, 
on 24 September 1975. An Indonesian record of the meeting stated: 
‘Mr Peacock and his party would not protest against Indonesia if 
Indonesia is forced to do something about Portuguese Timor, for 
example to “go in” to restore peace there … basically he respects 
Whitlam’s policy in this Portuguese Timor problem, and he is 
personally of the same opinion’.131 This disclosure by Indonesian 
officials of ‘the accommodating nature’ of Peacock, while on holiday 
in Bali in September 1975, ‘was strongly denied by Peacock when he 
was questioned about the matter in the federal parliament’.132
In addition to support from Peacock, a message from Prime 
Minister Fraser, delivered to President Suharto on 25 November 1975, 
‘had been taken by the Indonesians as supportive of their actions 
in Timor’.133 The message referred to ‘the great importance which 
Mr Fraser attaches to Australia’s relations with Indonesia’.134 It went 
on to say: ‘the Prime Minister … recognizes the need for Indonesia 
to have an appropriate solution for the problem of Portuguese Timor’. 
Suharto is reported to have ‘greatly appreciated’ the Prime Minister’s 
message, stating that ‘Indonesia too attached great importance to its 
relations with Australia’. With regard to Timor, Suharto stated that 
‘he was very pleased Mr Fraser recognized the need for Indonesia to 
have an appropriate solution of the Timor question. He said there 
was ‘no change’ in Indonesian policy. Portuguese Timor should be 
decolonized ‘properly’. Indonesian interests however needed to be 
taken into account’.
According to Whitlam, ‘from 11  November Indonesia knew 
that any “anti-Communist” action she took would have support in 
Canberra’.135 Whitlam also alleged that Fraser knew beforehand that 
Indonesia planned to invade East Timor. This was a ‘result of his 
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knowing that Australians were evacuated a couple of days before’.136 
Fraser and the Leader of the National Country Party, Mr Anthony, 
stated ‘if one thing was better calculated than anything else to incite 
the Indonesians to take action … it was the fear that there would be 
communist control in East Timor’.137
Summary: Indonesia obtains great power commitments
What is clear from the foregoing discussion is that obtaining 
Washington and Canberra support for Indonesia’s East Timor policy 
gave Suharto the confidence to act. As the vanguard state, Indonesia 
was able to utilize the environment in Southeast Asia in 1975 to 
gain great power commitments to secure its own interests. Both the 
United States and Australia relied on strong relations with Indonesia, 
to secure their own vital interests in an uncertain Cold War regional 
environment. Stable relations with Indonesia enhanced regional 
security and offered gains with respect to enhanced power. The 
securing of vital interests took precedence over the independence of 
a territory believed to be ‘too small, backwards and isolated to survive 
on its own’.138 By late November 1975, Jakarta was confident that a 
full-scale invasion of East Timor would not result in an international 
backlash, or any external power interference.
ASEAN institutional cohesion
It was not only external power backing that Suharto was anxious to 
obtain in advance of a full-scale invasion of East Timor. Regional 
support was also a vital component in Indonesia’s plans. By obtaining 
unanimous support within ASEAN, Suharto could portray a united 
regional front with respect to Indonesian actions in East Timor. A 
united ASEAN could help to deflect any unwanted international 
attention, and lend the invasion an appearance of legitimacy. As early 
as 1974, Suharto took steps to realize this goal. To understand ASEAN 
state responses to Indonesia’s East Timor policy, it is beneficial to 
consider the history of the Association, and the regional environment 
in which it found itself in 1975.
Suharto began his presidency with a desire to establish improved 
relations with neighbouring states, as evidenced by the creation of 
ASEAN on 8 August 1967, less than six months into his presidency. 
The establishment of the Association also came one year after President 
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Suharto ended former President Sukarno’s policy of Konfrontasi with 
Malaysia. For the remaining founders of ASEAN, the formation of 
the Association was a way to draw Indonesia ‘into a limited security 
community’,139 thus preventing another ‘confrontation’ occurring 
between Indonesia and the ASEAN states. Indonesian intervention 
in East Timor came only eight years after ASEAN’s establishment. 
There was the possibility that open criticism of Indonesia could 
jeopardize improved regional relations. As such, any ASEAN state 
unease regarding Indonesia’s East Timor policy was ‘muted by the 
dictates of realpolitik’.140
An uncertain regional environment compounded this problem. 
Vietnamese communist expansion, with Soviet backing, was a 
primary fear for the ASEAN states. In June 1975, two months after 
US defeat in North Vietnam, Philip Habib visited Southeast Asia. In 
a memorandum from Dr Kissinger to President Ford summarizing the 
trip, Kissinger stated that ‘in each country it is believed that Hanoi’s 
success in Indochina has brought about a fundamental power shift 
in the region. All the Southeast Asian countries fear Hanoi, which 
they now see as a major force in the sub-region with plenty of arms, 
revolutionary zeal and the momentum of success’.141 A vulnerable and 
independent Timor could invite intervention by external powers, and 
as such was met with much regional consternation.142
As early as September 1974, Malaysia had been in support of 
Indonesia’s policy of integration with East Timor. Officials argued 
that if an independent East Timor ‘becomes a communist stronghold, 
it will endanger the security in the Southeast Asian region’.143 The 
Indonesian invasion was also supported by the Philippines, which 
stated the belief that ‘the people of Portuguese Timor had invited 
Indonesia to help them’144 and cautioned that a ‘power vacuum … 
would threaten peace in the region’.145 According to ASEAN officials, 
‘Chinese and Soviet support for the FRETILIN group in East Timor 
might slow the growing friendship between ASEAN countries and 
the two communist nations’.146 As such, the ASEAN members ‘were 
closely watching moves by China and the Soviet Union on the Timor 
issue, to see if these would be followed by material assistance, including 
arms’.147
It is also important to note that the annexation of small neighbouring 
territories was not an unusual occurrence in the Southeast Asian 
region. Indonesia annexed Aceh in 1949 and West Papua in 1969. This 
resulted in independence movements and attempts at secessionism, 
which represented an internal and external threat. Secessionism 
of various ethnic groups, such as the Patani United Liberation 
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Organization (PULO) in Southern Thailand, and the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF) in the Southern Philippines, have also waged 
long-running campaigns for independence. This meant that many 
regional states could relate to Indonesia’s predicament following 
decolonization in East Timor, and had some sympathy for Indonesia’s 
situation. Indeed, evidence suggests that Malaysia’s staunch support for 
Indonesia’s East Timor policy was due to designs Kuala Lumpur had 
on neighbouring Brunei. Malaysia believed Brunei should become 
another state in its own federation, despite Brunei’s strong opposition 
to the plan.148 Brunei’s integration with Malaysia was attractive to 
Kuala Lumpur, due to ‘Brunei’s awkward geographical position in 
the middle of Malaysia’s north Borneo territories’, and because ‘it 
possesses oil reserves … and the Sultan holds very substantial sterling 
cash reserves’.149 It was reported in Australia that ‘the possibility of a 
Malaysian takeover of the state may cast some light on recent Malaysian 
statements on the crisis in East Timor. One Government spokesman 
recently described the FRETILIN party, which has the upper hand 
in East Timor, as ‘communist’ and said the Government supports 
Indonesia’s position’.150
For Malaysia to realize its territorial ambitions in Brunei, ‘Indonesian 
approval would be a necessity. The Malaysian stand on Timor might 
be seen as part of an exercise in mutual self-help’.151 This view is 
supported in a telegram sent from the Embassy in Kuala Lumpur 
to the Secretary of State in Washington in September 1975, in 
which Australian and US officials expressed the view that ‘GOM 
[Government of Malaysia] would back Jakarta politically … in addition 
to close military-security ties maintained between GOM and GOI 
since Suharto came to power, Malaysians in past two years have given 
increasing indications of wanting to absorb Brunei at some future date 
thus would find it in own interests to support Timor take-over’.152 
According to Gough Whitlam, Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Andrew Peacock ‘had been under the illusion that Indonesia could be 
influenced through her partners in ASEAN … the ASEAN countries 
soon disabused him … It had become clear to me that ASEAN would 
not become involved after I had spoken to Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore 
on 8 August 1975 and to Tun Razak in Canberra in mid-October’.153 
During a meeting with Lee Kuan Yew in August 1975, Whitlam 
reportedly asked ‘whether Australia and Singapore, as members of the 
Five-Power Agreement and the Commonwealth, and as neighbours of 
the area, should confer about East Timor’.154 However, ‘Mr Lee would 
not have anything to do with the proposition’.155 The October 1975 
meeting between Razak and Whitlam was summarized in a telegram 
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from the Embassy in Canberra to the Secretary of State in Washington. 
It stated: ‘Both Whitlam and Razak expressed support for eventual 
Indonesian takeover of Timor. Both agreed not to criticize recent 
Indonesian military steps and expressed regret that [Indonesia] hadn’t 
acted more promptly following Portuguese pull out’.156
In its bid to aid Indonesia, Malaysia hosted Apodeti leadership, the 
Timorese political faction advocating integration with Indonesia. 
Malaysia also disseminated anti-FRETILIN propaganda, and 
supplied weapons to Indonesian special force troops.157 Indonesia’s 
Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, and Malaysia’s Prime Minister 
Razak began issuing statements about Timor becoming a base for 
communist subversion.158 Malaysia ‘even broadcast support for the 
decision of Indonesia to send troops to East Timor’.159 A telegram 
from the Indonesian Embassy to the Secretary of State in Washington 
summarized the ASEAN response to events in East Timor. It stated 
that ‘ASEAN neighbours would probably react mildly, perhaps even 
expressing “understanding” of Indonesian concerns … (indeed, there 
are reports Malaysia has urged [Indonesia] to seize Portuguese Timor 
quickly)’.160
Ultimately, concerns regarding the regional environment, coupled 
with a desire to maintain good relations with Indonesia, meant that 
the ASEAN states were not going to oppose Indonesian actions in 
East Timor. Support for Indonesia could also help achieve regional 
state interests regarding other neighbouring territories. The various 
ASEAN states voiced their support for Indonesia, and coupled with 
external power support, Suharto was now in a position to act and 
launch a full-scale invasion of East Timor.
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor (December 1975)
East Timor’s civil war provided Indonesia with the pretext it had been 
waiting for to intervene in the territory. Blaming the civil violence 
on FRETILIN, and wary of losing East Timor to independence, 
Suharto began preparations for a full-scale military intervention. It 
was reported, on 4 September 1975, that special Indonesian troops had 
been sent into East Timor to fight FRETILIN, infiltrate and organize 
UDT and Apodeti, and to encourage pro-Indonesian sentiments.161 
On 7 October, Indonesia captured the border city of Batugadé, as well 
as nearby Balibó. In an effort to prevent Indonesia from furthering its 
plan of annexation, FRETILIN unilaterally declared independence 
for the Democratic Republic of East Timor on 28 November. It 
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received recognition from twelve nation-states, but not the Portuguese 
government. This meant that the UN continued to recognize Portugal 
as the legitimate administrative authority in East Timor.162
Two days after East Timor’s declaration of independence, the 
Indonesian government influenced members from four East Timorese 
parties: the UDT, Apodeti, the KOTA and Trabalhista, to sign the 
Balibó Declaration, which sought integration with Indonesia.163 
Indonesia was therefore able to use the Balibó Declaration to justify 
its occupation of East Timor as being in the interests of the Timorese 
majority. Indonesia launched a full-scale invasion of East Timor on 
7 December 1975, less than 24 hours after Suharto’s meeting with 
President Ford in Jakarta. By noon, Indonesian troops had taken 
Dili, after combat with FALINTIL, the armed military wing of 
FRETILIN. Observers stated that ‘warships shelled Dili before dawn 
[on 6 December] … Indonesian paratroops began shooting down 
people in the streets as soon as they landed’.164 A second invasion 
on 10 December led to the seizure of Baucau, East Timor’s second 
largest town. By April 1976, some 35,000 Indonesian soldiers, one-
tenth of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI), occupied 
the Portuguese colony and further subjected it to Indonesian rule.165 
Ninety percent of Indonesian armed forces utilized US equipment at 
this time.166
Heavily outnumbered, FALINTIL troops fled to the mountains, 
where they began guerrilla warfare operations. In the first year of 
Indonesian occupation, it is believed 60,000 East Timorese were 
killed, averaging 10  percent of the population.167 According to 
Kiernan, the invasion and subsequent occupation took the lives of 
21–26 percent of the country’s population.168 It is believed that the 
majority of these deaths occurred in the first five years of occupation, 
with between 116,000 and 174,000 killed.169 The list of atrocities 
carried out by the TNI is vast, including massacres, public executions, 
rape, torture, starvation, political imprisonment, forced sterilizations, 
enforced marriages, and destruction of fields and villages using 
bombs and napalm.170 During this period, nearly all of the major 
FRETILIN leaders were killed or captured. Indonesia’s ‘extensive 
and indiscriminate killing’ succeeded in alienating the population, 
‘giving FRETILIN wide popular support’.171 James Dunn, former 
Australian consul in East Timor, reported that refugee accounts 
‘of Indonesia’s behaviour in East Timor, suggest that the plight of 
these people might well constitute, relatively speaking, the most 
serious case of contravention of human rights facing the world at 
this time’.172
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Indonesian incorporation of East Timor as the 27th province of 
the Republic was formally completed on 18 July 1976.173 Ali Alatas, 
Indonesia’s Ambassador to the UN and future Foreign Minister, 
summarized the Indonesian position, stating that Indonesia only 
entered Timor, ‘after Portugal’s precipitate abandonment of the 
territory and its failure to fulfil its responsibilities as administering 
authority, and in the face of FRETILIN’s mounting reign of terror 
against its own people’.174 For the next 25  years, the Indonesian 
government would claim that the majority of East Timorese supported 
integration, a claim unverifiable due to a ban on foreign journalists.
Invasion repercussions: Indonesian resistance to 
sovereignty violation
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor violated two principles 
of international law: the principle that states shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state; and 
the principle of self-determination of peoples.175 According to a 
representative of Portugal, Indonesian military aggression in East Timor 
‘had abruptly altered the course of the decolonization process which 
should and could have been concluded peacefully’.176 Portugal chose 
to sever diplomatic relations with Indonesia, and to call for an end to 
Indonesian intervention.177 On 12 December 1975 the UN General 
Assembly adopted Resolution 3485 by a recorded vote of 72 to 10 
with 43 abstentions. Within this Resolution, the General Assembly 
‘strongly deplored the military intervention of the armed forces of 
Indonesia in Portuguese Timor [and] called upon Indonesia … to 
withdraw without delay its armed forces from the territory’.178
The Portuguese Government also requested an urgent meeting 
of the UN Security Council, ‘to bring an end to the military 
aggression by Indonesia and to establish conditions that would enable 
the decolonization process to continue’.179 The Security Council 
considered the question of Timor at five meetings held between 
15 and 22 December 1975. José Ramos-Horta, who said he was 
speaking on behalf of the Central Committee of FRETILIN and of 
the Government of the Democratic Republic of East Timor, said 
that he did not deny the existence of a certain common cultural and 
ethnic origins of the peoples of East Timor and Indonesia, but he 
refused to consider it as sufficient reason for integration of the territory 
into Indonesia.180 Ramos-Horta called on ‘the Security Council to 
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condemn Indonesia’s aggression and to send a fact-finding mission 
to assess the situation in East Timor and enforce the decisions of 
the United Nations’. The Security Council adopted Resolution 384, 
which ‘deplored the intervention of the armed forces of Indonesia in 
East Timor’.181 The Council also ‘requested the Secretary-General to 
send urgently a special representative to East Timor to make an on-
the-spot assessment of the situation and to establish contact with all 
the parties in the territory and all states concerned in order to ensure 
the implementation of this resolution’.182
On 12 March 1976, Special Representative, Vittorio Winspeare 
Guicciardi, entered East Timor to assess the situation and to establish 
contact with the parties. Winspeare noted that the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of East Timor ‘had suggested a referendum with 
a choice between independence and integration with Indonesia … 
Indonesia had maintained that the decision of the Provisional 
Government for integration with Indonesia should be subjected to 
ratification by East Timor people’.183 In the UN General Assembly, 
the US ‘abstained in 1975 and voted against every East Timor 
resolution for the next seven years’.184 As Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
US Ambassador to the UN in 1975–76 confirmed in his memoirs, 
the US ‘wished things to turn out as they did [in East Timor], and 
worked to bring this about. The Department of State desired that 
the United Nations prove utterly ineffective in whatever measures it 
undertook. This task was given to me, and I carried it forward with 
no inconsiderable success’.185 This approach, adopted by a number 
of influential Western powers, prevented the UN from providing an 
effective response to the crisis. Between 1977 and 1980, ‘the US and 
other supporters of Jakarta … worked to remove East Timor from the 
agenda of the UN decolonization committee’.186
Despite UN resolutions remaining in force throughout Indonesia’s 
occupation of East Timor, from 1982 onwards, consideration of the East 
Timor issue was effectively muted. Very few states came out in support 
of East Timor. China, which ‘was still committed to supporting anti-
colonial movements in the developing world’, endorsed FRETILIN’s 
declaration of independence.187 After the invasion, the FRETILIN 
leader, Xavier do Amaral, ‘declared that China would henceforth 
speak on behalf of East Timor at the UN’.188 Although China went 
on to act as ‘East Timor’s primary patron’, supplying diplomatic and 
financial support, even this had ‘waned by 1978 when it [China] 
needed ASEAN support to fight the Vietnamese’.189
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The Ford Government (August 1974–January 1977)
The Ford government’s initial response to Indonesia’s invasion of East 
Timor was to delay any further arms sales pending a review by the 
State Department.190 Use of US arms in the invasion of East Timor 
violated a 1958 treaty between the US and Indonesia limiting the use 
of US-supplied weapons to ‘legitimate self-defence’.191 Kissinger and 
his officials were aware that the invasion of East Timor did not fall 
within the scope of the arms treaty. Kissinger complained: ‘And we 
can’t construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia 
as self-defence … I know what the law is but how can it be in the US 
national interest for us to … kick the Indonesians in the teeth?’192 In 
accordance with Kissinger’s view, military equipment continued to 
flow to Indonesia.193 During the six-month review period undertaken 
by the Department of State, the US ‘made four new offers of military 
equipment sales to Indonesia including maintenance and spare parts 
for the Rockwell OV-10 Bronco aircraft, designed specifically for 
counterinsurgency operations and employed during the invasion of 
East Timor’.194 In a February 1976 memorandum to Brent Scowcroft, 
the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Ambassador 
Newsom’s concerns were expressed with regards to military supply to 
Indonesia. It stated that ‘congressional action could end … military 
assistance to Indonesia’, and as such the state should ‘undertake a 
discreet survey of possible alternative measures to insure that Indonesia 
would still have access to American equipment’.195 In the Secretary of 
State’s Staff Meeting on 17 June 1976 Mr Habib stated that the US 
had ‘not objected in UN Security Council debates’, and as such the 
Indonesians were ‘quite happy with the position we’ve taken. We’ve 
resumed, as you know, all of our normal relations with them; and there 
isn’t any problem involved’.196 Kissinger replied, ‘not very willingly. 
Illegally and beautifully’.197
The Carter Government (January 1977–January 1981)
The Carter administration largely continued the Ford Administration’s 
East Timor policy, despite a ‘professed commitment to human 
rights’.198 The US Congress criticized Indonesia’s invasion and 
occupation of East Timor as being illegal. However, Michael Armacost 
of the US National Security Council Staff stated in June 1977, 
that ‘the Indonesian decision is irreversible … the US government 
has accepted it. Continued congressional hearings are regarded as 
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unwarranted and mischievous interference in their [the Indonesians] 
internal affairs’.199 In mid-1977, Carter administration officials blocked 
attempts made by US Congressman Don Fraser to obtain a copy of 
the Ford-Suharto meeting in 1975.200 In April 1977, a congressional 
delegation led by Lester Wolff visited East Timor. Indonesian military 
officials escorted Wolff on a ‘staged tour of the capital, Dili, during 
which they were greeted by cheering crowds and met with hand-
picked Timorese collaborators’.201 Upon returning to Washington, 
Wolff blamed Timorese deaths on FRETILIN guerrillas, stating that 
‘the Indonesians should have entered the fray much earlier and perhaps 
more lives could have been spared’.202
Indonesia’s request for military aid in 1978 ‘amounted to twice 
the quantity of aid the Ford administration had supplied’.203 US Vice 
President Walter Mondale met with Suharto in May 1978, with 
Suharto reported to have ‘very much appreciated [US] approval of the 
F-5 sale … but of more immediate importance, it needs a squadron of 
A-4s and a light arms factory’, all of which Mondale confirmed had 
been approved.204 With regard to East Timor, Mondale ‘reaffirmed 
that the Carter administration accepted the position of its predecessor 
and that it does not question the incorporation of East Timor into 
Indonesia’. Mondale noted however, ‘that there are problems on how 
to deal with our mutual concerns regarding East Timor and how to 
handle [the] public relations aspect of this problem’. In this respect, 
Mondale advised Suharto to allow a ‘private voluntary organization 
to be permitted to send people into East Timor … this would have a 
beneficial effect on US public opinion’.
Testifying in February 1978 before the House of Representatives 
International Relations Committee hearing on human rights, Robert 
Oakley, a senior Department of State official, reframed Indonesia’s 
invasion of East Timor as counter-insurgency, stating it was a legitimate 
response to ‘armed groups such as FRETILIN who are employing 
armed forces against the government’.205 This gave US military aid 
a ‘façade of legitimacy’.206 Ultimately, the US continued diplomatic, 
economic and military support to the Suharto regime following its 
invasion of East Timor. Coupled with the government’s attempts to 
manipulate events in Congress and at the UN, this prevented any 
intervention in East Timor, from the UN or powers external to the 
region. As Secretary of State Cyrus Vance confirmed, ‘now, insofar 
as speaking out on human rights issues abroad is concerned, we will 
speak out when we believe it is desirable to do so … In each case we 
must balance a political concern for human rights against economic 
and security goals’.207
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Australia and the United Nations envoy
One country notably in favour of UN General Assembly Resolution 
3485 was Australia. This was despite the Fraser caretaker government 
implying to Suharto in advance of the East Timor invasion that it 
would follow an acquiescent policy, as implemented by the previous 
Whitlam government. For the Fraser government, ‘the choice was 
between silent acquiescence or the encouragement of an active role 
by the United Nations which would keep the spotlight on the issue 
and would embarrass Indonesia in view of the heavy United Nations 
majority opposed to its actions in Timor’.208 While Australian support 
for UN Resolution 3485 appeared to be a sign of Australia moving 
away from Indonesia’s East Timor policy, this was undermined by the 
‘ineffectiveness’ of Australia’s actions with respect to the UN envoy, 
Dr Winspeare-Guicciardi.209
As part of the UN Security Council Resolution 384, Winspeare 
was sent to East Timor to make an assessment of the situation there. 
Winspeare therefore sought access to FRETILIN controlled areas. 
However, Australian actions largely hindered this access. Australia 
began by shutting down a FRETILIN controlled radio in Darwin, 
citing that this was ‘an illegal transmitter’ and not appropriate for 
purpose.210 The Australian government then declined to fly the 
envoy to FRETILIN territory, claiming this could ‘be done only 
when security for the aircraft and its mission was assured’.211 Australian 
Foreign Minister Peacock reacted to criticism that the Australian 
government had given in to Indonesian pressure to deny Winspeare 
access to East Timor, stating that ‘the uncertainties of the security 
situation precluded the sending of any Australian aircraft into the war 
zone in Timor’.212 However, ‘pro-FRETILIN elements in Australia 
claimed that a high-level source in DFA [Department of Foreign 
Affairs] “confirmed” that … Peacock had agreed during his recent 
meetings with … Malik in Indonesia to block Winspeare’s attempt to 
reach FRETILIN-held areas in Timor from Australian territory’.213 
This was an allegation that Peacock strongly denied, ‘both publicly 
and privately’.214
According to the findings of the Australian Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee, the Fraser government 
developed a twofold policy regarding East Timor: ‘Wanting to 
differentiate the new government’s position from that of the Whitlam 
government, which was described as “acquiescent”, on the grounds 
that Australia could not afford to condone Indonesia’s use of force in 
incorporating East Timor’.215 On 4 March 1976, Australia’s Foreign 
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Affairs Minister Peacock called ‘for a cessation of hostilities, withdrawal 
of Indonesian troops, [and the] implementation of a genuine act of 
self-determination’.216 At the same time, however, Peacock stated: 
‘Australia should not think of taking unilateral action against Indonesia 
over the East Timor issue … it would not serve Australia’s interests 
to embark on a collision course with Indonesia’.217 Peacock believed 
‘damage to Australia-Indonesia relations could be kept at a tolerable 
level if both sides respected each other’s interests and agreed to differ 
over Timor’.218
However, during Fraser’s visit to Jakarta in October 1976, ‘the 
Indonesians made it clear that they would no longer accept the 
Peacock formula: continued Australian government criticism of the 
integration process would be regarded as a display of hostility toward 
Indonesia’. It was therefore concluded that ‘Australia’s interests lay 
in hastening, not obstructing, the spread of Indonesian control’. 
The meeting ‘represented the end of official, albeit ambiguous, 
Australian opposition to the Indonesian invasion’.219 Following the 
meeting, the Fraser government began ‘a phase of tacit support for 
the Indonesian policy of eliminating all East Timorese resistance’.220 
Notably, neither Fraser nor Peacock reiterated the policy expressed 
by Peacock on 4 March, ‘although they were pressed to do so on 
many occasions’.221 In a statement to Parliament on 20  October 
1976, Peacock said ‘the Government had not recognized Indonesia’s 
incorporation of East Timor, but had to accept “certain realities”’.222 
Australia had to take into account ‘Indonesia’s view that East Timor is 
now part of Indonesia and that this situation is not likely to change’.223 
Australia abstained from the UN Resolution on East Timor held in 
1976.224 On 20 January 1978, Peacock ‘announced that the Australian 
government had decided to ‘recognize de facto’ that East Timor was 
part of Indonesia, even though Australia remained ‘critical of the 
means by which integration was brought about’.225 In March 1978, it 
was announced that Australia and Indonesia had agreed to negotiate a 
permanent seabed boundary south of East Timor.226 On 15 December 
1978, Peacock announced that ‘Australia would give de jure recognition 
of Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor early in 1979’.227
ASEAN capitulates to Indonesia
With the exception of Singapore, all the ASEAN states voted against 
UN General Assembly Resolution 3485. Singapore’s abstention, 
seemingly at odds with ASEAN solidarity, can arguably be explained 
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by ‘an inability to endorse Indonesia’s conduct without appearing 
to prejudice its own vulnerable independence’, where ASEAN 
solidarity ‘would not be permitted to obstruct the defence of national 
interests’.228 Lim Bian Kie, aide to Indonesia’s Ali Murtopo, confirmed 
on 24 December that ‘Suharto is ‘furious’ over Singapore’s abstention 
on UNGA [UN General Assembly] Timor Resolution when all other 
ASEAN countries joined Indonesia in opposing it. Suharto thought he 
had obtained Lee’s ‘understanding’ of Indonesian position on Timor 
during early Sept[ember] Bali meeting, and Singapore vote came as 
very cold shower’.229 Bien Kie stated that there was speculation that 
‘Suharto will seek reason to abort planned ASEAN summit, and it 
[is] certain that [Indonesia] is much less likely to be amenable to 
increased intra-ASEAN economic cooperation which Singapore 
favours’.230 Bian Kie explained ‘that only rationale [Indonesia] can 
see for Lee’s action is Brunei, where Singapore opposes Malaysia’s 
territorial ambitions. Indonesian leadership was chagrined that GOS 
[Government of Singapore] apparently considered Brunei more 
important than relationship with Indonesia’.231
Tan Boon Seng, Singapore’s Deputy Secretary of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, stated that Singapore’s decision to abstain on the 
vote on Timor was taken ‘at the highest level’.232 In explaining this 
decision, Tan confirmed three basic reasons why Singapore abstained. 
First, ‘for reasons related to its own national security, the GOS was 
fundamentally opposed to armed intervention by any country … 
GOS felt it must be consistent in supporting this principle, and 
did not believe it could make an exception even when it involved 
action by a friendly ASEAN colleague’. Second, ‘the forcible take-
over of Timor by Indonesian forces would provide a bad precedent 
and could conceivably encourage Malaysia in a similar take-over 
of Brunei, it could encourage at some future time possibly hostile 
regimes to take aggressive action against Singapore’. While Tan 
admitted Singapore is ‘in a considerably more secure position than 
odd colonial remnants like Brunei or Timor … in geographical size 
Singapore was smaller than both of them’. Third, Singapore felt that 
Indonesia ‘must understand that Singapore was not prepared to go 
along automatically accommodating and supporting every twist and 
sudden turn of Indonesian diplomacy. GOS support should not be 
taken for granted and the sooner Indonesia realized this the better off 
Indonesian/Singapore relations and ASEAN would be’.
However, this position was not a sustainable one. Angered by 
Singapore’s actions, Indonesia deliberately sought to boycott 
Singaporean initiatives within ASEAN. Singapore’s efforts to promote 
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an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) were not accepted by Indonesia, 
and were not adopted at the ASEAN Bali Summit in 1976. Singapore 
was also excluded from ‘security and intelligence briefings’.233 By late 
1976, Singapore bowed to Indonesian pressure and joined its Southeast 
Asian neighbours in support of the East Timor invasion. During an 
unofficial visit made by Suharto to Singapore in November 1976, 
‘personal rapport’ was re-established between the two leaders.234 As 
Lee later confirmed, ‘I [told Suharto] Singapore … accepted Timor as 
part of Indonesia, but we could not publicly endorse its invasion and 
occupation. He [Suharto] accepted my position that if we had voted 
with Indonesia we would have sent the world a wrong signal about 
our own security’.235 Singapore ultimately joined its Southeast Asian 
neighbours in helping with the dissemination of anti-FRETILIN 
propaganda.236
On 13  December, the Malaysian Foreign Ministry issued a 
statement which ‘blamed Timor’s troubles on Portuguese neglect and 
abandonment of responsibility, [and] noted that “therefore there is 
no legitimate authority capable of maintaining peace and order in 
the territory”’.237 It went on to state that the Malaysian government 
‘accepts the decision of the Indonesian government to allow Indonesian 
volunteers to enter Portuguese Timor at the invitation of the moderate 
groups in order to assist them to restore law and order’.238 Similarly, it 
was reported in the Straits Times that ‘the morality of the Indonesian 
action is under fire from certain quarters but Jakarta simply could not 
stand idly by and let the leftist FRETILIN seize power unilaterally … 
Jakarta could not be expected to allow the threat of insurgency at its 
doorstep’.239
By 1976, all ASEAN states were in support of Indonesia’s policy 
towards East Timor. This is clearly evidenced by the Joint Communiqué 
released following the Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila 
on 24–26 June 1976. Present at this meeting were all five founding 
members of ASEAN, who expressed the view that Indonesian actions 
in East Timor ‘correspond[ed] with the provisions of, the United 
Nations Security Council Resolutions No.384 … and No.389’.240 
The meeting expressed the view that ‘the solution of the East Timor 
question would contribute positively to the maintenance of peace 
and stability in the Southeast Asian region’.241 The ASEAN states 
also lobbied to have the discussion dropped from the Decolonization 
Committee, claiming it ‘constituted interference in Indonesia’s internal 
affairs’.242
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Theoretical assessment of Indonesia’s invasion of 
East Timor (1975)
The 1975 case is an example of ASEAN vanguard state success 
of resistance to sovereignty violation. The foregoing analysis has 
attempted to show how the uncertain regional environment of 1975 
acted as a catalyst for interest convergence between Indonesia, the 
US and Australia with regard to Indonesia’s East Timor policy. As 
the vanguard state, Indonesia had the most compelling interests at 
stake regarding East Timorese independence. East Timor’s proximate 
location to Indonesia’s border, and the vacuum that it represented, 
constituted a threat to Indonesia at that time. A further Indonesian 
interest was the desire to maximize power regionally through 
expansion and conquest. Indonesia actively sought external power 
approval for the invasion of East Timor and the integration of 
the territory into the archipelago. As evidence suggests, this was 
a dynamic process, where Indonesia actively sought great-power 
commitment to regional policies, which were consistent with the 
interests of both Indonesia and the US and Australia. Jakarta had 
an active and substantial role in resisting sovereignty violations from 
other external powers.
For these external powers, positive relations with Indonesia and 
the security of a key regional ally were important interests that took 
precedence over independence for East Timor. Clearly, there existed 
symmetry of interests at this time. Cooperation occurred as a response 
to regional threat,243 in the form of an aggressive and expansionist 
communism, and for the pursuit of gains,244 as evidenced by Indonesian 
and Australian joint oil exploration in the Timor Gap. These external 
powers actively supported Indonesia, providing weapons, military 
aid, and actively seeking to deflect diplomatic attention away from 
Indonesia’s invasion.245 Indonesia also actively sought ASEAN state 
support, applying pressure where necessary, in order to show a united 
ASEAN front for Indonesia’s East Timor policy. This was achieved, 
and evidenced by the Joint Communiqué released following the Ninth 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting.
The Indonesian invasion of East Timor violated two principles 
of international law. Despite this, Indonesia was supported in its 
actions, regionally by the ASEAN states, and externally by the US and 
Australia. Although condemned by the UN and a large proportion 
of the international community, Indonesia was not subjected to 
any sovereignty violation by way of external power intervention in 
East Timor, which became the archipelago’s 27th province in 1976. 
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Analysis of the regional environment in 1975 supports the hypothesis 
that an increase in interest convergence between the Indonesian 
vanguard state and designated external actors caused the success of 
Indonesian resistance to sovereignty violation, from powers external 
to the region.
Contrasting theoretical arguments
Interestingly, Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 is largely 
absent from the constructivist literature on ASEAN. Indonesia’s 
invasion represents a direct challenge to the view that a strong ASEAN 
norm of non-interference exists. It would also appear to contradict 
the view that ASEAN’s norms and institutions have a largely positive 
impact on state behaviour. There is no mention of Indonesia’s invasion 
of East Timor in Acharya’s Constructing a Security Community in Southeast 
Asia,246 Whose Ideas Matter?247 or Ba’s [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast 
Asia.248 Jürgen Haacke briefly mentions the invasion, acknowledging 
that ‘at no point following Jakarta’s intervention in East Timor in 
1975 had the issue formally featured in any ASEAN meeting’.249 
This, he argues, is due to Indonesian President Suharto’s rejection of 
‘anything that smacked of interference in Indonesia’s internal affairs’.250 
Haacke stresses that the non-interference norm is part of a set of 
norms, conceptualized as a diplomatic and security culture, ‘that has 
guided the interaction of state/government leaders and senior officials 
representing the member states of ASEAN’.251 However, at face value, 
Indonesia’s blatant disregard for the non-interference norm when it 
invaded East Timor would appear to contradict this interpretation.
One response to the relative silence on East Timor in the 
constructivist literature is that East Timor was not a member of ASEAN 
when Indonesia invaded the territory in 1975. As such, technically, 
Indonesia’s actions do not constitute deviation from the Association’s 
norms. This is alluded to in Haacke’s discussion of intervention in 
East Timor, where he states that ‘Indonesia had only been prepared 
to challenge the principles of the “ASEAN Way” indirectly, by not 
ascribing to them the status in relations with non-ASEAN countries 
that they enjoyed at the level of intramural relations’.252 However, 
Indonesia could have pushed for East Timor’s admission into ASEAN 
rather than choosing to invade, consolidating an anti-communist bloc 
of ASEAN states at a time of regional instability. That it did not do so 
raises serious questions about the importance attributed to ASEAN’s 
norms by one of ASEAN’s largest and most prominent states.
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Like the constructivists, David Jones and Michael Smith pay little 
attention to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975. However, their 
reasons for doing so differ dramatically. For Jones and Smith, one of 
the outcomes of US retrenchment from the region was ‘that it gave the 
ASEAN states a new latitude in policy formulation, thereby affording 
the insecure member states the illusion of international significance’.253 
A joint declaration of sovereignty by Indonesia and Malaysia in 1971 
‘indicated the increasing assertiveness of ASEAN states. Indonesia in 
particular, as the largest member of ASEAN and aspiring to regional 
leadership, wished to stake out its various interests in the area’.254 
However, ASEAN initiatives during this period merely revealed 
‘the organization’s continuing ambivalence’.255 This was because the 
ASEAN states ‘remained ultimately dependent upon the continued 
American security commitments’.256 In this view, Indonesia’s increased 
regional assertiveness is subordinate to the role played by great powers, 
specifically the US. Similarly, Leifer argues that ‘American policy 
towards Southeast Asia is an integral, if subordinate, aspect of a wider 
design in Asia in which the prime object is to ensure that the strategic 
balance … is not disturbed dramatically, either in a general sense or 
in respect of a particular sector of the region’.257 US policy in Asia 
was therefore focused on ‘a strong flexible military presence to help 
maintain the balance of power’.258
Leifer and Jones and Smith’s emphasis on the role of external powers 
in the region provides little agency for a state such as Indonesia. 
However, while evidence suggests that external powers did indeed 
play a vital role during this period, there is also evidence to suggest that 
Indonesia played an active role in securing its own interests. Indeed, 
Suharto was astute enough to utilize external power concerns to his 
advantage. Leifer does state that Indonesian actions in Timor were to 
‘protect her interests’,259 and that Indonesia’s regional neighbours ‘have 
been obliged at least privately to come to terms with Indonesia’s way 
of securing her and their priorities’.260 However, these interests are 
not considered in conjunction with external power interests. Jones 
and Smith also minimize the role of ASEAN, which is described as a 
‘community of evolving ambiguity’.261 This is despite a united ASEAN 
being a vital component in Suharto’s plan to legitimize his actions 
in East Timor. While the existing realist assessment of the regional 
environment is apt, their primary focus on external powers at the 
expense of regional powers leaves a gap in their analysis of Southeast 
Asia in the mid-1970s.
According to Lee Jones, ‘Indonesia’s invasion and ASEAN’s support 
is best explained by the fear that a leftist state would emerge after 
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Timor’s decolonization, providing a possible base for communist 
“subversion”’.262 According to this view, Indonesia’s fears ‘were 
conditioned by the conflicts that had given rise to the Suharto regime, 
the social order it was attempting to defend, and the likely effects 
of Timorese independence on that order’.263 Jones also argues that 
this was ‘further exacerbated by the rise of communist regimes and 
insurgencies across Southeast Asia, and by the worst social unrest in 
Indonesia since Suharto had seized power’.264 ASEAN collaborated 
with Jakarta because it also shared these concerns. Jones’ argument 
therefore rests on the regional fear of communism, principally because 
of the effect that an independent East Timor would have on ‘socio-
political and economic order within Indonesia’.265
However, this view disregards evidence which suggests that Indonesia 
was well aware that there was little communist influence in East Timor. 
The communist factor is important, but not for the reasons Jones 
claims. This was a factor played upon by Suharto to receive external 
power acquiescence and support for his plans to invade the territory. 
FRETILIN is described by Jones as a ‘left-wing independence 
movement’.266 This is despite the existence of a large number of 
moderates within the FRETILIN party, which was largely recognized, 
even by external powers, as having little communist influence. Jones 
discounts the possibility that Indonesia had expansionist designs 
with regard to East Timor. For Jones, Sukarno’s aggressive foreign 
policy was less to do with territorial ambitions and more to do with 
managing social conflict.267 Similarly, in his view, Malaysian support 
for Indonesia’s East Timor policy was due to the ‘recent upsurge in 
its domestic communist insurgency’, and fears of a ‘leftist takeover of 
Brunei’.268 Nonetheless, the fact that Suharto was apparently aware that 
there was little communist influence in East Timor, yet still wished to 
annex the territory, suggests the existence of other, more compelling 
explanations, with territorial gain the most convincing.
A preferred approach to those presented here is one based upon 
interest convergence between an ASEAN vanguard state and external 
powers. According to this approach, the important role played by 
external powers is stressed, without denying the agency of Indonesia, 
which clearly pursued a strategy to secure its own interests with respect 
to East Timor in an uncertain regional environment. Indonesia was 
able to use external power Cold War concerns to secure support for 
its East Timor policy. This increase in interest convergence caused an 
increase in Indonesia’s ability to resist sovereignty violation from actors 
external to the region.
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The Third Indochina War1
The Third Indochina War, also referred to as the Cambodia conflict, 
began on 25 December 1978, when between 150,000 and 220,000 
Vietnamese troops invaded and occupied neighbouring Cambodia.2 
Rooted in Sino-Soviet rivalry, the conflict was intrinsically a product 
of the Cold War regional environment. Following Vietnam’s invasion 
of Cambodia, Vietnamese troops also became involved in small cross-
border operations in Thailand, which ‘on several occasions seemed on 
the verge of launching a punitive attack on that country’.3 However, 
Thailand was never subjected to a Vietnamese invasion. As a response 
to Vietnamese aggression, Thailand sought closer diplomatic relations 
with China, weapons from Washington, and expanded its armed forces 
by a third.
In recognition of Thailand’s role as front-line state, external powers 
such as China and the US, as well as regional countries belonging to 
ASEAN, promised to come to Thailand’s aid if attacked by Vietnam. 
Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping succinctly expressed Chinese and 
Southeast Asian state fears regarding Vietnam in a meeting with US 
President Jimmy Carter on 29 January 1979.4 During this meeting, 
Deng informed Carter that ‘Vietnam has become totally Soviet 
controlled. At least a majority of ASEAN countries assess this as an 
extremely grave matter … ASEAN countries are now in the front 
line’.5 Evidence derived through analysis of the Third Indochina 
War (1978–91) will be used to support the argument that following 
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, an informal alliance 
developed between Thailand, China, the ASEAN states, the ousted 
Khmer Rouge, and to a lesser extent the US, in an effort to contain 
Vietnamese and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.6 As a consequence 
of high interest convergence between Thailand and a designated 
external power, China, ASEAN was able to resist violations to the 
sovereignty of Thailand from a Soviet-backed Vietnam. As a front-line 
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state, Thailand can be described as the vanguard state, having the most 
compelling interests at stake during the Cambodia conflict.
Throughout 1978 to 1991, the ASEAN states successfully lobbied the 
UN to deny international recognition of Vietnam’s puppet regime in 
Cambodia. Despite this, ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts were not sufficient 
to secure the withdrawal of Vietnam from Cambodia. Evidence will be 
presented to show that the end of the conflict was brought about by 
events outside of ASEAN’s control: namely, normalization of relations 
between the Soviet Union and China prior to the end of the Cold 
War. As the vanguard state, Thailand was able to set the agenda of 
ASEAN to portray a united ASEAN front for Thailand’s Vietnam 
policy, to garner great power security commitments, and to actively 
seek and support a great power intervention in regional affairs. While 
Thailand (in its capacity as the ASEAN vanguard state) clearly had 
an important role to play in this process, an equally important factor 
explaining ASEAN resistance to sovereignty violation during this 
time-period resides in the role played by external actors, and China 
in particular. As will be shown, without this external power support, 
it is highly likely Thailand would have resigned itself to a Vietnamese 
fait accompli in Cambodia.
Analysis of the Third Indochina War will begin with an assessment 
of the regional environment in the period 1975–1978. This period was 
characterized by a degree of regional uncertainty and mixed interest 
convergence. External power interests converged over the threat 
posed by Soviet expansion in the region, and a hegemonic Vietnam. 
However, the ASEAN states were divided. Certain ASEAN states 
sought a reduction in external power influence in the region. Other 
ASEAN states sought enhanced relations with external powers such as 
China, to offset the Vietnamese threat. The chapter will then consider 
the 1978 invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam, the China-Vietnamese 
Border War of 1979, and the effect of Vietnam’s invasion on the 
ASEAN states and Thailand, with the latter emerging as the ASEAN 
vanguard state.
Analysis will then consider Thailand’s external relations after the 
Vietnamese invasion, a period characterized by an increase in interest 
convergence between Thailand and China. It will be argued that this 
interest convergence caused the formation of an alliance, which was a 
catalyst for success of ASEAN resistance to sovereignty violation from 
a Soviet-backed Vietnam. An assessment of the regional environment 
in the period 1980 to 1991 will highlight the events that led to a 
withdrawal of Vietnamese troops from Cambodia. The chapter will 
conclude with a theoretical assessment of the chapter’s findings, and 
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analysis of alternative theoretical explanations for Thailand’s resistance 
to sovereignty violation.
The Southeast Asian regional environment (1975–
1978)
In 1975, communist power was consolidated in three Southeast 
Asian countries: Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In Vietnam, the 
North Vietnamese communists emerged victorious from their 
struggle with the US-backed South. In the period 1975–78, China 
gradually curtailed economic and military aid to Vietnam,7 while 
the Soviet Union cancelled all of Hanoi’s debt to Moscow, valued at 
US$450 million.8 The Soviets also promised long-term aid to Vietnam 
in a joint communiqué on 30 October 1975, committing themselves 
to assisting the Vietnamese next five-year plan from 1976–80 with an 
aid package totalling US$2.5 million.9 This had the effect of drawing 
the Vietnamese closer to the Soviet Union. Having consolidated their 
power, the Vietnamese attempted to secure a number of objectives. 
These included: a nonthreatening region; the prevention of an anti-
communist front in Indochina; the elimination of US presence; and 
the limitation of superpower activity in the region.10 The Vietnamese 
communists had historically considered that an Indochinese Federation 
should exist in the region, to include Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. 
Domination over Indochina ‘required the elimination of extraneous 
influences in Laos and Cambodia’.11
Vietnam began by seeking a ‘special relationship’ with these 
countries. According to this relationship, governments in the two 
capitals would not make a major decision without clearing it with 
Hanoi first, and any foreign influence would be eliminated’.12 A 
Vietnamese delegation was sent to the Laos capital Vientiane in July 
1975. Before the delegation left the capital, the Vietnamese signed 
with Laos a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. This treaty laid 
the basis for political coordination between the two, and for Vietnam’s 
security role in Laos.13 Relations developed further in February 1976 
following the foundation of the Laos People’s Democratic Republic. 
Officials from Laos headed a delegation to Hanoi, the outcome of 
which was the ‘unambiguous declaration that Laos fell under Vietnam’s 
sphere of influence’.14 This was supplemented in July 1977 with the 
signing of a 25-year Treaty of Friendship.
In Cambodia, General Lon Nol had ousted the King of Cambodia, 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk, from power during a US-backed coup 
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on 18 March 1970.15 This was shortly followed by the US invasion 
of Cambodia in May. Lon Nol was staunchly anti-Vietnamese, unlike 
Sihanouk, who sympathized with the North Vietnamese struggle 
against the West. Sihanouk allowed the Vietnamese communists 
sanctuary along the Vietnam-Cambodia border, and arms transit 
through the country’s ports.16 Following the coup, Sihanouk sought 
refuge in Beijing, where the Chinese and North Vietnamese urged 
that he lend his name to the communist Cambodian resistance group, 
the Khmer Rouge. This government in exile, named The Royal 
Government of National Union of Kampuchea (GRUNK), existed 
between 1970 and 1976. The anti-Vietnamese Khmer Rouge, led 
by Brother Number One Pol Pot, had been fighting against the 
Sihanouk regime since 1967. However, it was in the regime’s best 
interests to cooperate with Sihanouk and the North Vietnamese after 
the Prince’s exile. The revolutionary faction gained legitimacy in 
Cambodia by using the Prince’s name, attracting support from the 
peasantry who were devoted to Sihanouk.17 This helped the Khmer 
Rouge gain control over Cambodia. The alliance also benefited the 
North Vietnamese, who saw the government in exile as a resistance 
to US domination and as a means of maintaining Vietcong sanctuaries 
within Cambodia.
Between 1973 and 1975, the Khmer Rouge aimed a number 
of offensives at the Cambodian capital, Phnom Penh. A February 
1973 attempt failed after the US launched a massive B-52 bombing 
raid around the capital.18 An offensive in the early months of 1974 
also failed, although the Khmer Rouge ‘noose around the city was 
considerably tightened’.19 The Khmer Rouge final offensive for 
Cambodia began in January 1975, following the rejection of further 
military aid to Cambodia from the US government.20 By April, 
they had closed in on Phnom Penh. At this time Lon Nol left the 
country, and the US made the decision to evacuate. By 17 April, the 
Khmer Rouge had taken control of the state, renaming it Democratic 
Kampuchea.
The Soviet and Vietnamese threat
Both China and the US perceived Vietnam, backed by the Soviet 
Union, to be a regional threat. As the Vietnam War developed, China 
increasingly voiced its disapproval of North Vietnamese collaboration 
with the Soviet Union, which enhanced Chinese fears of a larger Soviet 
encirclement policy directed against China.21 The feeling amongst the 
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Chinese was that, ‘if Vietnam was not against Moscow, it was against 
China’.22 Vietnamese reliance on the Soviet Union, and an increase 
in Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, led to a further deterioration in 
both the Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relationships.23 From as 
early as 1969, China began to reassess its policy towards the US. By 
engaging in Sino-American rapprochement, China could use the 
US to balance the Soviet threat. At the same time, a newly-elected 
President Nixon was beginning a similar reassessment of the Sino-
American relationship. US rapprochement with China would engage 
the latter in balancing the Soviet Union, and would help to reduce 
US presence in Vietnam.24
From 1973 onwards, it became apparent to the US that China 
viewed Moscow and Hanoi as key regional threats. US Secretary of 
State, Henry Kissinger, confirmed that China ‘wants four separate 
Indochinese states and not one state dominated by Hanoi. Because 
they could not be sure that this single state would not be under the 
influence of Moscow’.25 In 1975, Deng Xiaoping, Vice Premier of 
the State Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), informed 
Kissinger of China’s fears that ‘the Soviet Union will increase its 
influence in Vietnam and Laos’.26 Similarly, in 1978, Foreign Minister 
Huang Hua informed US National Security Advisor Dr Zbigniew 
Brzezinski that ‘the countries that are subjected to the Soviet threat 
must make serious efforts to resist the expansion of the Soviet Union’.27 
China was especially concerned about Soviet influence over Vietnam. 
Foreign Minister Hua informed Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in 
1978 that Vietnam’s ‘objective is regional hegemony, and it has hired 
itself out to the Soviet Union, while the Soviet Union has exploited 
the ambitions of Vietnam to realize its aggression’.28
The US had similar concerns, which were heightened following 
US retrenchment from Southeast Asia following the conclusion of the 
Vietnam War. In a meeting between Kissinger and Vice Premier Deng 
in 1974, Kissinger stated that the US ‘will not permit a strategic gain 
for Soviet power. We will attempt to reduce Soviet power where we 
can’.29 The US was similarly aware of Soviet influence over Vietnam, 
and the latter’s desire for regional hegemony. Dr Brzezinski informed 
Foreign Minister Hua in 1977 that the US is ‘opposed to the creation 
of an Indochinese federation dominated by Vietnam. We realize what 
is behind it’.30 US Secretary of Defence Harold Brown surmised that, 
‘to the extent our opening to China reduces the chances of Sino-
Soviet détente, we gain enormously … it is very important to stabilize 
our relationship with China and to avoid the situation where the 
Chinese are allied with the Soviets against us’.31
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Clearly, in the period 1975 to 1978, Chinese and US interests 
increasingly converged with respect to the Soviet and Vietnamese 
threat. Both China and the US believed that the Soviet Union had 
expansionist aims for Southeast Asia. Both states also recognized 
Vietnam’s potential hegemonic ambitions, which they believed were 
supported by the Soviet Union. For both China and the US, improved 
relations were seen as a vital component in balancing the Soviet Union, 
blocking its expansion further east and tying down a portion of the 
Soviet military effort.
Intra-ASEAN interest divergence
While threats posed by the Soviet Union and Vietnam led to increased 
interest convergence between China and the US, the ASEAN states 
were less able to reach a common threat consensus. This was despite 
Vietnamese communist victory and US regional retrenchment 
having a major impact on the region. The non-communist ASEAN 
states, which in 1975 included Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand had, to varying degrees, all relied upon the 
US security umbrella during the Vietnam War. Many of the ASEAN 
states provided diplomatic or military support to the US in its effort 
against the North Vietnamese. Most notable contributions involved 
Thailand, which assisted the US bombardment of North Vietnam 
and sent ground combat forces to support South Vietnam,32 and 
the Philippines, which maintained major US military bases on the 
island of Luzon.33 US retrenchment was therefore met with much 
regional consternation. This was especially notable in Thailand and the 
Philippines, which had provided most help to the US during the war. 
Regional states voiced their concerns during a visit made by Mr Habib 
to Southeast Asia in June 1975. In a memorandum from Kissinger to 
US President Gerald Ford summarizing the trip, Kissinger confirmed 
that for the Southeast Asian states ‘there is a uniform desire that the US 
play a supporting – and deterrent – role in the region’.34 Indonesian 
Foreign Minister Adam Malik expressed a similar view to Kissinger in 
1976, stressing that the ASEAN states ‘regard as especially important 
that the US remain interested in Southeast Asia’.35
Following the Paris Peace negotiations, there was a move among the 
ASEAN states to establish diplomatic relations with North Vietnam. 
Malaysia established relations with Hanoi on 30 March 1973.36 This 
was followed by Singapore on 1 August 1973.37 Indonesia, which 
had established diplomatic relations with Hanoi in 1964, sent an 
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ambassador to North Vietnam in early 1973.38 While Thailand and 
the Philippines also made an attempt to establish diplomatic relations 
at this time, their collaboration with the US during the Vietnam 
War hampered these efforts. Thailand extended an invitation to the 
North Vietnamese to send an observer to the ASEAN Ministerial 
Meeting to be held in April 1973. Hanoi rejected this invitation due 
to Thai involvement in the Vietnam War. ASEAN extended a similar 
invitation in 1974. However, Hanoi argued that ASEAN was too 
heavily influenced by the West, and the Association was ‘venomously 
flayed as a de facto military alliance’.39
The suddenness with which the Vietnam War ended caused 
considerable alarm among the ASEAN states. However, the period is 
notable for the disparate ASEAN state responses to North Vietnamese 
victory. As one commentator noted, ‘much of the initiative towards 
accommodation with the emerging realities of the power structure 
in the region was effectively in the hands of individual member states 
rather than in ASEAN as a regional grouping’.40 The lack of ASEAN 
consensus was reflected in the Joint Communiqué issued at the end 
of the 8th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 13–15 May 1975, which 
made no mention of recent developments in Indochina.41 Of the 
ASEAN states, most alarm was felt in Thailand, ‘the country closest 
to the epicentre of political and military turmoil’.42 In a January 
1975 meeting the Thai Foreign Minister, Charunphan Isarangkun 
Na Ayuthaya, stated that the Thai government was aware that if both 
Cambodia and South Vietnam collapsed to North Vietnam, the 
next major threat ‘first and foremost is Thailand’.43 In a June 1975 
Secretary of State Staff meeting, Mr Habib confirmed that ‘the Thai 
are desperate to find some means of protecting themselves. So they 
will try every diplomatic channel … at the same time, they will be 
pleading, I am sure, with the ASEAN group to give them the support 
of the regional organisation’.44
By November 1975, a Thai strategy to counter the Vietnamese threat 
was already beginning to materialize. In a meeting between Secretary 
Kissinger and the Thai Foreign Minister Chatchai Chunawan, 
Kissinger informed Chatchai that the US would like Cambodia ‘to 
be independent as a counterweight to North Vietnam … we would 
prefer to have Laos and Cambodia aligned with China rather than with 
North Vietnam. We would try to encourage this if that is what you 
want’.45 Chatchai replied: ‘yes, we would like you to do that … the 
Chinese are 100 percent in support of Cambodia’s being friends with 
Thailand’. Chatchai informed Kissinger that he had ‘asked the Chinese 
to take over in Laos’. Kissinger stated that the US ‘would support 
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this. You should also tell the Cambodians that we will be friends 
with them. They are murderous thugs, but we won’t let that stand 
in our way’. Confirming this strategy in a separate meeting between 
Chatchai and New Zealand officials, Chatchai stated that he wanted 
Cambodia and Laos ‘strong enough to be buffers between Thailand 
and [the] Vietnamese’.46 Similarly, in a meeting with Japanese officials 
in Tokyo in October 1975, Chatchai made it clear that the situation in 
Indochina was ‘very dangerous’ for Thailand, and that Hanoi was the 
major threat.47 Japanese officials believed Chatchai implied a ‘linked 
PRC, Cambodia and Thailand in [a] quasi-alliance’.48
The remaining ASEAN states exhibited varying levels of concern, 
with Vietnamese communist victory bringing ‘the least response 
from the country furthest away, Indonesia’.49 Indonesian Minister 
of Defence General Maraden Panggabean stated in April 1975 that 
‘naturally [the] prospect of communist takeover in Indochina creates 
a very real concern in Indonesia’.50 However, ‘Indonesians hoped … 
and were inclined to believe, that communists in Indochina were 
as much nationalists as communists. If this was [the] case, relations 
with them over longer term would be possible’.51 The Indonesian 
government also believed that this was a view shared by other ASEAN 
states. Indonesian Director-General of Political Affairs Djajadiningrat 
stated that the ASEAN states would welcome membership of a 
communist Vietnam in ASEAN, so long as the ‘Vietnamese regime is 
not expansionist and is willing to be [a] good neighbour’.52
The Malaysian government recognized the PRG [Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam] 
following the fall of Saigon, stressing that good relations could exist 
with the Vietnamese communist government, whilst ‘privately 
fear[ing] the results of Indochina’s fall’.53 Taking a position similar to 
that of Indonesia, acting Malaysian Prime Minister, Ghafar Baba, stated 
the Malaysian hope that ‘both the new governments in Cambodia 
and South Vietnam would cooperate with ASEAN countries’.54 
Singapore’s Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, took an approach closer 
to that of Thailand. Lee informed Kissinger in a meeting in May 
1975 that his ‘immediate reaction [to the fall of Saigon] is one of 
astonishment and alarm at the rapidity with which the situation fell 
apart’.55 Kissinger informed Lee that ‘this year Hanoi will do more 
than take Laos. They are fully occupied with absorbing what they have 
already conquered. They are very careful planners, and they will step 
up in Thailand and Malaysia next year’. Lee agreed, stating that the 
North Vietnamese ‘have American weapons now. It sends chills down 
my spine. My worst fears have come true … I must be careful so as 
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not to scare the Malays and the Thais that the situation is hopeless … 
Laos and Cambodia are gone’.
According to Lee, the North Vietnamese ‘need only take the 
corner of Thailand, and they could for example take over the 
Mekong hydroelectric scheme. They would then have the entire 
Mekong delta. That is one step they may risk. Then they would have 
a basis for becoming an industrial power.’ In an April 1975 meeting 
between Lee and a Thai delegation in Bangkok, that included the 
Thai Prime Minister Khukrit Pramot and Foreign Minister Chatchai, 
Lee informed Chatchai that he sees Thailand as potentially ‘the next 
domino’ in Southeast Asia.56 It was therefore vital that they maintain 
a US presence in order to resist communist incursions.57 Of all the 
ASEAN states, the Philippines remained the most detached from the 
crisis. Geographically isolated and home to US bases, the Philippines 
President Marcos remained ‘firm in his expressions that the US-
Philippine security relationship is essential to his country’.58
Vietnam and the Soviets seek enhanced Southeast Asia relations
Meanwhile, seeking to enhance regional security and secure economic 
aid, a reunified Vietnam began to make diplomatic overtures towards 
the ASEAN states. These first began in 1976, when Hanoi announced 
a policy of establishing ‘relations of friendship and cooperation’ with 
Southeast Asian countries.59 Relations were to be based on a mutual 
respect for independence, good neighbour policies and the prevention 
of regional countries being used as a base for external power aggression. 
However, Vietnam would only deal with regional states individually, 
believing ASEAN to be a ‘product of the US imperialist policy of 
intervention and aggression’.60 Vietnam was forced to reassess this 
position in mid-1978, at a time of increased Sino-Vietnamese conflict. 
In competition with China for the ‘hearts and minds’ of ASEAN, 
Vietnam announced its willingness to deal with ASEAN in June 
1978.61 In September 1978, Vietnam’s Prime Minister, Pham Van 
Dong, visited the capitals of ASEAN, dispensing assurances of non-
intervention.62 Prime Minister Pham was particularly concerned with 
trying to obtain a friendship treaty with Thailand. Pham ‘dropped 
Hanoi’s demand for the return of all planes and vessels used by refugees 
fleeing South Vietnam in 1975, pledged that Vietnam would not 
support the Thai insurgency, signed agreements in repatriation of 
refugees who had fled Vietnam in the 1940s and on commercial and 
economic cooperation’.63 Vietnam’s Deputy Foreign Minister, Phan 
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Hien, also ‘recognized ASEAN as a “genuine regional organization for 
economic cooperation”’.64 All of the ASEAN states, despite varying 
policies towards Vietnam, decided against rushing into a formal 
agreement with Vietnam at that time.65
Following the end of the Vietnam War, the Soviet Union revived 
the notion of a collective security system in Asia, which it had 
been attempting to garner support for since as early as 1969. The 
Soviet aim was to take advantage of US disengagement, to increase 
a regional presence, and to assert influence against the Chinese.66 
However, the proposal never received regional support. This was 
largely due to regional states recognizing the proposal as an anti-
China move, and not wishing to provoke Beijing.67 The Soviet Union 
also sought to reconcile ASEAN and Vietnam in the hope that ‘the 
ASEAN countries might become more receptive to influence from 
the communist states in Indochina’.68 The Soviets particularly sought 
to capitalize on ASEAN efforts for a Zone of Peace, Freedom and 
Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ZOPFAN was identified as a regional goal by 
the ASEAN states at the 1971 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, and was 
in part a response to the intrusive Soviet collective security scheme.69 
In this declaration, the ASEAN countries stated their intent to keep 
Southeast Asia free from external interference by outside powers. The 
Soviet Union seized upon ZOPFAN ‘as an indication that the region 
was moving away from total reliance upon the West’.70 While some 
ASEAN states did move to enhance diplomatic relations with the 
Soviet Union, this did not result in any formal alliances. Kissinger 
confirmed that the regional states ‘are all suspicious’ with regard to the 
Soviet Union, ‘they place their trust in the US deterrent and the Sino-
Soviet conflict as the basic checks on soviet expansionism in Asia’.71
Thailand was willing to tolerate an increased regional role for the 
Soviet Union following the end of the Vietnam War. However, this 
was only as a means to maintain some regional US presence, and to 
demonstrate to Vietnam that Thailand was not completely dependent 
on the US or China.72 Soviet diplomatic relations with the Philippines 
was restored in June 1976. However, this was recognized by the Soviets 
as of secondary importance to relations with China, which had been 
restored in June 1975. While the Soviet Union hoped that shared 
perceptions of a threatening China might make Indonesia amenable to 
their influence, ‘Indonesian desire for the removal of the great powers 
from the region conflict[ed] with Soviet intentions’.73 Malaysia hoped 
that the Soviet Union might play a mediating role between Vietnam 
and the ASEAN states. However, Malaysian desire for a reduction in 
great power influence in the region meant that this was the extent to 
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which Soviet involvement was encouraged. Taking a similar approach 
to that of Thailand, Singapore engaged with the Soviet Union to 
maintain a regional balance of power, hoping Soviet engagement 
would act as a ‘device to ensure a continuing Western presence in 
the region’.74
ASEAN-China relations
During the 1949 to 1970 period, the states of Southeast Asia viewed 
China as having regional hegemonic intentions. Chinese-backed 
communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia had threatened domestic 
political structures and regional peace and stability. Indonesia suspected 
Beijing’s involvement in a 1965 communist conspiracy, which killed the 
large majority of Indonesia’s top military command.75 Chinese support 
for communist guerillas in Thailand and Malaysia also continued late 
into the 1970s.76 To balance this threat, the ASEAN states sought 
an enhanced US regional presence. However, this situation changed 
with US-Chinese rapprochement, US retrenchment following the 
Vietnam War, and an increase in Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese 
hostilities. At this time, the majority of the ASEAN states sought to 
normalize relations with China. Malaysia was first to establish relations 
with China in May 1974, followed by the Philippines in June 1975 
and Thailand in July 1975. By late 1975, China had started to reduce 
its support for communist insurgencies in Southeast Asia. One US 
official noted that ‘Peking’s public views … have been muted of late. 
Particularly since the establishment of relations with Bangkok and 
Manila’.77 This was seen as an effort to ‘placate ASEAN governments’ 
sensitivity concerning public PRC support for the insurgents’.78 
Singapore, although stating that it would not establish relations with 
China before Indonesia, still sought to improve its relations with 
Beijing.79 Lee informed US Secretary of Defence, James Schlesinger, 
in May 1975 that the North Vietnamese could move all the way to 
Singapore, and that Singaporeans ‘don’t believe the US would make a 
move, but we do believe the PRC would, and that is protecting us’.80
This left Indonesia ‘practically isolated’ from the rest of ASEAN.81 
Indonesia traditionally viewed China as an, ‘aggressive and expansionist 
power,’ and was displeased with Beijing’s attempt to ‘woo’ ASEAN 
countries, and with the ‘current “panicky rush” of ASEAN countries 
to Beijing’.82 Deng Xiaoping told US President Ford in December 
1975 that, ‘Indonesia does not have good relations with us, but we are 
in no hurry … as far as China is concerned, we are willing to improve 
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relations with Indonesia, but we have patience’.83 Ford informed Deng 
that he will ‘speak very forcefully to them concerning this effort’ when 
he is next in Indonesia.84
Of the ASEAN states, Thailand was most keen to develop diplomatic 
relations with China. In a May 1975 meeting Lee Kuan Yew informed 
Kissinger that Thailand would ‘come to terms with China … China is 
their insurance agent’.85 Thai Foreign Minister Charunphan confirmed 
this approach in a 1975 meeting with US Senators Thurmond and 
Scott, stating that ‘the Thai had been approaching China confidentially 
to lower the level of these [subversive] activities [in Thailand] since 
before President Nixon went to Peking’.86 US ambassador to Thailand, 
Charles Whitehouse, informed US National Security Advisor, Brent 
Scowcroft, that ‘the Thai saw Vietnam as the real threat and China as 
a rather benevolent power even if some Thai also recognized that this 
benevolence stemmed from China’s self-interest’.87 Enhanced relations 
resulting from the Vietnamese threat had an immediate impact on 
bilateral trade between Thailand and China, which increased from 
US$4.7 million in 1974 to US$136.4 million in 1976.88
China encourages enhanced Thai-Cambodian relations
China also mediated an agreement to establish relations between 
Thailand and Cambodia in 1975.89 This was a vital component in 
China’s Vietnamese containment policy. Historically, relations between 
Thailand and Cambodia had been characterized as one of ‘unending 
conflicts’.90 Cambodia viewed Thailand as an, ‘oppressive neighbour’ 
which sought to envelop Khmer territory.91 Despite this history of 
poor relations, Thailand recognized that Cambodia could be used 
as a ‘fence state’ to protect itself from Vietnamese attack.92 Thailand 
could also be useful to Cambodia. Democratic Kampuchea had already 
begun a diplomatic offensive with regard to the ASEAN states in 1975, 
recognizing ‘diplomatic support of ASEAN as an important factor 
given an impending conflagration’.93 Thai and Cambodian officials 
met twice in 1975, at China’s behest. At Thailand’s insistence, the 
ASEAN states ‘collectively and promptly recognized the new Phnom 
Penh government’ on 18 April 1975.94 In October 1975, Cambodian 
Foreign Minister, Ieng Sary, visited Bangkok, where it was agreed that 
Thailand and Cambodia would establish diplomatic relations.95
In an official scheduled visit by Chinese Vice-Premier Deng to 
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore in early November 1978, Deng 
sought support for China’s Vietnam policy, and ‘impressed upon his 
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foreign hosts that China would use force against Vietnamese aggression 
if Vietnam attacked Cambodia’.96 Evidence therefore suggests that 
by 1978, at least two ASEAN states had adopted a clear policy that 
sought to engage with external powers to face the Vietnamese threat. 
The remaining ASEAN states believed that accommodation with 
the Vietnamese may be possible, and that engagement with external 
powers compromized a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia. These different 
strategies prevented the formation of a united ASEAN front. Instead, 
the regional states largely pursued policies in defence of their own 
national interests.
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia – a catalyst for 
convergence
The Khmer people had long been wary of Vietnamese regional 
ambitions. According to Prince Sihanouk, ‘the Khmer people have 
serious reasons not to like the Vietnamese. Our neighbours in the 
east have, in effect, in the course of the centuries, “swallowed” 
territories which had always belonged to Cambodia’.97 In relations 
with Vietnam, Sihanouk stated that he ‘always adopted a realist 
attitude … it was a very dangerous neighbour, to be handled with 
care’.98 Sihanouk concluded that the US would eventually retrench 
from the Southeast Asian region, thus making accommodation with 
North Vietnam inevitable. Unlike Sihanouk, the Khmer Rouge did 
not wish to accommodate the Vietnamese due to Vietnam’s history of 
intervention in Cambodia, which had seen Khmer territory ceded to 
the Vietnamese. The opinion within the Khmer resistance government 
was that Vietnam was their ‘acute enemy’.99 Clashes between Khmer 
fighters and Vietnamese troops were reported throughout the mid-
1970s. In an attempt to gain total control of Cambodia, the Pol Pot 
group ‘stepped up a campaign to denigrate Sihanouk’100 and sought 
to ‘blunt Vietnamese expansion, [and] pre-empt Hanoi’s effort to 
exert influence over Phnom Penh’.101 As Sihanouk’s role in Cambodia 
was increasingly marginalized, clashes between the Khmers and the 
Vietnamese communists escalated.102
The North Vietnamese tolerated these clashes in order to maintain 
sanctuaries along the Cambodia border. Similarly, while Cambodia 
wanted to avoid the emergence of a strong Vietnam in Indochina, the 
balance of forces within the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) 
was not ready for open confrontation with the North Vietnamese.103 In 
1976, Pol Pot argued that the building of communism in Democratic 
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Kampuchea had to be hurried, in order to confront the Vietnamese 
with greater strength.104 According to a research study prepared by 
the CIA, the Khmer Rouge communists showed themselves ‘to be 
the most extreme of the world’s totalitarian regimes’.105 The regime 
adopted ‘unorthodox economic practices’, that included the total 
mobilization of the Cambodian people, abolition of private ownership 
and the departure from a money economy.106 The Cambodian urban 
population underwent forced resettlement into rural areas, which 
was justified ‘as a means to create a huge permanent labour force in 
the countryside’.107 In its desire to implement a communist system 
quickly, it is believed 21 to 26 percent of the country’s population 
were killed.108 Even those within the regime were subject to large-scale 
killings and routine purges.109
The Khmer Rouge began to assume a greater role in Chinese 
foreign policy between November 1973 and April 1974. China was 
concerned with increased Soviet aid to the Vietnamese, and saw 
enhanced relations with Cambodia as a means to balance a Soviet-
aligned Vietnam.110 Enhanced relations between China and Cambodia 
were realized in a May 1974 agreement, which provided the Khmer 
Rouge with free military equipment and supplies.111 In April 1975, 
Cambodia negotiated a Chinese military aid package of 13,300 tons 
of weapons.112 By mid-September, ‘China was prepared to extend 
to Cambodia a total of US$1 billion in interest-free economic and 
military aid, including an immediate $20 million gift’.113 This was 
reportedly ‘the biggest aid ever given to any one country by China’.114
China anointed the Sino-Khmer alliance on 28 September 1977.115 
However, Chinese leaders still sought to exercise a ‘moderating 
influence’ on the Khmer Rouge, and to point the regime ‘in the 
direction of a more traditional realpolitik foreign policy’.116 According 
to a November 1978 US Interagency Intelligence Memorandum, 
China may have been ‘unhappy with some of the policies of the 
present Khmer regime’, but it still considered ‘an independent 
Kampuchea allied with Peking an essential buffer against the expansion 
of Vietnamese, and by extension Soviet, influence in the area’.117 China 
hoped ‘to thwart Vietnamese ambitions by providing strong support 
for Kampuchea’. In its bid to prevent Vietnamese regional expansion, 
China became ‘the principal source of military and economic aid to 
Kampuchea’.
With Chinese aid and firm domestic control, Pol Pot began to 
eliminate all Vietnamese influence in Cambodia from 1977. Cambodia 
openly declared a cessation in diplomatic relations with Vietnam on 
31 December 1977.118 This was construed by the Vietnamese as ‘the 
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creation of a “bridgehead of aggression” on behalf of the Chinese’.119 
The Vietnamese feared that Pol Pot was consolidating the Khmer 
Rouge position internationally, and gathering Southeast Asian and 
Western sympathizers.120 Seeking to put a halt to this process, the 
Vietnamese decided to remove Pol Pot as leader of the Kampuchean 
communist party. A US Intelligence Assessment reported that ‘Hanoi 
seems determined to bring a more malleable regime to power in 
Phnom Penh, while China shows no sign of willingness to soften its 
support of the current Cambodian leadership’.121
Vietnam’s invasion and its after effects
Following the Vietnam War, Vietnam’s domestic situation was in disarray. 
This was characterized by ‘acute food shortages, a steadily sagging 
economy, rampant official mismanagement, and cadre misbehaviour’.122 
Unable to receive aid from countries such as the US and China, Vietnam 
was driven further into the arms of the Soviet Union. Vietnam joined 
the Comecon, a Moscow based economic arrangement, in August 1978. 
On 3 November 1978, it signed a treaty of Friendship and Cooperation 
with Moscow, which resulted in a massive shipment of Soviet military 
hardware to Vietnam.123 A closer relationship with the Soviet Union 
provided economic and military aid, as well as security assurances 
against an aggressive China. However, the increase in Soviet-Vietnamese 
relations led to a further decrease in Sino-Vietnamese relations.124 China 
viewed the treaty as a direct threat, believing it represented ‘another step 
in the Soviet effort to establish a collective security system in the region, 
ultimately directed against China’.125
China responded with a diplomatic effort to strengthen its regional 
relationships.126 The most important of these was enhanced relations 
with Thailand, which China believed could be used in a Vietnamese 
containment strategy.127 Two days after Vietnam signed the treaty 
of friendship with the Soviet Union, Deng travelled to Bangkok to 
seek more formal security cooperation.128 Deng assured the Thai 
Prime Minister, General Kriangsak Chamanan, that Beijing would 
end its support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and 
would punish Hanoi for its hegemonic behaviour.129 He also stated 
that China would help enhance Thai security against the Vietnamese 
threat. While Kriangsak did not immediately agree to a formal alliance, 
the meeting set the groundwork for future enhanced relations.
With Soviet economic and security assurances, Vietnam now felt in 
a position to take action against an increasingly aggressive Cambodia. A 
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hostile Cambodia posed a serious threat to Vietnamese security. Apart 
from Cambodia’s close physical proximity to Vietnam, Cambodia’s 
relationship with China allowed an external power a regional presence 
in Indochina. It was vital for Vietnam that Cambodia be prevented 
‘from becoming springboards for attacks on its territory or havens 
for organizing insurgencies’.130 Vietnamese attempts to remove Pol 
Pot began during 1977, with a series of shallow military incursions 
that sought to trigger a military coup in Phnom Penh, or to spark a 
civil war.131 When these attempts failed, the Vietnamese attempted to 
create a liberation movement within Cambodia in mid-1978. While 
successful, the Vietnamese came to the decision that the strategy was 
too protracted. As such, in December 1978, the Vietnamese decided 
on a third strategy, ‘the highly visible big unit war’.132 The first phase 
of the assault commenced on 25 December 1978, when between 
150,000 and 220,000 Vietnamese troops invaded neighbouring 
Cambodia.133 On 7 January 1979, Pol Pot was driven from Phnom 
Penh by Vietnamese troops, supported by some 20,000 dissident 
Cambodians.134 Elements of the Khmer Rouge survived, including 
approximately 20–40,000 troops, which withdrew to the jungle.135 On 
8 January, a Vietnamese puppet government, titled the Kampuchean 
United Front for National Salvation (FUNSK), was installed, headed 
by Heng Samrin, a former Khmer Rouge defector who fled to 
Vietnam during the regime purges.
On 31 December 1978 and 3 January 1979, Deputy Prime Minister 
in charge of Foreign Affairs of Democratic Kampuchea, Ieng Sary, 
charged Vietnam ‘with intensifying acts of aggression against his 
country, including ground and air attacks, pillaging, burning and 
killing’.136 Sary requested an urgent meeting of the UN Security 
Council to condemn Vietnam’s attack.137 On 4 January, a Vietnamese 
representative transmitted two December FUNSK declarations to the 
UN, which charged that ‘the regime of Prime Minister Pol Pot and 
Foreign Minister Ieng Sary of Democratic Kampuchea had usurped 
power, transformed the revolutionary forces into mercenaries for the 
Chinese authorities, and threatened the Kampuchean people with 
extermination’.138 A Vietnamese representative transmitted further 
documents to the UN on 8  January concerning the liberation of 
Phnom Penh, stating that ‘any meeting of the Security Council to hear 
the representative of the Pol Pot regime would constitute intervention 
in the internal affairs of the Kampuchean people’.
The UN Security Council met from 11 to 15 January at the request 
of Democratic Kampuchea, and from 23 to 28 February at the request 
of Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the US. At each 
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meeting, a draft resolution calling for cessation in hostilities and a 
demand for strict adherence to non-interference was rejected, owing to 
the negative vote of the USSR [Union of Soviet Socialist Republics]. 
The Soviet Union objected to these resolutions, as it considered 
FUNSK ‘to be the genuine and sole representative of the Kampuchean 
people, and that the situation in that country was an internal matter’.139 
The Council extended an invitation to the delegation of Democratic 
Kampuchea, and a representative reiterated that ‘his country was 
the victim of large-scale aggression by Viet Nam (sic), supported by 
the USSR’. In a letter to the UN on 20 February 1979, Vietnam 
transmitted the text of a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation 
between the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and the People’s Republic 
of Kampuchea, signed at Phnom Penh on 18  February by Heng 
Samrin and Pham Van Dong.140 This effectively consolidated Vietnam’s 
influence in Cambodia and hegemonic position in Indochina.
China’s plan to teach Vietnam a lesson
Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia drew an immediate Chinese response. 
In a letter to the UN dated 7  January 1979, China charged that 
Vietnam ‘had invaded Democratic Kampuchea, was occupying a large 
part of the country and, with USSR support, intended to annex 
Kampuchea by force and set up an “IndoChinese Federation” under 
its control’.141 In a meeting between President Carter and Premier 
Deng on 29 January 1979, Deng argued that ‘the Vietnamese now 
are extremely arrogant. They now claim to be even the third most 
powerful military nation in the world, after the United States and the 
Soviet Union … we consider it necessary to put a restraint on the wild 
ambitions of the Vietnamese and to give them an appropriate limited 
lesson’.142 With regard to potential Soviet reprisals, Deng believed 
that the Soviet Union ‘did not have adequate forces to conduct any 
large military operations against China immediately’.143 He expressed 
the belief that ‘if our action in the South is quickly completed, they 
won’t have time to react … we need your [the US] moral support in 
the international field’.144
However, Carter was not quick to give this support. He informed 
Deng that ‘this is a serious issue. Not only do you face a military threat 
from the North, but also a change in international attitude … it could 
result in escalation of violence and a change in the world posture from 
being against Vietnam to partial support for Vietnam.’
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Carter followed this with an oral presentation to Deng on 
30 January, confirming the US belief that a punitive strike against 
Vietnam ‘would be a serious mistake … the United States could not 
support such action, and I strongly urge you not to approve it’. Deng 
was unmoved by Carter’s presentation, insisting that China ‘are forced 
to make the decision to take necessary self-defense operations against 
Vietnam. This operation will be restricted and limited in scope … 
it may play a certain role to check the ambitions of Vietnam and 
will benefit peace and stability of this region’. Having informed the 
US of China’s intentions, Deng then set out to woo the ASEAN 
countries, embarking on a nine-day tour through Thailand, Malaysia 
and Singapore, with the task of assuring ‘these countries of China’s 
benevolent role as guardian of regional security and to enlist their 
support in the confrontation with Vietnam’.145
China’s military action against Vietnam came approximately two 
weeks after Deng’s visit to Washington. US Secretary of Defence, 
Harold Brown, believed this was ‘clearly Deng’s intent … to use 
security relations with us [the US] as a means of constraining the 
USSR’.146 On 10 February 1979, Vietnam transmitted an urgent 
message to the UN from its Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, which ‘charged that China had recently intensified 
armed activities at the Vietnamese frontier in preparation for war’.147 
On 17 February, the Chinese government issued a statement arguing 
that ‘because Vietnamese authorities had ignored China’s warnings 
and repeatedly encroached on Chinese territory and attacked Chinese 
frontier guards and inhabitants, China had been forced to counter-
attack’.148 On 18 February, a representative from the Soviet Union 
charged ‘China with aggression against Viet Nam, blatantly flouting 
international law and exposing the essence of Peking’s hegemonic 
policy in Southeast Asia’.149
The Sino-Vietnamese border war was fought in three stages, 
beginning on 17 February, and ending with a complete withdrawal 
on 16 March.150 It involved 400,000 Chinese troops,151 and was the 
largest People’s Liberation Army (PLA) military operation undertaken 
since the Korean War.152 The attack caught Hanoi off-guard, forcing 
them to resist the Chinese advance whilst requesting immediate aid 
from Moscow. The Chinese claimed the war to be a victory, with 
more than a dozen border cities captured and 57,000 Vietnamese 
soldiers wounded or killed.153 The Vietnamese claimed they lost 
several cities, but only after killing and wounding 42,000 Chinese 
troops.154 However, the PLA were willing to absorb heavy losses, as 
long as the conflict achieved its strategic goals. The PLA believed 
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these goals had been achieved, and that the war had succeeded in 
‘exposing Moscow’s inability or unwillingness to back Vietnam’.155 
While the use of force against Vietnam had been condemned by the 
US, albeit ambiguously, and raised the suspicions of regional states such 
as Indonesia and Malaysia, ultimately there was very little backlash, 
regionally or internationally.
Emergence of the ASEAN vanguard state
ASEAN responded to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia with a 
diplomatic effort at the UN. On 9 January, Indonesia issued a statement 
from its Minister for Foreign Affairs, as Chairman of the ASEAN 
Standing Committee, expressing ‘grave concern’ over the escalation 
of the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam.156 The convening of 
a UN Security Council meeting was requested to discuss the situation 
in Indochina. On 12 January, Indonesia issued a joint statement of a 
special meeting of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers held in Bangkok, in 
which the Ministers, ‘deplored the armed intervention in Kampuchea, 
affirmed the right of the Kampuchean people to determine their 
future by themselves; [and] called for the immediate withdrawal of 
foreign forces from Kampuchean territory’.157 An ASEAN Foreign 
Ministers joint statement was also released on 13 January in relation 
to Indochinese refugees displaced due to conflict in Cambodia. The 
ASEAN ministers ‘expressed their grave concern over the increasing 
influx of these persons into ASEAN countries  … the influx is 
encountering severe economic, social, political and security problems 
particularly in the countries bearing the main brunt of the influx, such 
as Thailand and Malaysia’.158
ASEAN submitted two further letters to the UN in 1979. On 
20  February, Indonesia issued a statement by the Chairman of 
ASEAN’s Standing Committee, ‘appealing for a cessation of hostilities 
and withdrawal of all foreign forces from all areas of conflict in Indo-
China’.159 This statement became the basis for a draft UN resolution, 
sponsored by the five ASEAN countries, to be considered at a Security 
Council meeting on 16 March. By this text, the Council urgently 
called upon all parties to ‘cease all hostilities forthwith, withdraw 
their forces to their own countries and settle their disputes by peaceful 
means’. On 17 August 1979, the ASEAN states sent a letter to the UN, 
requesting inclusion of an item on ‘The situation in Kampuchea’ in the 
agenda of the General Assembly’s 34th (1979) session. The General 
Committee considered this request on 19 December, where Thailand 
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argued that ‘the armed conflict in Kampuchea was creating a refugee 
problem and thereby imposing immense strain on neighbouring 
countries’. China supported inclusion of the item, ‘charging Viet 
Nam with aggression against Democratic Kampuchea, which, it said, 
posed a serious threat to the security and stability of Southeast Asia’.
The General Committee decided, by 19 votes to 5, with one 
abstention, to recommend that the General Assembly include the 
item in its agenda. On 14 November, the General Assembly adopted 
resolution 34/22 by which it ‘called for the immediate withdrawal 
of foreign forces from Kampuchea’. The resolution was adopted by a 
vote of 91 to 21, with 29 abstentions. The ASEAN Ministers decided 
to explore the possibility of a settlement to the Cambodia conflict, 
by dispatching the Malaysian Foreign Minister, Tengku Ahmad 
Rithauddeen, to Hanoi as an ASEAN representative.160 Although the 
Vietnamese would not accept Rithauddeen as an ASEAN envoy, he 
did visit the Vietnamese capital as Foreign Minister of Malaysia from 
9–11 January 1980. During this meeting, the Vietnamese ‘refused to 
discuss the presence of their forces in Kampuchea’.161
ASEAN’s internal debate
Despite the joint ASEAN statements released following Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia, the conflict did not immediately create 
cohesion within ASEAN. There still remained disagreement over the 
major source of threat, and what should be done about it. There 
was, however, a general feeling that Vietnam’s attempt to placate 
the ASEAN states in 1978 had been a ‘duplicitous stratagem’, and 
a ‘manoeuvre to soften them as part of Vietnam’s preparations to 
invade Cambodia’.162 Moscow’s funding of the campaign also ‘hurt its 
image’163 in the region, with states of the opinion that Moscow ‘had 
attempted to gain illegitimate entry into the region’.164 The alliance 
between Moscow and Hanoi also badly damaged ASEAN confidence 
in Vietnamese claims to be a nonaligned nation.165 Despite this general 
feeling, certain ASEAN states continued to feel some sympathy for 
the Vietnamese. Indonesia and the Philippines indicated that they ‘did 
not consider that Vietnam posed any threat to ASEAN’.166 Indonesia 
remained particularly concerned about the regional role of China, 
with both Indonesia and Malaysia preferring to pursue a ZOPFAN in 
Southeast Asia, for fears that they were becoming trapped in a wider 
Sino-Soviet dispute. According to this view, enhanced Soviet regional 
influence might lead to a situation where ‘China was using ASEAN for 
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its own political objectives, and ASEAN was implementing Chinese 
policies’.167 These states were also concerned that taking a hard stance 
against Vietnam might bring about either ‘a debilitated Vietnam 
subject to China’s dominance or a debilitated Vietnam bound in a 
permanent client relationship to the Soviet Union which would in 
turn reinforce the Thai-Chinese relationship’.168
Even Thailand wished to maintain some façade of neutrality. The Thai 
Prime Minister, General Kriangsak Chamanan, stated his government’s 
formal position of neutrality in a visit to Moscow in 1979, hoping to 
gain assurances against an aggressive Vietnam, and to placate Moscow 
as to Thailand’s relationship with China.169 However, this was merely 
pretence to seek great power assurances. Both Thailand and Singapore 
viewed Chinese aid ‘as a bellwether for stability’.170 The lack of regional 
cohesion meant that Thailand felt dissatisfied with the level of support 
offered by the ASEAN states. Thailand showed this dissatisfaction 
through local news reports, stating ‘concern in the Foreign Ministry 
that other countries had not shown they were prepared to fully support 
Thailand in the event of an attack on it by Vietnam’.171 The Thai 
government wanted ‘its regional partners [to] stand up and be counted 
in a collective demonstration of ASEAN solidarity’.172
Two events can be credited with enhancing institutional cohesion 
in 1979 and early 1980. The first was the influx of refugees into 
Southeast Asia from Indochina. The problem of Cambodian refugees 
in Thailand was the topic of several communications to the UN 
Secretary General during June and August 1979.173 In a letter to the 
UN dated 23 October, Thailand stated that 100,000 Cambodians 
had entered Thailand as a result of fighting.174 Many in the ASEAN 
states believed that Vietnam was sending ‘out the “boat people” to 
destabilize the countries of the southeast where they land, and that 
this is done with Moscow’s encouragement’.175 The second event 
was a series of armed incursions by Vietnamese troops against camps 
in Thailand. Representatives of Thailand alleged violations of Thai 
territory during October and November 1979. Thailand claimed 
that on 14 and 21 October, 1 and 23 November and 27 December, 
mortar rounds fired from Cambodian territory had landed in Thai 
territory, and troop intrusions and shellings had killed and wounded 
Thai civilians, thus violating Thai neutrality.176 Vietnam responded 
with statements transmitted on 28 November and 21 December 1979, 
which ‘charged Thailand with colluding with the remnants of the Pol 
Pot-Ieng Sary regime and creating tension on the Thai-Kampuchean 
frontier by tolerating the use of Thai territory for supply centres and 
sanctuaries for combatants’.177
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The influx of refugees into Southeast Asia, coupled with Vietnamese 
incursions into Thailand, had the effect of ‘obliging wavering members 
of ASEAN to close ranks once more in support of the Association’s 
front-line state’.178 From that point, ‘ASEAN became more explicit 
in its challenge to Vietnam’, and the ‘political fortunes of ASEAN 
were made hostage to solidarity with Thailand’.179 By May 1979, 
the Malaysian Prime Minister had made a successful visit to China, 
indicating a shift away from Vietnam.180 Malaysia also cancelled aid 
and technological cooperation agreements with Vietnam, tripled the 
size of its air force and doubled the size of its army.181 The Philippines 
announced a $200  million increase in its military budget, and 
Indonesia ordered 60 army battalions to be brought to full strength.182 
From 1979, ‘military planning in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Singapore … shifted from internal, counter-insurgency warfare to 
preparation for conventional warfare’.183
The presence of the Soviet Pacific Fleet in the South China Sea and 
Indian Ocean encouraged Malaysia to agree to the basing of Australian 
P3-C reconnaissance aircraft.184 Singapore went so far as to propose 
military cooperation with external powers and to call upon ASEAN 
to aid Khmer Rouge guerrillas in their fight against the Vietnamese.185 
As the front-line state, Thailand obtained $30 million credit for arms 
purchases and military aid from the US, with additions bringing the 
total aid package to $400 million.186 Thailand also increased the army 
by 20 battalions, a one-third increase.187 From 1979 onwards, the 
ASEAN states were forced to seek additional military assistance from 
the US. In 1982, Indonesia, Philippines and Singapore sent military 
delegations to Washington to discuss arms purchases. In 1984, the Thai 
air force group sought to purchase F-16 fighter-bombers.188 Reliance 
on external power security guarantees meant that ASEAN’s aspiration 
for a ZOPFAN in Southeast Asia had ‘given way to a more real-politik 
[underlining in text] security formulation’.189
ASEAN’s internal debate: a summary
Evidence suggests that by the end of 1979, Thailand had assumed the 
role of ASEAN vanguard state. ASEAN support was an important 
component in Thailand’s anti-Vietnam policy. Thailand made it clear 
to the ASEAN states that it expected total commitment in the face 
of Vietnamese aggression, in addition to enhanced regional relations 
with extra-regional powers. While this policy was unpopular with 
certain ASEAN states, the influx of refugees into Southeast Asia, 
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coupled with Vietnamese incursions into Thailand, had the effect 
of increasing solidarity for Thailand, as the front-line ASEAN state 
with the most compelling interests at stake in the conflict. Although 
these events did not erase lingering concerns regarding the role of 
external powers in the region, they did have the effect of creating 
a united ASEAN front, which was used to great diplomatic effect 
at the UN.
ASEAN vanguard state – external power interest 
convergence
On 13 January 1979, several senior staff members of the PLA flew to 
meet with Thai premier Kriangsak. The following day ‘was spent in 
long sessions discussing the modalities of Sino-Thai cooperation in 
the Cambodian war … it was at that secret meeting between Chinese 
and Thai military leaders that a foundation of de facto Sino-Thai 
alliance was laid’.190 China was in desperate need of Thai support, as 
noted in a US telegram from the Embassy in China, in which it stated 
that ‘Beijing’s strategy is heavily reliant on Thai cooperation … if the 
Vietnamese spill over into Thailand, the risk of a major PRC military 
strike against Vietnam will be commensurately greater’.191 As part of 
the Sino-Thai alliance, Kriangsak agreed to allow the Chinese use of 
Thai territory to support the Khmer guerrillas.192 This arrangement 
began as soon as cooperation between the two was formalized. With 
Thailand and the Khmer Rouge, China had created a united front 
against Hanoi expansionism.
China and the ASEAN states also encouraged a continued American 
regional presence. In a conversation between President Carter and 
Vice Premier Deng on 29 January 1979, Carter confirmed that the US 
is ‘encouraging the ASEAN countries to stand united against Vietnam, 
and we are increasing military aid to Thailand’.193 Deng agreed with 
this approach, stating that, ‘at least a majority of ASEAN countries 
assesses this [as] an extremely grave matter … ASEAN countries are 
now in the front line’. Throughout 1979, China continually stressed 
the importance of Thailand in the fight against the Vietnamese. In July 
1979, National Security Council Staff members Nicholas Platt and 
Richard Holbrooke visited Beijing to meet Foreign Minister Huang 
Hua. On his return, Platt reported to US National Security Advisor 
Brzezinski that Hua ‘stressed the threat to Thailand, where seven 
Vietnamese divisions are poised on the border. If Thailand goes, “the 
rest of ASEAN will fall like dominoes”’.194
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In an August 1979 meeting between US Vice President Walter 
Mondale and Chinese Vice-Premier Deng, Mondale stated that ‘in 
Indochina, we share the same objectives: to create an independent 
Kampuchea that is not threatening to its neighbors, to prevent Laos 
from falling further under Vietnam and Soviet sway, to protect Thailand 
and other ASEAN states, and to show Vietnam that its increasing 
dependence upon Moscow will hurt badly over time and should be 
abandoned.’195 Mondale stated that the US ‘understand Thai and other 
ASEAN concern … the US stands ready to work closely with China 
and with ASEAN in making progress to this end’. Deng was adamant 
that the most important ‘conditions for a political settlement must 
be the genuine independence of Kampuchea and the withdrawal of 
Vietnamese troops from the country’. Deng insisted that ‘any political 
settlement that departs from these two preconditions is in fact aiding 
the Vietnamese and aiding the Russians’.
The Sino-Thai alliance did not mean that Bangkok and Beijing 
always shared the same view. Unlike China, ‘it was not ASEAN’s 
objective to humiliate Vietnam’.196 Vietnam was only perceived as 
a threat due to its invasion of Cambodia. Singapore stated its desire 
for ‘a strong, independent and prosperous Vietnam, rather than a 
Vietnam which was a satellite of China’.197 This difference in Sino-
ASEAN viewpoints provided Thailand with an additional, diplomatic 
role, whereby Thailand could ‘serve as a link and facilitator between 
China and Southeast Asia’.198 In an October 1980 visit to Beijing, Thai 
Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanond secured Chinese ‘willingness to 
consider ASEAN’s proposal to create a coalition resistance government 
that would include non-communist forces as well as the Khmer 
Rouge’.199 Thailand also sought to alleviate tensions between the 
PRC and ASEAN at a UN international conference in July 1981. 
Thailand persuaded ASEAN countries to move closer to the Chinese 
position on the need for the Khmer Rouge, as well as patching up 
misunderstandings, and alleviating lingering concerns regarding 
China’s true intentions.200
ASEAN vanguard state resistance to sovereignty violation
In an August 1979 meeting between US Vice President Walter 
Mondale and Chinese Vice-Premier Deng, Mondale informed Deng 
that the US have ‘placed major emphasis on the closest consultation 
with ASEAN countries including improved security assistance to 
Thailand, more modern planes, more economic assistance and 
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military assistance’.201 Deng agreed with Mondale’s support for the 
ASEAN states, stating that ‘ASEAN countries particularly Thailand, 
Malaysia, and the Philippines have expressed their apprehension that 
the Vietnamese may attack them, and I told them in the event of an 
attack against the ASEAN countries, we will stand on their side. And 
I told them that we mean what we say’. Thailand was at the forefront 
of this support. In a meeting between President Carter and Premier 
Hua in July 1980, Carter informed Hua that the US ‘had expedited 
shipment by air to Thailand of some weapons they had ordered’.202 
Hua stated that China was making ‘every effort to assist the Thais, 
including shipments of “natural resources”’. China was also ‘taking 
pressure off Thailand by tying down 29 SRV [Soviet Republic of 
Vietnam] infantry divisions along the Sino-Vietnamese border’. As 
an added element of security, Hua had informed ‘the Thais that the 
PRC would “side with them” if Vietnam made another large-scale 
attack into Thailand’.
Security cooperation was clearly in the interests of both Thailand 
and China following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia. The informal 
security alliance that developed between Thailand, ASEAN, China, the 
US and the ousted Khmer Rouge was a counter-encirclement strategy 
that sought to contain the Soviet and Vietnamese threat.203 Although 
China received permission from Thailand to aid the Khmer Rouge 
through Thai territory, Thailand received security guarantees that 
greatly enhanced its ability to resist Vietnamese aggression.204 Thailand 
was now in a position to ‘report Vietnamese shellings or attacks on the 
Thai border and expect that within six hours the Chinese troops on 
the Sino-Vietnamese border would repay the Vietnamese in kind’.205
While it is unclear whether Vietnam would have invaded Thailand, 
thus violating Thai sovereignty, there existed the belief, both regionally 
and among the external powers, that Thailand could be the next 
domino to fall. If this did occur, the rest of Southeast Asia was under 
increased threat. China, the US, Malaysia and Indonesia all promised 
to assist Thailand in case of a Vietnamese attack.206 While ASEAN 
could provide ‘collective political defence,’ it could not provide 
‘countervailing power’.207 As such, Thai responses to the Vietnamese 
invasion of Cambodia ‘involved large power diplomacy’.208 As an 
ASEAN vanguard state, Thailand played the important and necessary 
function of actively seeking and supporting great power intervention 
in regional affairs, which was consistent with the interests of both 
Thailand and the external actor in question, China. By doing so, 
Thailand, as an ASEAN vanguard state, had an active and substantial 
role in resisting sovereignty violations from a Soviet-backed Vietnam.
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The regional environment 1980–1991
Without the capabilities to provide a military response to Vietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia, ASEAN resorted to a diplomatic initiative at 
the UN. It was vital that ASEAN portray a united front, to prevent 
international recognition of the Heng Samrin puppet regime in Phnom 
Penh. This diplomatic initiative began in 1979, and continued for the 
duration of the conflict, with the ASEAN states also lobbying the UN 
repeatedly regarding refugee flows from Cambodia, and Vietnamese 
incursions into Thai territory. The credentials of the delegation of 
Democratic Kampuchea also became a topic for debate at the UN, 
which were examined by the Credentials Committee on 22 September 
1980.209 Singapore took the position that ‘if Democratic Kampuchea 
were to lose its seat in the United Nations, it would be tantamount 
to saying that it is permissible for a powerful military state to invade 
its weaker neighbour, to overthrow its government and to impose 
a puppet regime on it’.210 China, Singapore and the US stated that 
‘Democratic Kampuchea was a Member State of the United Nations 
and its Government was the sole legal representative of Kampuchea; 
therefore its credentials were in order’.211 However, ‘both Singapore 
and the United States indicated that they continued to deplore that 
Government’s human rights record’.212
This had been a point of contention among the US, China and 
the ASEAN states. Deng argued that ‘in deciding to form a united 
front we cannot exclude Pol Pot because Democratic Kampuchea is 
practically the only force of resistance now in Kampuchea’.213 However, 
the United States claimed that ‘if Pol Pot is the sole focal point of 
resistance to Heng Samrin, the situation is likely to get worse’.214 In 
July 1979, the US announced a policy of recognizing neither the Pol 
Pot nor the Heng Samrin governments.215 The Assembly voted to 
reject any amendment to the credentials of Democratic Kampuchea by 
a vote of 35 in favour to 74 against, with 32 abstentions.216 Democratic 
Kampuchea said that ‘rejection of the amendment had helped to 
prevent Viet Nam from legalizing its invasion of Kampuchea’.217 In 
October 1980, the General Assembly adopted resolution 35/6, by 
which it decided to convene in 1981 ‘an international conference on 
Kampuchea to seek a political settlement’.218
The International Conference on Kampuchea was held in New York 
on 13–17 July 1981, with a mandate to seek a comprehensive political 
settlement of the Cambodian problem.219 At the conference, 79 member 
states participated. A proposal by Singapore that ‘three political groups 
be invited to participate without vote was approved with respect to the 
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Khmer People’s National Liberation Front [KPNLF] and the National 
United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Co-operative 
Cambodia’. The Conference ‘referred to its Bureau the question of 
the participation of the People’s Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea’. 
The KPNLF was a political front formed by Son Sann, a former Prime 
Minister of Cambodia, who opposed the Heng Samrin regime. Prince 
Sihanouk formed the National United Front for an Independent Neutral 
Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia with the encouragement of the 
ASEAN states, which hoped to provide a more credible alternative for 
Cambodia than that offered by the ousted Khmer Rouge.
The International Conference on Kampuchea adopted a Declaration 
setting out elements for negotiation and resolution of the conflict, 
which included ‘withdrawal of all foreign forces from Kampuchea; 
restoration and preservation of its independence, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity; and a commitment by all states to noninterference 
in its internal affairs’. The Declaration was approved on 21 October 
1981 by the General Assembly, which adopted resolution 36/5 by 
a recorded vote of 100 to 25, with 19 abstentions. This resolution 
reiterated that ‘withdrawal of all foreign forces and the Kampuchean 
people’s right to determine their own destiny were principal 
components of any resolution of the problem’. The Assembly also 
noted a joint statement issued by Singapore on 4  September, in 
which ‘Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Son Sann and Khieu Samphan [a 
leading figure within the Khmer Rouge] expressed the desire to form 
a coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea’.
Stalemate at the United Nations
In a communiqué on the Kampuchea situation issued on 18 June 
1981, the ASEAN Foreign Ministers ‘proposed a political settlement 
including United Nations peacekeeping forces, foreign troop 
withdrawal and the disarming of all Khmer factions’.220 Following 
elections held by the Vietnamese regime in Cambodia, the Philippines 
Foreign Minister, as Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee, 
transmitted a statement on 25 March ‘by which the ASEAN members 
denounced the elections as an attempt by the Heng Samrin regime to 
legitimize itself ’.221 Thailand also continued to make submissions to 
the UN Secretary General complaining of incursions from Cambodian 
territory by Vietnamese-Heng Samrin forces. This included over 
80  separate violations between June 1980 and January 1981,222 
something vigorously denied by Vietnam.
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On 22 June 1982, Prince Sihanouk, Khieu Samphan, and Son Sann 
signed the Declaration of the Formation of the Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK) at Kuala Lumpur. Under the 
coalition, these became President, Vice President in charge of Foreign 
Affairs and Prime Minister, respectively.223 Vietnam responded to the 
Coalition Government by calling it a ‘farce that had been in production 
by China and the United States for over a year, and it regretted 
support of that farce by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’.224 
Despite the formation of the CGDK, ‘virtually all Chinese supplies 
were channelled only to the Khmer Rouge’.225 China blamed ‘the 
Sihanouk forces’ lack of organization and the KPNLF’s factionalism 
as explanations for China’s refusal of military assistance to them’.226
Having reached a stalemate, the Cambodian crisis remained 
unresolved for the majority of the 1980s. The General Assembly 
continued to call for a lasting solution to the conflict,227 and the 
ASEAN Foreign Ministers continued to release joint statements 
appealing to ‘efforts towards a just solution of the Kampuchea situation 
so as to restore Kampuchea’s status as an independent and sovereign 
state’.228 The ASEAN states also continued to call upon Vietnam 
to engage in talks with the Coalition Government of Democratic 
Kampuchea. In a joint statement issued 8 July 1985 by the ASEAN 
Foreign Ministers, it was reported that the ‘Coalition Government 
of Democratic Kampuchea had informed them that it was ready 
to enter into exploratory indirect or “proximity” talks with Viet 
Nam … to discuss the basic elements of a comprehensive, political 
settlement’.229 In a 9 October 1985 letter from the Chairman of the 
ASEAN Standing Committee, it was reported that ‘Viet Nam had not 
responded positively to ASEAN’s proposal’.230
Indonesia’s diplomatic initiatives: the Kuantan principle
Despite committing itself to providing a united ASEAN response to 
the invasion of Cambodia, Indonesia believed ‘that a compromize 
should be reached between ASEAN and Vietnam’, and this ‘was 
reflected in Indonesia’s unilateral diplomatic attempts to soften 
Vietnam’s position’.231 Within Jakarta, there existed some resentment 
regarding the ‘shift in the political centre of gravity of the Association 
from Jakarta to Bangkok … [which] had the effect of diminishing 
Indonesia’s assumed position of corporate leadership’.232 For Jakarta, 
Thailand’s Vietnam policy ‘and its implication for ASEAN … had 
been described as “the Thai tail that wags the ASEAN dog”’.233 Still 
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motivated by fear of China, Indonesia and Malaysia continued to seek a 
diplomatic settlement with Vietnam that deviated from China’s ‘bleed 
Vietnam white’ strategy.234 These attempts were articulated in March 
1980 in the Kuantan principle, which was largely a reiteration of the 
1971 ZOPFAN declaration.235 In an effort to reduce great power 
influence in the region, the principle proposed that ‘Vietnam would 
agree to cut its Soviet ties … if Thailand delinked from China and the 
Khmer Rouge’.236 The statement also ‘pointedly took cognizance of 
Vietnam’s security interests in Indochina’.237
In doing so, Indonesia and Malaysia confirmed that they were 
prepared to accept Vietnamese hegemony in Cambodia, in return 
for reduced tensions at the Thai-Cambodian border and a reduction 
in great power meddling in the region.238 Despite Indonesian and 
Malaysian efforts, the Kuantan principle was never implemented. This 
was largely due to a failure to gain either Chinese or Vietnamese 
endorsement for the proposal.239 The declaration also ‘proved to be 
totally unacceptable to Bangkok’.240 As the state most threatened 
by Vietnam, Thailand would ‘quietly sabotage any initiative that it 
perceived as against Thai interest’.241 During a tour of ASEAN capitals, 
General Prem Tinsulanond, ‘went out of his way in both Kuala 
Lumpur and Jakarta to indicate hostility to the Kuantan message’.242 
ASEAN concessions were not acceptable to Thailand or Singapore, 
which ‘publicly stood by the earlier ASEAN resolution calling for a 
complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces’.243 Ultimately, President 
Suharto ‘was not prepared to test the cohesion of the Association for 
the sake of a divisive joint formulation whose practical application 
was uncertain’.244
Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM)
Despite the failure of the Kuantan principle, Indonesia maintained its 
efforts to engage with Vietnam diplomatically. Recognizing this, the 
ASEAN states designated Jakarta the role ‘official ASEAN interlocutor’ 
with Vietnam.245 Indonesia made two unpublicized trips to Hanoi in 
1980 and 1982 to find a compromize to the Cambodian conflict. A 
third, official, trip came on 13–15 February 1984.246 From 25–28 July 
1988, Indonesia invited representatives from the four Cambodian 
parties, Prince Sihanouk from the National United Front for an 
Independent Neutral Peaceful and Co-operative Cambodia, Son 
Sann from the KPNLF, Khieu Samphan from the Party of Democratic 
Kampuchea, and authorities in Phnom Penh, headed by Hun Sen – 
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as well as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Vietnam and six 
members of ASEAN to meet for discussions at a cocktail party in 
Jakarta, later titled the Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM). One positive 
outcome from the JIM was that all parties to the Cambodian crisis 
met for the first time, ‘even though their respective positions remained 
incompatible’.247 For Indonesia, the process was ‘an opportunity to 
take a higher international profile’.248 However, this did not mean 
Suharto had deviated from ASEAN’s collective approach to the 
conflict. Suharto recognized that ‘the unity and solidarity of ASEAN 
is more important than the maintenance of good bilateral relations 
with Vietnam’.249 A second Jakarta Informal Meeting (JIM II) took 
place from 19–21 February 1989. Singapore noted ‘a more substantive 
convergence of interests amongst the three – Indonesia, Vietnam and 
the PRK – to work out a “regional solution” which could resist Sino-
Soviet pressure’.250
Thailand, on the other hand, ‘adopted a generally low-key role 
at JIM II which they were not supportive of in the first place’.251 
Singapore also noted that ‘the JIM process reflected the Indonesian 
assessment that Indonesia and Vietnam, as the two major powers 
in the region, should shape regional order and not let the external 
powers dominate’.252 However, the meeting revealed disagreements on 
certain aspects of the settlement of the Cambodia conflict, particularly 
‘the establishment of a provisional quadripartite authority of national 
reconciliation under the leadership of Prince Sihanouk’.253 Despite 
failing to provide a diplomatic solution to the Cambodian problem, 
and despite continued difference among the ASEAN member states, 
Suharto continued to maintain public solidarity with ASEAN on the 
issue of Cambodia.254
The end of the Third Indochina War
On 5 April 1989, Vietnam announced the decision to withdraw all 
of its troops from Cambodia by the end of September.255 Vietnam 
announced that this had been completed between 21 to 26 September 
1989.256 These steps towards conciliation coincided with a change in 
Soviet leadership. Mikhail Gorbachev became leader of the Soviet 
Union in March 1990. Faced with increased domestic and economic 
problems, Gorbachev realized that ‘ameliorating the Sino-Soviet 
conflict and disengaging China from the Western security system was a 
far more important objective than having good relations with Vietnam 
and significant influence in Indochina’.257 China placed conditions on 
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normalization of relations with the Soviet Union, one of which was 
that Moscow cease support of Vietnam in Cambodia.258
A subsequent reduction in Soviet economic and military aid left 
Vietnam effectively abandoned. Military aid to Vietnam was ‘almost 
exclusively’ Soviet.259 By the 1980s the Soviet Union was providing 
Vietnam with 97 percent of its military hardware. This was a marked 
increase from 1975, when the Soviet Union was only providing 
75 percent.260 Vietnam was unable to support its wartime economic 
and military policy in Cambodia without Soviet aid. Faced with a 
change in the status quo, Vietnam had little option but to capitulate to 
China. Beijing offered ‘reduced border tension and lower defence costs 
in return for Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia’.261 As Vietnam 
began to withdraw all of its troops from Cambodia, China eased 
tensions along the Sino-Vietnamese border and began to improve 
diplomatic relations between the two. In August 1990, the four 
Cambodian parties accepted a framework for a comprehensive political 
settlement, drawn up by the five permanent members of the UN 
Security Council.262 The Cambodian parties agreed to form a Supreme 
National Council (SNC) that would represent Cambodia at the United 
Nations.263 With the basis for a Cambodian settlement arranged, and 
with an end to the Cold War in sight, the Third Indochina War came 
to an official end on 23 October 1991.
Theoretical assessment of the Third Indochina War 
(1978–1991)
After many years of seeking a diplomatic solution to the Cambodian 
conflict, the ASEAN states ultimately had little say in its conclusion. 
This was because the conflict was essentially a product of great power 
Cold War rivalry. However, ASEAN and its supporters maintain 
the view that the Association played a key role in preventing the 
Vietnamese regime in Cambodia from receiving international 
recognition. Undoubtedly, Thailand, and by extension ASEAN, played 
an important role in the conflict. They did so in order to secure 
Thailand’s own interests, which were to prevent sovereignty violations 
from a Soviet-backed Vietnam. Thailand therefore had an active and 
substantial role in resisting sovereignty violations from other external 
powers. But an equally important factor is the role played by China, 
and to a lesser extent, the US. Had it not been for the informal alliance 
that developed, it is highly likely that Thailand would have resigned 
itself to Vietnamese domination in Indochina. ASEAN alone did not 
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have the capabilities to reverse Vietnam’s Cambodia policy, or to stand 
against Vietnam if it had sought to expand into Thailand. This suggests 
that convergence of both ASEAN vanguard state and external actor 
interests are necessary to secure ASEAN vanguard state resistance to 
sovereignty violation.
The case of the Third Indochina War can be understood in terms 
of a realist theoretical logic. The Soviet Union and Vietnam posed a 
clear threat to the external powers and to the ASEAN states. They 
responded to this threat by engaging in external and internal balancing 
strategies, to secure the vital state interest of autonomy and security. 
This interest convergence between an ASEAN vanguard state and 
external actor caused ASEAN vanguard state resistance to sovereignty 
violation, from actors external to the region. Can ASEAN be 
conceptualized as a unitary actor when Thailand was the vanguard 
state? Based on the foregoing analysis, ASEAN can be conceptualized 
as an actor during those periods when ASEAN displayed a united front 
in support of vanguard state interests. Evidence of minor deviations 
from cohesion should not result in denial of group actor designation.264 
Accordingly, those deviations from unitary action made by Indonesia 
and Malaysia during the Cambodian conflict do not result in denial 
of group actor status, because these deviations did not compromize 
the united front that ASEAN portrayed from late 1979 till the end of 
the conflict in 1991.
Analysis has shown that in the case of the Third Indochina War, 
behavioural cohesion was a response to the external threat posed by 
the Soviet Union and Vietnam. According to Stephen Walt, ‘external 
threats are the most frequent cause of international alliances’.265 Facing 
a threat, states seek to engage in balancing behaviour because ‘they 
place their survival at risk if they fail to curb a potential hegemon 
before it becomes too strong’.266 State interests are therefore premised 
on the basic point of seeking survival. This is consistent with the work 
of Crawford and Press, who define vital state interests as involving 
‘self-preservation, political independence, and, by extension, defence 
of strategically vital areas’.267 As the evidence has shown, in its 
pursuit of survival, Thailand actively sought maximum great-power 
commitment to its security interests.268 In conjunction with the rest of 
ASEAN, Thailand was able to affect the regional distribution of power 
by adding to the resources of China and the US while constraining that 
of Vietnam and the Soviet Union.269 The case in question therefore 
meets vanguard state theory’s expectations.
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Contrasting theoretical arguments
The consensus among the constructivists studying ASEAN is that 
the organization’s governing norms emphasize dialogue, consensus-
building and non-confrontation. What happens when the organization’s 
norms are challenged? Constructivist theorists interpret the Third 
Indochina War as a challenge to ASEAN norms, cohesion and unity.270 
However, their accounts of this case are at times limited, suggesting 
a need to look for alternative explanations. Ba states, ‘Vietnam’s 
action clearly challenged the idea of a unified and resilient Southeast 
Asia’, while Thailand’s subsequent alliance relationship with China 
‘represented a real test of the regional autonomy goals’.271 Ba concedes 
that ‘it would take some rhetorical contortions to make Thai actions 
consistent with what was agreed should be the ASEAN project of 
regional resilience’.272 However, she continues to maintain that their 
ability to work together ‘provided an important affirmation of their 
efforts and [italics in text] their solidarity as a group’.273
Despite challenges, Ba maintains that ‘shared ideas of region and 
the importance of regional unity might … have been the only [italics 
in text] significant thing that kept them [ASEAN] working together 
toward a common solution’.274 In this view, ideas about Southeast 
Asia’s ‘division and foreign intervention’ find expression in ‘ideas of 
resilience and “One Southeast Asia”’.275 Arguably, this overestimates 
the role of ideas in the historical record of this case study. Evidence 
presented here suggests that ASEAN cooperation was actually based 
on regional security concerns, rather than shared ideas of regional 
unity. Ba’s analysis of the conflict also underemphasizes the important 
role played by external powers. Ba acknowledges that Thai actions 
‘legitimat[ed] China’s involvement in Southeast Asia’.276 However, she 
fails to examine the critical role China, and the US, played in the 
conflict’s resolution. This presents an account of the conflict that is at 
odds with this period of Southeast Asia’s history.
Other constructivists maintain that the Third Indochina War was a 
success for ASEAN, which emerged from the conflict strengthened in 
its mission and core norms. According to Acharya, ASEAN ‘presented 
the Vietnamese invasion as a gross violation of the principle of non-
intervention in the internal affairs of states as well as the principle 
of non-use of force in interstate relations’.277 As events developed, 
the conflict gave ‘a more substantive meaning to ASEAN political 
and security cooperation’,278 while also having ‘positive effects for 
ASEAN’s pursuit of a regional identity’.279 In this view, the conflict 
‘motivated ASEAN members to overcome conflicting security interests 
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and territorial disputes within the grouping, thereby moving it further 
on the path towards a security community’.280 The account presented 
here does not deny the record of ASEAN cooperation, but emphasizes 
that it has been misinterpreted. To be specific, the role of ASEAN has 
been elevated, while that of external powers has been systematically 
downplayed, with important theoretical consequences. Indeed, Jürgen 
Haacke, who has studied ASEAN’s diplomacy in the Third Indochina 
War, reaches a very different conclusion to Acharya, noting that 
ultimately, ‘all of ASEAN had to bow to the pressure of major powers 
and accept the political compromize [sic] that was presented as a fait 
accompli’.281
A second strand in the literature is represented by the realist 
perspective. Michael Leifer, David Martin Jones and Michael Smith 
contend that ASEAN’s preference for consensus and conflict avoidance 
has lent itself to extra-regional actors manipulating ASEAN norms 
to serve their own best interests.282 Leifer, Jones and Smith all view 
ASEAN’s role in the Cambodia conflict as subordinate to that of the 
external powers. According to Leifer, the role of China represented 
a ‘much more effective means by which to challenge Vietnam’s 
hegemonic position than the diplomatic support of ASEAN’.283 
Because of this, the position ‘adopted by the Association favoured 
China’s interests, above all’.284 Jones and Smith also minimize ASEAN’s 
role in the resolution of the Third Indochina War, maintaining that 
the eventual settlement ‘represented an archetypal manifestation of 
great power politics’.285 According to this view, ‘ASEAN’s actual 
contribution to the Cambodian settlement reveals its role to be both 
ambiguous and ultimately limited’.286 The Association only appeared 
effective ‘because its actions coincided with superpower interests’, 
with ASEAN acting as ‘a convenient front for external actors and 
interests’.287 For Jones and Smith, the fact that China and the Soviet 
Union effectively resolved the conflict through bilateral diplomacy, 
illustrated ‘the region’s continuing dependence upon external actors 
and the illusory character of ASEAN’s attempt to erect a cordon sanitaire 
around Southeast Asia’.288
This perspective advanced by Leifer, Jones and Smith is difficult to 
reconcile with the facts. China and the US clearly saw ASEAN, and 
Thailand in particular, as a critical actor in opposing Vietnam. Any 
account of this case must therefore focus on the importance of Sino-
Thai cooperation. While Leifer does give some consideration to the 
‘differential impact on the actual security interests’ of the ASEAN 
member states, these are viewed as relatively ineffective.289 Thus, the 
alternative approaches to resolving the problem of Vietnam’s invasion 
105
THE THIRD INDOCHINA WAR
are interpreted as arising ‘from a natural divergence of strategic 
perspectives, which has been an important factor in denying the 
Association a conventional security role’.290 The critical point to note 
is that Leifer does not seek to develop a connection between external 
power and regional state interests. As such, ASEAN state interests 
remain hostage to those of China, and regional autonomy remains 
wholly reliant on external actors. For Jones and Smith, ASEAN only 
appeared effective because its actions coincided with the interests of 
China and the US. This approach takes an overly restrictive view of 
ASEAN autonomy and the role of ASEAN states. As this chapter has 
shown, Thailand also sought to secure its own interests as a response 
to the Vietnamese threat, and worked with ASEAN to prevent a 
Vietnamese fait accompli. Jones and Smith offer an accurate portrayal 
of the role of great powers in Indochina during the Cold War; they 
minimize the ASEAN role. As such, there remain limitations in their 
analysis.
For Lee Jones, ASEAN responded to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia 
‘not to defend its non-interference principle, but rather to contain 
revolution in Indochina’.291 To this end, the ASEAN states ‘engaged 
in counter-intervention, fomenting civil war inside Cambodia to keep 
Vietnamese forces pinned down and unable to support revolutionary 
movements outside Indochina’.292 The Vietnamese threat is ‘not 
understood in conventional, military, balance-of-power terms’ but in 
terms of ‘the likely consequences of the invasion for the balance of 
forces within their own societies’.293 The differing ASEAN responses 
to the Vietnamese invasion are explained as ‘stemming from intra-elite 
splits and differences in domestic social conflicts’.294 Despite these 
differences, Jones maintains that ‘a shared determination to uphold 
capitalist social order in the region underpinned ASEAN’s basic 
cohesion’.295
Jones’ overwhelming focus on social conflict within individual 
ASEAN states leaves a number of important factors under-theorized. 
By focusing predominantly on the domestic politics of regional 
states, the role of external powers in the conflict has been minimized. 
Jones makes no mention of the role of the Soviet Union, despite the 
integral part Moscow had in the conflict. While Jones refers to China’s 
desire to counter ‘Soviet-initiatives’ in his narrative, his focus on the 
Sino-Thai relationship seems to consist largely of China’s reduced 
support for the CPT in Thailand, and the effect this had on Thailand’s 
social order.296 This focus on domestic factors underemphasizes the 
mutual security concerns of Thailand, China and the US, and de-
emphasizes legitimate and real fears of Vietnamese expansion on the 
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part of ASEAN states. Moreover, as evidence provided in this chapter 
has shown, ASEAN’s basic cohesion in the aftermath of the invasion 
was less to do with a determination to uphold capitalist social order, 
and more to do with concerns for regional security. These concerns 
were exacerbated after the influx of refugees into the region, and 
Vietnamese incursions into Thai territory. These important facets of 
the Third Indochina War case study are missing from Jones’ argument, 
suggesting the need for an additional approach.
As this chapter has instead attempted to show, a realist external actor-
ASEAN interest convergence model is effective in explaining ASEAN’s 
resistance to sovereignty violation during the Third Indochina War. 
Interest convergence between Thailand and China regarding the 
Vietnamese threat meant that Thailand (and by extension ASEAN) 
was able to resist sovereignty violation from an expansionist Vietnam. 
Conversely, China was able to use Thailand, and by extension ASEAN, 
to support its Vietnam policy in Southeast Asia.
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4
The East Timor 
Humanitarian Crisis
At the time of Indonesia’s 1975 invasion and occupation of East Timor, 
and in the two decades that followed, the US and Australia maintained 
consistent support for the Suharto regime. Despite UN condemnation 
of Indonesia’s actions with respect to East Timor, these external 
powers sought to mute international criticism, whilst strengthening 
relations with a state deemed to be of continued strategic significance. 
However, a sea change was in evidence by the late 1990s. While 
Indonesia maintained the backing of the ASEAN states, it had lost 
support from the US and Australia, its key external power allies. In 
the context of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997,1 Indonesia was 
pressured by these powerful non-ASEAN states into allowing a popular 
consultation in East Timor in 1999. The subsequent humanitarian 
crisis resulted in these external powers, in conjunction with the UN 
and wider international community, forcing Indonesia to accept 
external intervention by way of a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force. 
This act significantly undermined ASEAN autonomy.2 Had external 
intervention not occurred, it is unlikely that Indonesia would have 
permanently withdrawn its forces from East Timor.
Through analysis of the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, evidence 
will be provided to support the hypothesis that in 1999, ASEAN’s 
failure to resist violations to the sovereignty of Indonesia was a 
consequence of low interest convergence between Indonesia and the 
external powers. During this period, Indonesia continued to have the 
most compelling interests at stake in the future of East Timor, having 
incorporated the territory as the archipelago’s 27th province in 1976. 
As the vanguard state, Indonesia was able to apply continued pressure 
on the ASEAN states to obtain strong regional support for Indonesia’s 
East Timor policy, and to portray a united ASEAN front in the face of 
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external intervention. However, the key factor explaining Indonesia’s 
failure to resist sovereignty violation in 1999 resides in the critical role 
played by external actors.
Following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, the regional 
repercussions of Indonesia’s economic and domestic instability 
generated concern in the US and Australia. Interest divergence led 
these external powers to apply pressure on Indonesia to elicit change 
over East Timor. In a weakened state, Indonesia was coerced into 
accepting an international peacekeeping force in East Timor, despite 
asserting that such a force would constitute an unacceptable breach of 
its state sovereignty. Critically, ASEAN institutional cohesion alone 
was not sufficient to prevent Indonesian sovereignty violation. This 
supports the view that, as a collection of weak states, ASEAN is unable 
to affect the international security landscape on its own.3 Indeed, as 
one commentator noted, the crisis consolidated the view held by many 
that ASEAN was ‘chronically incapable of taking meaningful action 
even when its own interests are directly engaged’.4 As this chapter 
will attempt to show, ASEAN autonomy is much more contingent 
than currently portrayed in much of the existing non-realist literature.
The chapter will begin with an assessment of Indonesia’s position 
in the post-Cold War regional environment. During this period, 
which was characterized by a continuation of human rights abuses 
in East Timor, Indonesia continued to receive support from external 
powers such as the US and Australia. Interest convergence between 
Indonesia, Australia and the US regarding the formers’ East Timor 
policy remained high. Indonesia was also able to maintain pressure on 
the ASEAN states to support its East Timor policy, thus spearheading 
a united ASEAN front. The discussion will subsequently show the 
devastating impact of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis on Indonesia’s 
economy and domestic system. At this time, there was a loss of 
confidence in the Indonesian regime, and a divergence in interests 
between Indonesia, Australia, and the US. Despite this external power 
interest divergence, ASEAN maintained its support for Indonesia 
during a period of great regional economic instability. This support 
was ultimately to the detriment of the Association.
The chapter will then examine the pressure external powers placed 
on Indonesia to accept a process of consultation in East Timor after 
the financial crisis. It will consider East Timor’s subsequent vote for 
independence, the devastating humanitarian crisis that ensued, and the 
international community’s responses to the crisis. Particular attention 
will focus on the additional pressure placed on Indonesia, which 
ultimately paved the way for external intervention in the territory. 
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The analysis will then address Indonesia’s failure to resist sovereignty 
violation by way of a UN mandated peacekeeping force, and the period 
of UN sovereignty in East Timor approved by the Security Council in 
October 1999. The chapter will conclude with a theoretical assessment 
of the findings and consideration of the contending arguments for the 
humanitarian crisis in East Timor.
Indonesia in the post-Cold War regional 
environment
In the period after 1975, Indonesia was largely successful in keeping 
East Timor off the international agenda. This was due to two reasons. 
First, as will be shown, Indonesia maintained the support of key 
external powers such as the US and Australia. These powers were 
proactive in deflecting negative attention away from Indonesia’s East 
Timor policy. Second, Indonesia was able to ban foreign journalists 
from entering East Timor, thus cutting the region off from the 
international community.5 When journalists were allowed to enter 
the region, this was always in the company of Indonesian officials.6
East Timorese cultural and political resistance increased through the 
1980s. Fighting between FALINTIL, the military wing of FRETILIN, 
and Indonesian armed forces continued throughout this period. The 
severity of FRETILIN resistance led Indonesian President Suharto 
to increase troop levels in East Timor to 14,000–20,000 in 1984, 
and to declare a state of emergency in the region on 9 September 
1985.7 Suharto attempted to normalize Jakarta’s control in East Timor 
in 1988, when he declared that the territory had equal status with 
Indonesia’s other 26 provinces.8 As such, East Timor was provided 
with a government structure identical to Indonesia’s other provinces. 
Travel restrictions were also lifted, which allowed East Timorese to 
leave the region, and Indonesian and foreign visitors to enter. This 
was exemplified by a visit from Pope John Paul II in October 1989.
Despite normalisation, East Timorese political factions staged 
public protests while engaging in support for FALINTIL.9 One such 
demonstration against the Indonesian government occurred at the 
Santa Cruz cemetery in the East Timor capital of Dili on 12 November 
1991. More than 2000 unarmed East Timorese were present at the 
cemetery, to commemorate the death of an underground member 
killed by Indonesian security forces.10 The memorial procession was 
attacked by Indonesian troops after the demonstrators chanted slogans, 
displayed independence banners and unfurled the FRETILIN flag.11 
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The official death toll was initially declared at 19 and later revised to 
50.12 Local activists claimed as many as 273 deaths, with many more 
injured, and up to 255 missing after large-scale arrests.13 For some 
commentators, the massacre was the ‘critical turning point in East 
Timor’s path to independence’.14 The relaxation of the ban on foreign 
journalists in the area meant that many witnessed and recorded the 
violence. Max Stahl, an activist journalist, was filming at the cemetery 
when Indonesian troops opened fire. Stahl was able to hide this film 
and smuggle it from the country with the assistance of a foreign aid 
worker. As Kingsbury notes, when the footage aired, Indonesia’s 
‘woeful human rights record was back in the international spotlight’, 
putting ‘the question of East Timor firmly back on the international 
agenda’.15
The death of an Australian human rights activist during the massacre 
came as a particular embarrassment for the Australian government, 
which had officially recognized Indonesian sovereignty over East 
Timor in December 1989, by signing the Timor Gap ‘Zone of 
Cooperation Agreement’, allowing for joint exploration of Timor 
Gap natural resources.16 As international condemnation of Indonesia 
increased, the government went into ‘public relations damage control 
mode’, where an inquiry was held and a regional commander relieved 
of his post.17 However, this did little to silence Indonesia’s critics. 
These changes in events culminated in the Nobel Peace Prize for 1996 
being awarded to the East Timorese Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes 
Belo and Foreign Minister in exile José Ramos-Horta, for ‘their work 
towards a just and peaceful resolution to the conflict in East Timor’.18 
This was specifically intended to ‘spur efforts to find a diplomatic 
solution to the conflict in East Timor based on the people’s right to 
self-determination’.19
While the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 was an important event in 
Indonesia’s occupation of East Timor, it is important to note that, 
despite worldwide condemnation of Indonesia, there were no serious 
calls for intervention following the massacre. Despite evidence of 
ongoing and serious human rights abuses against the East Timorese 
people, it would be eight more years before the international 
community would attempt to intervene in East Timor. This suggests 
that while the Santa Cruz massacre was an important factor in East 
Timor’s eventual independence, it was not the ‘critical turning point’ 
claimed by some.20 There were no calls for intervention in 1991 
because Indonesia maintained the support of two important external 
powers: the US and Australia. With external power support, Indonesia 
was able to maintain its control over East Timor for the majority of 
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the 1990s. It would take a catalytic event before Indonesia lost this 
external power support, an event that would directly impinge on 
external power state interests.
Indonesia-state interest convergence in the post-
Cold War period
In the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre, US Senators Claiborne Pell, 
the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and David 
Boren, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, visited 
Indonesia. There, they stated that despite being concerned by the 
killings, any specific steps to reconciliation with the East Timorese 
‘were a matter for the Indonesian government to decide because this 
was an internal affair of the country’.21 Similar sentiments were echoed 
by the US Ambassador in Jakarta, Robert Barry. In 1994, Mr Barry 
stated that ‘the human-rights issue will not be detrimental to the future 
of ties between the US and Indonesia’, and that his government ‘from 
the start accepted [East Timor’s] incorporation into Indonesia’.22
From March 1992, US support for the Indonesian regime came 
under greater Congressional scrutiny.23 Both the US House of 
Representatives and the Senate within US Congress placed restrictions 
on the supply of arms and military aid to Indonesia. However, in 1997 
the House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee ‘heard 
administration testimony that the Pentagon sold Indonesia military 
training without congressional notification or consent throughout 
1996’.24 In 1998, released Pentagon documents showed that ‘US Army 
and Marine personnel had trained Indonesian soldiers under the Joint 
Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program every few months 
since 1992’.25 As part of this training, ‘Indonesian troops were trained 
in air assault, urban warfare, and psychological operations thirty-six 
times [italics in text] between 1992 and 1997 without congressional 
knowledge or approval’.26 Much of this training went to Indonesia’s 
Kopassus troops, widely acknowledged as having instigated numerous 
human rights violations during the invasion of East Timor.27
In addition to military training, the US continued to sell arms to 
the Indonesian government. In the year immediately after the Dili 
massacre, ‘the State Department licensed more than 300 military sales 
to Indonesia’.28 President Bill Clinton met with Suharto annually 
from 1992 to 1998, at which times he would always raise the issue of 
human rights in East Timor.29 However, this stance was undoubtedly 
undermined by continued arms sales and continued joint military 
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
122
training. The foregoing analysis suggests that despite intense pressure 
from Congress, and despite acknowledged human rights abuses in 
East Timor, the US government’s policy towards Indonesia and its 
occupation of East Timor had not significantly changed in the pre-
1997 period.
Indonesia-Australia interest convergence
Like the Clinton administration, the Australian government also 
continued its support for Indonesia in the period following the 1991 
Santa Cruz massacre. In April 1992, Australian Prime Minister Paul 
Keating met Suharto in Jakarta, where the Santa Cruz massacre was 
not discussed.30 Keating confirmed in 1994 that ‘no country is more 
important to Australia than Indonesia. If we fail to get this relationship 
right, and nurture and develop it, the whole web of our foreign 
relations is incomplete’.31 In 1995, Australian Foreign Affairs head 
Richard Woolcott claimed that ‘the East Timor lobby should accept 
that the time for an act of self-determination after 20 years has passed 
and that demanding independence is a lost cause which raises false 
hopes, prolongs conflict and costs lives’.32
Bilateral ties were strengthened between Australia and Indonesia 
in 1992, with the establishment of an Australia-Indonesia Ministerial 
Forum designed to provide a platform for the expansion of economic 
ties, including agreements on investments and copyright protection.33 
Canberra made it clear that Indonesian human rights abuses would not 
be allowed to affect bilateral trade and investment. Australian Foreign 
and Trade Minister Gareth Evans stated that ‘Australia did not think it 
appropriate to make “routine linkages” between the two as that would 
be counterproductive’.34 In addition to enhanced trade and economic 
linkages, Australia was also focusing on ‘building a much deeper and 
more consequential military and security relationship’ with Indonesia.35 
During this same period, the newly elected Australian Prime Minister 
Paul Keating travelled to Washington, at a time when Congress was 
seeking to restrict defence sales and training between the US and 
Indonesia, with the express intention of urging Clinton to withdraw 
human rights considerations from the drafting of defence contracts.36
By 1995, Indonesia held more military exercises with Australia than 
with any other country.37 The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and 
Indonesian Navy conducted maritime warfare exercises four times 
a year. The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) and Indonesian Air 
Force conducted joint exercises annually.38 Kopassus units travelled to 
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Australia for counter-terrorism and counter-hijacking training, ‘despite 
objections that the force has been linked to serious human rights 
abuses’.39 In 1995, the Australian Defence Force (ADF) became ‘the 
most important foreign provider of military training to Indonesia, 
having displaced the United States’.40 Increased relations between 
Australia and Indonesia culminated in the signing of a secret ‘watershed 
treaty’, in December 1995, known as the Australia-Indonesia 
Agreement on Maintaining Security.41 This treaty committed the 
Australian and Indonesian governments to consult at ministerial level 
about matters affecting their common security, consult each other 
in the case of adverse challenges to either party, or to their common 
security interests, and promote cooperative activities in the security 
field.42
A powerful Jakarta lobby, consisting of bureaucrats, academics 
and journalists, also had a significant impact on Australia’s foreign 
policy with respect to Indonesia. The Jakarta lobby ‘long regarded 
Australia’s relationship with Indonesia as an exceptional case requiring 
careful management by “experts” with a proper sympathy for and 
understanding of Jakarta’s difficulties’.43 This was a stance reflected 
by Richard Woolcott in 1995, when he confirmed that ‘we cannot 
allow foreign policy to be made in the streets, by the media or by the 
unions’.44 The Jakarta lobby ‘insisted that [Suharto’s] human rights 
“failures” should be balanced against his economic achievements’.45
Following the massacre in Dili, the Jakarta lobby made ‘concerted 
efforts to offset community outrage’.46 Richard Woolcott and 
journalist Greg Sheridan took steps to blame Portugal for the killings. 
An Australian National University Economics Professor stated that the 
massacre was a tragedy, not due to the loss of life, but because of the 
anti-Indonesian hate campaigns it had inflamed.47 The Jakarta lobby 
also took steps to minimize the number of victims of the massacre, 
and dismissed evidence of further massacres committed by Indonesian 
troops against the East Timorese. Clearly, in the post-Cold War period, 
Australia continued to view Indonesia as a key strategic regional 
partner. Canberra therefore prioritized good relations with Indonesia 
over concerns for human rights abuses committed by Indonesian forces 
in East Timor.
Indonesia-ASEAN state interest convergence
Despite the massacre of unarmed demonstrators in Santa Cruz, the 
ASEAN states continued their support for Indonesia’s East Timor 
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policy, taking whatever steps were necessary to obstruct further protest 
movements. The Nobel Peace prize award-giving ceremony in 1996, 
where East Timorese Bishop Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo and Foreign 
Minister in exile José Ramos-Horta were to be honoured, was held in 
Oslo, Norway. Thailand, as the only ASEAN state to have an Embassy 
in Norway besides Indonesia, refused to attend the ceremony, making 
it clear that the Thai ambassador’s attendance at the function would be 
‘inappropriate’.48 In May 1994, the Philippine President Fidel Ramos, 
responding to pressure from Jakarta, tried to ban an international 
conference on East Timor human rights in Manila.49 Jakarta warned 
the Philippines that ‘the holding of such a conference in Manila may 
impair the friendly relations between the two countries’.50
In an effort to placate Jakarta, President Ramos confirmed that ‘the 
Philippines considers East Timor part of Indonesia as its 27th province. 
This is a position which we took a long time ago’.51 Despite the 
Philippines constitution providing for freedom of association and free 
speech, Manila confirmed it would do everything it could, within 
the constitution’s limits, to avoid damaging relations with Jakarta.52 
Philippines’ Secretary Raul Manglapus stated that Manila ‘will not 
support any secessionist movement in Indonesia’.53 Ultimately, the 
Philippines made the decision to ban foreign participation at the 
conference. This meant that Mr Jose Ramos-Horta was blacklisted 
from attending. Indonesian Foreign Minister Ali Alatas welcomed 
the Philippines decision. Alatas argued that the conference had been 
‘inspired, planned and engineered by East Timorese exiles’, and 
that the conference was ‘leaning towards interference in Indonesia’s 
territorial integrity’.54 The Chairman for the Asia-Pacific Coalition 
for East Timor (APCET) argued that the Philippines’ decision was 
evidence of Manila’s ‘clear surrender to Indonesian pressure. Indonesia 
has succeeded in invading the Philippines – not in military terms … 
but in foreign policies and diplomatic work’.55 However, President 
Ramos affirmed that ‘the Philippine government has acted, as it will 
always act, in accordance with the national interest’.56
Plans for a human rights conference to be hosted by the Southeast 
Asian Human Rights Network (SEANET) in Thailand were met 
with similar consternation. The Thai government stepped up its 
control over the operations of international non-governmental 
organisations, requiring them to apply for permission for any planned 
activities 30 days in advance.57 This meant that SEANET conference 
organizers were unable to find a venue for the meeting. Thai officials 
feared that Bangkok might be used as a venue to criticize Indonesia 
in its handling of East Timor.58 As such, the Thai government sent 
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plainclothes police to ‘monitor the movements of a group of foreign 
human rights organisation members’.59 Thai Foreign Minister Prasong 
Soonsiri urged the human rights group ‘to consider the adverse effects 
the meeting may have on relations between Thailand and Indonesia … 
the meeting will not only strain relations between the two countries’.60
Ali Alatas informed the Thai Foreign Ministry that he may ‘decide 
against attending the ASEAN meeting if the SEANET meeting is held 
in Bangkok’.61 Indonesia also protested against a Thai newspaper, The 
Nation, after it ‘carried two editorials critical of Indonesian policy 
on East Timor’.62 Thailand’s Special Branch Police Bureau Assistant 
Commissioner Yothin Mattayomnan stated that ‘police had been 
instructed to intervene and make arrests if the activities of NGO 
[Non-governmental Organisation] members threaten national security 
and the country’s international relations’.63 The Thai Prime Minister 
Chuan Leekpai denied that his administration was contravening its 
policy to promote human rights. Leekpai argued that Thailand ‘must 
place the national interest before anything else while upholding the 
rights and freedom of all’.64
Manila banned Ramos-Horta from entering the country for a 
second time in October 1996, fearing he may disturb an upcoming 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting scheduled for 
November. The House of Representative Speaker Jose de Venecia said 
that the decision had been taken ‘in the national interest and in the 
ASEAN interest, out of respect for President Suharto, and in order to 
maintain serenity within APEC’.65 Ramos-Horta was also banned from 
entering Bangkok in 1995 to teach a programme at a local university. 
In November 1996, the youth wing of the ruling government, the 
United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), broke up the Asia-
Pacific Conference on East Timor, convened in Kuala Lumpur. The 
Malaysian police went on to arrest more than 100 people, including 47 
foreigners.66 These foreigners were subsequently deported. Indonesia 
expressed its ‘highest appreciation’ to the Malaysian government for 
shutting down the conference.67 The Malaysian decision ‘reflected the 
ASEAN members’ commitment not to interfere in the affairs of other 
countries, and their highest solidarity’.68
In December 1996, ASEAN warned the European Union that 
continued scrutiny of extraneous issues such as East Timor could 
aggravate relations between the two organisations. This statement 
was the first time ASEAN as a group ‘formally cautioned another 
grouping against poaching into the affairs of one of its members’.69 
This statement had the desired effect. During EU-ASEAN dialog in 
February 1997, EU foreign ministers skirted the issue of East Timor, 
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despite initially expressing a determination to press the topic.70 ASEAN 
officials expressed their satisfaction that ‘East Timor was not included in 
the agenda’.71 According to Jakarta, ‘ASEAN countries are aware East 
Timor would have been far worse off without Indonesian intervention. 
No ASEAN country would have endorsed a “Cuba” on Indonesia’s 
doorstep’.72 It is apparent from these findings that ASEAN support 
was a key component in Indonesia’s East Timor policy. Within the 
region, Indonesia was determined to keep East Timor off the agenda, 
by any means necessary. The ASEAN states recognized this, and did 
everything in their power to placate Jakarta. Maintaining positive 
relations with Indonesia was as a key national interest at this time.
The Asian Financial Crisis (1997) – a catalyst for 
change
Relations between Indonesia, Australia and the US remained strong in 
the period up to 1997, despite a change in the regional environment 
following the end of the Cold War. Levels of interest convergence 
had been maintained in the absence of a common unifying threat, 
through joint exports and direct investments. The US had strong 
economic ties with Indonesia, with US exports between 1986 and 
1993 tripling from US$795 million to US$2.8 billion.73 Australia-
Indonesia two-way trade also grew rapidly, from $AU2.2 billion in 
1990–91 to $AU4.3 billion in 1995–96, a growth rate of approximately 
14.5 percent a year.74 Australia also had direct investments in Indonesia 
totalling some AUS$2.5  billion.75 Clearly, the US and Australia 
had much at stake in Indonesia. It was in external power interests 
to see a strong and stable Indonesia in Southeast Asia. The Asian 
Financial Crisis of 1997 acted as a catalyst for change, with Indonesia’s 
subsequent economic and domestic collapse seriously impacting 
external power interests. Following the crisis, a decrease in interest 
convergence between Indonesia and these external powers would lead 
to the first significant calls for intervention in East Timor, and would 
culminate in Indonesia’s failure to resist sovereignty violation from 
actors external to the region.
Background to the Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian Financial Crisis first manifested in Thailand, in early 1997. 
At that time, the Thai baht began to crumble as a result of a number of 
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factors, including ‘imprudent domestic lending practices, an imbalance 
between short-term and long-term financing, and an unrealistic 
exchange rate pegged to the US dollar’.76 When doubts grew regarding 
Thailand’s ability to maintain the baht to the dollar, investors began 
to sell their currency. Despite the Bank of Thailand attempting to 
float the baht on the international money market, it fell quickly by 
10 percent. As it continued to weaken, confidence in the value of 
the currency was further undermined. By August 1997, evidence of 
similar short-term debt financing became apparent in Indonesia. In 
the late 1980s, a large number of private banks were created within 
Indonesia, which were ‘poorly managed and prone to making risky 
or politically motivated loans’.77 During the 1990s, Indonesia’s foreign 
debt increased to approximately US$80 billion, with much of this 
short-term debt financing speculative investments in real estate.78 The 
Suharto government supported cronyism, unsound banking practices 
and maintained market-distorting monopolies, something the World 
Bank was reportedly aware of.79
The Suharto regime’s record of economic growth also failed to 
take into account the poor distribution of wealth or the excessive 
accumulation of wealth to a small number of elites.80 These practices 
increased the Suharto family’s estimated worth to over US$30 billion.81 
After devaluation of the Thai baht, investors questioned the strength of 
the rupiah, which they subsequently sold to buy the US dollar. As in 
Thailand, the Indonesian Central Bank attempted to float the rupiah 
on the international money market. This led to a rapid depreciation of 
the currency, which lost 81 percent.82 Collapse of the rupiah devastated 
the Indonesian economy. As a result, borrowers were unable to repay 
debts, banks were unable to secure foreign loans in an attempt to 
foster regrowth, and manufacturers were no longer able to afford raw 
materials to continue production.
Indonesia’s economic and domestic crisis
As a result of Indonesia’s economic crisis, inflation reached 80 to 
100 percent. The rupiah reached its lowest point, at 17,000 to the 
US dollar.83 Banks became insolvent and businesses went bankrupt. 
Coupled with depreciation of the rupiah, International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) rates of interest reached as high as 50 to 60 percent, 
forcing further companies into insolvency.84 In 1997, unemployment 
in Indonesia passed 40 percent. Food shortages due to adverse weather 
the previous year meant that by early 1998, there were predictions 
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that Indonesia would require 4 to 5 million tons of rice before 1999 
to prevent starvation of vulnerable citizens.85 Ultimately, Indonesia’s 
failing economy led to mass unemployment, poverty and malnutrition, 
with nearly two-thirds of Indonesians in danger of falling below the 
poverty line in 1999.86 As a result of the crisis, Indonesia was forced to 
seek help from the IMF, which offered economic aid but demanded 
greater democratic and microeconomic reforms by return.
As part of the IMF support package, Indonesia was required to 
‘restructure certain banks, dismantle a quasi-governmental monopoly 
on all commodities (except rice), cut fuel subsidies, increase electricity 
rates, increase the transparency of public policy and budget-making 
processes, and speed up privatisation and reform of state enterprizes’.87 
Suharto openly criticized the stringent IMF package, informing the 
international community that no reform changes would be made. 
Indonesian government official Dim Syamsudin stated: ‘I’m afraid 
there’s a communications breakdown between us and the IMF. Our 
people will say “go to hell with your aid”’.88 As a response to stringent 
IMF reforms, Suharto threatened to renege on regional free-trade 
agreements, and shut off Indonesia’s banking system from the rest 
of the region, creating an Islamic banking system with no interest 
charges.89 Such changes could precipitate the total collapse of the 
Indonesian economy, sparking regional instability and a domino effect 
whereby other countries such as Thailand would seek to renegotiate 
their own IMF bailout packages.90 As a result of Suharto’s actions, 
‘international confidence in the regime, already at an all-time low, 
simply collapsed … as Suharto’s domestic support began to collapse, 
his international support evaporated’.91
Following the Asian Financial Crisis, domestic support for Suharto’s 
New Order evaporated. Large sections of Indonesian society 
abandoned Suharto. Despite domestic upheaval, Suharto had himself 
reappointed president by Indonesia’s Consultative Assembly for a 
seventh term in March 1998.92 Suharto then made the decision ‘to 
appoint a new cabinet which included his eldest daughter, a notorious 
businesswoman, and other cronies’.93 Student-led demonstrations 
against the Indonesian government’s handling of the economic crisis 
began in May 1998.94 On 12 May, Indonesian troops fired on students 
as they returned to their university campus, killing four. The following 
day, riots broke out in the capital’s Chinese commercial centre, with 
approximately 1200 people killed.95 Subsequently, thousands of 
Chinese families fled the country. As protests grew within Indonesia, 
plans were made to hold a mass meeting of over one million Indonesian 
citizens on 20 May 1998. Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto 
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threatened to create a ‘Tiananmen’ tragedy if the meeting were to 
take place, and plans were subsequently abandoned.96 As a result of 
mass public protests, General Suharto had little option but to resign 
from office. He did so on 21 May 1998, appointing his Vice President, 
Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie, to succeed him.97
Political turmoil in Indonesia, followed by Suharto’s eventual 
resignation, led to an increased number of secessionist movements in 
Indonesia’s provinces, including East Timor, Aceh and West Papua. 
On 6  June 1998, the first public meeting to discuss the future of 
Timor was convened in Dili.98 Some 3,000 people, including all 
Timorese political factions, attended the meeting.99 The following 
week, a student demonstration attended by more than 3,000 people 
was held at the University of East Timor.100 East Timorese student-led 
demonstrations were also held at the ministries of Foreign Affairs and 
Justice in Jakarta. During demonstrations in Dili in June and July 1998, 
calls for a referendum on independence intensified.101 Bishop Belo met 
with President Habibie to discuss East Timor’s future in June 1998. 
Bishop Belo left the meeting announcing that ‘President Habibie had 
promised ABRI [Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia] troops 
would be removed from East Timor little by little’.102 However, it 
would take significant pressure from external powers before agreement 
on a referendum would be reached. Analysis of external power 
interests following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 will highlight 
two important factors: first, as a specific result of the financial crisis, 
interest convergence between Indonesia, the US and Australia began 
to decrease; and second, that this decrease in interest convergence 
led to external powers pressuring President Habibie into holding a 
referendum on East Timor’s independence.
Indonesia – external power interest divergence
Following the financial crisis of 1997, the US was forced to re-evaluate 
its relationship with Indonesia.103 Despite significant pressure from 
Congress, which had steadily increased since the Santa Cruz massacre 
in Dili in 1991, the Clinton administration had continued to supply 
arms and military training to Indonesia. However, Indonesian domestic 
and economic instability following the Asian financial crisis had a 
significant impact on US state interests. A Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) report, written on 6 February 1998, provides several 
reasons why the effects of the financial crisis in Indonesia were of 
interest to the US government.104 First, due to the interlinking of 
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financial markets, instability in the Asian financial markets might affect 
US markets. American banks and companies were also significant 
lenders and/or investors in the region. It was feared that turmoil 
would affect US imports and exports as well as capital flows and the 
value of the US dollar, in addition to exposing weaknesses in many 
regional Asian financial institutions. The crisis had a region-wide 
effect, spreading to South Korea, Hong Kong and Malaysia, with 
economic problems also adversely affecting Japan, and potentially 
spreading to Latin America and the US. The crisis might also impede 
the progress of trade and investment liberalisation under the World 
Trade Organisation and the APEC forum.
Ultimately, the US had a ‘great interest in a prosperous and stable 
Indonesia that continue[d] to evolve toward democracy’.105 By helping 
Indonesia with its economic recovery, the US could ‘foster a broader 
economic recovery in Asia’.106 Indonesia was also important to the US 
in terms of Asian security, largely because the archipelago ‘sits astride 
vital sea lanes through which 40 percent of the world’s shipping passes, 
including 80 percent of Japan’s oil supply and 70 percent of South 
Korea’s’.107 By offering assistance to Indonesia, the US could ‘help 
Indonesians emerge from their crisis and perhaps build the world’s 
third-largest democracy. An economically reformed and democratic 
Indonesia would make a worthy strategic partner for the US in Asia’.108
Suharto’s resistance to the IMF’s economic aid and reform package 
was particularly disconcerting for the US, considering its interests 
in seeing a stable and prosperous Indonesia in Southeast Asia. As a 
response, Washington pushed Suharto to accept the IMF reform 
package. By March 1998, the US stated it would ‘refuse dispersal of 
IMF loans to Indonesia without appropriate progress on dealing with 
monopolies, subsidies, monetary policies and [its] approach to the 
financial system’.109 It is therefore apparent that, by early 1998, the US 
had taken a stronger stance against Indonesia. Whereas Indonesia was 
once a vital component in Washington’s regional defence against Cold 
War threats, it now constituted a threat by itself, capable of destabilising 
the region and its economy.
When President Habibie replaced General Suharto in May 1998, 
Habibie inherited an economy in vital need of recovery. The US 
threat to refuse dispersal of IMF loans, if actualized, would put 
Jakarta in an intolerable situation. Like Suharto, Habibie had been 
in support of East Timor’s integration with Indonesia. However, 
occupation of East Timor was costing the Indonesian government 
approximately US$1 million per day in 1998.110 In the post financial 
crisis environment, this figure was unsustainable. The US also began 
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to press Indonesia on its human rights abuses in East Timor, urging 
UN-sponsored talks between the two parties aimed at settling East 
Timor’s political status.111 In June 1998, less than three weeks after the 
resignation of Suharto and with external power support diminishing, 
President Habibie announced that a ‘new status for East Timor 
should be contemplated’.112 In particular, Habibie announced that 
‘he was willing to consider autonomy for East Timor in exchange for 
international recognition of Indonesian sovereignty’.113
Habibie’s announcement was closely followed by US Senate 
Resolution 237, which was unanimously adopted on 10 July 1998.114 
In this resolution, the Senate stated that President Clinton should, 
‘encourage the new political leadership in Indonesia to promote and 
protect the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people 
of Indonesia and East Timor … [and] support an internationally 
supervised referendum on self-determination’.115 Clearly for the 
US, the Asian financial crisis and Suharto’s subsequent resignation 
from power were a turning point. Congress had been pushing the 
President to take action with regard to Indonesia’s human rights 
abuses in East Timor since 1991. The Senate increased this demand 
following Suharto’s resignation. This pressure from Congress, coupled 
with Washington’s desire to safeguard economic and security interests, 
ultimately led President Clinton to adopt a new policy with regard 
to Jakarta. The US would refuse dispersal of much-needed aid to 
Indonesia, unless Habibie allowed a referendum on self-determination 
in East Timor. This revaluation of the US-Indonesia relationship 
meant Indonesian occupation of East Timor lacked the international 
support it once had. Holding a fragile grip on power, and in need of 
continued foreign economic aid, Habibie came under pressure from 
the US, which saw an opportunity to push Indonesia towards a change 
in its East Timor policy.
Australia interest divergence
Developments in Indonesia and changes in the US-Indonesia 
relationship were being closely followed in Canberra. The Howard 
government had adopted a different stance towards Asia since gaining 
power in 1996. According to this view, engagement with Asia would 
only be pursued if in the national interest, and if it did not involve the 
abandonment of other values such as the international rule of law.116 
Prior to 1997, high levels of import and export trade with Indonesia, 
coupled with high foreign direct investment, meant that it remained in 
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
132
the national interest to foster good relations with Indonesia. However, 
the regional financial crisis overturned the long-held foreign policy 
assumption that a prosperous Asia would bring Australia into its 
economic orbit.117 As investments were threatened, regional instability 
increased, and the crisis ‘threatened to undermine Canberra’s attempts 
at fostering regional organisations’.118
Like the US, the Australian government pushed Indonesia to 
implement IMF reforms. Refusal to accept reforms could ‘lead 
to instability in the region and precipitate a complete economic 
catastrophe’.119 Australia was also concerned about the change of 
leadership in Indonesia. According to Hugh White, Deputy Secretary 
in the Australian Department of Defence, Canberra believed that 
Dr Habibie ‘appeared erratic and weak … his relationship with TNI 
[Indonesia’s National Armed Forces] was especially problematic … 
even if TNI did not seize power directly, it seemed likely to be a 
critical player in Indonesia’s political evolution’.120 It was therefore 
determined that ‘Australia’s priorities in the post-Suharto era was to 
support Indonesia’s democratic transformation, and to sustain a good 
relationship with TNI’.121
Suharto’s departure, precipitated by the financial crisis, also offered 
Australia an opportunity to address its East Timor policy.122 In May 
1998, the Australian Labour opposition party debated the question of 
East Timor, adopting the policy that the East Timorese had a right 
to self-determination.123 This was one of the first times a government 
party had challenged the prevailing consensus that Indonesia had 
sovereignty over East Timor.124 At the same time, links between 
the Australian Defence Force and Indonesia’s Kopassus force were 
suspended, after the latter’s involvement in violence against Indonesian 
pro-democracy protestors and demonstrators at the time of Suharto’s 
resignation.125 In October 1998, following an Australian federal 
election, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer initiated a 
re-examination of Australia’s East Timor policy. In November 1998, 
parliamentary sessions held by the Australian Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade granted the motion adopted by the federal Senate 
to lead a review of the Timor issue. During this review, ‘the opinions 
of refugee and political leaders were sought on the future shape of an 
autonomous or independent East Timor, and on what support would 
be needed if the territory was ever to become self-sufficient’.126 The 
review found that the East Timorese would not accept any connection 
with Indonesia without a referendum. As such, the decision was 
taken that Canberra should seek to influence policy in Jakarta more 
directly.127
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The Howard letter
Australian Prime Minister John Howard took Canberra’s first step to 
influence policy in Jakarta in December 1998. By this time, it had 
become apparent to the Howard government that the status quo 
Australia and Indonesia had maintained with regard to their East 
Timor policy was no longer sustainable. As such, Howard wrote to 
Habibie, suggesting East Timor be granted autonomy and the right 
to self-determination. On the surface, this appeared to constitute a 
total policy reversal by Canberra. However, this is not the case. While 
Howard did recommend autonomy for East Timor, this was to be an 
extensive period of autonomy of up to ten years, before the holding of a 
referendum.128 In addition to this, Howard expressed his ‘Government’s 
preference for autonomy within Indonesia rather than independence’.129 
As such, the Howard letter actually demonstrated the continuity of 
Australia’s foreign policy with relation to Indonesia and East Timor. 
Primarily, the letter intended to ‘encourage Indonesia to find a long-
term and incremental solution to the problem of East Timor’.130
For the Australian government, East Timor autonomy within 
Indonesia was preferable to independence for two reasons. First, 
there was a growing concern in Canberra that ‘an independent East 
Timor would be economically unviable and politically unstable, and 
thus a liability to regional security for which Australia would have to 
take prime responsibility’.131 Second, East Timor autonomy within 
Indonesia would prevent Indonesian Balkanisation. By 1997, Indonesia 
was still described as ‘a key determinant of Australia’s security in the 
years ahead’.132 Australian defence analyst Paul Dibb confirmed that 
‘a unified Indonesia is vital to Australia’s national interest’ and that 
Balkanisation is ‘something we must make absolutely sure doesn’t 
happen’.133 Both Richard Woolcott and Alexander Downer echoed 
this view, with the former claiming that ‘it is foolish to suggest the 
fragmentation of Indonesia into a number of independent states need 
not concern Australia’.134
What the Howard government could not predict was Habibie’s 
response to the letter, which inadvertently ‘generated outcomes that 
it had specifically sought to avoid’.135 For Jakarta, the Howard letter 
‘although couched in cautious, diplomatic language … constituted an 
unmistakable shift in policy as it suggested acceptance of the idea of 
self-determination for the people of East Timor, albeit after a delay of 
time’.136 According to Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, Habibie 
was ‘visibly agitated with the implications of the letter,’ rejecting the 
idea that Indonesia could continue to fund East Timor.137 Habibie 
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preferred rapid action to resolve the issue so as not to play ‘rich uncle’ 
to East Timor,138 or to ‘leave a time bomb’ for his successor.139 Clearly, 
financial pressures and constraints were forcing Habibie’s hand. A 
lengthy period of East Timor autonomy within Indonesia, as preferred 
by Australia, was not a viable option for Jakarta at that time. A quick 
act of self-determination for East Timor was ‘the exact opposite of 
what the Howard letter sought to achieve’.140 Habibie’s proposal ‘was a 
bid to win the support of the international community, whose backing 
Indonesia badly needed if it was to rebound from the financial crisis’.141
Habibie’s decision to move quickly presented Australia with a fait 
accompli, giving the government very little option but to go along 
with it.142 A senior Australian diplomat in the Jakarta embassy ‘was 
instructed to leak the [Howard] letter to an Australian newspaper 
reporter based in Jakarta’.143 Alexander Downer then called a press 
conference ‘to announce what he called an historic policy shift’ with 
regard to Australia’s East Timor policy.144 In what was essentially a 
‘damage-limitation exercise’ by Canberra, following nearly a quarter 
of a century of support for Indonesia’s East Timor policy, the Howard 
government recognized East Timorese right to self-determination 
on 5  January 1999.145 For the Habibie government, Australia’s 
announcement was ‘the final straw,’ and contributed to a dramatic 
announcement from Jakarta that a referendum to determine East 
Timor independence would be held in August 1999.146
ASEAN institutional cohesion
Notably absent from the foregoing analysis is the role of the ASEAN 
states, who maintained the same policy regarding East Timor in 1999 
as they had after Indonesia’s initial invasion in 1975. The ASEAN states 
‘had little to say publicly’ on the matter, refraining from discussing the 
topic and maintaining silent support for Indonesia.147 In April 1999, 
Rodolfo Severino Jr, the Secretary General of ASEAN, stated that the 
problem of East Timor ‘was for the Indonesians and the international 
community to resolve’.148
Indonesian stability was vital for ASEAN state security. In a May 
1999 meeting, convened at the Philippine presidential palace by 
members of President Joseph Estrada’s cabinet, fears were expressed 
at the ‘prospect of a political or social disintegration in Indonesia 
[which] would threaten not only the security of Southeast Asia but 
also the unity of ASEAN’.149 A disintegrating Indonesia could herald 
the end of the Association. There also remained concerns over the 
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possibility that ‘separatist groups elsewhere in Southeast Asia might 
draw succour and inspiration from FRETILIN’s success’.150 Separatist 
movements could damage domestic stability, and allow external powers 
a foothold in the region. For the Southeast Asian states, solidarity with 
Indonesia was vital. Cambodian officials argued that ‘the important 
thing is we need to have good cooperation with Jakarta. We don’t have 
any clear position [on East Timor] … because it is the internal affair 
of Indonesia’.151 A Philippine diplomat expressed similar sentiments, 
confirming that ‘the Philippines would not be risking a long-time ally 
on any one issue’.152
At an APEC meeting held on 9 September 1999, the ASEAN 
states were reported to be ‘furious that APEC forum organizers had 
allowed East Timor talks to side-track the trade summit’.153 Senior 
Thai Foreign Ministry official Kopsak Chutikul confirmed that ‘no 
ASEAN countries will attend [the East Timor talks] because it is a 
non-APEC issue’.154 Similarly, Singapore Prime Minister Goh Chok 
Tong stated that ASEAN ‘had not met to discuss East Timor’,155 with 
Thai Foreign Minister Surin Pitsuwan arguing that ‘ASEAN should 
contribute [to the East Timor crisis] in a way that we think is effective 
and appropriate. At this point, we think through the UN process is 
most effective and most appropriate. Let us keep it at that level’.156 It is 
apparent that if there was to be a resolution to the matter of Timorese 
independence, it was not going to be orchestrated by ASEAN.
East Timor’s vote for independence
On 27 January 1999, Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas announced 
that Indonesia would allow a referendum to determine East Timor’s 
political future. If the majority of East Timorese rejected autonomy 
in favour of independence in a ‘process of consultation’, Indonesia 
would grant that independence.157 However, not all elements within 
the Indonesian government approved of Habibie’s decision to allow 
a referendum. This is especially true of Indonesia’s National Armed 
Forces, the TNI, formerly the ABRI, and their commander-in-chief 
General Wiranto. Wiranto disagreed with Habibie’s East Timor 
decision, and like most of the military ‘did not regard the political 
aspirations of the East Timorese as legitimate’.158 In order to get the 
military’s consent for an August referendum, conditions were laid 
down ‘that there be no revision of the historical judgment that the 
army’s conduct of the intervention was beyond reproach, and that its 
casualties were not in vain’.159
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UN-brokered negotiations: United Nations mission in East Timor
Consultations between Indonesia and East Timor’s former colonial 
power Portugal began with UN-brokered talks for popular 
consultations. Although an initial draft plan was produced, ‘differences 
on provisions for a referendum, a future constitution, and an interim 
UN presence prevented the principals from signing the document’.160 
UN-assisted negotiations continued between Indonesia and Portugal 
in New York in March 1999. On 12 March, UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan announced that the parties had agreed upon a method 
of direct ballot, to ascertain whether the people of East Timor 
accepted or rejected a proposal for autonomy. It was agreed that a 
UN presence would assist the ballot. As the UN pushed Indonesia and 
Portugal towards finalized negotiations, the situation in East Timor 
was gradually deteriorating. In March and April 1999, ‘militia groups 
backed by the TNI and police forces began to assault and detain 
known advocates of independence, and to burn down the houses of 
those thought to be supporting them’.161 On 6 April, militia members 
killed at least 50 East Timorese who had taken refuge in a Catholic 
church in Liquiçá.162 Present at the massacre were TNI troops and 
local police, which not only failed to prevent the attack, but – which 
many claim – helped to organize it and carry it out.163
Amidst reports of violence in East Timor, the UN pushed Indonesia 
and Portugal to reach a conclusion on negotiations. These efforts 
culminated in an agreement signed by the two governments on 5 May 
1999, entrusting the UN Secretary General with ‘the organisation 
and conduct of a popular consultation for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether the East Timorese people … accept or reject a proposed 
constitutional framework providing for a special autonomy for East 
Timor within the unitary Republic of Indonesia’.164 Under Article 5 
of the Agreement, if the people of East Timor approved the proposal 
for special autonomy, the Indonesian government would initiate 
the constitutional measures required for the implementation of the 
autonomy framework. The question of East Timor would also be 
removed from the UN Security Council and General Assembly agenda. 
Under Article 6 of the Agreement, should the people of East Timor 
reject the proposal for special autonomy, the Indonesian government 
would take the necessary steps to terminate Indonesia’s links with East 
Timor. The governments of Indonesia and Portugal would also agree 
with the Secretary General on arrangements for a peaceful and orderly 
transfer of authority in East Timor to the UN, which would begin a 
process of enabling East Timor to transition to independence.
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Under Article 7 of the Agreement, the Secretary General noted 
that ‘it is foreseen that the United Nations will maintain an adequate 
presence in East Timor during the interim period’.165 The Agreement 
stipulated that the ballot would take place on 9 August 1999, and 
that the Indonesian authorities would have the responsibility for 
maintaining law and order. Upon signature of the agreement, the UN 
would deploy personnel to East Timor, adequate for the execution of 
the various phases of the consultation process. This agreement formed 
the basis of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). 
Authorized by the UNSC on 11 June 1999, the role of UNAMET 
was to organize and conduct a popular consultation.166
The UNSC authorized the deployment of up to 280 civilian police 
officers in East Timor, to act as advisors to the Indonesian police and 
to escort the ballot papers and boxes from the polling sites.167 It was a 
contentious decision to allow the Indonesian authorities responsibility 
for controlling law and order during the ballot. Indonesia made it clear 
that it would not allow East Timor security to be an international 
responsibility. Habibie informed Howard that if a peacekeeping force 
‘was imposed on Indonesia then it would abandon East Timor and 
the ballot and unilaterally withdraw’.168 It was implicit that ‘had 
Habibie accepted a pre-ballot PKF [peacekeeping force], this might 
have precipitated a civil-military showdown and posed the grave 
risk of a TNI coup’.169 However, some commentators asserted that 
an independent peacekeeping force should be put in place for the 
ballot, because ‘referendums have a poor record as peace-building 
mechanisms in conflict situations, because they are a “zero-sum game”; 
that is, there is always a big winner and a big loser, and loss of face 
is inevitable’.170 The idea that East Timor may require peacekeepers 
was steadfastly refuted by the US government, which was worried 
that pressure for a peacekeeping force might threaten the vote itself.171 
It was also refuted by Canberra, which did not want to endanger 
Australia’s strategic objectives by precipitating a potential TNI coup.172
TNI militia violence before and after the vote
As UNAMET staff arrived in East Timor and began to witness the 
level of violence being perpetrated by the TNI and militia, many 
argued strongly against proceeding with an August ballot. Instead, 
they suggested a postponement pending a significant improvement in 
the security situation.173 However, external powers were concerned 
that, given more time, Habibie may change his mind about the ballot. 
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The domestic situation in Indonesia also remained unstable. In June 
1999, elections were held in Indonesia for the People’s Representative 
Council. Habibie’s party came second to Megawati Sukarnoputri, who 
had openly criticized Habibie’s actions in relation to East Timor.174 
Indonesia’s People’s Consultative Assembly was due to meet on 
29 August to select a new president, with Sukarnoputri likely to be 
chosen. This put further pressure on the timing of the vote.
Despite the presence of UNAMET in the region, pro-Indonesia 
militias continued to terrorize the inhabitants of East Timor in the 
lead-up to the ballot, hoping to affect its final outcome. UNAMET 
observers witnessed TNI officers training and conducting joint 
operations with militia groups.175 Militias were also seen carrying 
firearms and wearing new TNI uniforms. The Indonesian police 
routinely failed to investigate militia violence, and informed UN 
officers that they were constrained from doing so by the TNI.176 
This was a fact already known to the Australian government, whose 
intelligence community ‘concluded that ABRI had armed various pro-
integrationist militia groups and was planning to use them against East 
Timorese who supported moves towards independence’.177 Australia 
remained convinced however that ‘Canberra’s special relationship with 
Jakarta … would ensure that the Indonesian authorities remained 
both frank and responsive in their dealings with Canberra over East 
Timor’.178 Australia maintained this stance despite the continued 
evidence of Indonesian complicity in militia violence.
Within East Timor, voter registration began on 16 July. This coincided 
with a lull in militia violence, which supported what some within 
UNAMET and the UN believed was a ‘genuine change in government 
and TNI policy’ brought about by ‘concerted international political 
pressure at the beginning of July’.179 The high East Timorese turnout 
for registration supported this view, and UNAMET moved ahead 
with the second stage of voter registration on 26 July. However, this 
second stage was more volatile, involving politically motivated violence 
directed against civilians, and serious militia attacks on UNAMET staff. 
On the morning prior to the ballot, a public ceremony at UNAMET 
headquarters was held between FALINTIL and the militias. It was 
announced that an agreement had been reached between the two parties, 
which promised ‘to refrain from recourse to violence, and abide by 
the outcome of the vote’.180 Despite this agreement, TNI commander 
Colonel Tono Suratman warned that ‘if the pro-independents do win … 
all will be destroyed … it will be worse than 23 years ago’.181
On the day of the Timorese independence ballot, 98.6 percent 
of the enrolled voters cast their votes.182 Of that 98.6  percent, 
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78.5 percent chose in favour of independence, effectively ending 
Indonesia’s claim to the territory. Before the results were announced, 
militia violence began to escalate, with violence aimed at UNAMET 
staff and East Timorese civilians. As the security situation in certain 
Timorese districts worsened, UNAMET staff had to evacuate to Dili 
on the morning of 3 September. The result of the ballot was officially 
announced on 4 September 1999. Following the results, a three-week 
campaign named Operation Clean Sweep began, in which Indonesian 
armed forces and locally organized militia undertook a scorched earth 
policy, executing hundreds, possibly thousands of East Timorese.183 
Over three-quarters of East Timor’s population were forcibly 
displaced, and over 70 percent of the infrastructure was destroyed.184 
Between 5 September and 14 September, the UNAMET compound 
in Dili came under siege, preventing UN staff from stopping the 
violence, and risking the lives of several hundred staff.185 Indonesian 
authorities claimed that the militias ‘had formed spontaneously in 
response to provocation by pro-independence activists’.186 However, 
all the evidence demonstrates that ‘the militias were mobilized, trained, 
supplied and backed by Indonesian authorities’.187
Calls for external intervention in East Timor
As violence continued to spread through East Timor, UNAMET 
was forced to withdraw its personnel from the region. By midday 
on 10 September, 444 international and local UN staff had been 
airlifted to safety in Darwin, leaving 81 international staff inside the 
Dili compound.188 With violence raging in East Timor, President 
Habibie came under intense pressure from the UN to allow a 
peacekeeping coalition to intervene in the area. Habibie acknowledged 
that international assistance might be required to restore peace,189 and 
on 6 September, the Secretary General asked Prime Minister Howard 
to lead a multinational intervention force in East Timor.190 The UN 
Secretary General was adamant that Indonesian ‘claims of national 
sovereignty must not be allowed to stand in the way of effective 
international action in defence of human rights’.191
US response to the humanitarian crisis
It took several days of pressure by the UN Secretary General before 
certain states changed their posture towards intervention in East 
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Timor. External powers, specifically the US, continued to argue that 
Indonesian armed forces should be in charge of the restoration of 
power in East Timor, and called upon Indonesian leaders to control 
the violence.192 The US resisted an international peacekeeping force 
for days after violence erupted, indicating that it wanted Australia to 
take the leading role in any East Timor intervention.193 A number of 
reasons for US delays in supporting a peacekeeping force are plausible. 
First, there was a reluctance to fund the endeavour.194 Second, the US 
had placed strict conditions on its support for peacekeeping missions 
following the deaths of US soldiers in Somalia in 1993.
By 8  September, the US opinion regarding an East Timor 
peacekeeping force had started to shift. At this time, commander-in-
chief of the US forces in the Pacific, Admiral Dennis Blair, met with 
General Wiranto in Jakarta and told him ‘that military ties between the 
US and Indonesia were to be suspended’.195 Additionally, in advance 
of an upcoming APEC meeting, President Clinton stated that ‘if 
Indonesia does not end the violence, it must invite – it must invite – 
the international community to assist in restoring security … it would 
be a pity if the Indonesian recovery was crashed by this’.196 Nor was this 
an empty threat. The US told Indonesian officials that the World Bank 
would withhold future crisis funding if security was not returned to East 
Timor. The IMF also suspended a visit to Jakarta to discuss financial 
crisis aid. On 12 September, at a scheduled APEC meeting between 
Asian leaders and the US, President Clinton stated that ‘the Indonesian 
military has aided and abetted militia violence in East Timor … we are 
ready to support an effort led by Australia to mobilize a multinational 
force to help bring security to East Timor under UN auspices’.197
Australian response to the humanitarian crisis
By mid-September the Australian government had also come to the 
conclusion that the benefits of intervention now outweighed the costs. 
Initially, Australia had been reluctant to endorse a peacekeeping force 
in East Timor, since to do so ‘would have been to effectively renounce 
support for Indonesian sovereignty of East Timor’.198 Despite evidence 
of violence in East Timor, Australia continued to believe that ‘pressure 
from interested members of the international community, including 
Australia, would lead to an improvement in the security situation’.199 
The government had been under mounting pressure to take action in 
East Timor from domestic movements and NGOs,200 which had been 
particularly vocal on the topic of Timorese autonomy.201 These groups 
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had been active since Indonesia’s initial invasion of the territory, and 
had stepped up domestic pressure in the period following the Santa 
Cruz massacre in 1991.
However, evidence suggests that domestic pressures did not play a 
key role in Canberra’s decision-making regarding Indonesia and East 
Timor. This was evident in 1995, when the Australian government 
signed the secret security agreement with the Indonesian government, 
without allowing the public to participate in the decision-making 
process. The Jakarta lobby argued that this was ‘a fantastic slap in the 
face for the anti-Indonesian protest groups … it declares definitively 
that the protest groups cannot set the agenda in the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship’.202 The timing of Australia’s decision to intervene in East 
Timor suggests that the Howard government took a similar stance 
to domestic movements. Despite a long period of domestic pressure, 
Australia did not decide to intervene in East Timor until 7 September, 
one day after the UN Secretary General requested that Australia lead a 
multinational intervention force.203 This suggests that popular pressure 
was not the deciding factor in Australia’s decision, and that instead ‘the 
government’s attention shifted to securing Australia’s interests in East 
Timor directly’.204 Hugh White confirmed that ‘if East Timor proves 
to be a viable country and a reasonable neighbour, with stable internal 
politics and responsible international relationships, then Australia’s 
original concerns about the threats to regional stability posed by a 
non-viable East Timor will have proved unfounded’.205
Habibie rejects a peacekeeping coalition
Faced with mounting UN and external power pressure to accept a 
peacekeeping coalition in East Timor, President Habibie remained 
adamantly opposed to intervention. The Indonesian government 
stated that the presence of international forces ‘would represent an 
unacceptable violation of Indonesian sovereignty, and if foreign troops 
tried to land without prior Indonesian agreement, they would have 
to fight their way ashore’.206 Despite the ‘dubious legal basis’ for 
Indonesia’s sovereignty claim, both Australia and the US respected 
Indonesian wishes at that time.207 A number of important factors 
conspired to change Indonesia’s position: the loss of external power 
support; the loss of institutional financial assistance; the suspension of 
British military supplies on 13 September; and a general arms boycott 
lodged by the European Union. The culmination of these pressures 
left Habibie in an untenable situation.
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The President of the World Bank wrote to Habibie in early 
September, stating the belief that Indonesia [must] ‘act swiftly to restore 
order’.208 Following a threat of economic aid suspension, the World 
Bank announced its decision to freeze $300 million of Indonesian 
economic aid recovery. Similarly, the IMF informed Indonesia of its 
decision to halt the disbursement of some $460 million.209 Heavily 
reliant upon foreign economic and military aid, Habibie met with his 
military officials on 12 September to discuss the crisis in East Timor. 
This meeting came the same day as President Clinton’s speech at 
APEC, where it was announced that the US would support an effort 
to mobilize a multinational force in East Timor. It also came the day 
after an open debate was held on East Timor in the UNSC, where 
some 50 states spoke in favour of urgent international intervention in 
East Timor. With the support of General Wiranto, President Habibie 
reluctantly ‘proposed that Indonesia should now permit an international 
force to assist in restoring order in East Timor’.210 The Indonesian view 
was relayed to the UN Secretary General, effectively ending the crisis by 
sanctioning a UN-sponsored peacekeeping force to enter East Timor.
Indonesian failure to resist sovereignty violation
On 15  September 1999, the UNSC adopted Resolution 1264. 
Invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Resolution expressed 
concern at the ‘widespread and flagrant violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights law’.211 As such, the Resolution 
authorized ‘the establishment of a multinational force under a unified 
command structure’.212 The remit of the force was ‘to restore peace 
and security in East Timor, to protect and support UNAMET in 
carrying out its tasks and, within force capabilities, to facilitate 
humanitarian assistance operations’.213 The International Force for 
East Timor (INTERFET), established under an Australian command 
structure, was given the authority to use all necessary means to restore 
security in East Timor. The multinational peacekeeping taskforce first 
entered East Timor on 21 September 1999, less than one week after 
the Security Council Resolution. INTERFET’s task was to address 
the humanitarian crisis in East Timor, until a more permanent UN 
peacekeeping force could be assembled. Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer made concerted efforts to encourage troops from 
different countries to join this ‘coalition of the willing’. Despite 
this, Australian personnel comprised the core of the peacekeeping 
taskforce.214 Hugh White summarized Canberra’s decision to lead the 
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INTERFET force, stating that ‘there was a sense that if Australia didn’t 
lead, no one else would’.215
For the Australian government, returning East Timorese stability was 
vital ‘to avoid having yet another weak and fragile state in what is already 
a difficult neighbourhood’.216 Australian Prime Minister John Howard 
cemented his beliefs in the ‘Howard Doctrine’, which he announced 
the same week that INTERFET entered East Timor. Howard’s 
conviction was that, post-Timor, Australia would seek to upgrade 
its defence forces and embrace a new role as the US’ peacekeeping 
‘deputy’ in Asia, with involvement in East Timor helping to ‘cement 
Australia’s place in the region’.217 Having reinforced Canberra’s role as 
lead command of the peacekeeping force, INTERFET began to round 
up militias in East Timor, in some cases killing them.218 Whilst this 
approach elicited protests from some within Indonesia, INTERFET 
met with very little resistance, either from the militias or the TNI.219 A 
measure of security was restored to East Timor relatively quickly, with 
INTERFET taking till 16 November to secure the region. Despite 
this success, INTERFET was not ‘intended or equipped to resolve 
the many problems of administration or reconstruction’.220 As such, 
UNAMET re-established a presence in the region from 29 September, 
until a more comprehensive effort could be authorized and mobilized.
Despite Canberra explicitly seeking a Southeast Asian contingent for 
INTERFET, the states of ASEAN were notably reluctant to take part 
in an East Timor peacekeeping force. As Lee Kuan Yew confirmed, 
intervention in East Timor was ‘a task no country in the region would 
have undertaken’.221 While Lee acknowledged that ‘it did not make 
sense’ for the TNI to devastate East Timor, he stated that ‘many things 
that did not make sense had happened, which is why Singapore, like 
the others in ASEAN, had stayed out of the East Timor issue’.222 The 
ASEAN states were particularly reluctant to intervene in East Timor 
without prior permission from Indonesia, and were also uncomfortable 
with the unprecedented power afforded to INTERFET. As Singapore 
Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong argued, East Timor ‘was not a 
problem created by ASEAN, it was and is an international problem 
that remains an issue with the United Nations. It never started off as 
an ASEAN problem’.223
These were sentiments felt by the majority of ASEAN states. The 
member states were, ‘suspicious of Western attempts to internationalize 
the dispute [and concerned] … that East Timor could set a precedent for 
Western interference in the internal affairs of other member states using 
the norm of humanitarian intervention as justification’.224 Prime Minister 
Mahathir of Malaysia was particularly outspoken on the topic of Western 
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interference in the internal affairs of states. Of specific concern was the 
implication that in times of humanitarian crisis, the use of military force 
against a sovereign state could be determined and sanctioned by a concert 
of Western states.225 This concern was echoed throughout Southeast 
Asia and the Third World, where states worried that humanitarian 
intervention could allow the West ‘to call into question the legitimacy 
of governments and regimes not of their liking’.226
Blaming the US and UN for the East Timor crisis, Mahathir argued 
that President Habibie had been, ‘pressured to allow an act of self-
determination even though many East Timorese had reconciled 
themselves to integration with Indonesia’.227 According to Mahathir, 
there had been ‘no killings’ before the ballot, and pro-Indonesia 
Timorese had felt ‘cheated’ by the quick vote and ‘responded in 
the only way they knew how’.228 Mahathir also expressed the view 
that ‘the West would like to see Indonesia broken up into smaller 
countries’ with Australia ‘the main beneficiary’.229 Coupled with these 
concerns were a number of more pragmatic considerations related to 
sending troops to take part in INTERFET. Some ASEAN countries 
worried about the potential consequences for ASEAN troops if they 
were to exchange fire with Indonesian troops or Indonesian-backed 
militias.230 Others were concerned about the expense of participating 
in an intervention, with some making participation in INTERFET 
conditional on financial support from Australia and Japan.231
Indonesia was suspicious of Australia’s intentions in the region after 
Canberra’s policy shift on East Timor’s right to self-determination. 
These suspicions intensified after Australia agreed to lead the 
INTERFET force into East Timor. The Indonesians tore up the 
1995 security pact signed with Australia on 16 September 1999, the 
day after the UN Security Council approved INTERFET.232 The 
‘Howard Doctrine’ in particular drew angry reactions from many 
within Southeast Asia. This can best be summarized by Malaysian 
Democratic Action Party Secretary General Lim King Siang, who 
argued that, ‘Asia does not want, nor has it recognized, the US as the 
policeman of the world, what’s more, one needing a deputy’.233 For 
Jakarta, Howard’s remarks acted as a potential agent of interference in 
Indonesia’s internal affairs.234
Indonesia requests an ASEAN contingent in INTERFET
Canberra’s role in INTERFET led to ‘assaults on Australian personnel 
and property within Indonesia, as Jakarta’s former ally was considered 
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to have its own designs on East Timor’s resources’.235 Ultimately, 
Indonesia’s perception of its ‘nation’s humiliation at the white hands 
of Canberra’, meant that it sought to minimize Australia’s influence in 
East Timor.236 It did so by expressly requesting an ASEAN presence 
within INTERFET. Habibie approached Thailand initially, requesting 
an ASEAN contribution to the force. This left ASEAN with little 
option but to engage with the INTERFET force. Not to do so would 
sour relations with Indonesia and invite international condemnation. In 
addition to a Thai contingent to INTERFET, Malaysia, Singapore and 
the Philippines also agreed to contribute troops to the multinational 
force.
As ASEAN troops prepared for deployment, Mahathir met with 
the UN Secretary General to discuss a scaling back of Australian 
troops within INTERFET, stating that ‘there are other ways of 
solving problems besides pointing guns at people’.237 Similarly, 
Thailand advocated restraint from the Australian troops, suggesting 
that Asian troops would be more ‘gentle’.238 Canberra confirmed that 
it wanted to scale back Australian troops and include more troops 
from ASEAN. However, this could not be implemented because 
ASEAN countries were weeks away from deployment and were 
unwilling to foot the bill for a lengthy involvement.239 ASEAN’s 
eventual contribution to INTERFET numbered approximately 
2500 of the 9900 force.240 Thai troops formed the second largest 
contingent to the force of about 1500 troops, including the force’s 
deputy-commander.241 In an effort to maintain good relations with 
Indonesia, the Philippine government declared its official designation 
as a ‘Humanitarian task force’, sending only non-combatant forces 
of engineering and medical units.242
Despite the eventual contribution to INTERFET, ASEAN’s slow 
response to the crisis raised serious questions regarding the Association’s 
ability to respond to regional conflicts. Without Western intervention, 
it is highly unlikely the East Timor crisis would have been resolved. 
This enhanced the view held by many in the West that ASEAN was 
‘chronically incapable of taking meaningful action even when its own 
interests are directly engaged’.243 Evidence suggests that the ASEAN 
states learnt very little from the crisis in East Timor. In a July 2000 
ASEAN Joint Communiqué, ASEAN foreign ministers ‘commended 
Indonesia for all its efforts in resolving the East Timor issue’.244 This 
led at least one commentator to argue that ‘there was no suggestion 
of lessons learned or mistakes to be avoided’.245
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East Timor’s formal independence
On 25  October 1999, the UNSC established a United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was 
given overall responsibility for administration of the country.246 East 
Timor became formally independent on 20 May 2002, at which time 
the state was renamed Timor-Leste. Upon independence, UNTAET 
ended, to be replaced by the UN Mission of Support in East Timor 
(UNMISET), established to provide assistance to core administrative 
structures and to provide interim law enforcement. Although initially 
established for a period of 12 months, the mandate was extended until 
20 May 2005. At this time, all UN personnel left the region. However, 
Timor-Leste remained weak and vulnerable, with many important 
nation-building tasks still uncompleted. Timor-Leste descended into 
internal and factional conflict in 2006, necessitating an International 
Stabilisation Force (ISF), which was unable to leave the country until 
22 November 2012. Timor-Leste remains a vulnerable state, still 
attempting to grapple with independence.
INTERFET as a violation of Indonesian 
sovereignty
Did intervention in East Timor by way of a UN-mandated 
peacekeeping force constitute a violation of Indonesian sovereignty? 
There are two potential arguments against intervention in East 
Timor constituting a breach of Indonesian sovereignty. First, because 
Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty in East Timor was not recognized by 
the UN, intervention by a peacekeeping force could not constitute 
a breach of Indonesian sovereignty. Second, Indonesia’s sovereignty 
could not have been violated, because Indonesia agreed to the 
peacekeeping force entering East Timor.
UN recognition of Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty
With respect to the first argument, there are a number of important 
factors to consider. First, Indonesia clearly believed that it exercized 
sovereignty over East Timor, making it clear that discussion of East 
Timor would represent an unacceptable violation of Indonesian 
sovereignty. Second, and related to the first, Indonesia’s claim of 
sovereignty over East Timor was recognized by members of the 
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international community. All ASEAN states supported Indonesia’s 
East Timor policy, believing the matter to be an internal affair of 
Indonesia. This provided strong regional support for Indonesia’s claim 
of sovereignty over East Timor. External powers also recognized 
Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. Australia acknowledged 
Indonesia’s sovereignty over the territory when it signed the Timor Gap 
‘Zone of Cooperation Agreement’. Evidence suggests that the US also 
supported Indonesia’s claims over East Timor. The US Ambassador to 
Jakarta, Mr Robert Barry, stated that the US government had from the 
start accepted East Timor’s incorporation into Indonesia.247 The US also 
sought to frustrate UN attempts to resolve the East Timor issue post-
1975, and helped to keep the Timor issue off the international agenda. 
Third, members of the international community made it clear that 
they would not move ahead with an intervention force in East Timor 
without Indonesian approval; the implication being that to intervene 
without Indonesian approval would constitute a breach of Indonesia’s 
rights. Despite a lack of UN recognition, Indonesia, ASEAN and the 
international community recognized Indonesian sovereignty in East 
Timor. For Indonesia, this validated its occupation of the territory.
Indonesia’s agreement to a peacekeeping force
A basic principle of UN peacekeeping is that ‘operations are deployed 
with the consent of the main parties to the conflict’.248 This is a legal 
necessity, so as not to violate Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which 
states that the UN has no authority ‘to intervene in matters which 
are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state’.249 Thus, 
it might be surmised that Indonesia’s consent to a UN peacekeeping 
force in East Timor legitimized intervention. However, the conditions 
under which this consent was given should be brought into question. 
According to Krasner, violations of sovereignty can occur through 
coercion or imposition.250 In situations of coercion, there is the threat, 
‘to impose sanctions on another if the target ruler does not alter his 
or her policies. The target can reject these demands, in which case it 
suffers sanctions, or accept them. In either case the target is worse off’.251 
Violation through imposition ‘involves a situation in which the target 
has no choice but to accept the demands of the initiator … the target 
is so weak that it cannot effectively resist’.252 Coercion and imposition 
violate state sovereignty because a state would never voluntarily accept 
an arrangement that leaves them worse off. Imposition can only occur 
when interests are different and power asymmetries high.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
148
Krasner’s definition can be used to support the claim that during the 
East Timor humanitarian crisis, Indonesia’s sovereignty was violated. 
Through coercion, Indonesia had little option but to consent to a UN 
peacekeeping force. After the financial crisis caused external power 
interest divergence, the status quo had irreparably changed. Indonesia 
was weakened by economic and domestic instability. External powers 
such as Australia and the US used this opportunity to push Jakarta into 
allowing a vote for independence in East Timor and, subsequently, 
to accept a UN-mandated peacekeeping force. They did so, despite 
Habibie clearly stating that this would represent an unacceptable 
violation of Indonesian sovereignty. As violence escalated in the region, 
these external powers imposed sanctions on Indonesia, to coerce the 
state into altering its East Timor policy. By threatening to withhold 
much needed military and economic aid, Indonesia had little choice 
but to compromize its sovereignty and accept external power demands. 
It could even be argued that Indonesia was so weak that it had no 
option but to consent to peacekeepers entering the region. Despite 
Indonesian consent, we can argue that coercive measures by external 
powers caused Indonesia’s failure to resist sovereignty violation from 
actors external to the region.
Theoretical assessment of the East Timor crisis 
(1999)
The foregoing analysis has shown that, during the East Timor 
humanitarian crisis of 1999, decreased interest convergence between 
Indonesia and the US and Australia caused Indonesia’s failure to 
resist sovereignty violation by actors external to the region. Prior 
to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997, external power interests were 
convergent with Indonesian interests, causing these states to acquiesce 
to Indonesia’s activities in East Timor. Nor did domestic pressures, 
such as Congressional restraints or the activities of NGOs and other 
domestic protest movements, significantly impact on these interests. 
During this period, Indonesia remained the ASEAN vanguard state. 
Indonesia, believing East Timor to be its 27th province, clearly had 
the most compelling interests at stake with regard to the territory. The 
ASEAN states, often under the watchful eye of Jakarta, continued to 
maintain support for Indonesia’s East Timor policy.
The 1997 Asian financial crisis acted as a catalyst for external power 
interest change. It was in the interests of Australia and the US to have 
a strong and stable Indonesia in the region. Indonesia’s economic and 
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domestic instability now posed a significant threat to the regional 
environment. The subsequent downfall of Suharto also represented an 
opportunity for the US and Australia to play a direct role in helping 
to implement transitional democratic reform in Indonesia. This was 
a secondary interest of these states that the more benign post-Cold 
War environment allowed them to pursue. In doing so, East Timorese 
right to self-determination came to dominate the agenda. It became 
apparent to the US and Australia that the benefits of action in relation 
to Indonesia and its East Timor policy far outweighed the costs of 
inaction. These states ultimately sought to secure their own interests, 
and to prevent a regional power vacuum.
To elicit a change in Indonesia’s East Timor policy, these external 
powers were able to use two key strategies to their advantage. First, 
they openly stated that Indonesia should allow the East Timorese a 
right to self-determination. In doing so, Indonesia automatically lost 
Western power support, which had lent a large degree of credibility 
to Indonesia’s claim over East Timor. Second, the US and Australia 
used Indonesia’s economic situation to their advantage. Specifically, 
coercive measures to withhold economic aid were used in order 
to implement changes in line with external power interests. These 
strategies had the required effect. Indonesia capitulated to external 
power pressure, stating it would allow the East Timorese a referendum 
to determine East Timor independence. This set in motion a chain of 
events that would ultimately lead to a devastating humanitarian crisis 
and external intervention by way of a UN-mandated peacekeeping 
force. Despite external power interest change, Indonesia remained 
the vanguard state, and maintained support within ASEAN, many of 
whom feared the ramifications of potential Indonesian Balkanisation at 
a time of severe economic instability. Indonesia and the ASEAN states 
also feared Western intervention in the region under the auspices of 
humanitarianism. This was regarded as a way for external powers to 
secure their own interests in the region. As an Association, ASEAN 
continued its support for Indonesia in the face of international 
condemnation.
Significantly, support within ASEAN for Indonesia’s East Timor 
policy was not enough to prevent Indonesia’s eventual sovereignty 
violation. This raises questions about ASEAN and its ability to 
maintain regional autonomy under challenge from sufficiently powerful 
external actors. It also suggests that external powers play a vital role 
in the dynamics of ASEAN state resistance to sovereignty violation. 
Analysis of the regional environment in 1999 supports the hypothesis 
that a decrease in interest convergence between a vanguard state and 
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designated external actors caused a failure of ASEAN vanguard state 
resistance to sovereignty violation, from powers external to the region.
Contrasting theoretical arguments
The humanitarian crisis that devastated East Timor is noticeably 
underemphasized in the existing constructivist literature, which 
emphasizes ASEAN autonomy and ‘regional solutions for regional 
problems, with minimal intervention by outside powers’.253 However, 
in the case presented here, there appears little evidence that ASEAN 
adhered to this norm. Acharya states that the ‘regional solutions to 
regional problems’ norm must not be conflated with self-reliance, 
‘but rather with the right not to be ignored or sidelined by outside 
powers … in the management of Southeast Asian affairs’.254 ASEAN’s 
challenge is therefore ‘not to achieve self-reliance, but to coordinate 
the seeking and channelling of outside support’.255 The East Timor 
case is a clear example of ASEAN’s failure to achieve this goal. External 
power intervention occurred without ASEAN support, and despite 
vocal opposition from the ASEAN member states.
All constructivist authors frame the East Timor crisis with respect to 
the norm of non-interference. Acharya takes the stance that ASEAN’s 
‘reluctance to dilute its non-interference doctrine’ prevented the ASEAN 
states from providing an effective response to the humanitarian crisis.256 
In this view, ASEAN state reluctance to contribute to INTERFET, 
despite Indonesia’s request ‘further attested to the continued salience of 
non-intervention’.257 For Acharya, the East Timor crisis is an example 
of ASEAN’s inability to respond to the crisis due to its respect for the 
Association’s norms. That ASEAN state adherence to non-interference 
actually exacerbated regional instability is underemphasized. Indeed, 
this is a point made by Alice Ba, who refers briefly to East Timor, 
stating that the emerging crisis ‘destabilized’ ASEAN’s established norm 
and practice of not interfering in their neighbour’s affairs and added 
another layer to already difficult intra-ASEAN debates’.258 Missing from 
Acharya’s and Ba’s discussion of East Timor is an admission that, by 
adhering to the non-intervention norm, these states effectively invited 
external intervention into the region. In doing so, they contravened 
the ASEAN norm of regional autonomy. This suggests a flaw in the 
conceptualization of ASEAN’s norms.
Only Haacke appears to highlight the tension between these 
two norms. Haacke acknowledges the significance of ASEAN state 
participation in intervention forces such as INTERFET, admitting that 
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some of the shared understanding ‘intrinsic to ASEAN’s long-standing 
diplomatic and security culture have been relaxed, particularly the 
principle of non-interference’.259 Haacke also notes that the Australia-
led international force, ‘demonstrated ASEAN’s incapacity to address 
regional problems on its own terms’.260 However, he argues that ‘it 
seems premature to consider the [INTERFET] participation … as 
evidence of the demise of ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture’.261 
For Haacke, the norms associated with the ‘ASEAN Way’ are ‘still 
perceived to serve the important and necessary function of … limiting 
interference by non-ASEAN states’.262 The evidence presented here 
does not validate Haacke’s conclusion.
As a case study, the East Timor humanitarian crisis of 1999 conforms 
well to realist expectations. According to Michael Leifer, ‘regional 
order in the grand sense has been beyond the capacity of ASEAN’.263 
One reason for this is that ‘the Association was established as the 
institutional fruit of conflict resolution’.264 Since this time, there has 
been ‘an absence of any distinctive … peace process in respect of any 
intra-mural dispute’.265 In the period following 1997, ‘ASEAN’s round 
of troubles had only just begun as a period of regional economic 
turmoil ensued … which has been well beyond the competence of the 
Association to address on any exclusive basis’.266 This was compounded 
by the resignation of Suharto in 1998, which ‘left an enlarged and less 
cohesive ASEAN in a diminished condition’.267 The ASEAN of the 
1990s was therefore ‘a much more diverse and cumbersome entity; 
while the changes in its scale means that an earlier intimacy in political 
communication and consultation is no longer possible’.268
Taking a similar view, David Jones and Michael Smith argue that in 
the period after the financial crisis, the Association’s purpose ‘seemed 
to consist of concealing fundamental differences of view among its 
members under the guise of consensus and non-interference’.269 This 
supports their assessment that ‘since 1997, the security situation in 
East Asia reveals … that the ASEAN states possess no clear strategy to 
respond to the challenges the organisation currently faces’.270 For Jones 
and Smith, ‘ASEAN has floundered in its attempts to manage both 
the regional economic crisis and its legacy of intercommunal violence 
and separatist struggles’.271 The ASEAN norm of non-interference 
‘has only intensified the failure’.272 This is because ‘non-interference 
negates the expression of a region. It merely denotes recognition of a 
collocation of independent sovereign states’.273
Jones and Smith contend that ‘only since 1997 has Canberra begun 
to ask how to stabilize a disintegrating Southeast Asia rather than 
integrate itself with a rapidly integrating region’.274 Similarly, it is only 
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after the East Timor crisis in 1999 that ‘Canberra and Washington 
realized how important a proactive Australia and a supportive US are 
to the maintenance of a regional balance’.275 Ultimately, ‘the members 
of a hollow ASEAN need an American and Australian presence far 
more than the US and Australia need them, as the stabilisation of East 
Timor – where ASEAN proved utterly ineffectual – demonstrated’.276 
The realist assessment of ASEAN’s role in the post-1997 period is 
persuasive. As evidence provided in this chapter shows, ASEAN was 
unable to provide a response to the East Timor crisis of 1999, and 
external powers played a key role in maintaining regional stability. 
Ultimately, ASEAN unity was unable to prevent Indonesian sovereignty 
violation from actors external to the region.
For critical theorist Lee Jones, the application of non-interference 
to East Timor was ‘coercively enforced by the Suharto regime and 
its allies in neighbouring countries’ oligarchic classes, as a means of 
limiting scope of conflict over East Timor’.277 This application of 
non-interference ‘emerged out of a coercive struggle involving states, 
business groups and civil society organizations’.278 Jones similarly argues 
that ASEAN’s response to the 1999 crisis was ‘principally due to their 
fear of contagion from the social and economic unrest spreading 
from Indonesia’.279 At this time, ‘core ASEAN states, which had been 
most badly affected by the Asian crisis and the growing unrest in 
Indonesia … felt compelled to intervene’.280 They therefore ‘actively 
encouraged and participated in a humanitarian intervention in East 
Timor’,281 becoming ‘increasingly involved in Indonesia’s “internal” 
affairs’.282 This culminated in the ASEAN states rapidly ‘preparing for a 
peace-enforcement intervention, committing their forces before [italics 
in text] Western states did’.283
There are two limitations to Jones’ argument. First, there is evidence 
to suggest that Jones has overemphasized the role of ASEAN in the 
crisis. Evidence presented in this chapter actually contradicts Jones’ 
argument, and shows how the ASEAN states vocally opposed Western 
intervention in East Timor on the grounds of humanitarianism. 
Although Australia attempted to gain an early ASEAN contingent 
to INTERFET, it failed to do so because of ASEAN unwillingness 
to become involved in the conflict. Arguably, ASEAN had very little 
role in resolving the humanitarian crisis, hence the need for external 
power intervention. Jones also fails to address the fact that Indonesia 
requested an ASEAN contingent to INTERFET. It was only after 
Indonesia requested an ASEAN presence that the ASEAN states 
supplied troops to the peacekeeping force. It can therefore be argued 
that non-interference was not contravened in this case.
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Second, Jones argues that the ASEAN states intervened in the 
humanitarian crisis because the core ASEAN states ‘felt that the fate 
of their societies and economies was bound up with events in East 
Timor’.284 This argument is less compelling. While it is true that the 
financial crisis and Indonesian instability had an impact on the ASEAN 
states, this was by no means uniform. Whereas certain regional 
states, such as Thailand, were badly affected by the crisis, other core 
ASEAN states were much less affected. Despite its open economy, the 
effects of the financial crisis in Singapore were less severe than other 
states.285 Similarly, contraction in the Philippines ‘was considerably 
less severe than those experienced by its neighbours’.286 While Jones 
stresses the fear of separatism as a driving force behind the Philippines’ 
intervention in Indonesia,287 this explanation does not sit well with 
Singapore, which did not have similar domestic considerations. In 
reality, the Asian Financial Crisis impacted on state interests, acting as 
a catalyst for change. A subsequent decrease in interest convergence 
caused a decrease in Indonesian resistance to sovereignty violation 
from actors external to the region. Although domestic factors can 
and do play a role, the deciding factor in this case was the role played 
by external powers. ASEAN support for Indonesia was ultimately of 
little consequence.
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5
The South China Sea Dispute1
The South China Sea dispute (1992 to present) is a long-standing and 
ongoing maritime sovereignty dispute involving China, Taiwan and 
the ASEAN states of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. 
Tensions over the region’s waters have fluctuated since the Cold War 
period, with instances of conflict linked to a variety of factors, including 
surging economic growth and corresponding military modernization 
in China, enhanced competition for maritime resources, China’s status 
as a rising power, increased great power rivalry with the US, and the 
consolidation of power under China’s current President Xi Jinping.2 
With increased tensions linked to ‘renewed Chinese assertiveness’,3 
the South China Sea is ‘on the way to becoming the most contested 
body of water in the world’.4
At the forefront of this struggle for autonomy5 in the South China 
Sea sit the ASEAN states of the Philippines and Vietnam. As Southeast 
Asia’s ‘frontline states’ in the South China Sea dispute,6 these states 
have had their maritime sovereignty violated by China, which has 
increasingly pushed its own sovereignty claims over the region’s 
rocks, islands and reefs. China took control of the Paracel Islands, 
also claimed by Vietnam, by force in 1974, establishing a presence 
on Fiery Cross Reef in 1987. China went on to occupy Mischief 
Reef in 1995, actions which resulted in military confrontation with 
the Philippines due to conflicting sovereignty claims over the same 
territory. Since this period, there have been numerous maritime 
clashes between Chinese, Vietnamese and Filipino armed forces, of 
varying levels of intensity. The purpose of this chapter is to assess the 
ability of the Philippines and Vietnam to resist sovereignty violation 
from an increasingly assertive China over three separate time periods: 
1992–2012, 2012–2016, and 2016 to present.
In the first of these time periods, evidence will show how the US, 
as the only external power with ‘the wherewithal to seriously counter 
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China’,7 was insufficiently concerned with events in the South China 
Sea to cooperate with either the Philippines or Vietnam in their bid 
to resist sovereignty violations from China. At the same time, ASEAN 
failed to reach a consensus on what its own role in the South China Sea 
dispute should be. Significantly, without a credible security commitment 
from an external power such as the US, ASEAN was unable to provide 
an effective response to the dispute. Despite the Philippines and Vietnam 
having the most compelling interests at stake in the dispute, and therefore 
increasingly taking on the role of joint vanguard state, both continued 
to have their sovereignty violated at this time.
A sea change was in evidence from 2012. From this period to 
2016, the US increasingly recognized its own vital interests at stake 
in preventing Chinese expansion and militarization in the South 
China Sea. Characterized by a foreign policy ‘pivot’, the Obama 
Administration recognized the Philippines and Vietnam as the 
region’s frontline states, and increased economic, military, and political 
cooperation to each accordingly. Despite this, the period can at best be 
characterized as one of partial interest convergence. Increasing interest 
convergence between the ASEAN vanguard states and the US did not 
reach the levels required to prevent the Philippines and Vietnam from 
having their sovereignty violated by China. This was compounded 
by relatively weak ASEAN support of vanguard state policy, with the 
Association still fragmented over how to deal with repeated Chinese 
transgressions.
From 2016 onwards, shifting US and Philippines’ interests heralded a 
change in each state’s China and South China Sea policy, thus exposing 
the fragility of interest convergence. This has left Vietnam largely 
isolated, seeking to resist violations to its sovereignty while unsure of 
US security commitments and the support from ASEAN and its fellow 
vanguard state. The argument made here is that if Vietnam and the 
Philippines, in their role as vanguard states, hope to resist sovereignty 
violations from China, they need to focus on re-engaging the US and 
developing greater ASEAN cohesion. Failure to do so will result in 
these states increasingly ceding maritime sovereignty to China.
The chapter will begin by discussing the background to the maritime 
dispute, including detail of the various regional state interests and the 
sovereignty claims of each party. It will then provide evidence of 
ASEAN vanguard state-external power interest divergence between 
1992 and 2012. During this period, Chinese land reclamation and 
militarization of a number of contested islands in the South China 
Sea sparked conflict with both the Philippines and Vietnam, which 
gradually emerged as the ASEAN vanguard states. Analysis of the 
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period from 2012 to 2016 will show the way in which increasing 
interest convergence between the US, the Philippines and Vietnam 
led to increased cooperation regarding the South China Sea dispute. 
This partial interest convergence was supported by the Obama 
Administration’s ‘Asia pivot’ policy, and arbitration legal proceedings 
undertaken by the Philippines. Subsequent analysis of the period 2016 
to present will highlight the impact of changing administrations in the 
Philippines and the US, which contributed to a change in interests 
towards China and the South China Sea. Evidence will show that 
this interest divergence has contributed to the ASEAN vanguard 
states continuing to have their maritime sovereignty violated. The 
chapter will conclude with a theoretical discussion of the South 
China Sea dispute since 1992, a summary of the chapter’s findings, 
and consideration of the contrasting theoretical arguments, and their 
applicability to this case.
Background to the maritime dispute
China historically considers all territory in the South China Sea to be 
under its control, despite competing claims with a number of Southeast 
Asian states. A law was passed to this effect in 1992, in which China 
asserted its claims to the South China Sea, as well as reserving the right 
to use force to enforce these claims.8 The disputed islands themselves 
are little more than rocky outcrops in the South China Sea, and are of 
relatively little land value. This is a view supported by the 1982 United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which has 
confirmed that many of the disputed features in the Spratly Islands 
should be classified as rocks.9 Contested sovereignty claims are driven 
by hydrocarbons and minerals beneath the seabed, in addition to the 
strategic geographic position of the various islands that straddle vital 
sea-lanes and trade routes.10 China bases its claim to sovereignty on a 
map produced in 1949 ‘indicating nine undefined, discontinued and 
dashed line’.11 China claims sovereignty over all features within this 
‘nine-dash line’, despite questions over the legality of China’s claim and 
the exact location of the line’s coordinates.12 Both China and Vietnam 
claim sovereignty over the Paracel Islands, which China occupied by 
force in 1974. The Spratly Islands are also subject to a number of 
conflicting sovereignty claims, with various islands, rocks and reefs 
occupied by China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.13
China has calculated that the South China Sea has the potential to 
yield 130 billion barrels of oil, which if true would place the region 
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second behind Saudi Arabia in terms of oil reserves.14 China is in 
need of this energy, with ‘Chinese oil reserves account[ing] for only 
1.1 percent of the world total, while it consumes over 10 percent of 
world oil production’.15 It is also estimated that the South China Sea 
provides approximately 10 percent of the global catch, which is a 
significant source of protein for the region’s population.16 The dispute 
has also increasingly ‘become an issue of dissension between the US 
and China’, with the former seeking to maintain a foothold in the 
region, while the latter increasingly seeks to exert its influence over 
the region.17 There has been a notable reduction in the size of the 
US Navy since the 1980s, and a dramatic growth in the size of the 
Chinese Navy.18 For Kaplan, Chinese expansionism ‘is a declaration 
that it never again intends to let foreigners take advantage of it, as they 
did in the previous two centuries’.19
In pursuit of this goal, the period from 2013 has seen accelerated 
Chinese construction and militarization in the South China Sea. 
This has included increased land reclamation in the Spratly Islands, 
the installation of various weapon systems and defence fortifications 
on all seven of its artificial islands built in the South China Sea, the 
deployment of surface-to-air missile launchers to Woody Island in 
the Paracels,20 and the installation of structures intended to house 
missile systems on Fiery Cross Reef, Mischief Reef and Subi Reef, 
all of which have ‘military-grade airfields’.21 China’s actions raise a 
number of important questions regarding future peace and stability 
in the region, China’s regional and international ambitions as a 
rising power, the continued role of the US as a Pacific power, and 
the degree to which competition between the two could impact 
the states of Southeast Asia. For Hayton, the South China Sea is 
symbolic in that it is ‘the first place where Chinese ambition has 
come face to face with American strategic resolve’.22 What remains 
to be seen is the degree to which these states will seek to pursue 
these interests, and the extent to which regional ASEAN States will 
hinder or support this.
ASEAN’S failure to secure interest convergence 
(1992–2012)
Despite sovereignty disputes over territory in the South China Sea 
existing since at least the 1970s, the dispute became more pronounced 
when Beijing passed the Territorial Waters Law, in February 1992. 
Adopted at the 24th meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
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National People’s Congress, the law states China’s right to exercize 
sovereignty over its territorial sea, incorporating offshore islands such 
as Taiwan, Diaoyu Island, Penghu Islands, Dongsha Islands, Xisha 
Islands, Nansha (Spratly) Islands and other islands that belong to 
China.23 The legislation was indicative of China’s shift towards a new 
military strategy towards the end of the Cold War. From 1992, conflict 
over territorial seas and islands was designated of special importance, 
and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) were tasked with 
enhancing offshore defence, and ‘over the long term, building a 
survivable, sea-based nuclear retaliatory force’.24
China’s creeping assertiveness (1995–1999)
China’s ability to project force was evident in February 1995, when 
nine vessels were sent to take control of Panganiban atoll, also known 
as Mischief Reef, territory long claimed by the Philippines. Critically, 
this was the first time China had moved to occupy maritime territory 
claimed by an ASEAN country, having previously targeted territory 
claimed by Vietnam, which did not become an ASEAN member until 
1995. While the Philippines lodged a ‘strong diplomatic protest’ with 
Beijing, its position was a weak one, and not supported by an ally 
with the military power to intimidate China.25 A US state department 
spokesperson responded to the incident by confirming that the US 
‘takes no position on the merits of the competing claims in the South 
China Sea’.26 Michael Leifer accurately summarized the challenge for 
the Philippines, noting that regional states believed the US had ‘lost 
the will to uphold the regional balance of power’, and that ASEAN’s 
own ‘inability … to adopt a common position over the South China 
Sea’ could encourage China’s ‘creeping assertiveness’.27
In the aftermath of the Mischief Reef incident, representatives from 
the Philippines and China met in Manila on 9–10 August 1995 to 
engage in consultations on the South China Sea. A joint statement 
was subsequently released, detailing a code of conduct designed 
to ‘build confidence and trust between the two parties’.28 Despite 
the Philippines’ hope that this would prevent any further Chinese 
unilateral action in the region, the 1997 sighting of Chinese warships 
near Philippine-occupied islands in the Spratlys, in addition to the 
discovery of further structures on a nearby reef, thwarted these hopes. 
More Chinese structures were erected in January 1999, this time 
constructed in concrete, including construction of what appeared to 
be a helicopter landing-pad.29
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The US response to Chinese gains in the South China Sea was 
largely one of disinterest. In a 1991 interview held in Malaysia, US 
Pacific Commander-in-Chief Admiral Charles Larson made a number 
of comments regarding the Spratly Islands dispute, including the fact 
that ‘there was no interest for the US to intervene’, that it was ‘a 
regional issue’, and that it was up to ASEAN and countries in the 
region to ‘resolve the issue through political channels’.30 With the 
US preoccupied with securing its interests in the Middle East and 
North Africa, the Philippines’ military chief General Angelo Reyes 
‘publicly stated that the Philippines could not rely on the US for 
its defence’.31 Nor were the Philippines able to elicit help from its 
regional neighbours, with ASEAN providing minimal tangible support 
following the dispute. The Philippines Foreign Affairs Under-Secretary 
Lauro Baja Jr confirmed that ‘on Mischief Reef, we were left alone. 
The other countries said that while they sympathize and understand 
our situation, the issue is only a Philippine-China problem’.32 Baja 
explicitly highlighted ASEAN reluctance to become involved in the 
dispute, stating that ‘even some of our ASEAN friends are either mute, 
timid or cannot go beyond espousal of general principle of peaceful 
settlement of disputes and polite words of understanding given in the 
corridors or meeting rooms’.33
Despite Chinese actions, it was Malaysia’s belief that China was 
‘fundamentally benign’, feelings echoed by Singapore, which did 
‘not see China’s actions as truly threatening’.34 Left without the 
support of traditional allies, compounded by the 1991 termination 
of US basing rights in Filipino territory, the Ramos Administration 
focused on developing its own defensive capabilities.35 This included 
modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). This 
took the form of a proposal for a $2 billion upgrade of the AFP, 
with a focus on improved military hardware for external defence, 
and weapons system upgrades for the Navy and Air Force.36 The 
modernization programme particularly focused on the Philippines’ 
Navy (PN), ‘designed so that the PN would get most of the program 
funds to develop its capability for inshore and offshore patrol, surface 
warfare, detection, and maritime surveillance’.37
ASEAN calls for a code of conduct (1992–1999)
ASEAN’s first declaration on the potential for conflict in the South 
China Sea and ways in which this might be ameliorated came in July 
1992, in the aftermath of Beijing’s passing of the Territorial Waters 
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Law. At the 25th ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting, an ‘ASEAN 
Declaration on the South China Sea’ was adopted, in which the 
Foreign Ministers called for a code of international conduct over the 
South China Sea.38 By July 1996, Ministers became more explicit 
in their call for a code of conduct, with calls for a plan of action 
reiterated in the 1998 Ha Noi [sic] plan of action. Concrete steps 
were made in March 1999, when the Philippines and Vietnam were 
assigned the task of designing a draft document.39 However, trying to 
obtain ASEAN or Chinese consensus was to prove difficult. Following 
recommendations made by ASEAN officials in May, the Philippines 
submitted a ‘draft Regional Code of Conduct’ for consideration of 
the ‘ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting [SOM] Working Group on 
ZOPFAN and SEANWFZ [Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone]’.40 ASEAN officials finally agreed on a draft code in November 
1999, which was then sent to China for consideration.
China agreed to explore the possibility of a joint code of conduct in 
May 1999. This was in stark contrast to China’s traditional preference 
for settling regional sovereignty disputes bilaterally. China’s shifting 
stance can be attributed to the realization ‘that if it continued to stand 
outside the forum, it risked either being isolated or being a laggard that 
had no other choice but to accept the previously settled formalities and 
principles’.41 Fears of intervention by external interested parties, most 
notably the US and Japan, helped drive Chinese decision-making, 
as did the hope that a code of conduct could serve China’s own 
interests, and avoid the risk of being dictated to by other countries 
in the region.42 A protracted period of negotiations followed, with 
parties disagreeing on the code of conduct’s scope, in addition to 
whether the code should be legally binding or not, something that 
China steadfastly resisted. To overcome this impasse, Malaysia proposed 
a non-binding ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South 
China Sea’. This approach was subsequently seized upon by China, 
which insisted upon the adoption of a non-binding code of conduct.43 
At a stalemate, ‘the other ASEAN members had to give in, accepting 
a political declaration as a stepping-stone towards a formal code of 
conduct’.44
The Foreign Ministers of ASEAN and the People’s Republic of 
China adopted the ‘Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the 
South China Sea’ at the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on 
4 November 2002.45 The Code of Conduct declared the parties’ 
respect for the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, and 
their desire to exercise restraint and resolve territorial disputes without 
resorting to the threat or use of force.46 Despite these provisions, the 
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
170
2002 DOC has been subject to misinterpretation and abuse. Most 
notable is the self-restraint provision, which ‘suggests that the parties 
are to refrain from new occupations’.47 However, ‘the parties seem 
to have interpreted the self-restraint clause to imply that they can 
continue enhancing their presence on features they already occupy’.48 
Therefore, actions taken to build structures on occupied islands are 
consistent within the code of conduct declaration. A further major 
flaw of the 2002 DOC is that it lacks any enforcement mechanisms 
for non-compliance, in addition to any dispute-settlement mechanisms 
‘to deal with differences which may arise over the interpretation or 
application of the provisions in the declaration’.49
Despite concerns regarding the applicability of the DOC, the 
immediate period following its signing saw a general reduction of 
regional tensions, with China seeking to ‘burnish its credentials’ 
with ASEAN ‘by launching a “charm offensive”’.50 This period saw 
China enhance multilateral initiatives, including cooperation in the 
2005 East Asia Summit (EAS), enhance economic cooperation and 
Southeast Asian foreign aid, and increase ASEAN-China dialogue. As 
evidence of this period’s reduction in tensions, Chinese exports to and 
imports from ASEAN countries grew by 450 percent and 625 percent 
respectively between 1997 and 2006, with a framework agreement 
for an ASEAN-China Free Trade Area signed in 2002.51 In the 
South China Sea, China, the Philippines and Vietnam signed a Joint 
Marine Seismic Undertaking (JMSU) in 2004–05, an agreement that 
sought to undertake joint seismic studies for oil and gas exploration.52 
Unfortunately, strained relations with Vietnam and increased US 
activity in the South China Sea meant that this period of calm was 
not to last.
Tensions in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship
Vietnam and China’s fraught relations were evident during an 
18–20  January meeting in 2007. Held between the Chinese and 
Vietnamese Vice Foreign Ministers, the latter reported being 
‘extremely disappointed with Chinese preparation for and conduct of 
the negotiations’, which resulted in the Chinese walking out of the 
session.53 A number of multinational energy companies subsequently 
became embroiled in the two countries’ territorial dispute. In a 
telegram sent from the US Embassy in Hanoi, China was charged 
with coercing a number of energy companies, including Chevron 
and British Petroleum (BP), to pull out of offshore gas concessions in 
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disputed waters.54 According to one Chevron executive, Xiu Dong 
Jia, China’s Political Counselor in Washington summoned Chevron’s 
executive to the Chinese Embassy in Washington DC. There, he 
warned them that China, had ‘indisputable rights over the area, 
including Nansha Island’, and that further activity by them would be 
a ‘grave violation of China’s sovereignty’.55 Vietnam, unhappy with 
Chevron’s decision to accede to Chinese demands, ‘urged the company 
to proceed and promised the Vietnamese Navy for protection’.56
Increased tensions between China and Vietnam over disputed 
territory in the South China Sea fanned the flames of anti-
China nationalism in Vietnam. Over two weekends in December 
2007, students in Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi met in front of 
China’s consulate to demonstrate against China’s decision to set 
up administrative control over the Paracel and Spratly Islands.57 
In the past, the Vietnamese government had been quick to quash 
such protests in order to maintain good relations with China. In 
this case, however, ‘political elites in Vietnam, especially nationalist 
pragmatists, increasingly saw the benefits of popular patriotism to show 
tenacity against China’s creeping expansions and attract international 
attention’.58
The Obama Administration’s China policy (2008–2012)
A change in US policy towards China was evident following the 
election of President Barack Obama in 2008. Although this did 
not immediately translate into any explicit move towards interest 
convergence with interested South China Sea parties, it did highlight 
US growing interests in the region, and the beginning of a policy 
designed to pushback against China’s expansionism. From 2008 
onwards, the US recognized the important interests it had at stake in 
maintaining a strong presence in the Pacific, with ‘renewed US interest 
in the territorial disputes … driven by its own goals of re-engagement 
and sustaining its primacy in the long term’.59
Tensions between the two powers escalated in 2009, when it was 
reported that the US ocean surveillance ship Impeccable was harassed by 
Chinese naval ships in March, with China claiming the US’ vessel was 
in China’s exclusive economic zone. The US responded to the incident 
by stating that they would ‘continue to operate in those international 
waters and we expect the Chinese to observe international laws around 
them’.60 Events came to a head in early 2010, after it was reported 
that Chinese officials had referred to the South China Sea as a ‘core 
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interest’ in a private meeting with senior US officials in Beijing in 
March 2010.61 If true, the maritime sovereignty dispute would have 
been elevated to the same importance as Taiwan and Tibet, and would 
imply that ‘Beijing would be willing to use force or the threat of force 
to defend its sovereignty’.62 The report was followed by confusion 
as to whether officials did in fact delegate South China Sea ‘a core 
interest’, with Chinese leaders neither explicitly endorsing nor denying 
the comment.63
The statement was lent credence by Hillary Clinton, who stated 
that Dai Bingguo, a Chinese senior foreign policy official, made the 
statement to her in a meeting in May 2010. According to Clinton, ‘I 
immediately responded and said, “We don’t agree with that”’.64 The 
US added fuel to the fire in July 2010 comments made by Secretary 
of State Clinton at a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum in 
Vietnam. Apparently ‘encouraged by some ASEAN members who 
had grown uneasy over Chinese intentions in the South China 
Sea’, Clinton gave perhaps the strongest statement to date on the 
US position on the South China Sea.65 Stating that the region ‘was 
pivotal to US national interests’, the comments represented a ‘radical 
policy shift’ for the US, due to its ‘direct regional involvement’ in the 
dispute.66 The comments elicited an immediate response from China’s 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi, whose accused ‘the US of orchestrating 
an anti-China plot and threatened economic punishment for Southeast 
Asian nations that sought to stand up to Beijing’.67 He is reported to 
have stated that ‘China is a big country and other countries are small 
countries, and that is just a fact’.68
A downturn in regional relations: a hamstrung ASEAN
China’s volatile response was not lost on the ASEAN member states 
present. Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo stated that ‘there 
was quite an interesting and sharp exchange between the Americans 
and Chinese’.69 The exchange caused some concern within ASEAN 
over a heavy-handed US involvement in the dispute, with fears of 
an exacerbation of tensions. As one ASEAN state official confirmed, 
‘China is a geographic fact that ASEAN has to live with, whereas the 
US is both far away and fickle’.70 The tense exchange also elicited a 
strong domestic response in China. The People’s Daily website posted 
an online survey asking its readers whether the South China Sea should 
indeed be designated a ‘core interest’.71 By January 2011, 97 percent of 
approximately 4,300 respondents had responded in the affirmative.72
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The period from 2008 to 2012 saw a downturn in stability in the 
South China Sea. This began with a lapse in the Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking between China, the Philippines and Vietnam, as tensions 
in the region’s waters escalated.73 Relations between the Philippines 
and China deteriorated in April 2012, when a Filipino warship became 
engaged in a standoff with Chinese surveillance ships in the disputed 
Scarborough Shoal. The Philippines’ naval ship remained on the spot 
for two days before withdrawing, in the hope that this would diffuse 
tensions. However, China failed to reciprocate, and instead deployed 
a well-equipped and heavily armed patrol vessel.74 Despite filing a 
diplomatic protest with the Chinese Embassy, the standoff did not ease 
until two months later, when vessels withdrew due to the arrival of 
typhoon season, in what was described as a ‘carefully choreographed 
withdrawal’.75 The Chinese position was that its maritime vessels were 
‘in the area fulfilling the duties of safeguarding Chinese maritime rights 
and interests’, and that Scarborough Shoal was ‘an integral part of the 
Chinese territory’.76
The 2012 maritime incident triggered an anti-Chinese backlash 
in the Philippines, where Filipinos staged ‘anti-Chinese bullying’ 
demonstrations.77 Similar, small-scale, rallies broke out in China, which 
also sought to punish the Philippines by imposing travel restrictions 
and non-tariff barriers against its agricultural produce.78 For De 
Castro, the incident reflected China’s ‘fervent nationalism, growing 
naval prowess and unilateral moves … directed against a militarily 
weak Philippines’.79 Nor did the dispute occur out of the blue. In 
reality, China had been increasing its naval activities in the region’s 
waters since as early as 2010. Filipino fisherman reported a number of 
incidents of Chinese harassment, in addition to evidence of Chinese 
construction, in 2011. In one instance, members of the Armed Forces 
of the Philippines observed Chinese naval ships unloading building 
materials and erecting posts in the Army Douglas Bank.80 The 
Philippines protested to the Chinese Embassy in Manila, to which 
China responded that the Philippines must stop ‘harming China’s 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests’.81
What the 2012 incident at Scarborough Shoal did do, was make 
‘it obvious to the Filipinos – if it wasn’t obvious by then – that they 
needed a substantial military alliance with the US’.82 In addition 
to securing external security commitments from the US, both the 
Philippines and Vietnam also sought cooperation from ASEAN. 
However, ASEAN remained hamstrung over how best to respond to 
China. This was evident at the 45th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
July 2012, held in the aftermath of the Scarborough shoal standoff. 
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The Philippines and Vietnam requested that the Joint Communiqué 
include references to their maritime disputes with China. However, 
Cambodia’s foreign minister Hor Nam Hong, as ASEAN chair, 
blocked any mention of the dispute, claiming that these were bilateral 
issues and should therefore not be included.83 Unable to reach an 
agreement, the Association failed to release a Joint Communiqué for 
the first time in its 45-year history. This was evidence of China’s ability 
to exploit its close relationship with Cambodia to keep the South 
China Sea from featuring prominently at ASEAN meetings.84
Summary: 1992–2012
Notwithstanding a brief reduction in tensions following the signing of 
the 2002 DOC, during which time China’s unprecedented economic 
growth allowed it to consolidate power regionally, the period under 
analysis witnessed increased friction between China and the ASEAN 
frontline states and, from 2008 onwards, the US. Without a strong 
regional balance of power, China’s creeping expansionism, evidenced 
by incidents in Mischief Reef and Scarborough Shoal, was largely able 
to go unchecked. Notable during this period is the lack of interest 
convergence between the US, Philippines and Vietnam. Evidence 
presented here suggests that this, coupled with ASEAN’s inability to 
elicit a common response to the crisis, caused the latter states to have 
their sovereignty in the South China Sea increasingly violated.
ASEAN-US partial interest convergence (2012–
2016)
From 2012, the US began to take on a greater balancing role vis-
à-vis China in Southeast Asia. As this analysis will show, this was 
actively encouraged by the Philippines and Vietnam, which sought 
US security commitments in an effort to prevent further sovereignty 
violation by an expansionist China. According to Professor Carlyle 
Thayer, Vietnam saw ‘the US presence as a hedge against China’s rising 
military power’.85 The Vietnamese viewed themselves as having a role 
in facilitating this, with a desire to allow a US military presence at 
Cam Ranh Bay to counter the growing Chinese threat.86 While the 
Vietnamese would have ‘like[d] ASEAN to be stronger, in order to 
be a counterweight to China, they are realistic’.87 Similarly, following 
China’s actions in Mischief Reef in 1995, the Philippines, confronted 
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by China’s ‘power-politics approach’, implemented ‘a delicate 
balancing act’.88 This began by seeking enhanced military ties with 
the US, hoping that the ‘presence of the US would deter any Chinese 
tendency toward regional hegemony’.89
The US ‘pivot’ (2011)
By late 2011, there was a pronounced shift in US policy towards 
the Asia-Pacific. In an address to the Australian Parliament on 
17 November 2011, President Barack Obama formally outlined his 
Asia Pacific foreign policy strategy. This reflected a ‘broader shift’ away 
from a focus on the Middle East, to what President Obama referred 
to as ‘the vast potential of the Asia Pacific region’.90 President Obama 
highlighted five core underlying principles, which would shape the 
US’ strategic shift towards Asia. These were an emphasis on the US’ 
commitment to security in the region, re-engagement with regional 
organizations, continued efforts to build a cooperative relationship 
with China, the advancements of US-Asia shared prosperity through 
free trade and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and a support for 
fundamental rights of every human being.91 This ‘strategic rebalance’ 
was given further shape by defence secretary Leon Panetta in June 
2012 during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. There, Panetta 
referenced deepening cooperation with a number of Southeast Asian 
states. This included multilateral military exercises with Thailand, 
further military engagement with the Philippines, including work 
to improve the Philippines maritime presence, the implementation 
of forward deployment of the Littoral Combat Ships to Singapore, 
and the advancement of bilateral defence cooperation with Vietnam.
The US Asia-Pacific rebalance was met with some apprehension 
in Asia, despite the benefits that a more engaged US could bring to 
the region. Although traditional allies, such as Japan, welcomed the 
move, some states in Southeast Asia feared an increase in security 
competition with China that could destabilize the region. Indonesia’s 
foreign minister warned of the dangers of a ‘vicious cycle of tensions 
and mistrust’, a feeling echoed by Malaysia and Singapore, with the 
latter’s foreign minister stressing that ASEAN wanted to avoid getting 
‘caught between the competing interests’ of major powers.92 These 
feelings were undoubtedly compounded by regional state fears of 
American decline, with concerns that the pivot could prove to be 
an ‘empty promise’.93 The pivot was greeted more warmly by those 
states in conflict with China in the South China Sea. These states 
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immediately benefited from the US’ new posture. In 2012, the US 
tripled its military funding to the Philippines from $15 million to 
$30 million,94 and began a $41 million cleanup of Agent Orange in 
Vietnam, the first such cleanup operation conducted by the US.95
The Philippines takes a firm stance
Following the Obama Administration’s articulation of its new Asia 
pivot strategy, and responding to the 2012 Scarborough Shoal 
standoff, ‘hardliners’ in Manila began to push the Benigno Aquino III 
Administration to take a more assertive stance towards China, 
particularly with regard to Chinese expansion into Philippines’ maritime 
territory.96 It did so through the use of three counter-measures: 
international diplomatic pressure, the initiation of legal proceedings 
against China, and support of the Obama Administration’s ‘Pivot to 
Asia’ foreign policy strategy, whereby President Aquino, ‘sought to 
fortify defense relations with America in order to deter further Chinese 
assertiveness’.97 The Aquino government also sought to improve its own 
military capabilities, including a ‘border protection programme’ centred 
around enhanced air force, naval and coastguard surveillance, patrol and 
deterrence capabilities.98 The Philippines’ stance on the South China Sea 
dispute was formally expressed in January 2013, when the government 
confirmed that it would bring China before the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA) under Article 287 and V II of the 1982 UNCLOS to 
‘clearly establish the sovereign rights and jurisdiction of the Philippines 
over its maritime entitlements in the West Philippine Sea’.99
The Philippines requested that the arbitration tribunal address four 
key points. First, that the ‘Tribunal resolve a dispute between the 
Parties concerning the source of maritime rights and entitlements in 
the South China Sea’, thereby directly seeking to challenge China’s 
‘nine-dash line’ claim.100 Second, that the Tribunal address entitlements 
to maritime zones and certain maritime features claimed by both 
parties, including submerged banks and low-tide elevations. Third, 
that the Tribunal address the ‘lawfulness of China’s actions in the 
South China Sea’, with a specific focus on Chinese interference in 
Philippines’ fishing, navigation and exploration rights, in addition to its 
failure to protect the marine environment.101 Finally, that the Tribunal 
find ‘that China has aggravated and extended the disputes between 
the Parties’, through its maritime construction and land-reclamation 
efforts.102 In light of the fact that the UNCLOS does not address 
land-based sovereignty claims, the Tribunal confirmed that it would 
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not ‘make any ruling as to which State enjoys sovereignty over any 
land territory in the South China Sea’, including the Spratly Islands 
and Scarborough Shoal.103 Nor does it propose to delimit maritime 
boundaries between the two parties, something that China excluded 
from the dispute settlement process in 2006.
State responses to the PCA
China reacted angrily to the Philippines arbitration case. On 
20 February 2013, China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei 
stated that China ‘would continue to ‘unswervingly safeguard national 
sovereignty and interests’.104 On 7 December 2014, China’s Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs released a ‘Position Paper’, not formally submitted 
to the Tribunal, which elaborated on the reasons why China believed 
the Arbitration Court lacked jurisdiction with respect to the case. 
These positions were that the subject matter of territorial sovereignty 
over maritime features was beyond the scope of the Convention, that 
the Philippines had breached its obligation under international law to 
settle relevant disputes through bilateral negotiations, and that, even 
assuming the subject matter were concerned with the application of 
the Convention, it would constitute maritime delimitation between 
the two countries, which China had excluded from compulsory 
arbitration in 2006.105 China made it clear that the release of the 
position paper ‘shall not be regarded as China’s acceptance of or its 
participation in the arbitration’.106
In support of the Philippines case, and evidence of growing interest 
convergence between the two ASEAN states, Vietnam independently 
joined the arbitration case in December 2014, albeit not as a co-
plaintiff. Vietnam’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Le Hai Binh confirmed 
that ‘to protect its legal rights and interests in the East Sea which may 
be affected in the South China Sea arbitration case, Viet Nam [sic] 
has … requested the Tribunal to pay attention to the legal rights and 
interests of Viet Nam’.107 Detailing these interests, he confirmed that 
Vietnam ‘has full historical evidence and legal foundation to reaffirm 
its sovereignty over the Hoang Sa and Truong Sa archipelagos’, and 
that Vietnam fully rejected ‘China’s claiming of ‘historic rights’ to the 
waters, sea-bed and subsoil within the “dotted line” unilaterally stated 
by China’.108 China’s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson spoke out against 
Vietnam’s involvement in the arbitration case, stating that the ‘Chinese 
side urges the Vietnamese side to earnestly respect China’s territorial 
sovereignty and maritime rights and interests’.109
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The US, whilst not becoming directly involved in the arbitration, 
made its support for the Philippines and Vietnam clear. President 
Obama publicly stated his support for the Philippines’ decision to 
start arbitration proceedings in April 2014, remarking at a Joint Press 
Conference in Manila that he and President Aquino had ‘reaffirmed the 
importance of resolving territorial disputes in the region peacefully … 
in that spirit, I told him that the US supports his decision to pursue 
international arbitration concerning territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea’.110 In April 2015, President Obama stated that ‘where 
we [the US] get concerned with China is where it is not necessarily 
abiding by international norms and rules and is using its sheer size and 
muscle to force countries into subordinate positions’.111 He concluded 
that, ‘just because the Philippines or Vietnam are not as large as China 
doesn’t mean that they can just be elbowed aside’.112
ASEAN state responses to the Philippines’ decision to begin 
arbitration proceedings against China were generally unfavourable. 
This is evidence that, despite increasing interest convergence between 
the Philippines, Vietnam and the US, a cohesive ASEAN policy 
remained elusive. As Tang Siew Mun highlights, Manila’s decision 
‘was seen in 2013 by ASEAN as a wrong tactical step that undermined 
its efforts towards engaging China multilaterally in striving for a 
binding Code of Conduct’.113 In addition to this, there was a ‘sense 
of disappointment within ASEAN circles that Manila neglected to 
undertake prior consultation with the grouping’.114 In comments 
to media following the Philippines’ initiation of arbitration against 
China, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that ‘what the 
Philippines has done is a national decision’, and that ‘Singapore first 
knew about this action from media reports’.115 The Minister stated 
Singapore’s position, which was that it is ‘not a claimant state and 
that by their very nature, the specific territorial disputes in the South 
China Sea could only be settled by the parties directly concerned’.116
Vietnam and US adopt an aggressive China policy
The need for a coordinated response to the South China Sea dispute 
took on a degree of urgency in May 2014, when tensions between 
China and Vietnam threatened to descend into open armed conflict. 
A clash between Vietnamese and Chinese shipping vessels broke out, 
following China’s deployment of an oilrig in disputed waters 130 
nautical miles off the Vietnamese coast. China, accusing Vietnam 
of ramming its ships, reciprocated and fired water cannons on its 
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crew.117 The clash damaged a number of vessels on both sides, with 
at least six Vietnamese casualties reported.118 It was followed by anti-
Chinese riots held in Vietnam, which resulted in at least four deaths 
and over 100 people injured.119 Amid the violence, China was forced 
to evacuate several thousand Chinese workers from the country.120 
Further clashes in the waters around the oilrig continued into late May, 
when a Chinese vessel rammed and sank a Vietnamese boat. In the 
aftermath, China’s vice foreign minister stated that ‘being the lifeline 
for China, the South China Sea is far more important to China than 
to other countries’.121
Statements made by Ashton Carter during an annual security policy 
forum held in Singapore in May 2015 suggested the adoption of a 
more aggressive US posture. Carter characterized the Chinese islands 
as ‘massive outposts’ and warned against ‘militarization’ of the China 
Sea: the ‘bluntest warnings yet to Beijing’.122 The US conducted 
Freedom of Navigation (FON) operations in the South China Sea 
in October 2015, January 2016 and May 2016, something which 
China expressed ‘strong dissatisfaction and opposition’ to.123 In the 
wake of the October 2015 USS Lassen operation, the Philippines 
stated that it had ‘no issue as to this US naval ship traversing under 
international law’.124 These sentiments were echoed by a Vietnamese 
spokesperson, Malaysia’s Defense Minister Hishammuddin Hussein, 
and Singapore’s Minister of Foreign Affairs.125 At the Shangri-La 
conference in May 2015, US Secretary of Defence Ashton Carter 
confirmed that it ‘would not be deterred’ from exercising its right to 
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.126 Undeterred, China 
continued its militarization policy in the South China Sea. Satellite 
photos emerged in December 2016 of new anti-aircraft guns and 
missile defence systems on a number of contested islands. This is in 
addition to numerous Chinese naval ships operating in the region’s 
waters. Reports in September 2016 also hinted at continued dredging 
and land reclamation around Scarborough Shoal, a move denied by 
Chinese officials.127
Increased vanguard-US interest convergence
By late 2015, there was increasing evidence of interest convergence 
between the US and the Philippines. An Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) was signed between the two 
countries in April 2014 to ‘allow for the enhanced rotational presence 
of US forces at agreed locations in the Philippines’.128 The Philippines 
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Supreme Court upheld the agreement in January 2016, at which point 
it went into the implementation phase, with the Philippines offering 
the US eight bases to build equipment facilities, some based on the 
island of Luzon.129 The EDCA is significant in that it ‘conveyed a 
strong diplomatic signal to Beijing that it would have to take account 
of American military presence in the Philippines if it was to use force 
against Manila’.130 The implementation of the EDCA came one year 
after more than 100 Navy ships docked in Subic Bay in a regional 
show of force and US-Philippines cooperation.131
President Obama and President Aquino held a bilateral meeting on 
18 November 2015 in Sofitel, to discuss enhanced defence alliance 
between the two states. In a speech made after the meeting, Obama 
iterated US desire to ‘reaffirm … unwavering commitment to the 
security and defence of the Philippines’, and confirmed commitment 
‘to ensuring maritime security in the region’.132 In a bid to enhance the 
Philippines defence, Obama outlined US plans to increase ‘maritime 
security assistance to the Philippines to record levels, including two 
new vessels’.133 When asked if he was comfortable with an enhanced 
US presence in the South China Sea, President Aquino responded: 
‘I think everybody would welcome a balance of power anywhere 
in the world’.134 The Philippines announced in 2015 that it would 
spend a record $552 billion on defence spending to ‘purchase frigates, 
surveillance planes, and radar equipment to improve surveillance and 
detection’, in disputed areas of the South China Sea,135 in addition to 
stepped-up joint patrols with the US.136  
Similar growing interest convergence was evident between the US 
and Vietnam. President Truong Tan Seng travelled to the White House 
in July 2013 for a bilateral meeting with President Obama, where the 
two discussed enhanced political, economic and military-to-military 
cooperation. On the South China Sea, Truong stated his appreciation 
for ‘US support for our stance in this matter, as well as the stance of 
ASEAN’.137 Following the visit, the two countries implemented a 
Comprehensive Partnership, signed in July 2013. This framework for 
bilateral relations included a commitment of $32.5 million in maritime 
capacity building assistance for Southeast Asia, with $18 million to 
enhance Vietnamese coastal patrols.138 The Vietnamese president 
‘welcomed the US’ enhanced cooperation in the Asia-Pacific, which 
contributes to the peace, stability, and prosperity of the region’.139
In 2015 the two countries implemented a Joint Vision Statement, 
which stated both sides ‘commit[ment] to maximizing shared interests’, 
in addition to recognition of the need to uphold international law 
and maritime security in the South China Sea.140 President Obama 
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reciprocated Vietnam’s visit in May 2016, with a trip to Hanoi to 
meet with Vietnam’s President Quang. It was announced during this 
trip that the US would ‘completely lift the ban on lethal weapon 
sales to Vietnam … clear proof that both countries have completely 
normalized relations’.141 Obama confirmed that ‘this change will 
ensure that Vietnam has access to the equipment it needs to defend 
itself and removes a lingering vestige of the Cold War’.142 This was a 
significant step, demonstrating a deeper phase of defence cooperation 
between the two states that would help Vietnam face the perceived 
Chinese threat. The President of Vietnam’s Centre for Strategic 
Studies confirmed the move to be ‘of great importance to Vietnam’, 
continuing that ‘China should think twice over anything they can do 
to Vietnam or the South China Sea … they should get the message’.143
Evidence has also been apparent of increasing interest convergence 
between the Philippines and Vietnam, as ASEAN’s joint vanguard 
states. On September 2015, Vietnamese Ambassador to the Philippines 
Truong Trieu Duong stated that Vietnam and the US would ‘deepen … 
cooperation in order to solve all the issues concerning the South China 
Sea in a most peaceful way in accordance with international law’.144 
During an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, held on 
17 November in Manila, the two countries elevated their relationship 
through the signing of a strategic partnership. As President Truong 
stated, ‘President [Aquino] and I shared our concerns over the recent 
developments in the East Sea or the South China Sea, affecting trust, 
peace, security and stability in the region. We also reaffirmed the 
importance of ensuring the stability, maritime security, safety and 
freedom of navigation and of flight in the South China Sea’.145 Aquino 
echoed Truong sentiments, stating that ‘in terms of defence relations, 
we [the Philippines] welcome the active engagement and cooperation 
between our respective defense and military establishments’.146
While ASEAN remained fragmented over how to respond to 
sovereignty violations in the South China Sea, thus falling short of 
the cohesion and mobilization needed to support vanguard state 
interests, this did not stop the US from attempting to garner a 
deeper level of cooperation with the Association. In February 2016, 
President Obama invited all ASEAN leaders to an ASEAN Summit 
at Sunnylands resort in California, the first Summit to be held in the 
US. In a joint statement released following the summit, the leaders 
called for a ‘shared commitment to peaceful resolution of disputes’, 
in addition to ‘ensuring maritime security and safety … as well as 
non-militarization and self-restraint in the conduct of activities’.147 
President Obama confirmed that ‘we discussed the need for tangible 
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steps in the South China Sea to lower tensions including a halt to 
further reclamation, new construction and militarization of disputed 
areas … when ASEAN speaks with a clear and unified voice, it can 
help advance security, opportunity and human dignity’.148
Summary: 2012–2016
Momentum towards enhanced interest convergence grew from 
2012 onwards, with increased instances of cooperation and military 
coordination between the Philippines, the US, and Vietnam. Evidence 
of enhanced cooperation between the Philippines and Vietnam also 
confirms the two states’ burgeoning role as joint ASEAN vanguard 
states. Missing from the equation was a robust ASEAN response, 
with the Philippines and Vietnam unable to mobilize the Association 
in support of their own interests. Instead, China was able to use its 
influence among certain ASEAN states to frustrate efforts to coordinate 
a joint policy. The period can therefore be best understood as one of 
partial interest convergence. ASEAN states might have more openly 
supported the Philippines and Vietnamese position, if this were backed 
by a powerful US regional presence. However, US re-engagement was 
tempered by Obama Administration concerns ‘of triggering an all-
out confrontation with China’.149 ASEAN concerns are exemplified 
by March 2016 comments made by Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee 
Hsien Loong, who stated that there ‘must be no doubt in anybody’s 
mind that America is a Pacific power, that you have an interest in the 
region’.150 Lee concluded that the US ‘do have serious interests at 
stake. And you have to speak with one coherent voice’.151
The arrival of Trump and Duterte – interest 
divergence (2016 to present)
The advent of a newly elected leader in the Philippines in May 
2016 transpired to derail this burgeoning interest convergence. In 
the aftermath of his electoral victory, President Rodrigo Duterte 
announced that he would be ‘chartering [sic] a [new] course [for 
the Philippines] on its own and will not be dependent on the US’.152 
Duterte made it clear that he would ‘open alliances with China’ and 
Russia, and would ‘open up the Philippines for them to do business, 
alliances of trade and commerce’.153 This shift towards improved 
relations with China in exchange for economic support was clearly at 
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the expense of the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China 
Sea. As rumours of human rights abuses committed during Duterte’s 
war on drugs began to circulate to the international community,154 
the relationship between the Philippine President and his American 
counterpart began to deteriorate.
These strained relations served as backdrop to the Permanent Court 
of Arbitration ruling, which was announced on 12 July 2016. A press 
release issued on that day provided a brief overview of the Tribunal’s 
decision. This confirmed that China’s claim to historic rights to 
resources in the South China Sea, was ‘incompatible with the exclusive 
economic zones provided for in the convention’, and that ‘there was 
no evidence that China had historically exercised exclusive control 
over the waters [italics in text] or their resources’.155 As such, ‘there was 
no legal basis’ for China to claim historic rights within the nine-dash 
line.156 The Tribunal also found that none of the features claimed by 
China are capable of generating an entitlement to extended maritime 
zones, and that certain sea areas form part of the exclusive economic 
zone of the Philippines, ‘because those areas are not overlapped by 
any possible entitlement of China’.157 The Tribunal could therefore 
confirm that ‘China had violated the Philippines’ sovereign rights in 
its exclusive economic zone’, by interfering with Filipino fishing and 
exploration, and through its construction of artificial islands.158
An ASEAN divided
President Duterte’s response to this landmark ruling in support of 
the Philippines position was noticeably muted. This was significant 
evidence of his shifting stance towards China. Duterte stated in 
December 2016 that he would ‘set aside the arbitral ruling. I will not 
impose anything on China’.159 This was echoed by the Philippines’ 
Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr, who stated that he wanted ‘to 
make sure that there will be no further actions that will heighten the 
tensions between the two countries, particularly in the Scarborough 
Shoal’.160 Yasay concluded that ‘we cannot stop China at this point in 
time … we will continue to pursue peaceful means’ to the dispute.161 
This approach was welcomed by China, which had dismissed the PCA 
ruling as a ‘null and void decision’, and ‘nothing more than a piece of 
paper’.162 For Cruz De Castro, ‘the Philippines government’s cautious 
reaction to the PCA awards was due to the Duterte administration’s 
fear that flaunting its legal victory against China might force the latter 
to react adversely against Filipino fishermen’ in the South China Sea.163
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In the wake of the PCA ruling, Duterte stepped up his denigration 
of the US, while simultaneously dropping attempts to push the 
South China Sea as an agenda item at ASEAN meetings. In advance 
of an August 2017 ASEAN Summit to be held in Laos, Duterte 
confirmed that be would not push for a multilateral response to 
the dispute, stating ‘I will only bring the issue when we are face 
to face … because if you quarrel with them now and you claim 
sovereignty, make noise here and there, they might not just even want 
to talk’.164 This clear nod towards China’s preference to manage the 
dispute bilaterally rather than multilaterally has damaged ASEAN 
confidence in the Philippines, with Duterte’s efforts to woo China 
having ‘eroded the Philippines’ influence in the ASEAN on the 
South China Sea issue’.165 The Laos Summit concluded without the 
adoption of a joint statement on the South China Sea dispute.166 
An official statement issued at the close of the Summit made brief 
reference to the maritime tensions, but omitted referring to China 
by name, and failed to explicitly mention the July, South China Sea 
Arbitration ruling.167
Disagreements between the ten ASEAN states were also evident at 
the previous Foreign Ministers Meeting, held in the immediate wake 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling. Both the Philippines 
and Vietnam requested that the Joint Communiqué mention the 
PCA ruling.168 However, any mention of the ruling was blocked 
by Cambodia, which claimed the dispute should be dealt with on 
a bilateral basis.169 An extended deadlock ensued, during which it 
was feared ministers would be unable to agree a joint statement. 
A watered-down statement was eventually released, devoid of any 
mention of China’s maritime activities, or the PCA ruling.170 This 
was widely viewed as a diplomatic coup for China. In the aftermath 
of the July meeting, Cambodia’s Council of Ministers spokesman 
Phay Siphan asked, ‘why are those individuals, which tend to support 
the US, pushing Cambodia to support this or that? … They have a 
trend of supporting the US, which is against China, but they accuse 
Cambodia because Cambodia is a close friend to China’.171 It is 
perhaps notable that in the immediate aftermath of the PCA ruling, 
and in advance of the ASEAN foreign ministers summit, Cambodia’s 
Prime Minister Hun Sen met with the Chinese Prime Minister ‘to 
discuss a strengthening of cooperation’ between the two ‘on issues in 
the region and internationally which both parties are paying attention 
to’.172 It was subsequently announced that the government was to 
receive $600 million of Chinese grant aid, to be used for ‘electoral 
processes, health, education, clean water and wells’.173
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Duterte’s false hope in China
Responding to a perceived lack of US commitment, President Duterte 
declared in September 2016 that upcoming war games to be held 
between the two countries would be the last, and that he would 
instead establish new alliances for trade with Russia and China.174 On 
3 October 2016, Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte blasted the 
US during a speech in Manila, telling President Barack Obama that he 
could ‘go to hell’ for refusing to sell the Philippines weapons, which he 
confirmed he could readily receive from Russia or China.175 Duterte 
claimed that he would ‘break up with America’, and realign his 
country’s foreign policy.176 In this same month, during a visit to China, 
President Duterte succeeded in securing $24 billion in Chinese trade 
and investment commitments.177 China also offered the Philippines’ 
military a $500 million loan, with China’s Foreign Minister hailing a 
‘golden period of fast development’ between the two.178
This shift in the Philippines’ China policy coincided with a 
presidential election in the US in late 2016. The election of Donald 
Trump as US President only served to enhance uncertainty in 
Southeast Asia over the US’ role in the region, with concerns over 
whether America would ‘move towards a parochial and even isolationist 
foreign policy’, for which ‘both sides of the Pacific would have to pay 
dearly’.179 Seeking to allay regional fears, US Secretary of Defence 
Jim Mattis criticized China’s action in the South China Sea at the 
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2017, stating ‘artificial island 
construction and indisputable militarization of facilities on features 
in international waters undermine regional stability’.180 Focusing his 
attention on China, Mattis stated that Chinese actions differed from 
other claimant states due to the ‘nature of its militarization … its 
disregard for international law, its contempt for other nations’ interests, 
and its efforts to dismiss non-adversarial resolution of issues’.181 China 
responded to say ‘it was resolutely opposed’ to the comments, and 
urged ‘concerned parties to stop issuing irresponsible remarks’.182 The 
comments came one month before the US sailed a warship less than 
12 miles from an island in the Paracels in a freedom of navigation 
demonstration, something China called ‘a serious political and military 
provocation’.183
The Duterte Administration’s hope that engagement with China 
would ameliorate tensions in the South China Sea has largely proved 
to be unfounded. Despite the brokering of a ‘status quo’ between the 
two states, with China purportedly agreeing to halt further expansion 
in the South China Sea, reports from November 2017 suggest that 
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China has continued to develop facilities in the Paracel Islands, in 
addition to a military buildup in the Spratly Islands.184 At the ASEAN 
Summit held in Manila in November 2017, Duterte confirmed that 
‘the South China Sea is better left untouched, nobody can afford to 
go to war’.185 In the same month, the Philippines ordered its officials 
to halt construction of a shelter for Filipino fishermen on a sandbar in 
disputed waters, following a Chinese complaint that the construction 
constituted the occupation of a new feature.186 In the words of one 
former Filipino marine captain, ‘this is part of Duterte’s strategy of 
silence, inaction and subservience to China’s actions in the South 
China Sea’.187
Vietnam struggles as sole vanguard state
Meanwhile, Vietnam has been left to face China without its co-
vanguard backing, with limited success. In June 2017, China demanded 
that Vietnam halt drilling by a subsidiary Spanish energy company, 
Repsol, off the southern Vietnamese coast.188 Pushing back against 
Chinese demands, Vietnam’s Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Le Thi 
Thu Hang stated that ‘Vietnam’s petroleum-related activities take place 
in the sea entirely under the sovereignty and jurisdiction of Vietnam 
established in accordance with international law’.189 This position was 
not sustainable, however, with China reportedly threatening to attack 
Vietnamese bases in the Spratlys if it did not halt the drilling.190 China’s 
harsh rhetoric paid off, with Vietnam forced to suspend the drilling 
project. Crucially, the US failed to respond to China’s actions vis-à-vis 
Vietnam. Indeed, according to Hayton, the reason Vietnam capitulated 
to China was the realization that ‘the Trump administration could 
not be relied upon to come to Hanoi’s assistance in the event of a 
confrontation with China’.191 This was indicative of a general feeling 
across Southeast Asia, that ‘the US is not prepared to put skin in the 
game’, and that the US ‘either does not understand or sufficiently care 
about the interests of its friends and potential partners in Southeast Asia 
to protect them against China’.192 This has ‘left the region drifting in 
the direction of Beijing’.193
Relations with China soured further after Vietnam made an 
unsuccessful attempt to include a note on the need for a legally binding 
maritime code of conduct into the ASEAN Foreign Ministers joint 
communiqué in August 2017.194 The move infuriated China, which 
responded by cancelling a planned bilateral meeting.195 Chinese media 
accused Vietnam of attempting to ‘sow seeds of discord’, and of being 
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a ‘thief crying stop thief ’.196 Recognizing its weak position compared 
to China, Vietnam has continued to seek external power support 
from the US, despite uncertainty regarding US commitment following 
the election of Donald Trump. In an August 2017 meeting between 
Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis and the Vietnamese Minister of 
National Defense Ngo Xuan Lich, it was confirmed that the US and 
Vietnam would deepen defence cooperation, including the expansion 
of maritime cooperation, and work towards arranging a visit from a 
US aircraft carrier in 2018, the first such visit since 1975.197
Chinese threats have not been solely directed towards Vietnam. In 
May 2017, prior to Vietnam’s clash with China, Philippines President 
Rodrigo Duterte referenced a discussion he had with China’s Xi 
Jinping over oil exploration in disputed waters. According to Duterte, 
he informed Xi that ‘we intend to drill oil there, if it’s yours, well, 
that’s your view, but my view is, I can drill the oil’.198 Xi reportedly 
responded: ‘we’re friends, we don’t want to quarrel with you, we 
want to maintain the presence of warm relationship [sic], but if you 
force the issue, we’ll go to war’.199 In a damage limitation exercise, 
the Philippines Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano released his 
own interpretation of the meeting, stating ‘I will not contradict the 
president’s words. I’m just telling you … my interpretation in that 
meeting is that, there was no bullying, no pushing around. It wasn’t a 
threat … it was more the threat of conflict will always be there if we 
do not dialogue’.200
The future of interest convergence?
With the Philippines’ sovereignty in the South China Sea still being 
violated, despite improved relations with China, Duterte has been 
forced to reconsider his attitude towards the US. In October 2017, the 
Philippines’ military chief described the US as the Philippines’ ‘number 
one ally’, and announced a return to regular war games.201 Duterte is 
reported to have stated that his dispute with the Obama administration 
was ‘water under the bridge’, and that the Filipino leader wanted 
to pursue a closer relationship.202 Although the Philippines’ military 
chief also stated that the Philippines would pursue closer defence ties 
with China, the move remains indicative of what could be a more 
permanent change in the Philippines’ position.203
So far, this has been complicated by a lack of clarity over US 
intentions towards China and the Southeast Asian region under the 
Trump Administration. President Trump has oscillated between a 
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combative stance with China over what he believes to be an unfair 
trade deficit between the two countries, to a conciliatory approach 
in the hope that China can pressure North Korea to halt its nuclear 
weapons programme. In what was undoubtedly an attempt to reassure 
regional allies, President Trump embarked on a 12-day tour of Asia 
in November 2017, to include stops at the Philippines and Vietnam. 
In Manila, Trump hailed his ‘great relationship’ with Duterte.204 In 
Vietnam, Trump made reference to the South China Sea dispute, stating 
that ‘if I can help mediate or arbitrate, please let me know’.205 This 
statement came after comments made at an APEC Summit in Vietnam, 
where Trump referred to China’s ‘territorial expansion’.206 However, 
Trump’s decision to skip the East Asia Summit on the final day of the 
tour will have left other regional allies unsure of US commitment.207 As 
Thayer notes, the decision was an ‘act of political vandalism’.208 Thayer 
continued: ‘the US claims the US is a resident power, China claims it is 
an outside power. Trump’s actions will speak louder than his words’.209
The Trump Administration articulated a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ 
strategy in early 2018. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo fleshed 
out this strategy in an Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018. In 
doing so, he paid particular attention to defining the strategy’s terms, 
where ‘free’ was defined as the ability of all regional states ‘to be able to 
protect their sovereignty from coercion by other countries’, in addition 
to ‘good governance’ and the maintenance of citizen ‘fundamental 
rights and liberties’.210 An ‘open’ strategy was defined as the ability 
of all states to ‘enjoy open access to seas and airways’, including the 
‘peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes’, in addition 
to ‘fair and reciprocal trade, open investment  … and improved 
connectivity to drive regional ties’.211 Although the strategy does not 
name China directly, its focus on maritime security and the protection 
of state sovereignty leaves little doubt that the policy seeks to directly 
challenge China’s regional dominance and maritime expansion.
While this strategy to counterbalance Chinese power may come 
as some consolation to the states of Southeast Asia, other aspects of 
Trump’s regional policy may prove more unsettling. The strategy’s 
emphasis on bilateral free trade deals reflects President Trump’s 
rejection of multilateral coalitions. Under his ‘America First’ policy 
agenda, he withdrew the US from the TPP trade deal in January 2017, 
claiming the deal would benefit large corporations at the expense of 
American workers. This decision came as a blow to the regional states 
of Southeast Asia, raising questions over US continued commitment to 
the region. In comments made in April 2018, Singaporean Ambassador 
Tommy Koh stated that Trump’s trade policies were ‘a concern for 
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the whole of Asia’, confirming that ‘all of us have benefited from free 
trade and all of us oppose protectionism so we’re very concerned by 
the policies of the current administration in Washington’.212
President Trump’s ensuing trade war with China, fuelled by 
accusations of currency manipulation and unfair trading practices, 
has only served to exacerbate these concerns. Asian states’ reliance on 
regional supply chains make them particularly vulnerable to a full-scale 
trade war. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong confirmed 
that any trade war would have a ‘big, negative impact’ on his country, 
with growth rates potentially halved.213 Donald Trump’s subsequent 
decision to skip the 18-nation ASEAN Summit and APEC East Asia 
Summit in November 2018 only serves to undermine his strategy for 
the region. In the words of Oh Ei Sun, senior advisor at the Asian 
Strategy and Leadership Institute in Kuala Lumpur, Donald Trump’s 
absence ‘would doubtlessly solidify the impression that America has 
essentially abandoned its traditional presence in the Asia Pacific, not 
to mention the non-starter Indo-Pacific’.214 China will be seeking to 
capitalize on this absence, with Xi Jinping planning to hold his own 
summit at APEC with a number of Pacific leaders. President Trump’s 
trade war has confirmed the view held by many within China that 
the US seeks to limit its growth and expansion. This was confirmed 
in the People’s Daily, which reported that the ‘US’ intention to disrupt 
China’s development process has been thoroughly exposed’.215
For Kaplan, Donald Trump’s trade policies have hindered, rather 
than helped US security strategy in the South China Sea. He argues 
that we should not ‘believe for a moment that the US can use trade as 
a lever against China in the South China Sea, where Beijing has a well-
grounded, long-term grand strategy, as opposed to Trump’s zigzagging 
whims’.216 The contents of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ strategy suggest that the 
Trump Administration has finally realized the vital interests at stake in 
preventing China from securing a fait accompli in the region’s waters. In 
reality, however, the protectionist and inconsistent nature of the Trump 
Administration’s policies and actions risk alienating regional allies. As 
noted by Gupta, ‘without an altogether more wholehearted embrace 
of the Asia’s ASEAN-centred security multilateralism as well as deeper 
integration within the Asia-Pacific’s emerging community-style 
economic order, the US will find itself relegated to the sidelines’.217 
One unintended result would see Southeast Asian states forced to 
‘conclude separate understandings with China’, in lieu of a strong 
commitment from the US.218
Meanwhile, ASEAN’s struggle to coordinate a policy on the South 
China Sea has revived talks of the need for a legally binding code of 
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conduct. As Storey notes, ‘more than a decade after it was signed, 
the DOC has yet to be even partially implemented and most of the 
claimants have violated the spirit of the agreement through unilateral 
and provocative actions’.219 It is for these reasons that ASEAN member 
states, in conjunction with interested external parties, have pushed for 
the creation of a legally binding declaration.220 In August 2017, foreign 
ministers from Australia, Japan and the US called on ASEAN and 
China to establish rules that are ‘legally binding, meaningful, effective 
and consistent with international law’, while they also ‘voiced their 
strong opposition to coercive unilateral actions that could alter the 
status quo and increase tensions’.221 Singapore’s foreign minister Vivian 
Balakrishnan echoed these sentiments, stating ‘surely when we move 
into the COC [Code of Conduct], it has got to have some additional 
or significant legal effect’.222
Reports from mid-2017 suggest some progress on a framework for 
talks on a binding code of conduct. In August 2017, it was announced 
that ‘the regional bloc was ready to begin “substantive” negotiations 
on a code of conduct’.223 However, concerns remain amongst certain 
ASEAN claimants over the long-term interests China might be trying 
to secure through a more binding code. It was reported that ASEAN 
ministers had debated over how to respond to China, ‘with Vietnam 
said to be strongly resisting an agreement on the framework for a code 
of conduct as pushed by Beijing’.224 Although the move to a more 
binding code could enhance stability, it is important to note that the 
parties have to date only agreed on a framework to begin negotiations, 
and there is no clarity on whether this would be a legally binding code, 
something which China still resists.
Summary: 2016–present
Since 2016, Southeast Asia has been in flux. Changing administrations 
in the Philippines and the US have contributed towards a changing 
China and South China Sea policy, with the Duterte administration 
preferring a policy of engagement with China, and the Trump 
administration seeking to cooperate with China on matters on the 
Korean peninsula. As a consequence, sovereignty disputes in the South 
China Sea have taken a backseat, something that has allowed China 
to continue its provocative actions in the region. Crucially, this lack 
of strong interest convergence between the US and the Philippines 
has caused the latter to continue to have its maritime sovereignty 
violated. Vietnam has had little success in resisting China on its own, 
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and has received minimal backing from other members of ASEAN, 
which has remained divided. Evidence therefore suggests a lack of 
intra-ASEAN and external power interest convergence from the 2016 
period onwards.
While it might be tempting to abandon vanguard state theory in this 
instance, events towards the end of 2017 suggest its continued utility. 
As China has continued to pursue its own interests in the region, at 
the expense of US and Filipino domestic policies, President Trump 
and Duterte have perhaps began to recognize the significance of the 
South China Sea as a domain where they too have vital interests 
to secure. With ASEAN making small, albeit limited, steps towards 
further negotiations on a DOC, and the Philippines, Vietnam and the 
US engaging in further cooperation, the vanguard states of Southeast 
Asia may well yet be able to resist violations to their sovereignty from 
an assertive China. What is clear, is that without this intra-ASEAN 
and external power interest convergence, the Philippines and Vietnam 
will continue to have their sovereignty violated.
Theoretical assessment of the South China Sea 
dispute: interest convergence theory
The South China Sea case is an example of ASEAN vanguard state-
external power partial interest convergence. The Philippines and 
Vietnam, as the ASEAN states with the most compelling interest at 
stake in the South China Sea dispute, have increasingly had their 
sovereignty violated by an expansionist China since 1992. This has 
undoubtedly constituted a regional threat. The states have struggled 
to generate interest convergence, either with a powerful external actor 
with the capability to help prevent this sovereignty violation, or from 
regional neighbouring states. As this analysis has shown, it was not 
until 2012 that the US recognized the vital interests it had at stake in 
the South China Sea dispute, and was willing to act upon them to 
support the ASEAN vanguard states. ASEAN’s preference for dialogue 
and confidence-building measures, and its inability to prevent China 
from using the Association to serve its own best interests,225 has left 
it fragmented and unable to mobilize support for its member states 
under threat.
From 2012 onwards, the ASEAN vanguard states actively sought 
great power security commitments from an increasingly engaged US. 
As Cruz De Castro confirms, ‘confronted by China’s preponderant 
economic and military power, the Philippines and Vietnam have 
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no other recourse but to pursue a regional balance of power where 
the US remains a resident Pacific power and a major 21st century 
strategic player’.226 By engaging in such balancing behaviour, these 
small powers have hoped to ‘win asymmetric conflicts’, and ‘affect the 
regional power equilibrium as they engage other powers outside of the 
system’.227 As momentum grew throughout 2015 and 2016, it seemed 
that the region was on the brink of a shift in power dynamics. Clearly, 
there existed symmetry of interests at this time. The US recognized 
in the Philippines and Vietnam like-minded states, hoping to curtail 
Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. If this ASEAN vanguard 
state-external power interest convergence had been able to continue, 
it is feasible that steps might have been taken to prevent any further 
ASEAN state sovereignty violation. As it stands, the growing interest 
convergence evident at this time was partial at best. Low levels of 
ASEAN support for the Philippines and Vietnam compounded this. As 
noted by Beeson, ‘competing geo-political imperatives’228 have caused 
divisions amongst ASEAN, which as a result has left it struggling 
to maintain ‘a sense of unity or collective purpose’,229 with ‘an 
effective, coherent, consistent and collective response to the challenge 
of China … likely to prove beyond ASEAN’s abilities’.230 This has 
left the Philippines ‘especially exercised about ASEAN’s inability to 
demonstrate solidarity in the face of a looming external threat from a 
much more powerful state’.231
A change of administrations in the Philippines and the US from 2016 
onwards has served to derail this partial interest convergence. This 
period has seen a decrease in interest convergence, as these states have 
sought to secure varying regional interests. According to Heydarian, 
because President Duterte, ‘is constitutionally the Philippines’ chief 
diplomatic architect’, his election ‘represented nothing less than a 
volte-face for Philippines foreign policy’.232 The analysis presented 
here, while acknowledging the impact that domestic politics can play 
in such instances, shows that, whereas Duterte and Trump may well 
have initially sought to push their own nationalist agenda, systemic 
constraints imposed by the international system have increasingly 
prevented them from doing so. China, as a rising power, has continued 
to occupy and militarize territory also claimed by the Philippines. It 
has done so at the expense of US and Filipino preoccupation with 
domestic politics. Until the US and the Philippines recognize this 
fact, the argument presented here is that maritime sovereignty will 
continue to be violated.
For the purpose of this chapter, the Philippines and Vietnam are 
the ASEAN vanguard states, and the US the external power. This 
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is not to say that there are not other interested parties to the South 
China Sea sovereignty dispute. The question might be raised as to why 
Malaysia and Brunei are not classed as vanguard states, in light of their 
own conflicting sovereignty claims with China. However, Malaysia 
and Brunei have pursued a different approach to territorial disputes 
with China.233 For Storey, ‘Malaysia and Brunei’s relatively relaxed 
positions over the South China Sea is partly due to cordial political 
ties and partly because of the luxury of distance from China compared 
to Vietnam and the Philippines’.234 As such, they can not be classed as 
vanguard states in this instance.
It is also true that external states such as Japan, India and Australia 
have their own interests in the region, and have lent economic 
and military support to the vanguard states accordingly. Despite a 
downturn in relations with the US, the Philippines ‘continued its 
comprehensive engagement’ with Japan, including a Philippine-Japan 
security partnership, maritime security cooperation, and the provision 
to the Philippines of Japanese military equipment and training.235 
Japan has also sought to internationalize the dispute, particularly at 
multilateral forums, to enhance cooperation and capacity building with 
affected ASEAN states, and to coordinate policy with external powers 
such as the US, Australia and India.236 Vietnam has strengthened 
its defence relationship with India, including joint oil exploration, 
and the two elevated their relationship to that of a comprehensive 
strategic partnership in 2016.237 Undoubtedly, these regional states 
have an important role to play in the ASEAN vanguard state strategy 
to balance China in the South China Sea. However, these external 
states do not have the necessary power to balance China alone. Any 
effective counterbalance strategy requires the US, as the dominant 
power in the international system. As a Pacific power, the US has 
compelling interests at stake in preventing China from achieving 
regional dominance. However, until the US recognizes this, interest 
convergence and ASEAN resistance to sovereignty violation will 
remain elusive.
Contrasting theoretical arguments
All constructivist authors concede that the South China Sea dispute has 
tested ASEAN’s norms. For Ba, the South China Sea dispute ‘would 
in fact become the defining issue of ASEAN–China relations in the 
1990s’.238 Similarly, Haacke argues that China, in seeking to enforce 
its territorial claims, has appeared to challenge ASEAN’s norms on 
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the non-use of force and restraint.239 Acharya admits that the South 
China Sea dispute ‘posed a serious test of ASEAN’s unity and its norms 
concerning the peaceful settlement of disputes’.240 However, all authors 
still contend that ASEAN has upheld its norms and maintained its 
autonomy. For Haacke, China has ‘incrementally allowed discussions 
on the Spratlys to deepen’, and ASEAN has ‘succeeded in allaying 
the remaining fears of the Chinese about the purpose of ASEAN’s 
multilateral venture[s]’.241 For Ba, ASEAN rejected traditional alliances 
and security arrangements when confronted by China’s challenge to 
ASEAN on the South China Sea dispute.242 Success has accompanied 
ASEAN’s focus on socializing China through an enhanced security 
dialogue based on existing ASEAN frameworks, notably the ASEAN 
Regional Forum.243 Indeed, Acharya states that since the mid-1990s, 
China began ‘to take a more supportive role in multilateralism and 
the ARF’.244 Specifically, ‘ASEAN was able to secure an agreement 
from Beijing to conduct Sino–ASEAN multilateral consultations on 
security issues’.245 In this view, ‘China has come to acknowledge the 
usefulness of the ARF as the only multilateral venue available to it 
where it can discuss and share its security concerns and approach with 
Asia–Pacific countries’.246 Accordingly, ASEAN can also ‘claim some 
success in dealing with China on the Spratlys issue’.247
The foregoing claims are difficult to reconcile with the actual record 
of Sino–ASEAN interaction on the South China Sea issue.248 ASEAN’s 
multilateral diplomacy at the ARF and related ASEAN fora has 
consistently failed to make substantive headway on the dispute. Instead 
of ASEAN’s norms socializing China, or enhancing regional unity, 
China has succeeded in dividing the ASEAN states and advancing its 
position in the South China Sea. Significantly, in 2012, the ASEAN 
states were unable to reach an agreement on the South China Sea, 
and failed to issue a joint communiqué for the first time in ASEAN’s 
history. More importantly, ASEAN’s maritime sovereignty continues to 
be violated by China. To counter this, regional states have increasingly 
sought external power security guarantees, most notably from the 
US.249 This leads us to examine other perspectives to explain ASEAN’s 
record on regional autonomy.
Realist scholars take a very different view of ASEAN’s regional 
autonomy. According to Leifer, the ASEAN aphorism of ‘regional 
solutions for regional problems’ is more ‘a slogan serving a particular 
interest than an operational policy accepted and applied on a regional 
basis in any common interest’.250 In this view, the underlying behaviour 
of ASEAN actually conforms to the realist power-politics model.251 
According to Jones, Khoo and Smith, the ‘actual resolution of the 
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South China Sea dispute remained stalemated in the ARF’s preferred 
strategy of managing problems rather than solving them’.252 This 
stalemate ‘serves China’s rather than ASEAN’s long-term strategic 
interest’.253 Rather than pursuing cooperative security through the 
ARF, there has been a ‘classic recourse to hedging by weaker ASEAN 
states in an area of growing great power rivalry’.254 The dispute 
therefore demonstrates ‘how more powerful actors can manipulate 
ASEAN’s pliable norms to advance grand strategic interests’.255
For Leifer, a major problem is that in addition to a ‘lack of political 
will’ to resolve the dispute, there is an ‘absence of any regional 
machinery for addressing the complex contention’ in the South China 
Sea.256 Leifer argues that the South China Sea issue ‘is symptomatic of 
the problem of regional order in a strategically-fused East and South 
East Asia, which lacks a security architecture’.257 Ultimately, Leifer 
doubts ASEAN’s capability to effectively deal with the South China 
Sea dispute. Instead, ‘the role of the US remains critical’.258 In this 
view, ‘regional security would seem to require that such countervailing 
power, if it cannot be generated locally on a cooperative basis, should 
be available from an acceptable external source for which there is only 
one candidate’.259
Realist scholars offer a strong counter-argument to the constructivist 
view. ASEAN regional institutions have demonstrably been incapable 
of resolving the South China Sea dispute. Instead, China has succeeded 
in dividing the ASEAN states, and utilizing the existing institutional 
incoherence for its strategic advantage. These analysts’ emphasis on the 
role of an external actor, the US, is indeed a necessary one. China’s 
gains in the South China Sea have been predicated on an insufficiently 
robust US response.260 However, while the role of external powers 
remains a critical factor in the story, the fact is that regional states 
possess a greater capacity to secure their own interests than has been 
acknowledged by the realists cited previously. In theoretical terms, 
ASEAN states have greater autonomy, and hence state power, than 
they currently allow for. As this analysis shows, particularly in the 
post-2013 period, the Philippines and Vietnam actively sought, and 
partially secured, security commitments from the US, and a variety 
of external powers including Japan and India. This aspect of regional 
dynamics requires further theorizing.
Jones advances a perspective where regional autonomy is highly 
circumscribed, but in ways that depart from the realist understanding.261 
For Jones, external ‘intervention and the non-interference principle 
can be explained as the outcome of struggles between and within 
ASEAN’s most powerful social forces’.262 However, this perspective 
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appears unable to adequately account for the empirical record of Sino–
ASEAN South China Sea interactions. In two important respects, 
the South China Sea dispute represents a challenge to the view that 
sovereignty is contingent upon the role of ASEAN domestic forces. 
First, the dispute involves key external powers, most notably China and 
the US. The interaction of these states with regional powers is integral 
to any analysis of the conflict. Second, it is not clear what impact, if 
any, ASEAN domestic groups have had on the conflict, with Jones’ 
work omitting any discussion of the dispute. This raises questions 
about the relevance of the critical theory approach to an analysis of 
this central issue in ASEAN’s post-Cold War international relations.
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The Future of ASEAN 
Sovereignty?
The primary purpose of this book is to construct an explanation, rooted 
in a realist theoretical perspective, that more convincingly explains the 
dynamics of ASEAN state resistance to sovereignty violation. In this respect, 
one question is of particular importance: when has ASEAN state resistance 
to sovereignty violation succeeded, and when has it failed? This question 
has been answered with reference to the concept of an ASEAN vanguard 
state, which is defined as the ASEAN state with the most compelling 
interests at stake in a given issue. In determining the dynamics of ASEAN 
resistance to sovereignty violation, two variables are the focus of analysis: 
Interest convergence and success of resistance to sovereignty violation. As 
has been argued, a convergence in interests between an ASEAN vanguard 
state and an external actor accounts for the success of ASEAN vanguard 
state resistance to sovereignty violation (see Figure 1). Conversely, an 
absence of convergence accounts for the failure of ASEAN vanguard state 
resistance to sovereignty violation.
Four case studies were chosen for analysis. These case studies were 
selected to test the book’s central claims and to evaluate them against 
existing theoretical perspectives. In advancing a realist theoretical approach, 
the study aims to defend the continued applicability of traditional 
international relations theory to the field of Southeast Asian regionalism. 
Analysis began with the underlying premise that the study of interest 
convergence can yield considerable utility to the field of Southeast Asian 
international relations. This chapter will summarize the book’s findings, 
evaluating contending explanations for sovereignty violation in Southeast 
Asia, including those based on constructivist theory, realist theory and 
critical theory. Our preferred alternative, vanguard state theory, is offered 
as a more persuasive explanation. In doing so, it will make a strong case 
for a realist approach to the study of Southeast Asia.
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Contending explanations for sovereignty violation 
in Southeast Asia
Constructivist theorists advocate a perspective that strongly emphasizes 
ASEAN’s autonomy and ability to uphold regional order despite 
challenges.1 This perspective rests on collective understandings and 
outcomes, interaction, and an abiding adherence to norms. The 
intervening role of external powers and their effect on domestic 
structures is largely downplayed or ignored. For Acharya, ASEAN 
norms have a transformative impact, regulating state behaviour, 
redefining state interests and constituting state identities.2 By 
emphasizing the role of ‘regionalism’,3 Acharya shows how regional 
cooperation has played a central role in shaping the modern Southeast 
Asian identity.4 Haacke explores the origins and development of a set of 
norms conceptualized as a diplomatic and security culture. For Haacke, 
a process of ‘mutual recognition and reconciliation’5 was crucial to the 
emergence of regional norms, including norms of sovereign equality 
and non-intervention.6 For Ba, ideas about Southeast Asia’s ‘division 
and foreign intervention’ find expression in ‘ideas of resilience and 
“One Southeast Asia.”’7
An assessment of constructivist theorizing with respect to our 
case studies highlights a number of limitations. Analysis began with 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975. It is surprising that such 
an important case study is largely absent from the constructivist 
literature on ASEAN. This is significant, as it represents a hard case for 
constructivists. If they are able to demonstrate that the variables they 
focus on can explain the empirical record, they will have secured a 
major point against alternative theoretical approaches to understanding 
ASEAN. As it stands, Indonesia’s invasion represents a direct challenge 
to the view that a strong ASEAN norm of non-interference exists. It 
would also appear to contradict the view that ASEAN’s norms and 
institutions have a largely positive impact on state behaviour. Indonesia 
could have pushed for East Timor’s admission into ASEAN and 
attempted to socialize it, rather than choosing to invade. That it did 
not do so raises serious questions about the importance attributed to 
ASEAN’s norms by one of ASEAN’s largest and most prominent states.
In respect to our second case, constructivists interpret the Third 
Indochina War as a challenge to ASEAN norms, cohesion and 
unity.8 These theorists continue to maintain that shared ideas and 
the importance of regional unity kept the states working together.9 
In Acharya’s view, the conflict ‘motivated ASEAN members to 
overcome conflicting security interests and territorial disputes within 
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the grouping, thereby moving it further on the path towards a security 
community’.10 However, the evidence presented here suggests that 
this position over-estimates the role of ideas and norms, neglects a 
host of other factors, and elevates the role of ASEAN, even while 
systematically downplaying that of external powers’. This produces 
an inaccurate portrayal of the conflict and its impact on the region.
Our third case is the humanitarian crisis that devastated East Timor 
in 1999. Generally speaking, constructivist theorists place significant 
emphasis on ASEAN autonomy, and ‘regional solutions for regional 
problems, with minimal intervention by outside powers’.11 However, 
evidence presented in this chapter shows that ASEAN was incapable 
of adhering to this norm. All the authors reviewed here frame the East 
Timor crisis with respect to the norm of non-interference. Acharya 
contends that ASEAN’s ‘reluctance to dilute its non-interference 
doctrine’, prevented the ASEAN states from providing an effective 
response to the humanitarian crisis in East Timor in 1999.12 However, 
this approach overlooks the way in which ASEAN state adherence 
to non-interference exacerbated regional instability. By adhering to 
the non-intervention norm, these states effectively invited external 
intervention into the region. In doing so, they contravened the 
ASEAN norm of regional autonomy.
Our fourth case is the South China Sea dispute. While all authors 
argue that this dispute has tested ASEAN’s norms, they maintain that 
the Association has had some success in socializing China through 
multilateral forums such as the ARF.13 However, these claims 
are difficult to reconcile with the actual record of Sino–ASEAN 
interaction on the South China Sea issue.14 ASEAN’s multilateral 
diplomacy at the ARF has consistently failed to make substantive 
headway on the dispute. Instead of ASEAN’s norms socializing China, 
or enhancing regional unity, China has succeeded in dividing the 
ASEAN states and advancing its position in the South China Sea. To 
counter this, regional states have increasingly sought external power 
security guarantees, most notably from the US.15 These flaws, when 
taken together, significantly limit constructivism as an effective account 
of Southeast Asian sovereignty violation.
Realist theory
Realist theorists emphasize ASEAN’s lack of autonomy and reliance 
on external actors’ sufferance. For Leifer, regional organizations have 
‘reflected the condition of the more important regional relationships 
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and, in particular, that between the US and China’.16 This has made 
achieving regional solutions for regional problems ‘more a myth 
than a valid aspiration’.17 For Jones and Smith, ASEAN’s preference 
for consensus and conflict avoidance has lent itself to extra-regional 
actors manipulating ASEAN norms to serve their own best interests.18 
However, this is a restrictive view of ASEAN autonomy that is arguably 
at odds with the historical record.
For example, with respect to Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor 
in 1975, Leifer argues that US policy towards Southeast Asia was ‘an 
integral, if subordinate, aspect of a wider design in Asia’,19 focused 
on ‘a strong flexible military presence to help maintain the balance of 
power’.20 Similarly, Jones and Smith believe that ASEAN initiatives 
during this period merely revealed ‘the organization’s continuing 
ambivalence’.21 This was because the ASEAN states ‘remained 
ultimately dependent on continued American security commitments’.22 
These analysts’ emphasis on the role of external powers in the region 
provides little agency for regional states such as Indonesia. However, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that Indonesia played an active 
role in securing its own interests at this time. Indeed, Indonesia, as 
a large regional power and barrier to further communist advances,23 
was an essential factor in the ‘defence of Western interests’.24 From 
this position, Jakarta was able to utilize external power concerns by 
consistently describing FRETILIN as ‘communist-dominated’.25 This 
allowed Indonesia to secure its own security and expansionist interests 
in the territory. ASEAN solidarity was a vital component in Indonesia’s 
strategy, as evidenced by the Joint Communiqué released following the 
Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Manila on 24–26 June 1976. 
This evidence suggests greater agency for Indonesia than is currently 
acknowledged in the realist literature.
According to Leifer, during the Third Indochina War, the position 
‘adopted by the Association favoured China’s interests, above all’.26 
This was because China represented a ‘much more effective means 
by which to challenge Vietnam’s hegemonic position’. 27 Jones and 
Smith also minimize ASEAN’s role in the resolution of the Third 
Indochina War, maintaining that the eventual settlement ‘represented 
an archetypal manifestation of great power politics’.28 According to 
this view, ‘ASEAN’s actual contribution to the Cambodian settlement 
reveals its role to be both ambiguous and ultimately limited’.29 
Although Leifer, Jones and Smith offer an accurate portrayal of the 
role of great powers in Indochina during the Cold War, they take an 
overly restrictive view of ASEAN autonomy and the role of ASEAN 
states.
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As shown in Chapter 3, Thailand was a critical factor in China’s 
strategy to oppose Vietnam, with Beijing ‘heavily reliant’ on Thai 
cooperation.30 A Sino-Thai alliance clearly favoured Thai interests 
as much as it favoured China’s interests. Thailand was now in a 
position to ‘report Vietnamese shellings or attacks on the Thai border 
and expect that within six hours the Chinese troops on the Sino-
Vietnamese border would repay the Vietnamese in kind’.31 Both China 
and the US viewed a strong ASEAN as a vital component in their 
anti-Vietnamese strategy. They placed ‘major emphasis on the closest 
consultation with ASEAN countries’,32 and believed the development 
of ASEAN’s strength to be a positive development.33 This clearly 
provides Thailand, and ASEAN, with a greater role than currently 
exists in the realist literature.
As stated in Chapter 1, during periods of decreased interest 
convergence, our analysis shares the same expectations as Leifer and 
Jones and Smith, and is consistent with existing realist literature. 
This is evident with respect to the East Timor humanitarian crisis 
of 1999, which conforms well to realist expectations. According to 
Leifer, in the period following 1997, ASEAN’s troubles moved ‘well 
beyond the competence of the Association to address on any exclusive 
basis’.34 Similarly, Jones and Smith argue that ‘since 1997, the security 
situation in East Asia reveals … that the ASEAN states possess no clear 
strategy to respond to the challenges the organization currently faces’.35 
The realist assessment of ASEAN’s role in the post-1997 period is 
persuasive. Evidence provided in this chapter highlights ASEAN’s slow 
response to the crisis, which raises serious questions regarding the 
Association’s ability to respond to regional conflicts.36 ASEAN support 
for Indonesia during this period was not enough to prevent Indonesia’s 
eventual sovereignty violation, and their contribution to the outcome 
of the East Timor crisis was minimal.37 This suggests that external 
powers play the vital role in the dynamics of ASEAN state resistance 
to sovereignty violation.
The South China Sea chapter demonstrates ‘how more powerful 
actors can manipulate ASEAN’s pliable norms to advance grand 
strategic interests’.38 In this view, China has succeeded in dividing the 
Association, which has pursued a strategy of managing problems rather 
than solving them’.39 This has been compounded by a ‘lack of political 
will’ to resolve the dispute.40 Realist scholars offer a strong argument. 
ASEAN regional institutions have been incapable of resolving the 
South China Sea dispute. These analysts’ emphasis on the role of an 
external actor, the US, is also a necessary one. China’s gains in the 
South China Sea have been predicated on an insufficiently robust US 
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response.41 However, ASEAN states have greater autonomy than they 
currently allow for. As this analysis shows, in the post-2013 period, 
the Philippines and Vietnam actively sought, and partially secured, 
security commitments from the US. This aspect of regional dynamics 
requires further theorizing.
Evidence suggests that the existing realist literature on ASEAN offers 
a strong counter-argument to constructivist theorizing. However, the 
existing realist perspective in the literature does not offer a strong 
explanation for ASEAN state autonomy in the historical record. This 
highlights a gap in the realist literature, which I seek to fill. Indeed, 
evidence provided here shows that an ASEAN vanguard state has a 
substantial role in resisting sovereignty violation, when its interest 
converges with that of an external actor. This approach provides some 
autonomy to regional states, while maintaining the critical role played 
by external powers.
Critical theory
Critical theorist Lee Jones advocates a perspective of regional 
intervention that can be explained as the outcome of powerful social 
forces. For Jones, sovereignty and non-interference can be analysed 
as a technology of power, which is used by domestic groups to help 
determine the scope of political conflict in a way that best suits 
their needs.42 Evidence provided in this analysis suggests that Jones 
actually overemphasizes the impact business groups and social forces 
have on the state, and fails to advance a non-statist argument that 
effectively surpasses alternative theorizing. This is evident with respect 
to the Indonesian invasion of East Timor in 1975. Jones argues that 
‘Indonesia’s invasion and ASEAN’s support is best explained by the 
fear that a leftist state would emerge after Timor’s decolonization, 
providing a possible base for communist “subversion”’.43 In this view, 
Indonesia’s fears ‘were conditioned by the conflicts that had given rise 
to the Suharto regime, the social order it was attempting to defend, 
and the likely effects of Timorese independence on that order’.44
However, analysis in Chapter 2 has shown that this assessment fails to 
consider an abundance of evidence suggesting that Indonesia was well 
aware that there was little communist influence in East Timor.45 That 
Suharto still wished to annex the territory suggests the existence of 
ulterior motives, with territorial gain the most convincing. Arguably, 
in trying to emphasize the role of Indonesia’s domestic forces, Jones 
goes too far in downplaying the role of external powers. External actors 
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played a vital role prior to the invasion, when Ford gave Suharto’s East 
Timor policy his ‘understanding’ in a meeting in December 1975,46 
and following the invasion, when external powers prevented the UN 
from providing an effective response to the crisis.47 These external 
powers sought to secure their own interests in regional affairs, a fact 
consistent with realist expectations.
With regard to the Third Indochina War, Jones argues that ASEAN 
responded to Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia ‘not to defend its non-
interference principle, but rather to contain revolution in Indochina’.48 
The Vietnamese threat is ‘not understood in conventional, military, 
balance-of-power terms’, but in terms of ‘the likely consequences of 
the invasion for the balance of forces within their own societies’.49 
However, evidence shows that Jones has focused a disproportionate 
amount of his narrative on ASEAN’s opposition to the spread of 
revolution for domestic political reasons. This approach fails to 
consider a variety of other far more critical factors. First, ASEAN’s 
position in the Cold War regional environment was a clear source 
of insecurity, with ASEAN unable to ‘influence its wider regional 
environment’.50 This had a major impact on regional state actions 
and behaviour, with ASEAN states concerned that US retrenchment 
would leave a regional power vacuum, which other great powers may 
attempt to fill.
Second, the ASEAN states had clear external security concerns, 
which Jones minimizes. While security fears varied amongst the 
ASEAN member states, Vietnam’s treaty of friendship with the 
Soviet Union, and subsequent invasion of Cambodia, elicited great 
concern. This demonstrated that Vietnam, aided by the Soviet Union, 
was prepared to violate state sovereignty in pursuit of its interests. 
Third, Vietnam’s invasion provided the ASEAN states with external 
reasons for collaboration with the great powers. As Leifer notes, ‘an 
informal alignment between Thailand, Kampuchea and China was 
forged by the end of 1975, based on a common interest in containing 
the extension of Vietnamese influence’.51 All of these critical factors 
conform to realist expectations of state behaviour during periods of 
insecurity and conflict. By underemphasizing these factors in favour 
of domestic variables, Jones fails to provide a portrayal of the conflict 
that encompasses all of the relevant facts.
Jones argues that ASEAN’s response to the 1999 East Timor 
humanitarian crisis was ‘principally due to their fear of contagion 
from the social and economic unrest spreading from Indonesia’.52 At 
this time, ASEAN states ‘actively encouraged and participated in a 
humanitarian intervention in East Timor’, becoming ‘increasingly 
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involved in Indonesia’s “internal” affairs’.53 Indeed, there is evidence 
to suggest that Jones has overemphasized the role of ASEAN in the 
crisis. As shown in Chapter 4, ASEAN feared that the East Timor crisis 
would elicit Western interference in the internal affairs of ASEAN 
states, ‘using the norm of humanitarian intervention as justification’.54 
Canberra wanted to scale back its involvement in INTERFET, but 
this could not be implemented because ASEAN countries were not 
prepared for deployment and were unwilling to cover the costs of a 
lengthy involvement.55
By overemphasizing the role of domestic factors during the crisis, 
Jones is also unable to adequately address why external powers changed 
their East Timor policy following the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997. 
Suharto’s resistance to accepting an IMF economic aid and reform 
package was disconcerting for the US, which wanted a stable and 
prosperous Indonesia in Southeast Asia. Washington pushed for reform 
in Indonesia, to ‘foster a broader economic recovery in Asia’,56 and 
protect ‘vital sea-lanes through which 40  percent of the world’s 
shipping passes’.57 Similarly, Australia feared that Suharto’s refusal 
to accept reforms could cause regional instability ‘and precipitate a 
complete economic catastrophe’.58 Australia’s priorities were therefore 
to ‘support Indonesia’s democratic transformation, and to sustain a 
good relationship with TNI’.59 These external powers played a critical 
role in forcing Indonesia to change its East Timor policy. This is 
indicative of the impact great powers can have on regional state 
autonomy when in pursuit of their own interests. This is seriously 
underemphasized in Jones’ analysis in favour of domestic factors and 
the internal role of ASEAN states.
That Jones fails to provide a non-statist account of the South China 
Sea dispute leads us to question whether his theory can adequately 
account for the empirical record of Sino–ASEAN maritime 
interactions. This is particularly in light of the fact that the dispute 
involves key external powers, most notably China and the US, the 
interaction of which is integral to any analysis of the conflict. Critically, 
it is not clear what impact, if any, ASEAN domestic groups have had 
on the conflict. This raises questions about the relevance of the critical 
theory approach to an analysis of this central issue in ASEAN’s post-
Cold War international relations, and provides space for an alternative 
account of sovereignty and intervention in Southeast Asia.
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Vanguard state theory
The foregoing analysis has shown how constructivist and critical 
theory approaches provide an incomplete picture of Southeast 
Asian sovereignty violation. Realist responses are more compelling. 
However, their overemphasis on ASEAN’s lack of autonomy is not 
totally persuasive. This book has sought to build on these approaches 
and contribute to the realist argument, by proposing vanguard state 
theory. According to this theory, ASEAN’s sovereignty record is in 
fact highly dependent on the stance of external actors, whose interests 
align with the organisation’s. The theory focuses on the role of an 
ASEAN vanguard state, which seeks to set the agenda of ASEAN and 
garner great power security commitments in order to realize its own 
state interests.
For the purposes of the analysis, the book began with the assumption 
that state interests are premised on the basic point of seeking survival. 
Building on the works of Timothy Crawford60 and Daryl Press,61 vital 
state interests were defined as involving ‘self-preservation, political 
independence, and, by extension, defence of strategically vital areas’.62 
Interest convergence was measured by identifying symmetric or 
asymmetric interests,63 and arrangements for cooperation between 
states. This was conceptualized as a dynamic process, where small states 
‘actively seek maximum great-power commitment to their security 
interests’.64 The central argument is that when a clear and substantial 
interest convergence occurs between an ASEAN state and an external 
power, an ASEAN vanguard state plays the important and necessary 
function of actively seeking and supporting a great power commitment 
to regional policies, which is consistent with the interests of both the 
ASEAN state and the external actor. An ASEAN state can therefore 
have an active role in resisting sovereignty violation. Without this 
interest convergence, ASEAN is unable to successfully resist violations 
to its sovereignty.
Four case studies were selected to test this argument. The findings, 
summarized here, provide a strong case for the utility of vanguard 
state theory. Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor in 1975 is an example 
of ASEAN vanguard state success in resisting sovereignty violation. 
The analysis has shown how the uncertain regional environment 
of 1975, when ‘dramatic communist victories in Indochina were 
a matter for considerable concern’, acted as a catalyst for interest 
convergence between Indonesia, the US and Australia regarding 
Indonesia’s East Timor policy.65 East Timor’s proximate location to 
Indonesia’s border, and the vacuum that it represented, constituted 
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a threat to Indonesia at a particularly uncertain period in the Cold 
War. Indonesian interests were also offensive in nature. Jakarta sought 
to maximize power regionally through expansion. Indonesia actively 
sought US and Australian approval for the invasion of East Timor 
and the integration of the territory into the archipelago. For these 
external powers, Indonesia was a vital component in their own Cold 
War foreign policies. Indonesia therefore played the important and 
necessary function of actively seeking and supporting a great power 
commitment to regional policies, which were consistent with the 
interests of both Indonesia and the US and Australia. In doing so, 
Indonesia was able to resist any potential violation to its sovereignty 
from the international community in the wake of the East Timor 
invasion.
The Third Indochina War (1978–1991) is also an example of ASEAN 
vanguard state success in resisting sovereignty violation. The analysis 
showed how, following Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in 1978, an 
informal alliance developed between Thailand, China, the ASEAN 
states, the ousted Khmer Rouge, and to a lesser extent the US, in an 
effort to contain Vietnamese and Soviet influence in Southeast Asia.66 
As a consequence of high interest convergence between Thailand and a 
designated external power, China, ASEAN was able to resist violations 
to the sovereignty of Thailand from a Soviet-backed Vietnam. An 
expansionist and aggressive Vietnam, backed by the Soviet Union, 
posed a clear threat to the external powers and to the ASEAN states. 
They responded to this threat by engaging in external and internal 
balancing strategies, to secure the vital state interest of autonomy.
During the East Timor humanitarian crisis of 1999, substantial 
interest divergence between Indonesia and the US and Australia caused 
Indonesia’s failure to resist sovereignty violation by actors external 
to the region. The 1997 Asian Financial Crisis acted as a catalyst for 
external power interest change. It was in the interests of Australia and 
the US to have a strong and stable Indonesia in the region. Economic 
instability, and resulting domestic instability, threatened joint ventures 
and regional security. Suharto’s refusal to accept reform packages was 
indicative of an asymmetry of interests between Indonesia and these 
external powers.67 INTERFET’s subsequent intervention in East 
Timor comprised a violation of Indonesian sovereignty. Significantly, 
the available evidence strongly suggests that intervention would not 
have occurred in the absence of external power interest change. 
Crucially, support within ASEAN for Indonesia’s East Timor policy 
was not enough to prevent Indonesia’s eventual sovereignty violation. 
This raises questions about ASEAN and its ability to maintain regional 
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autonomy under challenge from sufficiently powerful external actors. 
Indeed, this case provides substantial evidence for our general argument 
that intervention by external powers has been instrumental for the 
outcome of the majority of Southeast Asia’s regional problems.
The South China Sea Dispute (1992–present) is an example of 
partial interest convergence between the ASEAN vanguard states of 
the Philippines and Vietnam, and the US. Despite these ASEAN states 
having crucial interests at stake with respect to their sovereignty in 
the South China Sea, they have been unable to generate a robust 
security commitment from the US, which has largely pursued interests 
outside of the region. This lack of credible backing has contributed 
to a divided ASEAN, which has been unable to provide an effective 
solution to the problem. Despite evidence of increasing interest 
convergence between 2012 and 2016, this did not reach the levels 
required to prevent ASEAN vanguard state sovereignty violation. As 
stated in Chapter 5, without this, these states will continue to cede 
sovereignty to China in the maritime region.
Dynamics of state interaction
What does the analysis presented tell us about ASEAN state and 
external power behavioural strategies during different periods in 
history? And what are the implications of these findings for states 
outside of the Southeast Asian region? As the four cases under analysis 
show, there are some key strategic commonalities in vanguard state 
behaviour during periods of regional intervention. Both Indonesia 
and Thailand, in their role as vanguard state, utilized elite diplomatic 
meetings or exchanges to impress on external powers the need for 
their understanding and economic assistance in the Cold War period. 
Notably, these states were adept at utilizing external power geopolitical 
fears to their own advantage. This is in addition to having an astute 
awareness of their own position in the regional environment, and 
how their alignment could shift the regional balance of power. Similar 
strategic behaviour is evident towards ASEAN, with the vanguard state 
using diplomatic meetings, in addition to the local media, to express 
their interests.
There is however one notable difference in vanguard state strategy at 
the regional level that we do not see at the international level. This is 
the use of coercive tactics, which both Indonesia and to a lesser extent 
Thailand engaged in to force other ASEAN states to comply with 
their interests. Such coercive strategies include boycotting member 
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state initiatives within ASEAN, such as refusal to adopt economic 
proposals, excluding member states from security and intelligence 
briefings, and denouncing member states in news reports and the 
media. Significantly, these strategies reflect ASEAN power dynamics, 
with Indonesia able to utilize such strategies most effectively, and with 
states such as the Philippines and Vietnam least able to coerce member 
states to comply with their interests.
We are also able to see a number of key strategic commonalities in 
the behaviour of external powers towards the vanguard state. These 
generally include large sums of economic assistance, the transfer of 
arms to enhance vanguard state capabilities, and the implementation 
of a variety of comprehensive partnerships, joint vision statements 
and joint treaties. There is also evidence of external powers seeking 
to persuade other powers to enhance their vanguard state support. 
For example, during the Third Indochina War, China consistently 
sought to persuade the US to enhance support to Thailand to prevent 
it from falling victim to Vietnamese expansion. Similarly, following 
Indonesia’s invasion of East Timor, the Australian Prime Minister 
travelled to the US to appeal to President Clinton to withdraw human 
rights considerations from the drafting of defence contracts. These 
initiatives come at fairly little cost to the external power, and yet they 
have a significant impact on an ASEAN vanguard state’s ability to 
pursue its interests.
As the four case studies show, a vanguard state is best able to secure a 
convergence of interests when there exists a common threat consensus, 
both regionally and internationally. At such times, ASEAN can be 
conceptualized as a unitary actor. Due to the disparate interests of 
states however, such interest convergence is rare. In reality, we can 
conceptualize ASEAN as a grouping of regional states, where each 
member seeks to secure its own interests in an uncertain geopolitical 
environment. This is particularly notable in the post-Cold War period. 
Indeed, it is no coincidence that in the last two cases under analysis, 
ASEAN vanguard state–external power interest convergence has 
been under threat. The reasons for this are varied, although three in 
particular stand out. First, there is a lack of common threat consensus 
in the period since the end of the Cold War. The unifying Soviet 
threat has dissipated, leaving behind a myriad of threats that impact 
regional states and external powers differently. Related to this, we 
see a general lack of faith in US engagement in Southeast Asia since 
the end of the Cold War. The US has been distracted by its own 
protracted conflicts in the Middle East. This has left the ASEAN states 
unsure of whether they can rely on the US during periods of crisis 
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or intervention. Finally, ASEAN enlargement during this period, to 
include the states of Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, has 
seriously impacted on the Association’s ability to act with any degree 
of consensus. As the South China Sea case has shown, states such 
as Cambodia have their own interests to pursue, something which 
external powers such as China can utilize to their own advantage.
Changes in the international environment since the end of the Cold 
War have necessitated changes in ASEAN vanguard state strategic 
behaviour. This includes searching for other regional and international 
allies that can support ASEAN vanguard state interests, as evidenced 
by Vietnam’s enhanced diplomatic relations with states such as India 
and Japan. This is in addition to an increase in internal balancing 
through the enhancement of state material capabilities. These steps 
are undoubtedly necessary but, as the Vietnam case shows, difficult 
to translate into successful resistance to sovereignty violation in the 
absence of great power backing. Clearly, these findings have utility 
beyond the Southeast Asian region. The strategies presented here 
show the ways in which small states can utilize regional organization 
membership in an attempt to secure their own interests and uphold 
their autonomy in an uncertain regional environment.
ASEAN, intervention and the responsibility to 
protect
What is the future of ASEAN sovereignty? Will a strict adherence 
to traditional Westphalian sovereignty continue to be the overriding 
concern for regional states in the post-Cold War era? Some 
commentators suggest not. In the past two decades, there has been a 
growing concern for the rights of the individual, and the duty of a state 
to protect its citizens. The doctrine of humanitarian intervention and 
its corollary, the Responsibility to Protect, has subsequently received 
increased interest from certain areas of the international community. 
This section will examine this shift towards humanitarian principles. It 
will consider to what extent the principle of humanitarian intervention 
has been adopted by the ASEAN states, and whether this might herald 
the end of the traditional Westphalian sovereignty model.
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Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect
Humanitarian intervention can be defined as ‘the threat or use of force 
across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing 
or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human 
rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission 
of the state within whose territory force is applied’.68 Exception to the 
general rule of non-intervention conflicts with the principle of state 
sovereignty, which is based upon territoriality and the exclusion of 
external actors from domestic authority structures.69
Inherent in the principle of humanitarian intervention is the 
belief that ‘states that violate human rights do not deserve sovereign 
immunity from outside interference in their internal affairs’.70 The 
concept is not a new one. John Stuart Mill made the case in 1859 
that intervention should be permitted to prevent recurring aggressive 
wars and to end protracted civil wars.71 The UN General Assembly 
unanimously agreed in September 2005 that ‘each individual state 
has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity’.72 The UNGA 
encouraged the international community to ‘help states exercise this 
responsibility’, and to take ‘collective action, in a timely and decisive 
manner’ when there is evidence that a state has manifestly failed in its 
responsibility to protect.73
ASEAN’s response to humanitarian intervention and R2P
R2P is the current incarnation of the case for humanitarian 
intervention.74 It signifies a focal shift from the state as the primary 
actor to the human rights of the individual. The advent of R2P has 
sparked scholarly debate regarding ASEAN’s reception of the norm, 
and its conflict with the existing regional norm of non-interference. 
See Seng Tan argues that ASEAN is ‘gradually embracing an ethic 
of sovereignty qua responsibility’,75 and is specifically embracing ‘the 
logic of responsibility as provision’.76 However, Tan also notes that 
the ASEAN states ‘continue to maintain and promote sovereignty as 
an inalienable and unequivocal right rather than as a responsibility’.77 
It is therefore unclear ‘whether responsibility to provide constitutes a 
stepping stone to R2P in Southeast Asia’.78
According to Acharya, through a process of constitutive localisation, 
local actors are reconstructing foreign ideas and norms to merge 
with local conditions.79 This is an idea mirrored by Bellamy and 
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Drummond, who argue that ‘many Southeast Asian states are moving 
away from the traditional notion of sovereignty and towards accepting 
a localized variant of sovereignty as responsibility’.80 Capie disputes this 
assessment however, arguing that ‘neither ASEAN nor the ASEAN 
Regional Forum has institutionalized R2P in any form’.81 For Capie, 
localization has failed to take place due to an insufficient number of 
insider actors that are receptive to the norm. It is therefore concluded 
that many states still view R2P ‘as a potential threat to sovereignty 
and regime security’.82
In a July 2000 speech, Rodolfo C Severino, Secretary General of 
ASEAN, stated that ‘national sovereignty and its handmaiden, the 
principle of non-interference, are the only conceptual bulwarks 
protecting the small and the weak from domination by the powerful. 
In the absence of a supranational government, it is indispensable 
to any sort of international order’.83 With regard to humanitarian 
intervention, Severino asked: ‘Who decides? There is a tendency 
for powerful states or groups of them to represent themselves as the 
“international community”’.84 Governments are therefore able to 
‘use humanitarian impulses as a cover for intervention that is actually 
undertaken for national policy objectives’.85 Severino summarizes his, 
and by extension, ASEAN’s view of intervention, by stating that, 
‘except in extreme cases in which the international community may 
have to be mobilized through the United Nations, the welfare of 
people, particularly in Southeast Asia today, is better served through 
economic interaction and integration, through the opening of societies 
to one another, than through blatant intervention and ostentatious 
gestures, which seldom work anyway’.86 This highlights an overriding 
ASEAN state concern with the inviolable sovereignty of the state.
In summary
For ASEAN, the appeal of Westphalian sovereignty lies in its two 
fundamental principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external 
actors from domestic authority structures.87 The TAC seeks to 
enshrine these principles, with the aim of protecting the autonomy 
of the state. As a collection of weak states, ASEAN is vulnerable to 
intervention, which can represent a ‘thinly veiled quest for renewed 
Western imperialism’,88 or even ‘Eastern’ imperialism, in the case of 
China in the 21st century. As Prime Minister Mahathir of Malaysia 
stated, following the advent of peacekeeping forces in East Timor, the 
implication was that in times of humanitarian crisis, the use of military 
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force against a sovereign state could be determined and sanctioned 
by a concert of Western states.89 The legitimisation of intervention 
could increase great power interference into state affairs, destabilising 
regime security and undermining state autonomy. Despite Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam all 
agreeing to ‘the main fundamentals about the R2P’,90 the Southeast 
Asian states have stressed that ‘the principle should be understood as 
an ally of sovereignty … inferring that it does not – and should not 
– contravene the principle of non-interference’.91 Ultimately, for the 
Southeast Asian states, the costs of intervention are likely to outweigh 
the humanitarian benefits.
What, therefore, is the future of ASEAN sovereignty? Analysis 
presented in this chapter suggests that ASEAN’s future sovereignty 
is unlikely to differ substantially from the Association’s past. Despite 
what appeared to be a turn in the post-Cold War period towards 
humanitarian intervention and a responsibility to protect, in reality, 
regional states are reluctant to move beyond the traditional Westphalian 
model of sovereignty. The principle of non-intervention is as important 
to the states of ASEAN today as it was during the Cold War. This 
suggests a case for bringing the sovereign state back into the study 
of regionalism in Southeast Asia. This argument conflicts with the 
vast majority of ASEAN theorists, who continue to argue a case for 
regional, rather than state autonomy, despite evidence pointing to the 
contrary. Vanguard state theory is able to remedy this deficit in the 
literature, to provide a definitive explanation for the mixed record of 
resistance to sovereignty violation in Southeast Asia.
Notes
1 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 80.
2 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 3.
3 Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, 3.
4 Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia, 1.
5 Haacke, ASEAN’S Diplomatic and Security Culture, 40.
6 Haacke, ASEAN’S Diplomatic and Security Culture, 7.
7 Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia, 29.
8 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 79; Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and 
Southeast Asia, 85; Haacke, ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture, 111.
9 Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia, 87.
10 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 92.
11 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 80.
12 Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, 152.
229
THE FUTURE OF ASEAN SOVEREIGNTY?
13 Ba, [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia, 176–177; Acharya, Constructing 
a Security Community in Southeast Asia, 211.
14 M Taylor Fravel, “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea”, Contemporary 
Southeast Asia 33, no. 3 (2011), 292–319.
15 Tan, Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific, 149.
16 Chin and Suryadinata, Michael Leifer: Selected Works, 151. Reprinted from 
Leifer, “Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?”
17 Chin and Suryadinata, Michael Leifer: Selected Works, 151. Reprinted from 
Leifer, “Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?”
18 Jones and Smith, “Making Process, Not Progress”, 150.
19 Chin and Suryadinata, Michael Leifer: Selected Works, 222. Reprinted from 
Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia.
20 Chin and Suryadinata, Michael Leifer: Selected Works, 223. Reprinted from 
Leifer, Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia.
21 Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, 51.
22 Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, 52.
23 Hansen, “Indonesia 1975: National Resilience and Continuity”, 146.
24 Barbedo de Magalhães, East Timor Indonesian Occupation and Genocide, 14.
25 Hanhimäki, The Flawed Architect, 478.
26 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, 98.
27 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, 97.
28 Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, 55.
29 Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, 54.
30 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. XIII, 
275.
31 Chambers, “The Chinese and the Thai are Brothers”, 616.
32 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. XIII, 
265.
33 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. XIII, 
313.
34 Chin and Suryadinata, Michael Leifer: Selected Works, 132. Reprinted from 
Leifer, “The ASEAN Peace Process”.
35 Jones and Smith, ASEAN and East Asian International Relations, 71.
36 Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis”, 167.
37 Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order, 84.
38 Jones, Khoo and Smith, Asian Security and the Rise of China, 113.
39 Jones, Khoo and Smith, Asian Security and the Rise of China, 111.
40 Leifer, “Stalemate in the South China Sea”, 7–8.
41 Jones and Smith, “Constructing Communities”, 179.
42 Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, 8.
43 Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, 59.
44 Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, 59.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
230
45 Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Documents on Australian 
Foreign Policy, 58.
46 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol. E-12, 
141.
47 Scheiner, “The United States: From Complicity to Ambiguity”, 119.
48 Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, 76.
49 Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, 78.
50 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, 76.
51 Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia, 97.
52 Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, 151–2.
53 Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia, 157, 159.
54 Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis”, 164.
55 Haq, “Mahathir calls for reduced Australian presence in Timor”.
56 Dori, “Indonesia’s Economic and Political Crisis”, 1998.
57 Dori, “Indonesia’s Economic and Political Crisis”, 1998.
58 Ambrosio, “East Timor Independence”, 129.
59 White, “The Road to INTERFET”, 71.
60 Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 30–31.
61 Press, Calculating Credibility, 25–28.
62 Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence, 31.
63 Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait”, 48–85.
64 Ciorciari, The Limits of Alignment, 2.
65 Leifer, “Indonesia and the Incorporation of East Timor”, 349.
66 Khoo, Collateral Damage, 131.
67 Ross, “Navigating the Taiwan Strait”, 48–85.
68 JL Holzgrefe, “The humanitarian intervention debate”, in Humanitarian 
Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, ed. JL Holzgrefe and 
Robert O Keohane (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 18.
69 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 20.
70 Robert A Pape, “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of Humanitarian 
Intervention”, International Security 37, no. 1 (Summer 2012), 45.
71 John Stuart Mill, “A Few Words on Non-Intervention”, in Essays on 
Politics and Culture, ed. Gertrude Himmelfarb (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 
1973), 368–384.
72 United Nations General Assembly, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, 
Resolution A/60/L.1, 24 October 2005, paragraphs 138–139.
73 UNGA, “2005 World Summit Outcome”, paragraphs 138–139.
74 Michael W Doyle, “International Ethics and the Responsibility to 
Protect”, International Studies Review 13 (2011), 73.
75 See Seng Tan, “Providers not Protectors: Institutionalising Responsible 
Sovereignty in Southeast Asia”, Asian Security 7, no. 3 (2011), 202.
76 Tan, “Providers not Protectors”, 213.
231
THE FUTURE OF ASEAN SOVEREIGNTY?
77 Tan, “Providers not Protectors”, 202.
78 Tan, “Providers not Protectors”, 214.
79 Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? 15.
80 Alex J Bellamy and Catherine Drummond, “The Responsibility to 
Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-interference and Sovereignty as 
Responsibility”, The Pacific Review 24, no. 2 (2011), 196.
81 David Capie, “The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia: 
Framing, Resistance and the Localisation Myth”, The Pacific Review 25, 
no. 1 (March 2012), 89.
82 Capie, “The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia”, 76.
83 Rodolfo C Severino, “Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN 
Way”, Address given at the ASEAN Scholars’ Roundtable organized 
by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Singapore Institute of 




84 Severino, “Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way”.
85 Severino, “Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way”.
86 Severino, “Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN Way”.
87 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 20.
88 Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 20.
89 Dupont, “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis”, 165.
90 Bellamy and Drummond, “The Responsibility to Protect in Southeast 
Asia”, 194.





Acharya, Amitav. Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: 
ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order. 3rd  ed., Hoboken,NJ: 
Taylor & Francis, 2014.
Acharya, Amitav. The Making of Southeast Asia. New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2012.
Acharya, Amitav. Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Southeast 
Asia. New York: Cornell University Press, 2009.
Agnote, Dario. “Manila Expresses Concern Over Turmoil in 
Indonesia”. Kyodo News, 5 May 1999.
“Agreement between the Government of the Commonwealth 
of Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia 
establishing Certain Seabed Boundaries”. Signed in Canberra on 
18 May 1971.
Al Jazeera. “Rodrigo Duterte: ‘I don’t care about human rights”. 
08 August 2016, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/08/rodrigo-
duterte-human-rights-160806211448623.html.
Alatas, Ali. The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor. 
Jakarta: Aksara Karunia, 2006.
Ambrosio, Thomas. “East Timor Independence: The Changing 
Nature of International Pressure”. In Transforming East Asian Domestic 
and International Politics, edited by Robert Compton  Jr, 115-137. 
Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002.
Andolong, Ina. “Cayetano: China did not bully PH with threat”. 
CNN, 23 May 2017, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2017/05/22/
cayetano-china-did-not-bully-PH.html.
Aneja, Urvashi. “Interanational NGOs and the Implementation of the 
Norm for Need-Based Humanitarian Assistance in Sri Lanka”. In 
Implementation & World Politics, edited by Alexander Betts and Phil 
Orchard, 85-104. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
Ang, Cheng Guan. Singapore, ASEAN and the Cambodia Conflict 1978-
1991. Singapore: NUS Press, 2013. 
Ang, Cheng Guan. “The South China Sea Dispute Revisited”. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2, 2000: 201–215.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
234
Ap, Tiffany, Jennifer Rizzo and Kevin Liptak. “Obama lifts US arms 
ban on Vietnam”. CNN Politics, 24 May 2016, http://edition.cnn.
com/2016/05/23/politics/obama-vietnam-trip/index.html.
Asia Times Online. “Howard Doctrine provokes Malaysian Rage”. 
25 September 1999.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “Turning Vision Into Reality 
For a Dynamic ASEAN Community”. Chairman’s Statement of the 
28th and 29th ASEAN Summits, Vientiane, 6-7 September 2016, 
http://asean.org/storage/2016/08/Final-Chairmans-Statement-of-
the-28th-and-29th-ASEAN-Summits-rev-fin.pdf.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “Joint Statement of the 
Foreign Ministers of ASEAN Member States and China on the Full 
and Effective Implementation of the Declaration of the Conduct 
of Parties in the South China Sea”. July 2016, http://asean.org/
storage/2016/07/Joint-Statement-on-the-full-and-effective-
implementation-of-the-DOC-FINAL.pdf.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “2002 Declaration on 
the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”. Phnom Penh, 
4 November 2002, http://www.assidmer.net/doc/Documents-on-
ASEAN-and-South-China-Sea-as-of-June-2011.pdf.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “Joint Communique of the 
33rd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”. Bangkok, 24-25 July 2000.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “1999 Joint Communiqué of 
the 32nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”. Singapore, 23-24 July 1999, 
http://www.assidmer.net/doc/Documents-on-ASEAN-and-South-
China-Sea-as-of-June-2011.pdf.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “1992 ASEAN Declaration 
on the South China Sea”. Adopted by the Foreign Ministers at the 
25th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 22  July 1992, http://
www.assidmer.net/doc/Documents-on-ASEAN-and-South-China-
Sea-as-of-June-2011.pdf.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “Joint Press Statement 
The Special ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting on Indochinese 
Refugees”. Bangkok, 13 January 1979.
Association of Southeast Nations. “Joint Communiqué of the Ninth 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting”. Manila, 24-26 June 1976.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 24 February 1976. Chapter 




Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The ASEAN Declaration 
(Bangkok Declaration) Bangkok, 8  August 1967, http://asean.
org/the-asean-declaration-bangkok-declaration-bangkok-8-
august-1967/.
Aubrey, Jim. “Canberra: Jakarta’s Trojan Horse in East Timor”. In The 
East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, edited 
by Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey, 133-150. London: 
Tauris, 2000.
Australia Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Documents on 
Australian Foreign Policy: Australia and the Indonesian Incorporation 
of Portuguese Timor, 1974-1976, edited by Wendy Way. Victoria: 
Melbourne University Press, 2000.
Ba, Alice. “Institutional divergence and convergence in the Asia-
Pacific? ASEAN in practice and theory”. Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 27, no. 2, 2014: 295–318.
Ba, Alice. [Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism 
and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2009.
Baliga, Ananth, and Vong Sokhend. “Cambodia again blocks ASEAN 
statement on South China Sea”. The Phnom Penh Post, 25 July 2016, 
http://www.phnompenhpost.com/national/cambodia-again-blocks-
asean-statement-south-china-sea.
Ball, Desmond. “Silent Witness: Australian Intelligence and East 
Timor”. The Pacific Review 14, no. 1, 2001: 35–62.
Bangkok Post. “Govt threatens to arrest errant rights activists”. 20 July 
1994.
Bangkok Post. “Prasong firm on East Timor Policy”. 19 July 1994.
Bangkok Post. “Govt tightens curbs on NGO activities”. 16 July 1994.
Barbedo de Magalhães, António P. East Timor Indonesian Occupation 
and Genocide. Porto: Oporto University, 1992.
Bartrop, Paul R., and Steven Leonard Jacobs, eds. Modern Genocide: 
The Definitive Resource and Document Collection. Santa Barbara, CA: 
ABC-CLIO, 2015.
Baviera, Aileen SP. “An ASEAN Perspective on the South China Sea” 
China-ASEAN Collision or China-US Hegemonic Competition?” 
In Entering Unchartered Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea, 
edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 88-115. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2014.
Beckman, Robert C. “ASEAN and the South China Sea Dispute”. In 
Entering Unchartered Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea, edited 
by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 15-36. Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2014.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
236
Beeson, Mark. “Can ASEAN Cope with China?” Journal of Current 
Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no. 1, 2016: 5–28.
Bellamy, Alex J, and Catherine Drummond. “The Responsibility to 
Protect in Southeast Asia: Between Non-interference and Sovereignty 
as Responsibility”. The Pacific Review 24, no. 2, 2011: 179–200.
Betts, Alexander. “From Persecution to Deprivation: How Refugee 
Norms Adapt at Implementation”. In Implementation & World Politics, 
edited by Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard, 29-49. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014.
Betts, Alexander, and Phil Orchard. “Introduction: The Normative 
Institutionalization-Implementation Gap”. In Implementation & World 
Politics, edited by Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard, 1–28. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014.
Betts, Alexander, and Phil Orchard. “Conclusions: Norms and the 
Politics of Implementation”. In Implementation & World Politics, edited 
by Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard, 269–28. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014.
Bodeen, Christopher. “Recent developments surrounding the South 
China Sea dispute”. Philstar, 23 August 2017, http://www.philstar.
com/headlines/2016/08/23/1616443/recent-developments-
surrounding-south-china-sea-dispute.
Budiardjo, Carmel. “The Legacy of the Suharto Dictatorship”. In 
The East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence from Indonesia, 
edited by Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey, 51-68. London: 
Tauris, 2000.
Bower, Ernest, and Derwin Pereira. “Convince ASEAN countries that 
US pivot to Asia is no empty promise”. Straits Times, 21 April 2014, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/convince-asean-countries-
that-us-pivot-to-asia-is-no-empty-promise.
Burchill, Scott. “East Timor, Australia and Indonesia”. In Guns and 
Ballot Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence, edited by Damien 
Kingsbury, 169-184. Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 2000.
Bush, Richard C. “The Response of China’s Neighbours to the US 
“Pivot” to Asia”. Brookings, 31 January 2012, https://www.brookings.
edu/on-the-record/the-response-of-chinas-neighbors-to-the-u-s-
pivot-to-asia/.
Buszynski, Leszek. “Southeast Asia in the Post-Cold War Era: 
Regionalism and Security”. Asian Survey 32, no. 9. 1992: 830–847.
Buszynski, Leszek. Soviet Foreign Policy and Southeast Asia. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1986.
Buszynski, Leszek. “The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia Since the 
Fall of Saigon”. Asian Survey 21, no. 5, 1981: 536–550.
237
REFERENCES
Buzynski, Leszek. “Vietnam Confronts China”. Asian Survey 20, no. 8, 
1980: 829–843.
Canberra Times. “UN resolution on East Timor ‘lacked realism’”. 
Friday 19 November 1976.
Canberra Times. “Mr Whitlam links the demise of Timor with his own 
downfall”. Saturday 25 September 1976.
Canberra Times. “No lone action on Timor: Peacock”. Monday 
24 May 1976.
Canberra Times. “ASEAN Concern”. Tuesday 6 January 1976.
Canberra Times. “PM ‘knew of plan’ before invasion”. Thursday 
11 December 1975.
Canberra Times. “PM, Razak to discuss future of Brunei”. Tuesday 
14 October 1975.
Capie, David. “The Responsibility to Protect Norm in Southeast Asia: 
Framing, Resistance and the Localisation Myth”. The Pacific Review 
25, no. 1, March 2012: 75–93.
Carter, Ashton. “The United States and Challenges to Asia-Pacific 




Chachavalpongpun, Pavin. “Embedding Embittered History: 
Unending Conflicts in Thai-Cambodian Relations”. Asian Affairs 
43, no. 1, 2012: 81–102.
Chalk, Peter. Australian Foreign and Defense Policy in the Wake of the 
1999/2000 East Timor Intervention. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001.
Chambers, Michael. “‘The Chinese and the Thai are Brothers’: The 
Evolution of the Sino-Thai Friendship”. Journal of Contemporary China 
14, no. 45, 2005: 599–629.
Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War after the War. New York: 
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1986.
Chandran, Nyshka. “Even if Trump wants to renegotiate the TPP, 
members may not bite, says Singapore official”. CNBC, 18 April 
2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/04/18/singapore-ministry-of-
foreign-affairs-tommy-koh-on-the-trans-pacific-partnership.html.
Channel News Asia. “Philippines hails US as top ally, welcomes war 
games”. 05  October 2017, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/
news/asiapacific/philippines-hails-us-as-top-ally-welcomes-war-
games-9282364.
Chin, Kin Wah, and Leo Suryadinata, ed. Michael Leifer: Selected Works 
on Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 
2005.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
238
Chopra, Janet. “The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor”. Survival 42, no. 3, 
Autumn 2000: 27–39.
Ciorciari, John D. The Limits of Alignment: Southeast Asia and the Great 
Powers since 1975. Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2010.
Cloud, David S. “Defense Secretary Ashton Carter warns Beijing on 
South China Sea island-building”. LA Times, 29 May 2015. http://
www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-ashton-carter-china-20150529-story.
html.
CNN Philippines. “Philippines eyes record P25B defense spending for 
2016”. 21 July 2015, http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2015/07/21/
Philippines-proposes-record-P25B-defense-spending-in-2016.html.
Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Toronto. 
“Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press 
Conference on February 20, 2013, http://toronto.china-consulate.
org/eng/fyrthhz/t1015425.htm.
Copeland, Dale. “Economic Interdependence and the Future of 
U.S.-Chinese Relations”. In International Relations Theory and the 
Asia-Pacific, edited by John G Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, 
323–352. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003.
Cotton, James. East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: Intervention and 
its Aftermath in Southeast Asia. New York: Routledge, 2004.
Crawford, Timothy. Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the 
Pursuit of Peace. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2003.
Cruz De Castro, Renato. “The Early Duterte Presidency in the 
Philippines”. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 35, no.  3, 
2016: 3–14.
Cruz De Castro, Renato. “Facing up to China’s Realpolitik Approach 
in the South China Sea Dispute: The Case of the 2012 Scarborough 
Shoal Stand-Off and its Aftermath”. Journal of Asian Security 3, no. 2, 
2016: 157–182.
Cruz De Castro, Renato. “The Strategic Balance in East Asia and the 
Small Powers: The Case of the Philippines in the Face of the South 
China Sea Dispute”. Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of International Studies 
31, no. 1, 2016: 126–149.
Cruz De Castro, Renato. “The Philippines Confronts China in the 
South China Sea: Power Politics vs. Liberalism-Legalism”. Asian 
Perspective 39, no. 1, 2015: 71–100.
Cruz De Castro, Renato. “Adjusting to the Post-US Bases Era: The 
Ordeal of the Philippine Military’s Modernisation Program”. Armed 
Forces and Society 26, no. 1, 1999: 119–137.
239
REFERENCES
Dancel, Raul. “Nothing provocative in what the US is doing, says 
Aquino”. Straits Times, 28 October 2015, http://www.straitstimes.
com/asia/se-asia/nothing-provocative-in-what-the-us-is-doing-
says-aquino.
Dibb, Paul. “The Key to South-East Asia’s Security”. International 
Affairs 77, no. 4, Oct 2001: 829–842.
Djajamihardja, Hidayat. “A Reporter’s View”. In Guns and Ballot 
Boxes: East Timor’s Vote for Independence, edited by Damien Kingsbury, 
99–115. Victoria: Monash Asia Institute, 2000.
Djalal, Hasjim. “ASEAN Claimant’s Position in the South China Sea”. 
In Entering Unchartered Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea, 
edited by Pavin Chachavalpongpun, 67–88. Singapore: Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies, 2014.
Dollah, Siti Rahil. “Downer warns against Indonesia becoming like 
Balkans”. Kyodo News, 23 February 1999.
Dore, Christopher. “Unfuriated [sic] neighbours”. The Australian, 
9 September 1999.
Dori, John T. “Indonesia’s Economic and Political Crisis: A Challenge 
for the US Leadership in Asia”. The Heritage Foundation Backgrounder: 
Executive Summary, 17 August 1998.
Doyle, Michael W. “International Ethics and the Responsibility to 
Protect”. International Studies Review 13, 2011: 72–84.
Dunn, James. Timor: A People Betrayed. Australia: Jacaranda, 1983.
Dupont, Alan. “ASEAN’s Response to the East Timor Crisis”. 
Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no, 2, 2000: 163–170.
Dupont, Alan. “The Australia-Indonesia Security Agreement”. The 
Australian Quarterly 68, no. 2, Winter 1996: 49–62.
East Timor: Including the Report by James Dunn, Former Australian Consul 
in Dili. New Zealand University Students’ Association for the New 
Zealand Campaign for an Independent East Timor, August 1977, 
Wellington.
Elman, Colin. “Horses for Courses: Why Not Neorealist Theories of 
Foreign Policy?” Security Studies 6, no. 1, 1996: 7–53.
Emmerson, Donald. “Moralpolitik: The Timor Test”. National Interest 
58, 1999/2000: 63–68.
Fernandes, Clinton. “Recognition as a political act: Political 
considerations in recognizing Indonesia’s annexation of East 
Timor”. In Territorial Separatism in Global Politics: Causes, Outcomes 
and Resolution, edited by Damien Kingsbury and Costas Laoutides, 
93–108. Hoboken, NJ: Taylor and Francis, 2015.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
240
Fernandes, Clinton. “R2P and the East Timor Intervention”. In 
Responsibility to Protect and Sovereignty, edited by Charles Sampford 
and Ramesh Thakur, 63–84. Surrey: Ashgate, 2013.
Fernandes, Clinton. “The Road to INTERFET: Bringing the Politics 
Back In”. Security Challenges 4, no. 3, Spring 2008: 83–98.
Fifield, Anna. “China thinks the trade war isn’t really about 




Finnemore, Martha. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1996.
Forrester, Geoff, and Ronald James May. The Fall of Soeharto. London: 
C Hurst & Co, 1998.
Fravel, M Taylor. “China’s Strategy in the South China Sea”. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 33, no. 3, 2011, 292–319.
Frey, Frederick. “The Problem of Actor Designation in Political 
Analysis”. Comparative Politics 17, no. 2, January 1985: 127–152.
Funston, John “The Third Indochina War and Southeast Asia”. 
Contemporary Southeast Asia 1, no. 3, December 1979: 268–289.
Gallu, Joshua. “Trump’s ASEAN summit snub fuels doubts about 
US commitment”. The Sydney Morning Herald, 02 September 2018, 
https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/trump-s-asean-summit-snub-
fuels-doubts-about-us-commitment-20180902-p5019z.html.
Ganesan, Narayanan. “ASEAN’s Relations with Major External 
Powers”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 22, no.  2, August 2000: 
258–278.
Geddie, John. “Trump’s overture to emerging Asia drowned out by 
trade war”. Reuters, 02  August 2018, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-usa-trade-asean/trumps-overture-to-emerging-asia-
drowned-out-by-trade-war-idUSKBN1KN090.
Gerard, Kelly. “Crises, Civil Society and Regionalism in Southeast 
Asia”. In Crisis and Institutional Change in Regional Integration, edited by 
Sabine Saurugger and Fabien Terpan, 192–208. London: Routledge, 
2016.
Ghosh, Nirmal. “Laureate barred from Manila during APEC meet”. 
Straits Times, 22 October 1996.
Ghosh, Nirmal. “Ramos defuses crisis, bans non-Filipinos from 
meeting”. Straits Times, 21 May 1994.
Glas, Aarie, “Habits of Peace: Long-term regional cooperation in 




Godwin, Paul HB. “From Continent to Periphery: PLA Doctrine, 
Strategy and Capabilities Towards 2000”. The China Quarterly 146, 
1996: 464–487.
Gomez, Jim. “Duterte says he’ll set aside sea feud ruling against 
China”. Philstar, 17  December 2016,: http://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2016/12/17/1654340/duterte-says-hell-set-aside-sea-
feud-ruling-against-china.
Grieco, Joseph. “State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: 
A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European 
Economic and Monetary Union”. Security Studies 5, no. 3, March 
1996: 261–306.
Grieco, Joseph. “Realist Theory and the Problem of International 
Cooperation: Analysis with an Amended Prisoner’s Dilemma Model”. 
The Journal of Politics 50, no. 3, 1988: 600–624.
Gruber, Lloyd. Ruling the World: Power Politics and the Rise of Supranational 
Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Guardian. “‘Serious military provocation’: China angered by US 
presence in South China Sea”. 03  July 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/03/serious-military-provocation-
china-angered-by-us-presence-in-south-china-sea.
Guardian. “Obama says China bullying smaller nations in South 
China Sea row”. 10  April 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/apr/10/obama-says-china-bullying-smaller-nations-in-
south-china-sea-row.
Gupta, Sourabh. “China scores with ASEAN play as Trump’s America 
loses its way in South China Sea”. South China Morning Post, 
03  August 2018, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/
article/2158203/china-scores-asean-play-trumps-america-loses-its-
way-south.
Haacke, Jürgen. ASEAN’S Diplomatic and Security Culture. London: 
RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
Haacke, Jürgen. “ASEAN’s Diplomatic and Security Culture: a 
Constructivist Assessment”. International Relations in the Asia-Pacific 
3, no. 1, 2003: 57–87.
Hai, Do Thanh. Vietnam and the South China Sea: Politics, Security and 
Legality. New York: Routledge, 2017.
Handel, Michael. Weak States in the International System. London: Frank 
Cass, 1981.
Hanhimäki, Jussi. The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American 
Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Hansen, Gary. “Indonesia 1975: National Resilience and Continuity 
of the New Order Struggle”. Asian Survey 16, no. 2, 1976: 146–158.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
242
Haq, Farhan. “Mahathir calls for reduced Australian presence in 
Timor”. Asia Times Online, 01 October 1999.
Hayton, Bill. “The Week Donald Trump Lost the South China Sea”. 
Foreign Policy, 31 July 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/07/31/
the-week-donald-trump-lost-the-south-china-sea/.
Hayton, Bill. “South China Sea: Vietnam halts drilling after ‘China 
threats’”. BBC News, 24  July 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-asia-40701121.
Hayton, Bill. The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2014.
Henry, Iain. “Unintended consequences: an examination of Australia’s 
‘historic policy shift’ on East Timor”. Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 68, no. 1, 2014: 45–68.
Henry, Iain. “Playing Second Fiddle on the Road to INTERFET: 
Australia’s East Timor Policy Throughout 1999”. Security Challenges 
9, no. 1, 2013: 87–111.
Heydarian, Richard Javad. “Tragedy of Small Power Politics: Duterte 
and the Shifting Sands of Philippine Foreign Policy”. Asian Security, 
13, no.3 (2017): 220–236.
Heydarian, Richard Javad. “Has Duterte’s China engagement 
backfired?” Asia Times, 14  July 2017, http://www.atimes.com/
article/dutertes-china-engagement-backfired/.
Hoadley, Stephen. “East Timor: Civil War – Causes and Consequences”. 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 1976: 411–419.
Holmes, Oliver. “Trump skips East Asia Summit on final day of 12-day 
tour”. The Guardian, 14 November 2017, https://www.theguardian.
com/us-news/2017/nov/14/donald-trump-skips-east-asia-summit-
on-final-day-of-12-day-tour.
Holmes, Oliver. “Trump hails ‘great relationship’ with Philippines’ 
Duterte”. The Guardian, 13  November 2017, https://www.
theguardian.com/us-news/2017/nov/13/trump-hails-great-
relationship-with-philippines-duterte.
Holzgrefe, JL. “The humanitar ian intervention debate”. In 
Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal and Political Dilemmas, edited 
by JL Holzgrefe and Robert O Keohane, 15–52. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Hunt, Katie, and Kathy Quiano. “South China Sea: China building 
more islands?” CNN, 08  September 2016, http://edition.cnn.
com/2016/09/08/asia/south-china-sea-scarborough-shoal-
philippines-china/index.html.
Inbaraj, Sonny. “ASEAN’s commitment to East Timor faces tough 
test”. Asia Times Online, 01 February 2000.
243
REFERENCES
Indonesia Diplomatic Handbook. 5th ed. Washington DC, International 
Business Publications, 2008.
Jacob, Paul. “Alatas hails Philippines’ decision”. Straits Times, 21 May 
1994.
Jacob, Paul. “Alatas warns Manila not to allow East Timor meeting”. 
Straits Times, 17 May 1994.
Jacob, Paul. “Australia and Indonesia strengthen bilateral ties”. Straits 
Times, 18 November 1992.
Jaipragas, Bhavan. “ASEAN and China have moved on  … Didn’t 
Vietnam get the memo?” South China Morning Post, 13 August 2017, 
http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/2106469/
asean-and-china-have-moved-ondidnt-vietnam-get-memo.
Jakarta Post. “Anti-Indonesia Protests Held in Australia over East 
Timor”. 7 September 1999.
Jakarta Post. “EU warned not to scrutinise East Timor”. 1 December 
1996.
Jakarta Post. “Indonesia appreciates Malaysian Attitude”. 12 November 
1996.
Japan Times. “As attention focuses on North Korean threat, Beijing 




Jenkins, David. “Australia’s helping hand in Indonesia’s military 
muscle”. Sydney Morning Herald, 04 December 1995.
Jho, Whasun, and Soo A Chae. “Hegemonic Disputes and the Limits 
of the ASEAN Regional Forum”. Pacific Focus: Inha Journal of 
International Studies 29, no. 2, 2014: 237–259.
Jiangtao, Shi, and Liu Zhen. “’Better left untouched’: Philippines and 
Vietnam wary of Trump offer to mediate South China Sea disputes”. 
South China Morning Post, 12 November 2017, http://www.scmp.
com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2119551/better-left-
untouched-philippines-and-vietnam-wary.
Jiangtao, Shi. “Has Beijing really ‘turned the page’ on South China 
Sea ruling?” South China Morning Post, 09 September 2016, http://
www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2018038/
has-beijing-really-turned-page-south-china-sea-ruling.
Job, Brian L, and Anastasia Shesterinina. “China as a Global Norm-
Shaper: Institutionalisation and Implementation of the Responsibility 
to Protect”. In Implementation and World Politics, edited by Alexander 
Betts and Phil Orchard, 144–159. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
244
Johnson, Jesse. “Beijing continuing ‘steady pattern of militarisation’ 
in South China Sea”. Japan Times, 24 February 2017, https://www.
japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/02/24/asia-pacific/beijing-continuing-
steady-pattern-militarization-south-china-sea/#.WiQZnbSFjeQ.
Johnson, Tim. “ASEAN wants East Timor crisis tackled by Indonesia, 
UN” Kyodo News, 09 September 1999.
Johnston, Alastair Ian, and Robert S Ross. “Conclusion”. In Engaging 
China: The Management of an Emerging China, edited by Alastair Ian 
Johnston and Robert S Ross, 273–296. New York: Routledge, 1999.
Joint Statement of the RP-PRC Consultations on the South China 
Sea and on Other Areas of Cooperation, 9–10  August 1996. In 
International Law in East Asia, edited by Zou Keyuan and Jianfu Chen. 
New York: Routledge, 2016.
Jones, David, Nicholas Khoo, and MLR Smith. Asian Security and the 
Rise of China: International Relations in an Age of Volatility. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2013.
Jones, David M, and Michael LR Smith. “Constructing Communities: 
The Curious Case of East Asian Regionalism”. Review of International 
Studies 33, no. 1, 2007: 165–186.
Jones, David M, and Michael LR Smith. “Making Process, Not 
Progress”. International Security 32, no. 1, Summer 2007: 148–184.
Jones, David M, and Michael LR Smith. ASEAN and East Asian 
International Relations: Regional Delusion. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
2006.
Jones, David M, and Michael LR Smith. “ASEAN’s Imitation 
Community”. ORBIS 46, no. 1, Winter 2002: 93–109.
Jones, Lee. “Sovereignty, Intervention, and Social Order in 
Revolutionary Times”. Review of International Studies 39, no. 1, 2013: 
1149–1167.
Jones, Lee. ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia. New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.
Kaiman, Jonathan. “China accuses Vietnam of ramming its ships 
in South China Sea”. The Guardian, 8  May 2014, https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/china-accuses-vietnam-ships-
south-china-sea-oil-rig.
Kaplan, Robert D. “How President Trump is helping Beijing win in 




Kaplan, Robert D. Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End 
of a Stable Pacific. New York: Random House, 2014.
245
REFERENCES
Khmer Times. “China Gives $600 Million After South China 
Sea Support”. 15  July 2016, http://www.khmertimeskh.com/
news/27292/china-gives-600-million-after-south-china-sea-
support/.
Khoo, Nicholas. Collateral Damage: Sino-Soviet Rivalry and the 
Termination of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2011.
Khoo, Nicholas. “Deconstructing the ASEAN Security Community: 
A Review Essay”. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 4, no. 1, 
2004: 35–46.
Kiernan, Ben. Genocide and Resistance in Southeast Asia. London: 
Transaction, 2008.
Kiernan, Ben. How Pol Pot Came to Power: Colonialism, Nationalism, 
and Communism in Cambodia, 1930–1975. 2nd ed. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2004.
Kiernan, Ben. “The Demography of Genocide in Southeast Asia: 
The Death Tolls in Cambodia, 1975–79, and East Timor, 1975–80”. 
Critical Asian Studies 35, no. 4, 2003: 585–597.
Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia 
under the Khmer Rouge, 1975–79. New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1996.
King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba. Designing Social 
Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1994.
Kingsbury, Damien. East Timor: The Price of Liberty. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2009.
Kingsbury, Damien. Power Politics and the Indonesian Military. New 
York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003.
Kissinger Transcripts. A Verbatim Record of US Diplomacy 1969–1977. 
The Digital National Security Archive, KT00663, http://gateway.
proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:dnsa&rft_
dat=xri:dnsa:article:CKT00663.
Krasner, Stephen. “Rethinking the Sovereign State Model”. Review of 
International Studies 27, no. 5, December 2001: 17–42.
Krasner, Stephen. Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1999.
Krasner, Stephen. “Sovereignty and Intervention”. In Beyond 
Westphalia? State Sovereignty and International Intervention, edited by 
Gene M Lyons and Michael Mastanduno, 228–249. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
246
Krasner, Stephen. Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials 
Investments and US Foreign Policy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1978.
Kuok, Lynn. “The US FON program in the South China Sea”. 
Brookings Centre for East Asia Policy Studies, East Asia Policy Paper 9, 
June 2016.
Kyodo News. “Japan, US welcome East Timor result, ASEAN cautious”. 
5 September 1999.
Kyodo News. “East Timor changes future for ASEAN, Indonesia”. 
4 September 1999.
Lake, David A. Hierarchy in International Relations. New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2009.
Lawless, Robert. “The Indonesian Takeover of East Timor”. Asian 
Survey 16, no. 10 (1976): 948–64.
Lee, Kuan Yew. From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965–
2000. New York: HarperCollins, 2000.
Leifer, Michael. “Regional Solutions to Regional Problems?” In 
Towards Recovery in Pacific Asia, edited by Gerald Segal and David SG 
Goodman, 108–118. London: Routledge, 2000.
Leifer, Michael. Singapore’s Foreign Policy: Coping with Vulnerability. 
London: Routledge, 2000.
Leifer, Michael. “Stalemate in the South China Sea”. In Perspectives on 
the Conflict in the South China Sea, edited by K Snildal. Oslo: Centre 
for Development and the Environment, 1999.
Leifer, Michael. “The ASEAN Peace Process: A Category Mistake”. 
The Pacific Review 12, no. 1, 1999: 25–38.
Leifer, Michael. “Southeast Asia”. In The Oxford History of the Twentieth 
Century, edited by Michael Howard and Wm Roger Louis, 227–239. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
Leifer, Michael. ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia. London: 
Routledge, 1989.
Leifer, Michael. “ASEAN’s Search for Regional Order”. Faculty of 
Arts and Social Sciences Lecture 12, National University of Singapore, 
1987.
Leifer, Michael. Conflict and Regional Order in Southeast Asia. Adelphi 
Paper No. 162. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 
1980.
Leifer, Michael. “Post Mortem on the Third Indochina War”. The 
World Today 35, no. 6, 1979: 249–258.
Leifer, Michael. “Indonesia and the Incorporation of East Timor”. 
The World Today 32, no. 9, 1976: 347–354.
247
REFERENCES
Lum, Thomas, and Wayne M. Morrison and Bruce Vaughn. “CRIS 
Report for Congress: China’s “Soft Power” in Southeat Asia”. 
04 January 2008, Order Code RL34310, CRS-9, https://fas.org/
sgp/crs/row/RL34310.pdf.
Maley, William. “Australia and the East Timor Crisis: Some Critical 
Comments”. Australian Journal of International Affairs 54, no. 2, 2000: 
151–162.
Manibhandu, Anuraj. “Thailand shuns ceremony”. Bangkok Post, 
10 December 1996.
Mann, Michael. “The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, 
Mechanisms and Results”. European Journal of Sociology 25, no. 2, 
November 1984: 185–213.
Manne, Robert. The Howard Years. Melbourne: Black Inc. Agenda, 
2004.
Mansfield, Edward D. “International Institutions and Economic 
Sanctions”. World Politics 47, no. 44, 1995: 575–605.
Mason, Jeff, and Bruce Wallace. “Obama, ASEAN discuss South China 




Mattheis, Frank, and Uwe Wunderlich. “Regional actorness and 
interregional relations: ASEAN, the EU and Mercosur”. Journal of 
European Integration 39, no. 6, 2017: 723–738.
McCarthy, Terry. “Reef wars”. Time. 08 March 1999, http://content.
time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2054240,00.html.
McCloskey, Stephen. “Introduction: East Timor – From European to 
Third World Colonialism”. In The East Timor Question: The Struggle 
for Independence from Indonesia, edited by Paul Hainsworth and Stephen 
McCloskey, 1–16. London: Tauris, 2000.
Mearsheimer, John. “Structural Realism”. In International Relations 
Theories: Discipline and Diversity 3rd ed., edited by Tim Dunne, Milja 
Kurki and Steve Smith, 77–93. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2013.
Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: 
WW Norton & Co., 2001.
Mearsheimer, John. “The False Promise of International Institutions”. 
International Security 19, no. 3, Winter 1994/1995: 5–49.
Merom, Gil. “Realist Hypotheses on Regional Peace”. Journal of 
Strategic Studies 26, no. 1, 2003: 109–135.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
248
Mill, John Stuart. “A Few Words on Non-Intervention”. In Essays 
on Politics and Culture, edited by Gertrude Himmelfarb, 368–384. 
Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic China. “Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Remarks on Vietnam’s Statement 
on the Chinese Government’s Position Paper on Rejecting the 
Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal Established at the Request of the 
Philippines for the South China Sea Arbitration”. 12 December 2014, 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
t1218756.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. “Position 
Paper of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Matter of Jurisdiction in the South China Sea Arbitration Initiated 
by the Republic of the Philippines”. 7 December 2014, http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1217147.shtml.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Vietnam. “Remarks by MOFA 
Spokesperson Le Hai Binh on the South China Sea Arbitration Case”. 
11 December 2014, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/tt_baochi/pbnfn/
ns141212143709.
Moe, Terry M. “Power and Political Institutions”. Perspectives on 
Politics 3, no. 2, 2005: 215–233.
Mogato, Manuel, and Christian Shepherd. “Australia, Japan, U.S. call 
for South China Sea code to be legally binding”. Reuters, 07 August 
2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-asean-philippines-
southchinasea-idUSKBN1AN0TU.
Mogato, Manuel. “Duterte says China’s Xi threatened war if Philippines 




Mogato, Manuel. “US triples military aid to Philippines in 2012”. 
Reuters, 03  May 2012, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
philippines-usa/u-s-triples-military-aid-to-philippines-in-2012-
idUSBRE8420IU20120503.
Mogato, Manuel, Michael Martina, and Ben Blanchard. “ASEAN 
Deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia Blocks Statement”. 





Morgan, David. “US says Chinese vessels harassed Navy ship”. 
Reuters, 09  March 2009. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-usa-china-navy/u-s-says-chinese-vessels-harassed-navy-ship-
idUSTRE52845A20090309.
Morgenthau, Hans. Politics Among Nations. 4th ed. New York: Alfred 
Knopf, 1967.
Morris, Stephen. Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and 
the Causes of War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999.
Nair, KK. ASEAN-Indochina Relations Since 1975: The Politics of 
Accommodation. Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence Number 
30. Canberra: ANU, 1984.
Nanto, Dick K. “The 1997–98 Asian Financial Crisis”. CRS Report 
for Congress No. 97-1021 E, updated 06 February 1998.
Narine, Shaun. Explaining ASEAN: Regionalism in Southeast Asia. 
London: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
National Security Archive. “Digitized Set of 2,100 Henry Kissinger 
“Memcons” Recounting the Secret Diplomacy of the Nixon-Ford 
Era”. In National Security Archive Briefing Book No.193, edited by 
William Burr, 26 May 2006, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB193/.
National Security Archive. “A Quarter Century of US Support for 
Occupation”. In National Security Archive Briefing Book No.174, edited 
by Brad Simpson, 28 November 2005, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB174/#doc23.
National Security Archive. “East Timor Revisited”. In National Security 
Archive Briefing Book No.62, edited by William Burr and Michael 
L. Evans, 6 December 2001, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB62/.
Ngo, Huyn. “Trade with Indonesia and the Philippines”. Northern 
Territory of Australia Department of Primary Industry and Fisheries, 
Technical Bulletin No.258, March 1997.
Nicol, Bill. Timor: A Nation Reborn. Equinox Publishing Ltd: Indonesia, 
2002.
Nobel Peace Prize Press Release, Oslo, 11 October 1996.
Noland, Marcus. “The Philippines in the Asian Financial Crisis: How 
the Sick Man Avoided Pneumonia”. Asian Survey 40, no. 3, 2000: 
401–412.
O’Dowd, Edward. Chinese Military Strategy in the Third Indochina War: 
The Last Maoist War. London: Routledge, 2007.
Ortigas, Marga. “Scarborough Shoal stand-off sparks protests”. 
Al Jazeera, 13  May 2012, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
features/2012/05/2012512191343212584.html.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
250
Pape, Robert A. “When Duty Calls: A Pragmatic Standard of 
Humanitarian Intervention”. International Security 37, no. 1, Summer 
2012: 41–80.
Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia. East Timor: Final Report 
of the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee. 
Canberra: Senate Printing Unit, December 2000.
Path, Kosal. “China’s Economic Sanctions against Vietnam, 1975–
1978”. The China Quarterly 212, December 2012: 1040–1058.
Peou, Sorpong. Human Security in East Asia: Challenges for Collaborative 
Action. London: Routledge, 2008.
Periera, Derwin. “After Trump victory, uncertainty in Asia. If America 
retreats, will it be China to the fore?” Straits Times, 09 November 
2016, http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/after-trump-victory-
uncertainty-in-asia-if-america-retreats-will-it-be-china-to-the-fore.
Perlez, Jane. “China and Vietnam Point Fingers After Clash in the 
South China Sea”. New York Times, 27 May 2014, https://www.
nytimes.com/2014/05/28/world/asia/vietnam.html.
Perlez, Jane. “Philippines and China Ease Tensions in Rift at Sea”. New 
York Times, 18 June 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/19/
world/asia/beijing-and-manila-ease-tensions-in-south-china-sea.
html.
Permanent Court of Arbitration. “Press Release: The South China 
Sea Arbitration. The Republic of the Philippines v. The People’s 
Republic of China”. The Hague, 12 July 2016, https://pca-cpa.org/
wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-CN-20160712-Press-
Release-No-11-English.pdf.
Permanent Court of Arbitration Award. “In the Matter of the South 
China Sea Arbitration before an Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Under 
Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s 
Republic of China”. PCA Case No.  2013–19, 12  July 2016, 2, 
https://pca-cpa.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/175/2016/07/PH-
CN-20160712-Award.pdf.
Petty, Martin. “Philippine leader tells Obama ‘to go hell’, says 







Petty, Martin. “Duterte declares upcoming Philippine-US war games 
‘the last one”. Reuters, 28  September 2016, https://www.reuters.
com/article/us-philippines-duterte/duterte-declares-upcoming-
philippines-u-s-war-games-the-last-one-idUSKCN11Y1ZI.
Pham, My. “Vietnam pushes back after threats from Beijing over 
drilling in the South China Sea”. Business Insider, 28 July 2017, http://
www.businessinsider.com/r-vietnam-says-others-should-respect-its-
right-to-drill-for-south-china-sea-oil-2017-7.
Philstar. “Full Text: Obama on South China Sea, defense alliance 
with Philippines”. 18 November 2015, http://www.philstar.com/
headlines/2015/11/18/1523292/full-text-obama-south-china-sea-
defense-alliance-philippines.
Pietsch, Sam. “Australian Imperialism and East Timor”. Marxist 
Interventions 2, 2010: 7–38.
Pike, Douglas. Vietnam and the Soviet Union: Anatomy of an Alliance. 
London: Westview Press, 1987.
Pike, Douglas. “Communist vs. Communist in Southeast Asia”. 
International Security 41, no. 1, Summer, 1979: 20–39.
Pollard, Vincent K. “ASA and ASEAN, 1961–1967: Southeast Asian 
Regionalism”. Asian Survey 10, no. 3, 1970: 244–255.
Press, Daryl G. Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military 
Threats. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005.
Prime Minister’s Office Singapore. “PM Lee Hsien Loong’s interview 
with Wall Street Journal on 29 March 2016”. 29 March 2016, http://
www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/pm-lee-hsien-loongs-interview-wall-
street-journal-wsj.
Prime Minister’s Office Singapore. Speech by Mr  Lee Kuan Yew, 
Minister Mentor, at the S Rajaratnam Lecture, 09  April 2009, 
5.30pm at Shangri-La Hotel, https://www.pmo.gov.sg/newsroom/
speech-mr-lee-kuan-yew-minister-mentor-s-rajaratnam-lecture-09-
april-2009-530-pm-shangri.
Radio Free Asia. “ASEAN, Beijing Agree to Talks on South China Sea 
Code”. 06 August 2017, http://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/
asean-scs-08062017182346.html.
Ramos-Horta, José Manuel. Funu: The Unfinished Saga of East Timor. 
Trenton NJ: Red Sea Press, 1987.
Rathbun, Brian. “A Rose by Any Other Name: Neoclassical Realism as 
the Logical and Necessary Extension of Structural Realism”. Security 
Studies 17, no. 2, 2008: 294–321.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
252
Republic of the Philippines Department of Foreign Affairs. “Notification 




Republic of Singapore Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “MFA Spokesman’s 
comments In response to media queries on the Philippines’ 
initiation of arbitration proceedings against China under Article 
287 and V  II of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)”. 23  January 2013, https://www.
mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/asean/press_statements_
speeches/2013/201301/press_20130123.html.
Reuters. “China upset at Mattis’ “irresponsible remarks” on South 
China Sea”. 05  June 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
asia-security-china/china-upset-at-mattis-irresponsible-remarks-on-
south-china-sea-idUSKBN18W00U.








Richardson, JL. “Problems of Australian Foreign Policy: January to 
June 1976”. Australian Journal of Politics and History 22, 1976: 327–337.
Richardson, Michael. “Chinese Gambit: Seizing Spratly Reef Without 
a Fight”. New York Times, 17 February 1995. http://www.nytimes.
com/1995/02/17/news/17iht-sprat_1.html.
Robinson, Geoffrey. If You Leave us Here, We Will Die: How Genocide 
was Stopped in East Timor. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2010.
Robinson, Geoffrey. “People’s War: Militias in East Timor and 
Indonesia”. South East Asia Research 9, no. 3, 2001: 271–318.
Roff, Sue. Timor’s Anschluss: Indonesian and Australian Foreign Policy in 
East Timor, 1974–1976. Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.
Rose, Gideon. “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”. 
World Politics 51, no. 1, 1998: 144–172.
Ross, Robert S. “Navigating the Taiwan Strait: Deterrence, Escalation, 




Ross, Robert. “China and the Cambodian Peace Process: The Value 
of Coercive Diplomacy”. Asian Survey 31, no. 12, 1991: 1170–1185.
RT. “’We can’t afford war’: Duterte recommends leaving South China 
Sea alone, Trump offers mediation”. 12 November 2017, https://
www.rt.com/news/409620-duterte-war-south-china-sea/.
Rüland, Jürgen. “Inter- and Transregionalism; Remarks on the State of 
the Art of a New Research Agenda”. National Europe Centre Paper 35, 
Paper prepared for the workshop on Asia-Pacific Studies in Australia 
and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future, ANU, July 5–6, 2002.
Rüland, Jürgen. “ASEAN and the Asian Crisis: Theoretical Implications 
and Practical Consequences for Southeast Asian Regionalism”. The 
Pacific Review 13, no. 3, 2000: 421–451.
Sabillo, Kristine Angeli. “PH, Vietnam ink closer defense ties”. Inquirer, 
17  November 2015, http://globalnation.inquirer.net/131451/ph-
vietnam-sign-statement-on-strategic-partnership-amid-disputes-in-
south-china-sea.
Salla, Michael. “Australian Foreign Policy and East Timor”. Australian 
Journal of International Affairs 49, no. 2, 1995: 207–222.
Scheiner, Charles. “The United States: From Complicity to 
Ambiguity”. In The East Timor Question: The Struggle for Independence 
from Indonesia, edited by Paul Hainsworth and Stephen McCloskey, 
117–32. London: Tauris, 2000.
Schelling, Thomas. “An Essay on bargaining”. The American Economic 
Review 46, no. 3, 1956: 281–306.
Schweller, Randall, and David Priess. “A Tale of Two Realisms: 
Expanding the Institutions Debate”. Mershon International Studies 
Review 41, no. 1, May 1997: 1–32.
Schweller, Randall, and William Wohlforth. “Power test: Evaluating 
realism in response to the end of the Cold War”. Security Studies 9, 
no. 3, 2000: 60–107.
Scoop Independent News. “Australia to Become America’s Peacekeeping 
Deputy”. 23 September 1999.
Senate Resolution 237. “Expressing the Sense of the Senate Regarding 
the Situation in Indonesia and East Timor”. Senate, 22 May 1998, 
Congressional Record Page S5459, http://etan.org/action/237sres.
htm.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
254
Severino, Rodolfo C. “Sovereignty, Intervention and the ASEAN 
Way”. Address given at the ASEAN Scholars’ Roundtable organised 
by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation and the Singapore Institute 




Severino, Rodolfo C. “ASEAN Beyond Forty: Towards Political and 
Economic Integration”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 29, no. 3, 2007: 
406–423.
Shari, Michael. “Commentary: For Suharto, A Most Dangerous 
Game”. Bloomberg Businessweek, 22 March 1998.
Sidell, Scott. “The United States and Genocide in East Timor”. Journal 
of Contemporary Asia 11, no. 1, 1981: 44–61.
Sim, Susan. “Jakarta Thanks KL for closing Timor Meet”. Straits Times, 
12 November 1996.
Simon, Sheldon. “The Superpowers in Southeast Asia: A Security 
Assessment”. In Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis, 
edited by Donald Weatherbee, 65–81. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
Simon, Sheldon. “The Two Southeast Asias and China: Security 
Perspectives”. Asian Survey 24, no. 5, 1984: 519–534.
Simpson, Bradley. “Denying the ‘First Right’: The United States, 
Indonesia, and the Ranking of Human Rights by the Carter 
Administration, 1976–1980”. The International History Review 31, 
no. 4, 2009: 798–826.
Simpson, Bradley. “Illegally and Beautifully: The United States, the 
Indonesian Invasion of East Timor and the International Community, 
1974–76”. Cold War History 5, no. 3, August 2005: 281–315.
Singh, Bilveer. “Reports on East Timor not yet neutral”. Jakarta Post, 
29 November 1994.
Southgate, Laura. “ASEAN and the Dynamics of Resistance to 
Sovereignty Violation: The Case of the Third Indochina War, 
1978–1991”. Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 2, no. 2, 
2015: 200–221.
Southgate, Laura and Nicholas Khoo. “Enter the Vanguard State: 
Reinterpreting ASEAN’s Response to the South China Sea Issue”. 
Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 3, no. 2, 2016: 221–244.
Stinchcombe, Arthur. Constructing Social Theories. New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World Inc., 1968.
255
REFERENCES
Storey, Ian. “Rising Tensions in the South China Sea: Southeast Asian 
Responses”. In The South China Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and 
Strategic Tensions, edited by Ian Storey and Lin Cheng-yi, 134–161. 
Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute, 2016.
Storey, Ian. “Japan’s maritime security interests in Southeast Asia 
and the South China Sea dispute”. Political Science 65, no. 2, 2013: 
135–156.
Storey, Ian. Southeast Asia and the Rise of China: The Search for Security. 
London: Routledge, 2011.
Storey, Ian. The United States and ASEAN-China Relations: All Quiet 
on the Southeast Asian Front. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies 
Institute, US Army War College, October 2007.
Storey, Ian, and Cheng-yi Lin. “Introduction”. In The South China 
Sea Dispute: Navigating Diplomatic and Strategic Tensions, edited by Ian 
Storey and Lin Cheng-yi, 1–21. Singapore: ISEAS – Yusof Ishak 
Institute, 2016.
Straits Times. “Philippines and Vietnam to be ‘strategic partners”. 
04 September 2015, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/philippines-
and-vietnam-to-be-strategic-partners.
Straits Times. “Human-rights issue ‘will not impair US-Indonesia 
ties’”. 04 March 1994.
Straits Times. “Ties with Jakarta on the mend, say US senators”. 
24 April 1992.
Sukma, Rizal. Indonesia and China: The Politics of a Troubled Relationship. 
London: Routledge, 1999.
Sutter, Robert, and Chin-hao Huang. “China-Southeast Asia 
Relations: China Gains and Advances in South China Sea”. 
Comparative Connections 14, no. 3, 2012: 1–9.
Suryodiningrat, Medyatama. “EU dodges East Timor issue in talks”. 
Jakarta Post, 14 February 1997.
Sutter, Robert, and Chin-hao Huang. “China-Southeast Asia 
Relations: China Gains and Advances in South China Sea”. 
Comparative Connections 14, no. 3, 2012: 69–77.
Swaine, Michael D. “China’s Assertive Behaviour. Part One: On 
Core Interests”. China Leadership Monitor, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 15 November 2010.
Sydney Morning Herald. “Jakarta’s bungled Timor diplomacy”. 10 June 
1994.
Taliaferro, Jeffrey. Balancing Risks: Great Power Intervention in the 
Periphery. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
Tan, Andrew TH. Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific: The United States’ 
“Second Front” in Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
256
Tan, See Seng. “Providers not Protectors: Institutionalising Responsible 
Sovereignty in Southeast Asia”. Asian Security 7, no. 3, 2011: 201–217.
Tang Siew Mun. “What is at stake for ASEAN?” ISEAS Yusof Ishak 
Institute: ASEAN Focus Special Issue on the South China Sea Arbitration, 
Responses and Implications, July 2016, 16, ISSN: 2424–8045, https://
iseas.edu.sg/images/pdf/ASEANFocusSChinaSeaArbitration.pdf.
Thayer, Carlyle A. “ASEAN, China and the Code of Conduct in 
the South China Sea”. SAIS Review of International Affairs 33, no. 2, 
2013: 75–84.
Thayer, Carlyle A. “Vietnam’s Defensive Diplomacy”. Wall Street 
Journal, 19 August 2010, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014
24052748703649004575438474083884494.
Thies, Cameron. “State Socialisation and Structural Realism”. Security 
Studies 19, no. 4, 2010: 689–717.
Torbati, Yeganeh. “US announces ramped-up military presence in 
Philippines”. Reuters, 14  April 2016, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-southchinasea-philippines-carter/u-s-announces-ramped-
up-military-presence-in-philippines-idUSKCN0XB0QY.
Turley, William, and Jeffrey Race. “The Third Indochina War”. Foreign 
Policy 38, Spring 1980: 92–116.
United Nations Charter. “Chapter I: Purposes and Principles”. Article 
2.
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations and 
Department of Field Support. “United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations: Principles and Guidelines”. Peacekeeping Best Practices 
Section, January 2008, 1–100.
United Nations General Assembly. “2005 World Summit Outcome”. 
Resolution A/60/L.1, 24 October 2005.
United Nations General Assembly. “Question of East Timor: Report 
of the Secretary General”. A/53/951, S/1999/513, 5 May 1999.
United Nations General Assembly. “Question of Timor”. Resolution 
3485, 12 December 1975.
United Nations General Assembly. “Declaration on Principles of 
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”. 
Resolution 2625, 24 October 1970.
United Nations Legislation and Treaties. Law of the Territorial Sea and 
the Contiguous Zone of 25 February 1992”. Article 2. http://www.
un.org/depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/
CHN_1992_Law.pdf.
United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1272 (1999),” 
Resolution S/RES/1272, 25 October 1999.
257
REFERENCES
United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1264 (1999)”. 
Resolution S/RES/1264, 15 September 1999.
United Nations Security Council. “Resolution 1246 (1999)”. 
Resolution S/RES/1246, 11 June 1999.
United Nations Security Council. “Resolutions on East Timor 
(1975–76)”. Resolution S/RES/389, 22 April 1976.
United Nations Security Council. “Resolutions on East Timor 
(1975–76)”. Resolution S/RES/384, 22 December 1975.
US Department of Defense. “Remarks by Secretary Mattis at 
Shangri-La Dialogue”. 03  June 2017, https://www.defense.gov/
News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1201780/remarks-by-
secretary-mattis-at-shangri-la-dialogue/.
US Department of State. Remarks on “America’s Indo-Pacific 
Economic Vision” by Michael Pompeo, Indo Pacific Business Forum, 
Washington DC, July 30, 2018, https://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2018/07/284722.htm.
US Department of State. “Readout of Secretary Mattis’ Meeting 
with Vietnamese Minister of National Defense Lich”. Release No. 




US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–
1980, Volume XIII, China, edited by David P Nickles. Washington: 
United States Government Printing Office, 2013.
US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1969–1976, Volume E-12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 
1973–1976, edited by Bradley Lynn Coleman, David Goldman and 
David Nickles. Washington: United States Government Printing 
Office, 2011.
US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–
1976, Volume XVIII, China 1973–1976, edited by David P Nickles. 
Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 2008.
US Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam. “US-Vietnam Joint Vision 
Statement”. 07  July 2015, https://vn.usembassy.gov/u-s-vietnam-
joint-vision-statement/.
US Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam. “Fact Sheet: US-Vietnam 
Comprehensive Partnership”. 16  December 2013, https://
vn.usembassy.gov/20131216factsheet-us-vietnam-comprehensive-
partnership/.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
258
US Embassy in the Philippines. “Signing of Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement”. 28 April 2014, https://ph.usembassy.gov/
signing-enhanced-defense-cooperation-agreement/.
Valencia, Mark J. China and the South China Sea Disputes. Adelphi 
Paper 298. Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995.
Van Evera, Stephen. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. 
London: Cornell University Press, 1997.
Vatikiotis, Michael RJ. Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and 
Fall of the New Order. 3rd ed. London: Routledge, 1998.
Viet Nam News. “Viet Nam, India hold strategic talks”. 25 October 
2017, http://vietnamnews.vn/politics-laws/416212/viet-nam-india-
hold-strategic-talks.html#4vmrZtxelGI35uu7.97.
Villamor, Felipe. “Philippines halts work in South China Sea, in a 
bid to appease Beijing”. The New York Times, 08 November 2017, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/08/world/asia/philippines-
south-china-sea.html.
Viviani, Nancy. “Australians and the Timor Issue”. Australian Journal 
of International Affairs 30, no. 2, 1976: 197–226.
Wain, Barry. “The US position in the South China Sea”. In Entering 
Unchartered Waters? ASEAN and the South China Sea, edited by Pavin 
Chachavalpongpun, 247–265. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2014.
Walt, Stephen. The Origins of Alliances. London: Cornell University 
Press, 1987.
Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics. New York: McGraw 
Hill, 1979.
Weatherbee, Donald E. International Relations in Southeast Asia: The 
Struggle for Autonomy. 2nd ed. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.
Weatherbee, Donald. “Southeast Asia and ASEAN: Running in Place”. 
Southeast Asian Affairs, 2012: 3–22.
Weatherbee, Donald. “The Diplomacy of Stalemate”. In Southeast Asia 
Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis, edited by Donald Weatherbee, 
1–31. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985.
Wee Sile, Aza. “China sends missiles to contested South China 
Sea”. CNBC News, 16  February 2016. https://www.cnbc.
com/2016/02/16/china-appears-to-have-deployed-missiles-on-
woody-island-in-south-china-sea-us.html.
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President 
Obama and President Quang of Vietnam in Joint Press Conference”. 





White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint Statement of the 
US-ASEAN Special Leaders’ Summit: Sunnylands Declaration”. 
16  February 2016, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2016/02/16/joint-statement-us-asean-special-leaders-
summit-sunnylands-declaration.
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President 
Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint 
Press Conference”. 28 April 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-
president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi.
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President 
Obama and President Truong Tan Sang of Vietnam after Bilateral 
Meeting”. 25 July 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2013/07/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-
truong-tan-sang-vietnam-after-bila.
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Joint statement by 
President Barack Obama of the United States of America and 
President Truong Tan Sang of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam”. 
25  July 2013, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-
office/2013/07/25/joint-statement-president-barack-obama-united-
states-america-and-preside.
White House Office of the Press Secretary. “Remarks by President 
Obama to the Australian Parliament”. Parliament House Canberra, 
Australia, November 17, 2011, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.
gov/the-press-office/2011/11/17/remarks-president-obama-
australian-parliament.
White, Hugh. “The Road to INTERFET: Reflections on Australian 
Strategic Decisions Concerning East Timor, December 1998–
September 1999”. Security Challenges 4, no. 1, Autumn 2008: 69–87.
Whiting, Allen. “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension”. 
Asian Survey 37, no. 4, April 1997: 299–322.
Whitlam, Gough. “Australia, Indonesia and Europe’s Empires”. 
Australian Outlook 34, no. 1, 1980: 3–12.
Wikileaks Cable. “Patriotic HCMC and Hanoi Rallies Nevertheless 
Challenge GVN Sense of Order”. The Wikileaks Public Library of US 
Diplomacy. 21  December 2007, 07HOCHIMINHCITY1266_a. 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/07HOCHIMINHCITY1266_a.
html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Sino-Vietnam Territorial Dispute Entangles 
Multiple Multinational Energy Firms”. Wikileaks Public Library of US 
Diplomacy, 07 September 2007, 07HANOI1599_a, https://wikileaks.
org/plusd/cables/07HANOI1599_a.html.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
260
Wikileaks Cable. “Latest Round of China-Vietnam Border Talks 
Break Down”. The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy. 
26  January 2007, 07BEIJING598_a, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/07BEIJING598_a.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Timor”. The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 
28  January 1976, 1976CANBER00646_b, https://wikileaks.org/
plusd/cables/1976CANBER00646_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “ASEAN: Singapore/Indonesian Relations”. 
The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 06  January 1976, 
1976SINGAP00046_b, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1976SINGAP00046_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Relations between Singapore and Indonesia”. 
The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 29 December 1975, 
1975JAKART15794_b, https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1975JAKART15794_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Malaysian Government Backs Indonesia on 
Timor”. The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 22 December 
1975, 1975KUALA07442_b, http://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1975KUALA07442_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Razak Visit”. The Wikileaks Public Library of US 
Diplomacy, 23 October 1975, 1975CANBER07142_b, https://search.
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975CANBER07142_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “PRC’s Emerging Policy in Southeast Asia”. 
The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 15  October 
1975, 1975HONGK12216_b, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1975HONGK12216_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Rajaratnam’s Talks with FRG Foreign Minister”. 
The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 10  October 
1975, 1975STATE242323_b, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1975STATE242323_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Thai FonMin Chartchai’s Talks with Miki and 
Miyazawa”. The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 07 October 
1975, 1975TOKYO14290_b, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1975TOKYO14290_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “PM says no need for Malaysian troops in Timor; 
Brunei People’s Party denounces Singapore”. The Wikileaks Public 
Library of US Diplomacy, 04 September 1975, 1975KUALA05302_b, 
https://search.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975KUALA05302_b.
html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Visit of Thai FonMin Chatchi”. The Wikileaks Public 




Wikileaks Cable. “GOM Recognises PRG”. The Wikileaks Public 
Library of US Diplomacy, 03 May 1975, 1975KUALA02386_b, https://
wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975KUALA02386_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Lee Kuan Yew Visits Thailand”. The Wikileaks Public 
Library of US Diplomacy, 25 April 1975, 1975BANGKO07412_b, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975BANGKO07412_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “GOI Views on Cambodia and Vietnam”. The Wikileaks 
Public Library of US Diplomacy, 11 April 1975, 1975JAKART04295_b, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975JAKART04295_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “General Brown Meeting with General 
Panggabean”. The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 08 April 
1975, 1975JAKART04135_b, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1975JAKART04135_b.html.
Wikileaks Cable. “US Views on Portuguese Timor”. The Wikileaks 
Public Library of US Diplomacy, 06 March 1975, 1975JAKART02814_b, 
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1975JAKART02814_b.
html.
Wikileaks Cable. “Meeting with Thai Foreign Minister Charunphan”. 
The Wikileaks Public Library of US Diplomacy, 08  January 1975, 
1975BANGKO00355_b, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/
cables/1975BANGKO00355_b.html.
Wolfers, Arnold. “National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol”. 
Political Science Quarterly 67, no. 4, 1952: 481–502.
Wong, Edward. “China Hedges Over Whether South China Sea Is a 
‘Core Interest’ Worth War”. New York Times, 30 March 2011, http://
www.nytimes.com/2011/03/31/world/asia/31beijing.html.
Xinhua News Agency. “ASEAN wants peaceful settlement of E.Timor 
issue”. 12 April 1999.
Xinhua News Agency. “Ramos defends Manila’s action on East Timor 
conference”. 25 May 1994.
Xinhua News Agency. “Indonesia has sovereignty over East Timor –
Ramos”. 11 May 1994.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1990, Volume 44. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1990.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1989, Volume 43. The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1989.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1985, Volume 39. Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1985.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1984, Volume 38. New York: Office of 
Public Information United Nations, 1984.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1983, Volume 37. New York: Office of 
Public Information United Nations, 1983.
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
262
Yearbook of the United Nations 1982, Volume 36. New York: Office of 
Public Information United Nations, 1982.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1981, Volume 35. New York: Office of 
Public Information United Nations, 1981.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1979, Volume 33. New York: Office of 
Public Information United Nations, 1979.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1976, Volume 30. New York: Office of 
Public Information United Nations, 1976.
Yearbook of the United Nations 1975, Volume 29. New York: Office of 
Public Information United Nations, 1975.
Yeo, Andrew. Activists, Alliances, and Anti-US Base Protests. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2011.
Yue, Chia Siow. “The Asian Financial Crisis: Singapore’s Experience 
and Response”. ASEAN Economic Bulletin 15, no. 3, 1998: 297–308.
Zakaria, Fareed. From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s 
World Role. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
Zhang, Xiaoming. “China’s 1979 War with Vietnam: A Reassessment”. 




Aceh   45, 129
Acharya, Amitav   3–4, 5–6, 58, 103, 
150, 194, 214, 215, 226–7
actor, ASEAN as   16–17, 102, 224
AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area)   55
Alatas, Ali   48, 124, 125, 133, 135
alliances   2, 15, 71, 72, 77, 78, 102, 
219, 222
Aneja, Urvashi   6
Annan, Kofi   136
APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation)   125, 130, 135, 140, 
142, 181, 188, 189
Apodeti (Timorese Popular Democratic 
Association)   28, 29, 31, 46, 47
Aquino III, Benigno   176, 178, 180, 
181
arbitration tribunals   176–7
ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum)   xiv, 
6, 172, 194, 195, 215, 227
Armacost, Michael   51
arms supplies
East Timor invasion   30, 32–3
to Indonesia   50–1, 121, 141
to the Philippines   185
to Thailand   92, 95
to Vietnam   181
ASA (Association of Southeast Asia)   
xi, xii
ASEAN Summits   181–2, 184, 186, 
189
ASEAN Way   xiii, xv, 58, 151
ASEAN-China Free Trade Area   170
Asia- Pacific Conference on East Timor 
125
Asian financial crisis (1997)   xv, 117, 
118, 126–9, 130, 148–9, 153, 220, 
222
Asian Strategy and Leadership Institute   
189
Asia-Pacific Coalition for East Timor 
(APCET)   124
Australia
air bases   92
and ASEAN   152
East Timor humanitarian crisis   117, 
120, 140–5, 147, 220, 222
East Timor invasion   25, 26, 30, 33, 
46, 57, 224
and Indonesia   38–44, 52–4, 57, 
118–19, 122–3, 126, 131–4, 138, 
141, 144, 147–9, 220
seabed border agreements   31, 39
South China Sea Dispute   190, 193
autonomy
constructivist theory   xvii, 1, 2, 6, 
103, 194, 214, 215
East Timor humanitarian crisis   117, 
118, 131, 132–6, 149–50
and power   16
realist theory   xvii, 7, 194–5, 215–18, 
221
South China Sea Dispute   163
and sovereignty   19
Third Indochina War   102–3, 105
vanguard state theory   222–3
B
Ba, Alice   4, 58, 103, 150, 193, 194, 
214
Baba, Ghafar   78
Baja Jr, Lauro   168
BAKIN Badan Koordinasi Intelijens 
Negara (State Intelligence 
Coordinating Body)   33
Balakrishnan, Vivian   190
balance of power politics   6–7, 15, 105, 
167, 180, 192, 222, 223
Bali Summit (1976)   55
Balibó Declaration   47–8
Bangkok Declaration (1967)   xiii, xv
Barry, Robert   121, 147
Beeson, Mark   192
Bellamy, Alex J.   226–7
Belo, Carlos Felipe Ximenes   120, 124, 
129
Betts, Alexander   4–5, 6
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
264
Bian Kie, Lim   43, 54
bilateral agreements   15, 122, 169, 180, 
184, 188
Blair, Dennis   140
Boren, David   121
boycotts   55, 141, 223–4
British colonialism   xii
Brown, Harold   75, 88
Brunei   xi, 46, 55, 60, 163, 193
Brzezinski, Zbigniew   75, 93
C
Cambodia
Cambodia conflict (Third Indochina 
War)   2, 71–116, 214–15, 216, 219, 
222, 224
and China   77, 84, 98, 174, 184
communism   27, 73
critical theoretical scholarship   219
and Indonesia   98–100, 135
joining ASEAN   xi, xiv, 225
South China Sea Dispute   174, 184
and Thailand   3, 82–3
and Vietnam   73–4, 84–5, 86–7
Capie, David   227
capitalist social order   105, 106
Carter, Ashton   179
Carter, Jimmy   51–2, 71, 87–8, 93, 95
case study methodology   17–20, 213
Cayetano, Alan Peter   187
Charunphan Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya   
77
Chatchai Chunawan   77, 78, 79
China
alliances with   2
and ASEAN   xiv, 2, 81–3, 90–1, 94, 
170, 194, 215, 217, 220
and Cambodia   77, 84, 98, 174, 184
Cold War   xii
East Timor   30, 45, 50
as extra-regional power   6–7
and Indonesia   37, 81–2, 128
and the Khmer Rouge   84
and the Philippines   81, 167–8, 173, 
176–92, 223
South China Sea Dispute   163–211
and the Soviet Union   75, 80, 81, 87, 
100–1
and Thailand   71, 81, 82, 85, 91, 93, 
94, 95, 99, 217
Third Indochina War   7, 71, 103–4, 
216, 219, 222
and the UN   96
and the US   75, 81, 166, 171–2, 175, 
178–9, 188–9, 192, 193, 216, 224
US-Indonesian Consultative 
Commission   37
and Vietnam   7, 72–5, 79, 81, 87–91, 
93, 95, 99, 101, 170–1, 178–9, 181, 
186–8, 190–1, 217, 223
China-Vietnamese Border War of 1979   
72
civil war   31–3, 43, 86
Clinton, Bill   121, 122, 131, 140, 142, 
224
Clinton, Hillary   172
coalitions of the willing   142
code of conduct   168–70, 189–90
coercive power dynamics   2, 15–16, 
118, 147–8, 152, 170–1, 188, 190, 
223–4
cohesion norms   xx, 17, 44–7, 214–15
East Timor humanitarian crisis   118, 
134–5, 151
East Timor invasion   44–7
South China Sea Dispute   164, 178
Third Indochina War   90–1, 102–6
Cold War
and ASEAN’s origins   xi–xiv
Australia   38
East Timor   25–70
Indonesia   27–31
colonial era   xii
Comecon   85
common threat consensus   76, 224
Commonwealth   46
communism
Cambodia   83–4
East Timor invasion   27, 32, 34, 35, 
59–60
fears over expansion of   xii, 29–30, 
59–60
Indonesia   81
Vietnam   29–30, 73, 85
Communist Party of Kampuchea 
(CPK)   83
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT)   
85
conflict avoidance   7, 104, 216
consensus-based decision making   xiii, 
xv, 2, 7, 9, 16, 77, 103–4, 151, 164, 
216
constructive realism   11
constructivist scholarship   xvii, 1–6, 
11, 214–15
East Timor humanitarian crisis   150
East Timor invasion   58
South China Sea Dispute   193–4
Third Indochina War   103
containment policies   2, 82, 85
cooperative norms   2, 9, 13–14
Cotton, James   30
counterinsurgency   51, 52, 92
covariation   18
Crawford, Timothy   13, 15, 102, 221
265
INDEX
critical theoretical scholarship   xvii, 
8–10, 59, 105–6, 152–3, 218–20
D
Dai Bingguo   172
De Castro, Cruz   173, 183, 191–2
de Venecia, Jose   125
Declaration of the Conduct of Parties 
in the South China Sea (DOC)   
169–70, 174, 191
Declaration of the Formation of 
the Coalition Government of 
Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK)   
98
decolonization   25, 28–9, 35, 49, 59, 
218
Democratic Kampuchea   74, 82, 86, 
87, 96
Deng Xiaoping   71, 75, 81, 82, 85, 
87–8, 93, 94, 95, 96
Dibb, Paul   133
Dili coup, East Timor   32–3, 41, 123
Dim Syamsudin   128
diplomacy
large power diplomacy   5, 95, 
96–101
South China Sea Dispute   173, 176, 
180, 194
Third Indochina War   79, 82, 85, 89
vanguard state theory   15, 223
disinformation   32
do Amaral, Xavier   50
domino effect   34, 79, 93, 95, 128
Downer, Alexander   132, 133, 134, 
142
Drummond, Catherine   227
Dunn, James   42, 48
Dutch colonialism   xii
Duterte, Rodrigo   182–4, 185–6, 187, 
188, 190, 191, 192
E
East Asia Summit (EAS)   170, 188, 189
East Timor
constructivist scholarship   58, 150
humanitarian crisis   117–62, 215, 
217, 219–20, 222–3
invasion   2, 25–70, 214, 216, 218
realist theory   59, 151–2
selection as a case study   18, 19
vanguard state theory   221–2
economic aid
to Cambodia   84, 184
to Indonesia   34–5, 142, 149, 220
as strategy by external powers   224
to Vietnam   85, 101
Elman, Colin   11
empirical evidence base   18
Enhanced Defense Cooperation 
Agreement (EDCA)   179–80
European Union   125–6, 141
Evans, Gareth   122
expansionist aims
China   81, 164, 166, 171, 174, 176, 
188, 189, 191
Indonesia   30–1, 57, 60, 216, 218
Soviet Union   34, 72, 75, 76, 80, 84
Vietnam   xiv, 78, 83, 84, 93, 105–6, 
222
F
FALINTIL (National Liberation Armed 
Forces of East Timor)   33, 48, 119, 
138
Federation of Malaysia   xii
Five-Power Agreement   46
food shortages   127–8
forced resettlements   45, 84
Ford, Gerald   34, 37–8, 50–1, 219
Foreign Ministers (ASEAN)   89, 97, 
98, 145, 169, 184, 186, 190
Fraser, Don   51
Fraser, Malcolm   42–4, 52, 54
Freedom of Navigation (FON) 
operations   179
free-trade agreements   128, 170, 175, 
188
French colonialism   xii
FRETILIN (Revolutionary Front 
for an Independent East Timor)   
28–34, 41, 45, 47–50, 52–3, 56, 60, 
119, 216
Frey, Frederick   17
FUNSK (Kampuchean United Front 
for National Salvation)   86, 87
G
Gerard, Kelly   8
Glas, Aarie   2–3
Goh Chok Tong   135, 143
Gorbachev, Mikhail   100
Grieco, Joseph   10, 11
Gruber, Lloyd   3
GRUNK (Royal Government of 
National Union of Kampuchea)   74
guerrilla warfare   48, 52, 81, 93
Gupta, Sourabh   189
H
Haacke, Jürgen   4, 58, 104, 150–1, 
193, 194, 214
Habib, Philip   36, 45, 51, 76
Habibie, Bacharuddin Jusuf   129, 
130–1, 132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 
138, 139, 141–2, 144, 145, 147
habits of peace   2–3
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
266
Handel, Michael   13
Hayton, Bill   166, 186
hegemonic power   31, 72, 75, 81, 102
Heng Samrin   86, 87, 96, 97
Heydarian, Richard Javad   192
history of ASEAN   xi–xx, 44
Hong Kong   130
Hong Lei   177
Hor Nam Hong   174
Howard, John   131, 133–4, 137, 139, 
141, 143, 144
Howard Doctrine   143, 144
Hua, Huang   75, 93, 95
human rights
Cambodia   96
conference   124
contraventions in East Timor   48, 52
East Timor   118, 120, 121, 131
and the future of ASEAN   225–8
Philippines   183
humanitarian crisis, East Timor   
117–62
humanitarian principles, shift towards   
225–8
Hun Sen   184
I
identity, and the making of security 
communities   3–4
India   193, 195, 225
Indochinese Federation   73, 87
Indonesia
and ASEAN   16, 123–6, 134–5
Asian financial crisis (1997)   118, 
127–9
and Australia   38–44, 52–4, 57, 
118–19, 122–3, 126, 131–4, 138, 
141, 144, 147–9, 220
British colonialism   xii
and Cambodia   98–100, 135
and China   37, 81–2, 128
Cold War   27–31
communism   81
Dutch colonialism   xii
East Timor humanitarian crisis   
117–62, 222
East Timor invasion   7, 25–70, 216, 
218, 221–2
expansionist aims   30–1, 57, 60, 216, 
218
integration into the region   xiv
and INTERFET   144–5
joining ASEAN   xi
and Malaysia   xiii, 44, 46, 58–9, 125
post-Cold War   119–21
readying for war   92
and Singapore   xiii, 55, 135
small annexations   45
and Thailand   xiii, 95, 124–5
and the US   27, 31, 34–8, 48–54, 76, 
118, 119, 121, 126, 129–31, 147–9
as vanguard state   25–6, 33–44, 57, 
117–18, 148, 221–2, 223, 224
and Vietnam   76–7, 78, 90, 99
Indo-Pacific Business Forum   188
informal alliances   71, 72, 78, 219, 222
informal decision-making   xiii, 2
institutionalization processes   5
institutions
ASEAN institutional cohesion   44–7, 
134–5
as venues for cooperation   2
Westphalian model of sovereignty   
12, 16, 225, 227–8
intelligence gathering   15, 32, 138
interest convergence
East Timor humanitarian crisis   118, 
121–6
East Timor invasion   26, 57, 60
as independent variable   11–15
partial interest convergence   xx, 
13–14, 19, 164, 174–82, 192
South China Sea Dispute   164–5, 
166–74, 191–3
Third Indochina War   71, 102
and vanguard state theory   221–3, 
224
INTERFET (International Force for 
East Timor)   142–3, 144–5, 146–8, 
150–1, 152, 220, 222
International Conference on 
Kampuchea   96–7
international law   49, 57, 179, 181
International Monetary Fund (IMF)   
127, 128, 130, 132, 142, 220
International Relations   8, 213
International Stabilisation Forces (ISF)   
146
intra-ASEAN power dynamics   16, 
76–9, 90–2, 191
J
Jakarta Informal Meetings(JIM)   
99–100
Japan   xii, 78, 130, 144, 175, 190, 193, 
195, 225
Job, Brian L.   6
Joint Communiqués   56, 57, 77, 145, 
174, 184, 194, 216
Joint Marine Seismic Undertaking 
(JMSU)   170, 173
Joint Vision Statements   180–1
Jones, David M   6–7, 13, 58, 59, 
104–5, 151–2, 194–5, 216, 217




journalists   119, 120
Juddery, Bruce   41
K
Kaplan, Robert D   166, 189
Keating, Paul   122
Khieu Samphan   97, 98, 99
Khmer Rouge   27, 71, 74, 83, 84–5, 
86, 93, 94, 97, 98, 99, 222
Khoo, Nicholas   2, 194
Khukrit Pramot   79
Kiernan, Ben   30, 48
Kingsbury, Damien   120
Kissinger, Henry   34, 36, 37, 45, 50–1, 
75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 82
Koh, Tommy   188–9
Konfrontasi   xiii, 44
Kopassus military units   122–3, 132
Kopsak Chutikul   135
KPNLF (Khmer People’s National 
Liberation Front)   97, 99
Krasner, Stephen   12, 16, 147–8
Kriangsak Chamanan   85, 91, 93
Kuala Lumpur Declaration   80
Kuantan principle   98–9
L
Lao People’s Democratic Republic   
100
Laos
and China   77
communism   27, 73
joining ASEAN   xi, xiv, 225
and Vietnam   73
Larson, Charles   168
Le Hai Binh   177
Le Thi Thu Hang   187
Lee Hsien Loong   182, 189
Lee Kuan Yew   xi, 46, 56, 78, 79, 81, 
82, 143
Leekpai, Chuan   125
Leifer, Michael   xiv, 6, 7, 13, 28, 
58, 59, 104–5, 151, 167, 194–5, 
215–16, 217, 219
liberation movements   86
Lim Bian Kie   43, 54
Lim King Siang   144
localized sovereignty   227
Lon Nol, General   73–4
M
Macau   30
Mahathir, Prime Minister   143–4, 145, 
227
Malaya   xii
Malaysia
Asian financial crisis (1997)   130
and Brunei   46
and China   81, 92, 168
East Timor humanitarian crisis   
143–4, 145
East Timor invasion   45–7, 56, 60
formation of Federation   xii
and Indonesia   xiii, 44, 46, 58–9, 125
joining ASEAN   xi
readying for war   92
South China Sea Dispute   163, 165, 
169, 193
and the Soviet Union   80
and Thailand   95
Third Indochina War   89
and the US   76
and Vietnam   76, 78, 99
Malik, Adam   28, 33, 36, 47, 53, 76
Manglapus, Raul   124
Mann, Michael   16
Mansfield, Edward D.   3
Marcos, President   79
massacres   48, 84, 119–20, 136
materialist state theory   8
Mattis, Jim   185, 187
McCredie, John   30, 39
Mearsheimer, John   4, 13
Mekong hydroelectic scheme   79
Merom, Gil   10, 11
military aid
in Cambodia   84, 98
East Timor invasion   34–5, 36, 37, 
50–1, 52
to Indonesia   121, 122–3
to the Philippines   193
to Thailand   92, 94–5
to Vietnam   71, 73, 84, 85, 101
Vietnam War   76
 see also arms supplies
military bases   39, 76, 79, 180, 186
military coups
Cambodia   73–4, 86
East Timor   32, 41
Indonesia   27
militia violence   137–9, 143
Mill, John Stuart   226
Ministerial Meetings   56–7, 77, 89, 
173–4, 216
Mischief Reef   163, 166, 174
Moerdani, General   30, 43
Mondale, Walter   52, 94, 95
Morgenthau, Hans   12–13
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)   
45
Moynihan, Daniel Patrick   50
multilateral initiatives   170, 175, 178, 
184, 188–9, 193, 194, 215
multinational companies   170–1
multinational forces   139–40, 142, 145
Murdani, General   36
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
268
Murtopo, General Ali   32, 41, 54
Myanmar   xi, xiv, 225
N
Narine, Shaun   xii
National United Front for an 
Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and 
Co-operative Cambodia   97, 99
neorealism   4, 8, 10, 11
neo-Weberian views of the state   8
New Zealand   25, 78
Newsom, US Ambassador   36, 51
Ngo Xuan Lich   187
NGOs (non-governmental 
organisations)   125
Ninth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in 
Manila (1976)   56, 57
Nixon, Richard   38, 75
non-interference principle
critical theoretical scholarship   8, 
152–3
East Timor humanitarian crisis   150, 
215
East Timor invasion   58, 214
and humanitarian principles   226
realist theory   151
South China Sea Dispute   195–6
and sovereignty   xvi, 2, 3, 16, 227
technology of power mechanisms   
218
Third Indochina War   102–6
non-statist approaches   xvii, 218, 220
norms, as independent variables   3–6, 
58, 214
North Korea   188
Norway   86, 124
O
Oakley, Robert   52
Obama, Barack   164, 171–2, 175, 178, 
180–2, 185, 187
Oh Ei Sun   189
oil/gas reserves   31, 39, 46, 57, 120, 
165–6, 170, 186, 187
Operasi Komodo   32
Orchard, Phil   4–5
P
Pacific War   xii
Panetta, Leon   175
Panggabean, General Maraden   78
Paracel Islands   163, 165, 171, 185–6
Paris Peace negotiations   76
partial interest convergence   xx, 13–14, 
19, 164, 174–82, 192
Patani United Liberation Organization 
(PULO)   45
Pathet Lao   27
peacekeeping   97, 117, 118, 137, 139, 
140, 141–2, 146–8, 149
Peacock, Andrew   42–3, 53–4
Pell, Claiborne   121
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)   88, 
93
Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA)   
176–7, 183–4
Pham Van Dong   79, 87
Phan Hien   79–80
Phay Siphan   184
Philippines
and China   81, 167–8, 173, 176–92, 
223
and East Timor   45, 145, 153
independence movements   45
and Indonesia   xiii, 124, 135, 153
intra-ASEAN power dynamics   16
and Japan   193
joining ASEAN   xi
readying for war   92
South China Sea Dispute   163–211
and the Soviet Union   80
and the US   76, 79, 168, 173–80, 
182–5, 187–8, 190–2, 195, 218, 223
as vanguard state   164, 181, 191–3, 
223, 224
and Vietnam   77, 79, 90, 181
Pol Pot   74, 83–4, 85, 86, 91, 96
Pompeo, Mike   188
Portugal   28, 32, 33, 47, 49, 86, 123, 
136
power
and autonomy   16
balance of power politics   6–7, 15, 
105, 167, 180, 192, 222, 223
coercive power dynamics   2, 15–16, 
118, 147–8, 152, 170–1, 188, 190, 
223–4
countervailing power   95
hegemonic power   31, 72, 75, 81, 
102
and institutions   3
intra-ASEAN power dynamics   16, 
76–9, 90–2, 191
mutually reinforced by cooperation   
3
relative power   15
and sovereignty   16
technology of power mechanisms   8, 
218
power-maximizing behaviour   15, 57
Prasong Soonsiri   125
Prem Tinsulanond   94, 99
Press, Daryl   13, 15, 102, 221
Priess, David   3
process-tracing methodology   18
propaganda   32, 47, 56




Quang, President   181
R
Ramos, Fidel   124
Ramos-Horta, José   31, 49, 120, 124, 
125
Razak, Tun   46, 47
realist theory   xvii, xviii, 3, 6–7, 9, 
10–11, 12, 15, 213, 215–18
East Timor humanitarian crisis   
151–2
East Timor invasion   59
South China Sea Dispute   194–5
Third Indochina War   102, 104–6
refugees   79, 91, 92, 96
regional autonomy, norm of   xvii, 2, 
6, 19, 103, 105, 149, 150, 194, 195, 
215
‘regional solutions for regional 
problems’   6, 100, 150, 194–5, 216
relative power   15
responsibility to protect (R2P)   xx, 
225–8
retrenchment policies   xiii, 26, 58, 75, 
76, 81, 83, 219
Reyes, Angelo   168
Rithauddeen, Tengku Ahmad   89–90
Rüland, Jürgen   16
Russia   182, 185
 see also Soviet Union
S
Sabah   xii
Santa Cruz massacre   120, 123, 129, 
141
Sarawak   xii
Sary, Ieng   82, 86, 91
Scarborough Shoal   173, 174, 176, 
177, 179, 183
Schlesinger, James   81
Schweller, Randall   3
seabed border agreements   31, 39
SEANET (Southeast Asian Human 
Rights Network)   124–5
SEANWFZ (Southeast Asian Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zone)   169
secessionism   45
secondary interests   13
security concerns
about China   85
after invasion of Cambodia   92
Australian   38
critical theoretical scholarship   219
in East Timor   29
as reason for establishment of ASEAN  
xiii, xv
Third Indochina War   106, 214–15
Vietnam   85
security-maximizing behaviour   15
See Seng Tan   226
self-defence   50, 88
self-determination   26, 35, 40, 41, 49, 
53, 122, 132, 134, 144, 149
self-help principle   15
Severino Jr, Rodolfo   134, 227
Sheridan, Greg   123
Shesterinina, Anastasia   6
Sihanouk, Prince   74, 83, 97, 98, 
99–100
silent partner approaches   35–7
Singapore
and Cambodia   96, 100
and China   81, 91, 168
and East Timor   46, 54–6, 143, 145, 
153
and the Federation of Malaysia   xii, 
xiii
and Indonesia   xiii, 55, 135
joining ASEAN   xi
South China Sea Dispute   178
and the Soviet Union   81
and the US   76, 175, 188–9
and Vietnam   76
Sino-Vietnamese border war   88
Smith, Michael LR   6–7, 13, 58, 59, 
104–5, 151–2, 216, 217
Smyser, WR   35–6
social conflict theory   8, 105
social forces   xvii, 1, 8–10, 11, 195, 
218
social order   8, 59, 105, 106, 218
socialization effects   2, 4
Son Sann   97, 98, 99
South China Sea Dispute   163–211
constructivist scholarship   193–4, 215
critical theoretical scholarship   220
realist theory   194–5, 217–18
selection as a case study   18, 19
vanguard state theory   223
South Korea   130
Southeast Asia Command (SEAC)   xii
Southeast Asian Treaty Organization 
(SEATO)   xii
sovereignty
in ASEAN Treaty   xvi
and power   16
as technology of power   9
as vital interest   13
Westphalian model of   12, 16, 225, 
227–8
Soviet Pacific Fleet   92
Soviet Union
and Cambodia   74–81, 87
and China   75, 80, 81, 87, 100–1
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
270
Cold War   xii
collective security ideas   80
East Timor   30, 45
expansionist aims   34, 72
and Malaysia   80
and the Philippines   80
and Singapore   81
Third Indochina War   71, 103–4, 
105–6
and the US   80
US-Indonesian Consultative 
Commission   37
and Vietnam   71, 73, 74–5, 85, 90, 
99, 100–1, 219
special relationships   73
Spratly Islands   165, 167–8, 171, 177, 
186, 194
Stahl, Max   120
state, role in the international system   9
state interest   13
state of emergency   119
states
critical theoretical scholarship   8
power   16
state-centric realist paradigm   12
as unified, rational actors   12
vanguard state theory   xviii–xix, 
10–16, 213, 218, 221–8
Stinchcombe, Arthur   18
Storey, Ian   190, 193
strategic shields   38
student-led demonstrations   128, 129, 
171
Suharto, General   xiii, 27, 28, 29, 32, 
34, 35, 36, 37–8, 41, 43, 44, 47, 52, 
55, 58, 59, 60, 99, 100, 117, 119, 
121, 127, 128, 130, 131, 151, 152, 
218, 219, 220, 222
Sukarno, General   xiii, 27, 44, 60
Sukarnoputri, Megawati   138
Supreme National Council   101
Suratman, Tono   138
Surin Pitsuwan   135
survival, as basic state interest   13, 15, 
221
T
Taiwan   163, 165, 167
Tan, See Seng   226
Tan Boon Seng   55
Tang Siew Mun   178
technology of power mechanisms   8, 
218
territorialization   10
Thailand
Asian financial crisis (1997)   126–7
and Cambodia   3, 82–3
and China   71, 81, 82, 85, 91, 93, 
94, 95, 99, 217
colonial era   xii
and East Timor   145
independence movements   45
and Indonesia   xiii, 95, 124–5
joining ASEAN   xi
and Malaysia   95
neutrality   91
and the Soviet Union   80
Third Indochina War   7, 71, 89, 219, 
222
and the US   71, 95, 175
as vanguard state   72, 89–95, 101–2, 
104, 217, 222, 223
and Vietnam   71, 77–8, 79, 91, 93, 
94, 95, 98–9
Vietnam War   76
Thayer, Carlyle   174
Third Indochina War   71–116, 214–15
constructivist scholarship   103
critical theoretical scholarship   219
realist theory   7, 102, 104–6, 216
selection as a case study   18, 19
vanguard state theory   222, 224
threat perceptions   15
Timor Gap   31, 39, 57, 120, 147
Timor-Leste   146
Tjan, Harry   43
TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership)   175, 
188
Treaties of Friendship   73, 85, 87
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation 
(TAC, 1976)   xvi
Trump, Donald   185, 186, 187–9, 191, 
192
Truong Tan Seng   180
Truong Trieu Duong   181
U
UDT (Timorese Democratic Union)   
28, 29, 31, 32–3, 47
UK (United Kingdom)   xii, 25, 86, 
141
UN (United Nations)
Cambodia   97–8
Charter   xiii, xvi
Credentials Committee   96
diplomacy   89, 96
East Timor   47, 49–50, 117, 136–7
General Assembly   89–90, 98, 136, 
226
General Assembly Resolution 35/6   
96, 97
General Assembly Resolution 3485   
25, 49, 52–3, 54–5
International Conferences   94, 96
271
INDEX
peacekeeping   97, 117, 118, 142, 
146–8, 149
Secretary General   91, 136, 139, 141, 
142, 145
Security Council   3, 49, 51, 86–7, 
89, 101, 136, 142
Security Council Resolution 384   
49, 56
Security Council Resolution 1264   
142
Special Representatives   50
Third Indochina War   72
UNAMET (United Nations Mission 
in East Timor)   137, 138–9, 142, 
143
UNCLOS (Convention on the Law 
of the Sea)   165, 176
UNMISET (UN Mission of Support 
in East Timor)   146
UNTAET (United Nations 
Transitional Administration in East 
Timor)   146
United Malays National Organisation 
(UMNO)   125
US (United States)
and ASEAN   152, 174–82, 190, 224
Asian financial crisis (1997)   126
and Cambodia   74, 86, 87–8, 93–4
and China   75, 81, 166, 171–2, 175, 
178–9, 188–9, 192, 193, 216, 224
Cold War   xii
East Timor humanitarian crisis   117, 
137, 139–42, 147, 220, 222
East Timor invasion   25, 26, 50–1, 
57, 58, 59, 216, 219
free and open Indo-Pacific strategy   
188–9
and Indonesia   27, 31, 34–8, 48–54, 
76, 118, 119, 121, 126, 129–31, 
147–9
and Malaysia   76
and the Philippines   76, 79, 168, 
173–80, 182–5, 187–8, 190–2, 195, 
218, 223
pivot to Asia   164, 165, 175–6
realist theory   6–7
and Singapore   76, 175, 188–9
South China Sea Dispute   163–4, 
166, 167, 168, 174–91, 192, 195, 
215
and the Soviet Union   80
and Thailand   71, 95, 175
Third Indochina War   71
and Vietnam   45, 74–5, 174, 175–6, 
178, 180–1, 192, 195, 218, 223
US Interagency Intelligence 
Memorandum   84
US-Indonesian Consultative 
Commission   37
V
Van Evera, Stephen   18
Vance, Cyrus   52, 75
vanguard state theory   xviii–xix, 
10–16, 213, 218, 221–8
variables, continuous   13
variables, dependent and independent   
11–12
Vietnam
and Cambodia   73–4, 84–5, 86–7
and China   7, 72–5, 79, 81, 87–91, 
93, 95, 99, 101, 170–1, 178–9, 181, 
186–8, 190–1, 217, 223
Cold War   xii
communism   27, 45, 73
diplomatic relations with ASEAN 
states   79
French colonialism   xii
and India   193
and Indonesia   76–7, 78, 90, 99
intra-ASEAN power dynamics   16
joining ASEAN   xi, xiv, 225
and Malaysia   76, 78, 99
and Philippines   77, 79, 90, 181
and Singapore   76
South China Sea Dispute   163–211
and the Soviet Union   71, 73, 74–5, 
85, 90, 99, 100–1, 219
Third Indochina War   71–116, 219
and the US   45, 74–5, 174, 175–6, 
178, 180–1, 192, 195, 218, 223
as vanguard state   164, 181, 191–3, 
223, 224
Vietnam War   74, 75–7, 85
vital interests   13, 15, 31, 102, 221
voice opportunities thesis   10, 11
W
Walt, Stephen   102
Waltz, Kenneth   4, 13
watershed treaty   123, 141
Weatherbee, Donald   xv
West New Guinea   31
West Papua   45, 129
West Timor   28, 33, 40
Westphalian model of sovereignty   12, 
16, 225, 227–8
White, Hugh   132, 141, 142–3
Whitehouse, Charles   82
Whitlam, Gough   29, 39–42, 46, 53
Willesee, Don   39
Winspeare Guicciardi, Vittorio   50, 53
Wiranto, General   128, 135, 140, 142
Wolff, Lester   51–2
ASEAN RESISTANCE TO SOVEREIGNTY VIOLATION
272
Woolcott, Richard   38, 41, 122, 123, 
133
World Bank   127, 140, 142
World Trade Organisation   130
X
Xi Jinping   163, 187, 189
Xiu Dong Jia   171
Y
Yang Jiechi   172
Yasay Jr, Perfecto   183
Yeo, George   172
Yothin Mattayomnan   125
Z
ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom 




















































“An original argument, based on vanguard state 
theory… A very original and superb piece of 
scholarship.” 
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responded to external threats over 
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face of potential sovereignty violation.
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of previously unanalysed material, 
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examine four key cases since 1975. 
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and the role of external powers, 
the author develops the ‘vanguard 
state theory’ to explain ASEAN state 
responses to sovereignty violation, 
which, it is argued, has universal 
applicability and explanatory power.
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